

# **DESPERATELY SEEKING DEPTH:**

Global and local narratives of the South African general elections  
on television news, 1994 – 2014

By Bernadine Jones

Thesis presented for the Degree of

**DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY**

at the Centre for Film and Media Studies

**UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN**

August 2017

The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No quotation from it or information derived from it is to be published without full acknowledgement of the source. The thesis is to be used for private study or non-commercial research purposes only.

Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author.

# Declaration of own work and publications

This thesis is my own work, conducted in Cape Town, South Africa between January 2014 and August 2017.

I confirm that I have been granted permission by the University of Cape Town's Doctoral Degrees Board to include the following publication(s) in my PhD thesis:

Jones, B. 2016. Television news and the digital environment: a triadic multimodal approach for analysing moving image media, in *African Journalism Studies* 37(2): 116-137

# Acknowledgements

What respectable body of work would be complete without expressing ones gratitude to those who have helped carry the author – mind, soul, and sometimes body – through the wilderness of research and analysis? It stands to reason then that I convey my utmost appreciation for my two supervisors, Drs Martha Evans and Wallace Chuma, for guiding me along this path with infinite patience, wisdom, and maddening attention to detail without which I would flounder. Despite being half way across the world and enduring difficult and uncertain times, my supervisors never fail to give consistently excellent feedback and support.

Without the financial, academic, and moral support of the Next Generation Social Sciences in Africa team, this study would not have been possible. The two NextGen Fellowships granted me the time and space to focus on writing, while the mentors and colleagues I met at the Zambia workshop in January 2016 gave me invaluable advice. My mentors and colleagues at the Centre for Film and Media Studies have stood behind me throughout this project. From countless sighing sessions outside offices and allowing me the opportunity to teach, to supporting me financially at critical moments during this journey, I am indebted to the Centre. Vital funding from the National Research Foundation (NRF) enabled this study's depth and original research. The NRF provided me with the Innovation Doctoral Scholarship for all three years of my degree, and Extension Funding for the last six months. Without this generous grant, I would not have been able to continue with this project, nor afford the expensive broadcast data that made up my sample. Speaking of archives, a special thank you goes to Sias Scott and Duma-Sandile Mboni at the SABC Archives, and Carmen Whitcher at the

eTV Archives. Their consistent hard work and helpfulness made a long and difficult task that much easier, and I want to acknowledge their capabilities in what is often a thankless yet important role at these two broadcasters.

Parental support is not always a given in further study, and I am lucky to have parents who motivate, support, and encourage me in every step that I take in my career. I am eternally obliged to my father, Arthur, for his undying love and support throughout my degree, career, and my life. Without his advice and encouragement I would be a lesser person than I am today. My mother, Madeleine, has been a constant source of support and keeps the light in me burning even in the bleakest of days. After our life in South Africa fell apart in 2016, my mother-in-law Margaret took us in and has been a grounding influence for the majority of writing up my PhD. The simple act of leaving me in isolation has helped enormously, and I am forever indebted to her kindness, generosity, and love. So too my brother- and sister-in-law Cynan and Charmian, as little as I have seen them in the hardest 10 months of my life, their unending encouragement has meant the world to me. Thank you Cynan for the “3-for-2 and Storify” advice – it takes a writer to help a writer.

PhD students are a nightmare to be around – in fact, it’s more their absence that is noticeable, especially in the later stages. My love and thanks therefore go to my small, important group of friends. Although oceans, mountains, and fields separate us, I can feel your encouragement as if you were right next to me. Toussaint, your critiques always motivate me to do better, to dig deeper, and to follow your example. I am grateful for meeting you in Cape Town in 2013, and repeatedly at IAMCR conferences. Perhaps one day soon again we’ll get “s\*\*t-faced” and talk about Mandela. Dr Nothias, thank you for your input and friendship. My friends at UCT – for the PintNights, the Quiz Nights, and FAMAnon – I’ll miss the cheap beer and silly discussions, setting the world to rights and setting it ablaze. Alta, Clarien, Jaqui – we’re all in this together and your support means

the world to me. My friends from South Africa, the UK, America, and across the world, thank you for listening to me ramble in confusion and worry.

I cannot underestimate the power music has had on my journey through this PhD. Music is my lifeblood, and the people I have met because of it, through a shared passion for alternative music and culture, has shaped my life. Without metal, I would be a husk of a person. Cape Town's little metal community is growing, and I am proud to have been a part of it for a short time. The friends I met, gigged with, got into moshpits with, and made lifelong memories with, will stay with me forever. The dark, dirty, noisy corners of R.O.A.R, Gandalfs, the Rabbit Hole, and Mercury Live held little moments of motivation and inspiration in an escape from what was, at times, a bleak experience. The metal community, not just in Cape Town but also Telford (SH and GH), Aberystwyth (GM, RM, VH, and SB), Virginia (HB), and Texas / Illinois (BC), have kept me grounded, kept me normal, kept me weird, and provided escape these past four years. Realtime and Facetime friends, you deserve horns that would make Dio proud.

To my soul mate, best friend, eternal optimist, and husband, Emlyn. For all those times you had to listen to my jumbled up thoughts and yet somehow managed to slowly drag them out into a solid, sequential line; for having to speak via Facebook Messenger for hours on end because I needed isolation; for letting me fall asleep on you during exciting movies; for taking me on long walks when all I wanted to do was curl up in a ball. For joining me on this path and always seeing the light in this world; for supporting me emotionally, financially, physically, and mentally, without reservation, for many years. For all of these things, and countless others that you do for me and with me, I dedicate this thesis to you. Without you, I am nothing.

# Abstract

Eric Louw, Jesper Stömbäck, and W. Lance Bennett call the trend in late-20<sup>th</sup> century political journalism “mediatisation”, where the televisualisation of Western elections favours episodic, dramatic, fragmented, and event-driven reporting. This “hype-ocracy” results in narrow and shallow frames that entertain rather than enlighten. This thesis, titled “Desperately Seeking Depth”, examines this trend in both international and local news about South African elections.

While scholarship of Western elections on TV news is blossoming, analyses of news coverage of South African elections is sparse. There is particularly little analysis of the visual dimensions of TV news coverage, which remains a methodological challenge for media and communication scholars. This thesis draws together a comprehensive analysis of South Africa’s general elections on international and local television news over two decades. It develops an innovative, multimodal analysis method dedicated to television news and adds meaningful data to the overall study of South African media and politics, and international communication. It combines analysis of previous studies of each election with the original analysis of over 150 news broadcasts to uncover the news narratives about the South African general elections between 1994 and 2014.

This thesis demonstrates the difference between global and local journalism about South African elections. Restricted by mediatised news values that favour episodic reporting, Western journalists present entangled, contradictory narratives over the years. The fixation on 1994’s violent-turned-miracle election narrative ignored the complexities of

the new democracy, while an increasingly detached approach in covering the 2009 and 2014 ANC victories left journalists perplexed and unable to explore deeper narratives. Meanwhile, South African channels become progressively more hesitant to investigate controversial topics or criticise the ruling party. Avoidance of important issues such as the 1994 election violence, the AIDS crisis in 2004, and Zuma's Nkandla fiasco in 2014 results in narrow reporting that limits the substantive information available during the election periods. All channels to some extent seek narratives that attempt to explain and explore South Africa's complex democracy, but these narratives are often contradictory. The decline in journalists' engagement with political leaders and citizens means that the full picture of the elections is reduced to a few easily digestible frames that confirm neoliberal news values.

This thesis offers a new model for the analysis of TV news coverage of elections that can provide the basis for future studies. "Desperately Seeking Depth" ultimately uncovers a picture of news industry that, both locally and globally, works as an echo chamber of sound bites that focused on elite voices.

Keywords: *television news, South African democracy, mediatisation, political journalism, multimodal methodology, social semiotics, media and democracy*



# Table of Contents

<b>LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .....</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>LIST OF FIGURES .....</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>LIST OF IMAGES .....</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>INTRODUCTION .....</b>	<b>16</b>
1 RATIONALE .....	16
2 AIMS .....	20
3 RESEARCH STATEMENT AND QUESTIONS .....	21
4 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS .....	22
<b>CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE REVIEW .....</b>	<b>25</b>
1 GLOBAL RESEARCH ON ELECTION COVERAGE .....	26
2 RESEARCH ON AFRICAN ELECTION COVERAGE .....	38
3 RESEARCH ON SOUTH AFRICAN ELECTION COVERAGE .....	45
4 SUMMARY .....	58
<b>CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY .....</b>	<b>59</b>
1 SAMPLE .....	59
2 INSTRUMENTATION .....	74
3 DATA ANALYSIS .....	87
<b>CHAPTER 3: 1994 .....</b>	<b>89</b>
1 BACKGROUND TO 1994 .....	90
2 FINDINGS .....	98
3 DISCUSSION OF 1994 .....	136
4 SUMMARY .....	143
<b>CHAPTER 4: 1999 .....</b>	<b>144</b>
1 BACKGROUND TO 1999 .....	145
2 FINDINGS .....	153
3 DISCUSSION OF 1999 .....	168
4 SUMMARY .....	173
<b>CHAPTER 5: 2004 .....</b>	<b>174</b>
1 BACKGROUND TO 2004 .....	174
2 FINDINGS .....	186
3 DISCUSSION OF 2004 .....	208
4 SUMMARY .....	212
<b>CHAPTER 6: 2009 .....</b>	<b>214</b>
1 BACKGROUND TO 2009 .....	215
2 FINDINGS .....	224
3 DISCUSSION OF 2009 .....	252
4 SUMMARY .....	256

<b>CHAPTER 7: 2014 .....</b>	<b>258</b>
1 BACKGROUND TO 2014.....	259
2 FINDINGS.....	270
3 DISCUSSION OF 2014.....	312
4 SUMMARY .....	318
<b>CHAPTER 8: DISCUSSION.....</b>	<b>320</b>
1 SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS.....	320
2 UNDERSTANDING SOUTH AFRICAN ELECTIONS .....	321
3 JOURNALISM PRACTICE .....	329
4 CONTRIBUTIONS TO POLITICAL COMMUNICATION THEORY .....	333
<b>CONCLUSION .....</b>	<b>339</b>
1 SUMMARY OF THE THESIS .....	339
2 LIMITATIONS.....	339
3 IMPLICATIONS AND APPLICATIONS.....	340
4 RECOMMENDATIONS .....	341
<b>REFERENCES .....</b>	<b>346</b>
WORKS .....	346
BROADCASTS .....	376
<b>APPENDIX 1: CHANNELS .....</b>	<b>381</b>

# List of abbreviations

ACDP	–	African Christian Democratic Party
AMCU	–	Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union
ANC	–	African National Congress
AVF	–	Afrikaner Volksfront
AWB	–	Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging
AZAPO	–	Azanian People's Organisation
CODESA	–	Convention for a Democratic South Africa
COPE	–	Congress of the People
COSATU	–	Congress of South African Trade Unions
CP	–	Conservative Party
DA	–	Democratic Alliance
DP	–	Democratic Party, see <i>DA</i>
EFF	–	Economic Freedom Fighters
FF	–	Freedom Front
FF+	–	Freedom Front Plus
GEAR	–	Growth, Employment, and Redistribution
GNU	–	Government of National Unity
IEC	–	Independent Electoral Commission
IFP	–	Inkatha Freedom Party
IMC	–	Independent Media Commission
MK	–	uMkhonto weSizwe
MMA	–	Media Monitoring Africa
NA	–	National Action
NEC	–	National Executive Council (of the ANC)
NLP	–	New Labour Party
NNP	–	New National Party
NP	–	National Party
NPA	–	National Prosecuting Agency
NROC	–	National Results Operations Centre
NUM	–	National Union of Mineworkers
PAC	–	Pan African Congress
RDP	–	Reconstruction and Development Programme
SACP	–	South African Communist Party
SAPS	–	South African Police Service
SANDF	–	South African National Defence Force
TRC	–	Truth and Reconciliation Committee
UDM	–	United Democratic Movement
UNMOSA	–	United National Mission Observers in South Africa

# List of Figures

Graph 2.1	Total number of broadcasts per year
Graph 2.2	Total broadcasts spread across channels
Graph 2.3	African channels
Graph 2.4	North American channels
Graph 2.5	European channels
Graph 2.6	Asian / Middle Eastern channels
Graph 3.1	Total broadcasts per channel in 1994
Graph 3.2	Total broadcasts per region in 1994
Graph 3.3	Total event coverage in 1994
Graph 3.4	North American event coverage on 1994 broadcasts
Graph 3.5	United Kingdom event coverage on 1994 broadcasts
Graph 3.6	South African event coverage in 1994 broadcasts
Graph 3.7	Political parties represented across regions in 1994
Graph 3.8	Who speaks in 1994
Graph 3.9	Known speakers in 1994
Graph 4.1	Total broadcasts per region in 1999
Graph 4.2	Total broadcasts per channel in 1999
Graph 4.3	Total event coverage in 1999
Graph 4.4	SABC event coverage on 1999 broadcasts
Graph 4.5	eTV event coverage on 1999 broadcasts
Graph 4.6	Total political party representation in 1999
Graph 4.7	Political parties represented across regions in 1999
Graph 4.8	Who speaks in 1999
Graph 4.9	Known speakers in 1999
Graph 5.1	Total broadcasts per channel in 2004
Graph 5.2	Total broadcasts per region in 2004
Graph 5.3	Total event coverage in 2004
Graph 5.4	SABC event coverage on 2004 broadcasts
Graph 5.5	eTV event coverage on 2004 broadcasts
Graph 5.6	AP event coverage on 2004 broadcasts
Graph 5.7	Total political parties represented in 2004
Graph 5.8	Who speaks in 2004
Graph 5.9	Known speakers in 2004
Graph 6.1	Total broadcasts per channel in 2009
Graph 6.2	Total broadcasts per region in 2009
Graph 6.3	Total event coverage in 2009
Graph 6.4	African event coverage on 2009 broadcasts
Graph 6.5	European event coverage on 2009 broadcasts
Graph 6.6	North American event coverage on 2009 broadcasts
Graph 6.7	Other regions event coverage on 2009 broadcasts
Graph 6.8	Total political parties represented in 2009
Graph 6.9	Political parties represented across regions in 2009
Graph 6.10	Who speaks in 2009
Graph 6.11	Known speakers in 2009
Graph 7.1	Quarterly Economic Growth Rate per president

Graph 7.2	Total broadcasts per channel in 2014
Graph 7.3	Total broadcasts per region in 2014
Graph 7.4	Total event coverage in 2014
Graph 7.5	Total political parties represented in 2014
Graph 7.6	Political parties represented per region in 2014
Graph 7.7	Who speaks in 2014
Graph 7.8	Known speakers in 2014
Graph 7.9	Unknown speakers in 2014
Graph 8.1	Speakers across the years
Graph 8.2	Difference between Known speakers and Political Leaders across the years

Table 2.1	Example transcription
Table 3.1	Percentage of votes per party in 1994 election
Table 4.1	Percentage of votes per party in 1999 election
Table 5.1	Percentage of votes per party in 2004 election
Table 6.1	Percentage of votes per party in 2009 election
Table 7.1	Percentage of votes per party in 2014 election

# List of Images

Image 3.1	<i>Vote, the beloved country</i> , AP, 1994. "Queues stretch into the distance"
Image 3.2	<i>Vote, the beloved country</i> , AP, 1994. "Queues stretch into the distance"
Image 3.3	<i>CBS Evening news</i> , CBS, 1994. "Johannesburg car bomb aftermath"
Image 3.4	<i>Bloody Sunday</i> , CNN, 1994. "Casualties of the car bomb"
Image 3.5	<i>Earth Matters</i> , CNN, 1994. "Police clash with protesters in sepia"
Image 3.6	<i>Electing the Future spot</i> , CNN, 1994. "Police clash with protesters"
Image 3.7	<i>Election 94</i> , SABC, 1994. "Reporter in prominent flak jacket in Vosloorus"
Image 3.8	<i>Profile of a Zulu Nation</i> , CNN, 1994. "Prominent spears in the crowd"
Image 3.9	<i>Profile of a Zulu Nation</i> , CNN, 1994. "Armed IFP members"
Image 3.10	<i>Profile of a Zulu Nation</i> , CNN, 1994. "Brett Sadler drowned out"
Image 3.11	<i>Profile of a Zulu Nation</i> , CNN, 1994. "Fisheye on a large IFP crowd"
Image 3.12	<i>Profile of a Zulu Nation</i> , CNN, 1994. "Silhouette on Zulu dancers"
Image 3.13	<i>Profile of a Zulu Nation</i> , CNN, 1994. "Fisheye on Zulu dancers"
Image 3.14	<i>Profile of a Zulu Nation</i> , CNN, 1994. "Hands up"
Image 3.15	<i>Profile of a Zulu Nation</i> , CNN, 1994. "Hands up"
Image 3.16	<i>Profile of a Zulu Nation</i> , CNN, 1994. "Tanks roll in to KwaZulu"
Image 3.17	<i>Profile of a Zulu Nation</i> , CNN, 1994. "Low angle tanks to keep the peace"
Image 3.18	<i>Big Story</i> , CNN, 1994. "SANDF rode in to the rescue to the evident relief"
Image 3.19	<i>Vote, the beloved country</i> , AP, 1994. "Subjective angle as an observer"
Image 3.20	<i>Earth Matters</i> , CNN, 1994. "Subjective angle as an observer"
Image 3.21	<i>Bloody Sunday</i> , CNN, 1994. "Subjective angle as an observer"
Image 3.22	<i>Earth Matters</i> , CNN, 1994. "Juxtaposition of white and black farmers"
Image 3.23	<i>Earth Matters</i> , CNN, 1994. "Juxtaposition of white and black farmers"
Image 4.1	<i>Election 99 Journalist recap</i> , SABC, 1999. "PTC in Khutsong"
Image 4.2	<i>Election 99 Journalist recap</i> , SABC, 1999. "Smiling queues"
Image 4.3	<i>Election 99 Journalist recap</i> , SABC, 1999. "Robyn Curnow PTC"
Image 5.1	<i>IEC Special Votes</i> , SABC, 2004. "Assisting the bedridden"
Image 5.2	<i>Mbeki visits the Rand Show</i> , SABC, 2004. "Mbeki and the Indian girl"
Image 5.3	<i>Campaign Trail</i> , SABC, 2004. "Mbeki mid-shot at rally"
Image 5.4	<i>Mbeki visits the Rand Show</i> , SABC, 2004. "Mbeki in MCU"
Image 5.5	<i>Mbeki visits the Rand Show</i> , SABC, 2004. "Mbeki waving in mid shot"
Image 5.6	<i>DA/IFP campaigning</i> , SABC, 2004. "Reed skirt dancers"
Image 5.7	<i>DA/IFP campaigning</i> , SABC, 2004. "Warrior dancers"
Image 5.8	<i>DA/IFP campaigning</i> , SABC, 2004. "Kwaito stars"
Image 5.9	<i>South Africa preview</i> , AP, 2004. "Ngebulana's mansion"
Image 5.10	<i>South Africa preview</i> , AP, 2004. "Ngebulana's messy car boot"
Image 5.11	<i>South Africa preview</i> , AP, 2004. "Ngebulana's messy car"
Image 5.12	<i>South Africa preview</i> , AP, 2004. "Ngebulana's sparse office"
Image 5.13	<i>Police</i> , SABC, 2004. "Cops foregrounded"
Image 5.14	<i>Police</i> , SABC, 2004. "Cops in subjective angle"
Image 5.15	<i>Police</i> , SABC, 2004. "Cops followed into rooms"

Image 5.16	<i>Police</i> , SABC, 2004. "On the side of the police"
Image 5.17	<i>South Africa Preview</i> , AP, 2004. "Starkness: Dainfern wide shot"
Image 5.18	<i>South Africa Preview</i> , AP, 2004. "Starkness: Jerusalem wide shot"
Image 6.1	"100% Zulu Boy"
Image 6.2	<i>ANC's Jacob Zuma divides South Africa</i> , Sky, 2009. "Mandela on the stage"
Image 6.3	<i>Challenges await South Africa's future leader</i> , AFP, 2009. "Mandela on stage"
Image 6.4	<i>Final election rallies</i> , BBC, 2009. "Extreme low angle ANC support"
Image 6.5	<i>Inside Africa: South African election</i> , CNN, 2009. "Close framing ANC support"
Image 6.6	<i>Zuma's ANC closing in on election victory</i> , Sky, 2009. "Close framing vehement ANC support"
Image 6.7	<i>Zuma's ANC closing in on election victory</i> , Sky, 2009. "Extreme low angle"
Image 6.8	<i>Zuma's ANC closing in on election victory</i> , Sky, 2009. "ANC supporters carry coffin effigies"
Image 6.9	<i>Zuma's ANC closing in on election victory</i> , Sky, 2009. "Hurd drowned out"
Image 6.10	<i>Inside Africa: South Africa election</i> , CNN, 2009. "Support outside court"
Image 6.11	<i>South Africa election: ANC under fire</i> , CNN, 2009. "Jubilant support"
Image 6.12	<i>ANC's Jacob Zuma divides South Africa</i> , Sky, 2009. "Celebrations for Zuma"
Image 6.13	<i>Growing anger as South Africa goes to the polls</i> , Sky, 2009. "Zuma's face in the township"
Image 6.14	<i>Youth vote</i> , SABC, 2009. "Reporter PTC next to calm, quiet queue"
Image 6.15	<i>Youth vote</i> , SABC, 2009. "Eloquent young voter"
Image 6.16	<i>AmandlaTV South African election: housing</i> , AmandlaTV, 2009. "Vox to camera"
Image 6.17	<i>AmandlaTV South African election: housing</i> , AmandlaTV, 2009. "Vox to camera"
Image 7.1	<i>First SA vote since Mandela died</i> , CNN, 2014. "Mandela shirt on voter"
Image 7.2	<i>First SA vote since Mandela died</i> , CNN, 2014. "Mandela smiles down on queue"
Image 7.3	<i>SA Elections</i> , VOA, 2014. "Do it for Madiba"
Image 7.4	<i>First SA vote since Mandela died</i> , CNN, 2014. "Mandela tee-shirt"
Image 7.5	<i>South Africa protest vote</i> , VOA, 2014. "Sea of EFF red"
Image 7.6	<i>Sunrise</i> , Sky, 2014. "Malema and the sea of EFF red stadium"
Image 7.7	<i>South Africa' economic challenges</i> , BBC, 2014. "Malema in a sea of EFF red"
Image 7.8	<i>SA opposition taps into discontent</i> , AJE, 2014. "Black women hold back a tide"
Image 7.9	<i>SA opposition taps into discontent</i> , AJE, 2014. "Grimacing EFF"
Image 7.10	<i>Sunrise</i> , Sky, 2014. "Grimacing EFF"
Image 7.11	<i>SA poverty 20 years later</i> , CCTV, 2014. "Grimacing EFF"
Image 7.12	<i>SA opposition taps into discontent</i> , AJE, 2014. "Smiling DA support"
Image 7.13	<i>South Africa elections promo</i> , AJE, 2014. "Smiling DA support"
Image 7.14	<i>Security tight ahead of SA poll</i> , BBC, 2014. "Born Free at ANC rally"
Image 7.15	<i>Millions head to the polls in South Africa</i> , CNN, 2014. "Dressed in ANC flags"
Image 7.16	<i>South Africa's ANC braces for toughest election</i> , AJE, 2014. "Wide on rooftops"
Image 7.17	<i>South Africa' economic challenges</i> , BBC, 2014. "Wide on rooftops"
Image 7.18	<i>SA poverty 20 years later</i> , CCTV, 2014. "Wide on rooftops"
Image 7.19	<i>SA Elections</i> , VOA, 2014. "Wide on rooftops"
Image 7.20	<i>SA poverty 20 years later</i> , CCTV, 2014. "Zoom into township roads"
Image 7.21	<i>SA elections</i> , VOA, 2014. "Zoom into township roads"

Image 7.22	<i>SA poverty 20 years later</i> , CCTV, 2014. “Man throwing trashcan in protest”
Image 7.23	<i>SA police arrest 59</i> , Reuters, 2014. “Burning EFF poster”
Image 7.24	<i>SA police arrest 59</i> , Reuters, 2014. “Bright orange fire against black”
Image 7.25	<i>South Africans vote in general election</i> , AJE, 2014. “Destruction of property”
Image 7.26	OB3, AJE, 2014. “Destruction of property”
Image 7.27	<i>Ruling SA party wins 5<sup>th</sup> successive election</i> , CCTV, 2014. “Destruction of property”
Image 7.28	<i>SA police arrest 59</i> , Reuters, 2014. “Destruction of property”
Image 7.29	<i>News night 3</i> , eNCA, 2014. “Relaxed military”
Image 7.30	<i>Heavy security in Sterkspruit</i> , eNCA, 2014. “Cops playing around”
Image 7.31	<i>News night 3</i> , eNCA, 2014. “Relaxed mounted police”
Image 7.32	<i>South Africans vote in general election</i> , AJE, 2014. “Relaxed army”
Image 7.33	<i>What issues face the ANC after SA elections</i> , BBC, 2014. “Guns of Marikana”
Image 7.34	<i>Security tight ahead of SA poll</i> , BBC, 2014. “Behave, or face the consequences”



# Introduction

## 1 RATIONALE

On the April 27<sup>th</sup> 1994, the new South Africa was born a democracy with universal suffrage. Having risen from the ashes like Phoenix out of a low scale civil war, the new democracy seemed a resplendent example of negotiation vanquishing conflict and peace victorious over violence. Nelson Mandela, the charismatic icon of the Struggle, straddled the traditional and the modern admirably, uniting South Africans under the Rainbow Nation umbrella. The world watched as Madiba smiled his way into the hearts of everyone. Global journalists walked along unending lines of millions of newly enfranchised black South Africans stood shivering in the autumn sunlight, ready to cast their first ballot no matter what the circumstance. After the bloodshed of the previous weeks' bombing campaign and ethnic violence, this election seemed like the miracle panacea – perfect narratives to sooth a war-weary world.

South Africa's democracy turned 20 in 2014, a celebration of freedom, unity, victory over oppression, and culminated in the fifth free general election held on May 7<sup>th</sup> 2014. This election was auspicious for South Africa: it was simultaneously the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of democracy, the first election where young people born after the end of apartheid would be eligible to vote, and the first election after Nelson Mandela's death. This poll also saw controversial Jacob Zuma resume the presidency for a second five-year term, much to the disillusionment of nearly 40% of the population who voted for the opposition. Zuma

followed two previous leaders, Thabo Mbeki and Nelson Mandela, to steer South Africa through a complex post-apartheid setting. Yet again, news cameras were on standby to capture the long queues as the electorate stood shivering in the early morning, waiting to cast their hard-earned ballot. These scenes mirrored those of 1994 and journalists frequently alluded to the first poll when comparing voting lines, political leaders, enthusiasm for the election, and political violence. Increased protest action against a government evidently failing to deliver on election promises led to bloody clashes with authorities across South Africa in the run-up to the fifth election. These dramatic scenes were not unlike those in the closing moments of apartheid, and enthusiastic news channels streamed these images across the globe.

This project investigates the local and global broadcast news representation of the five democratic South African general elections, 1994-2014, analysing shifting and congruent narratives and journalism practices. This study goes beyond a discussion of the elections, but considers also the many factors that drive media narratives from both a global and local perspective. It also underlines the importance of the role of the media during the South African elections, from freedom and diversity of media to journalistic ethics and practices.

## 1.1 South African democracy

South Africa is the most modernised and industrialised African state (Fields, 2005; Van den Bosch, 2012) and has a unique history of apartheid that underpins the transition from the autocratic to the democratic. These traits make South Africa a prime example for a study about the narratives of transitional democratic elections. From the rainbow nationalism of Mandela's presidency, to Mbeki's elitist "African Renaissance" decade,

and ending in Zuma's conservative traditionalist incumbency, South Africa's 20-year democracy culminated in the 2014 general election. South African voters are divided, not just by race and economy, but also by geography and access to media and education. The ANC has strong loyalty in sections of the population who vote almost entirely based on identity politics (which is not unique to South Africa) and South African politics in increasingly a two-horse race (Mkhatshwa, 2014), with voters still aligning racial identity politics to their voting patterns, and I explore this further throughout Chapters 3 to 7 as background to each election year.

Voting for a general election occurs every five years through a system of Proportional Representation, where the electorate (those South Africans or permanent residents aged 18 or over) vote for a political party on a secret ballot. Voting usually takes place over two or more days, with the first day assigned for Special Votes (hospitals, prisons, and the elderly who need special assistance to cast ballots) and the general populace on the second day. The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) conducts voter education, registers citizens, runs the election, and counts the votes at the National Results Operations Centre (NROC). The last five elections have been deemed free and fair by both the IEC and international observers and monitors.<sup>1</sup>

## 1.2 Election research

Much literature already exists on analysing the political rhetoric of South Africa's democracy (Holmes & Shoup, 2013; Grootes, 2013; McKeiser, 2014; Boraine, 2014), but none exists in the way of analysing and comparing all five South African elections simultaneously. Even less research investigates media coverage of all five elections,

---

<sup>1</sup> [https://www.westerncape.gov.za/text/2016/June/iec\\_factsheet\\_01\\_free\\_fair\\_02-06\\_english\\_2.pdf](https://www.westerncape.gov.za/text/2016/June/iec_factsheet_01_free_fair_02-06_english_2.pdf)

specifically on broadcast news (despite the helpful research of Hubbard, 2010; Hungbo, 2011; Vicente, 2013; and Duncan, 2014). Chapter 2, the literature review of election coverage, explores this paucity further. South African election research usually entails a view into the political side: voting, electorate, parties, and the feasibility of democracy (Reynolds, 1999; Gouws & De Beer, 2008; Southall & Daniel, 2009; Habib & Herzenberg, 2011; Terre'blanche, 2014; Prinsloo, 2014) rather than broadcast news analysis. With this thesis, I intend to contribute not only to South African election research but also to analyses of electorates, democracy, and government depictions on news media.

### 1.3 Why broadcast news?

Louw (2006: 33) suggests that television is a political hype-maker's dream because the visual-ness, movement, urgency, immediacy, and persuasiveness make for an information vehicle that is easily digestible and simplified. This "televisualisation" of politics is actually "mediatisation" (Strömbäck, 2008), where sound bites are forever shrinking (Hallin, 1992: 9; Lichter, Noyes, & Kaid, 1999: 5; Bucy & Grabe, 2007: 658) and political information is specifically designed for television audiences. Although much of the Western world is solidly in a political communication phase defined by Blumler and Kavanagh (1999: 213) as a multi-media hydra-headed beast, with media ubiquity and celerity, South Africa still relies heavily on television and radio for political communication. This study focuses on television broadcast news because, throughout the 20 year period of democracy in South Africa, television news was an emergent media and increasingly influential globally and locally. Yet, despite this influence, broadcast news is notoriously difficult to analyse.

Television news is multimodal. The combined visual and audio data makes it a semiotically rich but intricate platform, particularly when deciphering the narratives told through visual stories. Montgomery (2007: 97-8) suggests one method of studying television news is to analyse two simultaneous rules: the verbal track expression and the visual track referent. It is therefore important to realise when analysing television news broadcasts that the audio and visual tracks do not exist within a vacuum, but instead react with one another and are juxtaposed. It is this juxtaposition that is most interesting and challenging when researching news. Visual analysis can reveal agenda-setting ideals, bias, as well as framing techniques within television news. These methodological issues are explored further in Chapters 2 and 8.

## 2 AIMS

This study goes beyond a discussion of South African democracy and election narratives, although that is the first point of entry to the field. Instead, the first aim of this research involves an overarching investigation and conglomeration of narratives during all five elections and offers new original data about the shifting journalistic practices and approaches in and about South African elections. A second aim takes the form of a dedicated methodological approach for analysing television news. This method is outlined in detail in Chapter 2, as well as in Jones (2016) and makes this study relevant to the changing forms of journalism and contributes significantly to the existing literature on both television research methods as well as digital media. This study does not stop with the discussion of democracy narratives and semiotic representation on television news, but goes further with a contextualised investigation into the nature of political communication about South African elections, the evolution of journalistic practice

across the years, and what presumably drives the differences between local and global broadcast narratives.

### 3 RESEARCH STATEMENT AND QUESTIONS

This study is a multimodal analysis of the shifting and continuous narratives during the first five democratic South African general elections, represented on global and local broadcast news. My objective is to answer the following three questions:

1. What were the stories told about South African democracy during the two decades of general elections: including political parties, surrounding events, and the voting day.
2. Do the narratives differ in local and global coverage and between Western and non-Western coverage?
3. What factors might be driving these media representations and narratives, and how do journalistic practices shift over time?

This study also rests on two central hypotheses: firstly, Louw (2005), Strömbäck (2008), and Bennett (2012) suggest that global political journalism became increasingly mediated in the 1990s and 2000s (see Chapter 2, the literature review, for an overview of this term), and so this thesis assumes media coverage of the South African elections will follow suit. Secondly, the international interest in South African elections will decrease substantially from 1994 to 2014 as democracy was further consolidated. Louw and Chitty (2000) suggest that South Africa effectively fell off the global radar post-1994 because global interest and investment in the country's democracy evaporated.

This thesis begins with an overview of the literature in Chapter 1. The review joins two fields of study: media studies related to both election coverage and political communication theory. The review points out the knowledge base of global and local trends in framing elections predominantly as a horse race, where two sides compete for winning the election, as well as the mediatisation of political journalism, where personalised event-based coverage trumps political policy and issues. Gaps exist in this substantial field: research about South African and African media coverage of elections as a whole is lacking, and analysis of television news coverage is often collectively analysed with other forms of media. I argue that these constitute significant oversights for media scholars' understanding, analysis, and conceptualisation of mediated elections.

Chapter 2 outlines the dedicated multimodal methodology developed for this project. Unlike the existing awkward existing analysis technique of analysing television news, this new method does not rely solely on time or frequency and emphasises the importance of analysing the visual aspect of television news. I argue in this chapter for a more precise, dedicated method involving a combination of semiotic and discourse analysis, with a contextual acknowledgement of the media's political economy. This chapter also sets out steps taken for data collection and analysis of this large data set.

Chapters 3 to 7 tackle each election in turn. Chapter 3 details the thematic analysis of the 1994 election year and, like all subsequent analysis chapters, starts with a background of key events, political parties, and issues. The analysis reveals significant differences between global broadcasts – and their overwhelmingly dramatized view of the election and emphasis on the negotiated settlement – and local broadcasts, which adopted a more

hesitant and cautious approach. Ultimately, entangled framing occurred because of a mediated approach from global channels, driven by the switch to post-Cold War news frames.

The 1999 election year is examined in Chapter 4. The low number of broadcasts available from global channels indicates just how far South Africa had fallen outside of the global spotlight. Nevertheless, narratives implied a general concern for ‘fit for purpose’ political leaders in South Africa. Nelson Mandela was criticised, albeit subtly, while Thabo Mbeki represented the new hope. Global coverage was cursory at best but South Africa attempted a comprehensive, if clumsy, view from the ground.

Chapter 5 explores the shift of focus away on South Africa, symbolised in the lack of international broadcasts available for 2004. Despite this paucity, narratives from local channels still suggested a push towards global mediated political communication. South African broadcasts glorified the authorities while the single global broadcast presented a stark reminder of the divisions in post-apartheid South Africa.

With an increased sample size because of improvements in digitisation as well as a reinvigorated election campaign attractive to media, Chapter 6 outlines how global broadcasters presented a tacit vote of no confidence in the new president Jacob Zuma in 2009, giving more time and space to voicing opposition parties. This implicit judgement of his fitness for office suggested that regime change was necessary, primarily because of Zuma’s cult-like status. Global narratives were entangled and shallow, despite journalistic attempts to dig a little deeper. South African broadcasters meanwhile were increasingly hesitant to explore controversial frames.



The final analysis section, Chapter 7, represents the largest sample gathered in this study. Global broadcasters presented top-down, mediated coverage of the 2014 election that excluded context and issues, favouring instead visualisation and mythologies that ultimately supported the status quo. Protest action and the liberation narrative formed key issues yet global broadcasters presented confusing accounts with hardly any voices from the ground. South African coverage, again, was distant, ignorant, and hesitant.

The overall discussion in Chapter 8 outlines three overall narratives from the global and local representation of South Africa's elections: firstly, narratives were driven by increased mediated political communication. Secondly, local channels avoided controversial narratives in an attempt to normalise democracy, while global narratives were predominantly visualised and dramatic, but often confused and contradictory. Thirdly, journalists disengage with political leaders and citizen voices over time and increasingly rely on pundits, which increases the distance between the audience and politics. Ultimately, narratives were far more entertaining than enlightening, which is in line with the global trend of political communication.

By way of a conclusion, the final section suggests implications and applications of this thesis. Using the dedicated method in future research would provide a deeper understanding of broadcast media narratives during election periods, while the findings add significant data to the paucity of research about South African election representation on television news. Recommendations range from advocating a better archival technique in South Africa's broadcast news channels, a better analysis technique of broadcast data, and a recommendation for journalists to include more grassroots and political voices in election coverage.

# Chapter 1:

## Literature Review

The review joins the field of media studies that is related to both election coverage and political communication theory. In doing so, three main areas of literature are examined: international elections, African elections, and South African elections. Each section assesses both local and international media representations (where available), the methodology of research, and notable findings and conclusions. The structure of this review begins with a broad overview of global political journalism as a contextual base. The second section looks at research on international media coverage of North American, British, and South Korean elections, focusing on the general themes of coverage and methodologies. Critically, this review differentiates between global and local media coverage.<sup>2</sup> Media framing of African elections is analysed in the third section of the review. Here, the complicating issues of postcolonialism and the Western gaze (Foucault, 1970; Said, 1978; Hunter-Gault, 2007; West, 2008; Khor, 2010; Göttzsche, 2013: 5) are considered as background theory to understanding media representations of African elections. Finally, the review ends with a section on the media framing of South African elections, which is separated into the five election years (1994 – 2014).

This review identifies five areas of concern: firstly, the general increase of mediatisation of political communication on the media, with sound bites, PR-ised journalism, lack of

---

<sup>2</sup> “Global” means media outside of the country under scrutiny (so, British media coverage of North American elections would class as “global” media) and is used interchangeably with “international”, whereas “local” means media from within the nation (so, North American media coverage of North American elections would class as “local”).

depth in reportage, and horse race journalism as common themes in media coverage of elections. Secondly, South African election coverage slipped off the global media radar after 1994, which Louw and Chitty (2000: 293) note is symptomatic of the assumed “normalisation” of South African democracy. Thirdly, production context (Woo, 1996) and narratives are neglected in favour of a quantitative airtime analysis. Fourthly, framing elections in Africa and South Africa are generally angled towards the global audience, with mediatised journalism, the horse race format, and Western media ethics influencing media coverage. Finally, the freedom of the media, particularly in South Africa (Tomaselli, Tomaselli, & Muller, 1987; Berger, 2002; Gouws & De Beer, 2008; Zegeye & Harris, 2013: 18; Malila, 2014), is a constant concern for researchers.

## 1 GLOBAL RESEARCH ON ELECTION COVERAGE

### 1.1 Overview of global scholarship about election coverage

Among the major characteristics of democracy, conducting regular, free, and fair elections is paramount. The electorate use mass media as their major tool in sourcing information about political leaders and, according to Strömbäck and Kaid, “election news coverage matters because it is a prerequisite for an informed electorate and because it contributes to how democracy works” (2008: 14). The media coverage of elections also gives a good indication to the degree of media freedom – of information, from interference, and from censorship – which can also be an indicator of the freedom and fairness of the elections themselves (Berger, 2002). It is also worth recalling the significance of elections as highly ritualised national media events, especially in the West (cf. Lauderbach, 2007: 316). Benoit (2004: 104) notes that global scholars have therefore invested considerable time and effort in understanding the news coverage of political campaigns, and robust debates about media coverage of elections exist in global

scholarship. Because of the intersection in disciplines (political science, media studies, anthropology, and even psychology), the focus of research is often very different. Researchers approach their analyses with dissimilar methodologies, conceptual frameworks, and terminology. Comparisons between results are therefore difficult, which Aalberg, Strömbäck, and De Vreese (2011) acknowledge in their own study on media framing of elections.

Global scholarship on the role of the media in covering elections tends to approach research from a 'top down' style: how politicians and authorities use the media, rather than how the media represents the politicians. For example, these analyses focus on the political aspects of coverage, rather than the media in which they are represented: Norris (1997), Louw (2005), Bennett (2012), and Graber and Dunaway (2015) investigate campaign and electoral coverage in the media, while others look specifically at campaign coverage in television news (Kern, 1989; Hallin, 1992; Jamieson, Waldman, & Devitt, 1998; Just, Crigler, & Buhr, 1999; Lichter, Noyes, & Kaid, 1999; Farnsworth & Lichter, 2003; Druckman, 2005; Cross, 2010; Cushion, Thomas, & Ellis, 2015; Cushion & Sambrook, 2015), some at print news coverage (Benoit, Hansen, & Stein, 2004; Kiouisis, 2006), and more recently online or convergence media coverage (Iyengar & McGrady, 2007; Druckman, Kifer, Parkin, 2009; Kushin & Yamamoto, 2010; Housholder & LaMarre, 2014; Glantz, 2016). Additionally, other studies analyse the narratives of the general election campaign (Klein & Maccoby, 1954; Graber, 1971, 1976; Russonello & Wolf, 1979; Robinson & Sheehan, 1983; Stempel & Windhauser, 1991; Mantler & Whiteman, 1995); coverage of presidential debates (Patterson, 1980; Kaid, McKinney, & Tedesco, 2000; Benoit & Currie, 2001); and the perceived media influence on voters (Benoit, 2007; Eargle, Esmail, & Sullivan, 2008).

While much of the research on media coverage of elections is of this ‘top down’ approach, a few notable examples exist where the media, rather than politicians, is the focus (Broh, 1980; Woo, 1996; Bucy & Grabe, 2007; Strömbäck, 2008; Cross, 2010; Aalberg, et al., 2011). These exceptions detail the narrative framing of candidates (Iyengar, 1991; Woo, 1996), discourse analysis of media framing (Scheithauer, 2007; Rose, 2014), and visual cues (Bucy & Grabe, 2007; Schieß, 2007), but do so with a methodology that often incorporates the length of time a politician is on screen (Grabe, 1996; Norris, 1997; Druckman, 2005; Bucy & Grabe, 2007; Cushion & Sambrook, 2015; and Cushion, Thomas, & Ellis, 2015) and lack visual analysis or semiotic discussion. The emphasis is therefore on political science, rather than media studies. There is a paucity of political communication analyses that take into account visual studies and my own study attempts to add significant data to this scarcity, from a South African perspective.

Scholastic research about African elections in general, and South African elections specifically, is lacking in both breadth and depth. Principal analyses of media coverage of elections come from North America and Europe: collectively, the global “West” or “North” (Huntington, 1996: 26). Research on Western media coverage of Western elections is in abundance, with fewer analyses available on Western media coverage of African elections. Even less research is available about African media coverage of African elections, and I have not found any significant data on the African media coverage of Western elections to date. Thus, this section is dedicated to the most important general literature on the media’s role in elections and, in particular, how local media cover Western and non-Western elections.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> Throughout this section, I refer to the “West” and “non-West” rather than “developed nations” or “developing nations” and so forth, for brevity and coherence. Previous research (Patterson, 1994; Lawrence, 2000; Esser & Angelo, 2006; Abate, 2013: 22) shows that there is little difference in how North American and most European media frame elections. Conversely, Abate (2013: 22) finds that the difference between Western and non-Western media coverage of elections is noticeable.

## 1.2 Role of the media in covering the political process

### 1.2.1 Television news and the hype-ocracy

Of the little dedicated research and writing about the role of the media in elections, Eric Louw's (2005) account of the media and the political process is one of the most noteworthy. Louw (2005: 50) echoes Coronel (2001: 6) in saying that the media's role in a democracy is to ensure the maximised flow of information to create an informed citizenry in order to deepen democracy. In a cynical approach, Louw argues that mass media don't create an informed citizenry but instead "serve as a vehicle for circulating hype required to deliver mass publics to mainstream political parties" (2005: 50) via spin-doctors. Louw terms this a "hype-ocracy" (ibid.). Bucy and Grabe (2009: 74) push this idea further and consider how political journalism has turned into "image bite" politics – the visual nature of television has irrevocably changed how politicians are represented in the modern era of journalism. Candidates are shown but not heard for longer periods, yet these images are the least scrutinised and understood aspects of political news (ibid.).

Louw argues that turning news into an entertaining spectacle has altered the journalism profession: public relation agents (or spin-doctors) often use journalists to "tame Western publics" (ibid.: 53) and distract, rather than inform. Louw identifies further challenges of global television newsrooms, including the juniorisation of staff, the spiral of silence generated by spin-doctors, and the push towards sensationalised adversarial watchdogism (ibid.: 71 – 83). Louw's interpretation looks at both Western and African journalistic practices, but his main analysis rests on Western(ised) media coverage.<sup>4</sup> He

---

<sup>4</sup> For a good overview of the problems of PR-ised journalism in the African context, Nyamnjoh (2005: 47-53) explains how public relations and brand journalism influences public service broadcasting, and ultimately harms democracy in recreating the American, "McDonaldised" programming for African audiences. Fast, shallow, and unsubstantial programmes do not perform an adequate role in democratization, Nyamnjoh observes.

also makes no suggestions about how audiences interpret these media messages or spin; instead his focus, similar to my own study, is on the media messages themselves.

### 1.2.2 Government, spin, and news

While his is not a dedicated television news critique, Bennett (2012) notes the crises of political journalism and newsroom politics in general and outlines the challenges political journalists face when reporting on elections and campaigns. He (2012: 3-6) suggests that without independent journalism, the lights go out on democracy. News is not what happens but “what newsmakers promote as timely, important, or interesting” (ibid.). He notes that there is therefore a fragile link between news and democracy, because news is largely a “freewheeling entity shaped by a combination of commercial forces” (ibid.: 20), sold and manufactured with few quality controls. Both Bennett and Louw have pessimistic opinions about the media coverage of the political process, but note that the packaging of politics for television is largely formed by economics. While the political economy of the media is only one part of newsroom management, many researchers across generations (Gans, 1979: 83; Gitlin, 1980; Bird & Dardene, 2009: 210; Bucy & Grabe, 2009; McChesney, 2009; Van Dijk, 2009: 199; Voltmer, 2010: 6) suggest news coverage of elections and democracy is often, directly or implicitly, shaped and driven by external gatekeeping forces. In spite of government, political, or commercial intervention, the role of the media in elections cannot be underestimated, as Robert McChesney (2005) underlines:

It is beyond debate that much of what government does is beyond the purview of the bulk of the citizenry. But through elections, citizens can control who gets to be in power and how long these people stay there... So, even if our media fail to provide analysis of the preponderance of what government does, they can, at

least, make it possible for citizens to effectively monitor the electoral campaigns on public officials.

These pressures can affect the framing of elections, in terms of both narratives about the political process as well as style of reporting.

### 1.2.3 Framing elections

Entman describes the news frame as the “imprint of power” (1993: 55) whereby some aspects of a news item are emphasised over others in order to promote a causal interpretation, problem construction, or moral evaluation; yet Bucy and Grabe (2009: 100, 203-211) argue that most discussions about framing are derived from the verbal aspects of media coverage, and neglect the visual. Narrative elements are usually considered the discourse or verbal track, but Bucy and Grabe (2009: 98-102) argue for editing, camera proxemics, and journalist mediation to be included in this visual framing analysis. For this thesis, “framing” will include not only the discourse but also the visual elements of the broadcast.

Iyengar’s (1991) research is important to understand the media framing of elections and the political process, specifically in his identification of the episodic and thematic news framing. While the majority of modern news-as-spectacle political journalists seem to adhere to it, Bennett (2012: 44) suggests that framing elections as episodic news is inherently problematic. Episodic news, Iyengar (1991: 18) states, is shallow, personalised, dramatic, and fragmented, with a focus on social order and disorder. Thematic news, conversely, places political issues and events in context, and is less likely to consider individuals responsible for these events (*ibid.*). In a review of Iyengar’s episodic/thematic framing theory, Scott London (1993) states:



Since electoral accountability is the foundation of representative democracy, the public must be able to establish who is responsible for social problems, Iyengar argues. Yet the news media systematically filter the issues and deflect blame from the establishment by framing news as ‘only a passing parade of specific events, a context of no context’.

Bennett (2012: 44) too suggests that episodic framing fragments news, which in turn dramatizes events and personalises problems, to the extent that news fails to offer a base for learning and generalising. While Iyengar’s news frame theory is a seminal work in the realm of the role of media in covering elections, there has been little research on developing the episodic/thematic frame since, as Scheufele (1999) suggests. The resultant news frames in episodic news are shallow, and policy is often overlooked in favour of personalisation.

This thesis uses the terms “narrow” and “shallow” often. Shallowness of narratives means there is a diversity of stories but which were superficial or simplistic without exploring depth, contradictions, or context, and similar to Iyengar’s episodic news frames. Narrowness, conversely, means that journalists attempt to explore depth and context but narratives are restricted in the broadness or number of frames. The frames themselves may be thematic (Iyengar, 1991: 18), profound, and investigative, but the narrowness describes the lack of breadth in relation to other frames. For example, explaining the voting day in shallow frames could show multiple narratives of queues, poor organisation from authorities, pre-election violence, the act of voting, and so forth, but all frames would be superficial, relying on visually rich events, emotional reporting, and drama. Narrowness of frames in explaining the voting day would look at the queues only, interviewing citizens about their expectations, exploring how the ballot works, and giving leaders of political parties a chance to speak. This narrowness includes depth of

reporting but excludes other important or contextual frames (such as pre-election violence, or disorganised authorities) and focuses only on one or two narratives.

### 1.3 Research on Western media coverage of elections

Research about the Western media coverage of elections is diverse in both approach and discipline, but some analyses have similarities in their findings. This section deals with two predominant themes in global reportage of elections, chiefly the “game frame”, or horse race journalism, and the increasingly dominant mediatisation of political reporting.

#### 1.3.1 The game frame

Scholars across generations suggest that the “game frame” or “horse race” style of journalism is paramount (Broh, 1980; Patterson, 1980; Graber, 1988; Stempel & Windhauser, 1991; Hallin, 1992; Mantler & Whiteman, 1995; Domke, Fan, Fibison, Shah, Smith, & Watts, 1997; Lawrence, 2000; Aalberg, et al., 2011). Under this “horse race” frame, media present election campaigns in terms of a win-or-lose competition or battle. In one of the first pieces of research to use the term, Broh (1980) analysed the 1979 US elections and found that journalists framed the election as a sporting event, notably using the metaphor of betting on a horse race (ibid.: 516): one candidate “leading” ahead of the other, and the unpopular candidate “chasing” the leader. While Broh (ibid.: 527) acknowledges the benefits of such a framework in attracting audience interest, he concludes that distortion is possible and harmful to the electoral process.

Aalberg et al. (2011: 173) conclude in much the same way: the game frame has the potential to boost public interest in politics but may also boost political cynicism, as evidenced in Cappella and Jamieson’s (1996) frame analysis of US political news. Aalberg et al. aimed for a clear definition of the game frame: news stories that portray politics as a

game and are centred on winning or losing (as a battle or a race); opinion polls dominate the story; approval from interest groups; and speculation about outcomes (ibid.: 172). Critically though, the authors echo Hahn and Iyengar (2002) and find that the reasons for the dominance of this frame in election coverage are mostly commercial: this frame allows journalists to more easily produce stories to a deadline as it demands fewer resources than complex policy debates (Aalberg et al., 2011: 164).

While developing this coding scheme, Aalberg et al (ibid.: 171) found that very few previous studies show a linear trend for the media using the game frame to cover elections across time, although Benoit (2004: 105) notes in his own study that the “horse race” was the most common topic in US research. Aalberg et al. (2011: 171) acknowledge that the differences in methodology, conceptualisation of terminology, and geographical location makes comparisons across these types of studies very difficult.

### 1.3.2 Mediatisation

Another major debate about Western media coverage of elections is the “mediatisation” of politics, whereby political journalists use media-logic to present easily digestible information to television audiences.<sup>5</sup> Cushion, Thomas, and Ellis (2015: 1530) found that the 2015 UK election on television news was characterised by three main styles of reporting: the game frame, conflict frame, and personalisation of politics. Both the game frame and personalisation of politics are part of Strömbäck’s “media logic” (Strömbäck, 2008: 233; Cushion et al., 2015: 1 525).

---

<sup>5</sup> It should be noted, though, that mediatisation is not limited to just political journalism. The “celebrity culture” of modern news is also mediatised. Mark Wheeler’s *Celebrity Politics: Image and Identity in Contemporary Political Communications* (2013) and Graeme Turner’s *Reinventing the Media* (2016) are both helpful in understanding the social functions of celebrity culture and the commodification of self.

Scholars often refer to either media logic or mediatisation, but the terms are roughly the same. Media logic refers to a reporting style where policy issues are marginalised in favour of personality and celebrity (Cushion & Sambrook, 2015). According to Strömbäck (2008: 233) and Altheide and Snow (1979, 1988, 1991), who originally coined the term, media logic involves both the process of information transmission (the organisation, technology, and aesthetic of the medium) as well as the format (symbolic rules for coding and decoding media messages). While Strömbäck (2008: 233) acknowledges that the definition is abstract, he defines it as

the dominance in societal processes of the news values and the storytelling techniques the media make use of to take advantage of their own medium and its format, and to be competitive in the on-going struggle to capture people's attention. These storytelling techniques include simplification, polarization, intensification, personalisation, visualisation and stereotypization, and the framing of politics as a strategic game or 'horse race'.

In news representation, media logic contrasts with political logic – which Strömbäck acknowledges as an even more ambiguous term. Politics is ultimately about “collective and authoritative decision-making as well as the implementation of political decisions” (ibid.), ergo representing active solution seeking through communication. Therefore, media logic would be similar to Iyengar's (1991) episodic news, while political logic would be more focused on issue-based reporting. Cushion et al.'s (2015) study of the 2015 UK elections highlights the concerns Broh raised in 1980: voters may be misled by the trivia of a campaign, especially when the election is presented as a sporting spectacle with no solutions, policy debates, or depth of context. Episodic news fragmentation (Iyengar, 1991) combined with this media logic framing (Strömbäck, 2008: 235) could be dangerous for democracy (Berger, 2002; Louw, 2005: 271; Benoit, 2007: 113; Bennett, 2012: 44).

It is important to note that mediatisation of politics does not mean simply “mediated” politics (Strömbäck, 2008: 230), whereby the “media are the most important source of information and vehicle of communication between the governors and the governed” (ibid.). This is an old understanding of media effects and processes. Mediatisation is a “process-orientated concept” (ibid.: 231), which Schulz suggests “relates to changes associated with communication media and their development” (2004: 88). Mazzoleni and Schulz affirm, “mediatisation denotes problematic concomitants or consequences of the development of mass media” (1999: 249). Mediatisation therefore refers to the *degree* to which media constitute the most important source of information on politics, are independent from political institutions, and to which the media content as well as political actors are governed by political or media logic (Strömbäck 2008: 234). Therefore, a journalist using media logic to frame the elections would be a symptom of mediatisation.

Key issues in the global coverage of elections are the concerns of the hype-ocracy: that is, the visualness of politics, the game frame, and mediatisation. PR-ised journalism means shallower frames and juniorisation of newsrooms, and researchers are concerned that this reportage damages democracy.

#### 1.4 Research on non-Western media coverage of elections

Hanitzsch notes that throughout various studies on political journalism in non-Western countries, a certain “Western bias” (2009: 422) is often present. In his criticism of Western researchers studying non-Western political journalism, Hanitzsch (2009: 422) notes they often fail to acknowledge that the normative expectations of political journalism have somewhat biased their interpretations. Further problems include the lack

of understanding or inclusion of developmental journalism, such as in Weaver (1998). Colonial history is an important factor to consider as mass media in many non-Western nations developed as derivatives of those in the West (Golding, 1977; Couldry, 2007: 247); yet Hanitzsch claims few researchers looking at non-Western media coverage of elections acknowledge this. Ultimately, scholars avoid taking into account the local professionalism of journalism when analysing election representation on non-Western news. Wasserman (2010, 2013) and Nyamnjoh advocate a kind of “glocalisation” of media research that acknowledges the effect of colonialism, postcolonialism, and independence has on journalism in non-Western states, particularly Africa.

De Nelson (2007: 174) and Cenite, Shing Yee, Teck Juan, Li Qin, & Xian Lin (2008) argue that the dominance of the “issue frame” (or political logic) in Brazil or Singapore election coverage is probably due to developmental journalism (Ogdan, 1980; De Beer, Wasserman, Malila, & Beckett, 2014), where journalists are pressured, often by the government or because of the political economy of the media, to ally with political forces. To view non-Western media coverage of non-Western elections through the lens of “Western bias”, where media freedom, objectivity, and non-partisanship is taken for granted, is therefore problematic.

#### 1.4.1 Objectivity

In his study of the local media coverage of South Korean elections of 1987 and 1992 on television news, Woo (1996) raises a crucial point about media objectivity in non-Western countries. He suggests that the Korean government strictly controls the media and that journalists strive for a different set of professional values. In South Korea, Woo says, “what is right for the people is what is right for the government” (1996: 66). Similar to the SABC board membership nomination in South Africa, Korea’s broadcasting

executives are chosen by the president. Woo looked at both visuals and discourse when analysing the broadcasts and found that South Korean media used three main frames to represent the elections: Stability vs. Disorder, Fair vs. Corrupt, and Festivity vs. War, with the government always framed on the positive side of the binary and the opposition on the negative. Woo's analysis is significant in underlining the differences between Western and non-Western journalistic practice and context. His research tackles the theoretical concerns that Nyamnjoh (2005: 48), Hanitzsch (2009: 422), Waisbord (2009: 372), and McNair (2009: 239) raise regarding objectivity in non-Western media.

Despite many studies about the media coverage of elections and the political process in general, it appears that only a few analysts refer to content and context as paramount to analysing media messages of elections (such as Woo's 1999 dedicated broadcast analysis and Nyamnjoh's 2005 overview). Much of the aforementioned research focuses on the length of time any party or candidate is on air during television broadcasts ("airtime" or "sound/image bites") or how often they appear in the newspaper ("space"). This length measurement ignores the content of the media message, as well as the context of production, such as partisanship, political economy of the media, and governmental/commercial influence. The specific methodological shortcomings in much of this previous literature are noted in the dedicated Chapter 2.

## 2 RESEARCH ON AFRICAN ELECTION COVERAGE

### 2.1 Local media coverage

Compared to the numerous studies of Western media coverage of Western elections there is little research about how the media cover African elections. Much of the available research looks at the use and effects of media during the elections: Bailard

(2012) investigates the Internet's effect on the local electorate's perception of fairness in the 2010 Tanzanian election; Mäkinen and Kuira (2008) and Moyo (2010) analyse social media use in the Kenyan and Zimbabwean 2008 elections respectively and find that social media encourages and enables citizen journalism and participation; Norris and Mattes (2003) look at the correlation between plurality of mass media and ethnic voting practices on the continent; and Eifert, Miguel, and Posner (2010) identify the effects of negative media stereotypes of Africa on voting patterns.

Meanwhile, other researchers focus on the role of media during elections: some look at overarching debates about media ethics in Africa (Wasserman, 2010, 2013, 2014; Nyamnjoh, 2005; Wasserman & Rao, 2008; Christians, Glasser, McQuail, Nordenstren, & White, 2009; Berger, 2007), the role of the media in encouraging democracy (Frère, 2011; Wasserman 2014) and also in post-election African conflicts (Kasoma, 1995; Wasserman, 2010; Frère, 2007; Kpaduwa, 2013: 21; Kellow & Steeves, 1998: 107; Goldstein & Rotich, 2008). Others focus on the partisanship of the media during elections (Joseph, 2009; Temin & Smith, 2002; Waldahl, 2000a, 2005b) and technicalities of democracy and elections in Africa (Evans & Bruce, 1999; Eatton, 1990; Hyden, Leslie, & Ogundimu, 2003; Moyo, 2010).

Little research exists therefore about the *type* of media coverage of African elections (insofar as quantitative reports on content are favoured over semiotic data on narratives, tone, bias, or particular media framing) but despite this paucity, the role of the media in covering elections should not be ignored. Election coverage, as Frère (2011: 4) acknowledges, begins even pre-campaign or manifesto launch. The media's role in covering elections is based on the overarching legislative and regulatory frameworks of the media (Frère, 2011: 2), and these frameworks in Africa are complicated by factors of



colonisation (Nyamnjoh, 2005: 38; Berger, 2007: 155; Frère, 2011: 8; Akoh & Ahjabenu, 2013: 62) and the relationship between Western and African media ethics, which is widely discussed in Wasserman (2010, 2013, 2014) and Berger (2007). While the role of the media in Africa is thus important in understanding election coverage, and is widely covered (see Nyamnjoh, 2005, Frère, 2011, and Wasserman, 2014 for pertinent examples), there is a lack of actual semiotic analyses of African election coverage on the media in general and television news in particular.

### 2.1.1 Partisanship

Josephi (2009: 52) notes that African media is largely characterised by partisanship and is more closely aligned with the ideology of loyalty than objectivity, but these conclusions are problematic mostly because she homogenises the continent's media. Conflating all African media as "partisan" neglects the very real paths blazed by opposition media in a convoluted and controlled "glocalised" (Wasserman & Rao, 2008) media system. Shaw (2009) observes that, far from "praise-singing", as Bourgault (1995) suggests, the mainstream African press are often polarised along ethnic and party lines. While partisanship in the Global North appears linked to the political economy of the media (Waisbord, 2009: 72; Barnhurst & Nerone, 2009: 22; Ward, 2009: 299; D'Alessio & Allen, 2006; Zeldes, Fico, Carpenter, & Diddi, 2008; Hanitzsch, 2009: 420-421; Semetko, Blumler, Gurevitch, & Weaver, 2011),<sup>6</sup> partisanship in Africa seems related to the development journalism framework (Wasserman, 2014: 126), and the relationship between media and government and access to technology. Chuma (2005, 2008), too, speaks of the governmental control of the media in Zimbabwe during the 2000 election, where the press became one of the most visible sites of struggles of control for the state.

---

<sup>6</sup> The findings between these studies are often contradictory or clumsy – partisanship of the media is difficult to assess it seems, often due to the differences in methodology used and because researchers often conflate press with broadcast media. Out of these discordant debates, Hallin and Mancini's 2004 seminal research is the most clear. Their meta-analysis across cultures holds a general view that partisan press in the West is on the decline.

For example, in his analysis of the media coverage of the 2000 Zimbabwean elections, Waldahl (2005a) surmises that, while pro-government media in Zimbabwe were uncritical of the election outcome, pro-opposition media promoted criticism of the government and attempted both technical (valid voting) and substantive (informed choice) information. Waldahl notes that opposition media lacked comparative analyses of political parties, but this was mostly due to the lack of information from the government, resulting in unclear technical/policy information.

Temin and Smith (2002) evaluate the role of Ghana's media in their 2000 election and also find that state- and private-owned print media approached the election differently. While Waldahl found that narratives changed in the partisan and independent media in Zimbabwe, for Temin and Smith, professionalism in the state- versus private-owned media was at stake in Ghana. The authors (2002: 595) suggest that a resource gap in broadcast media, as well as the relationship with the government, played a big role in the quality of election coverage in Ghana: where the private media had adequate funding, from state or NGOs, and a good relationship with government, coverage was clear and widespread (2002: 603). Similarly to Waldahl's analysis, they found that content across both private- and state-owned media was superficial, topical, and lacked critical analysis. These studies speak back to the global trend of mediatization of election coverage (Stömbäck, 2008), but also note that unequal funding and access to information hamper African media coverage of elections. Nyamnjoh too suggests that the journalism profession is often underpaid, job insecurity is rife, and in South Africa particularly elite black journalists are often pilfered by the business sector because of higher pay and better working conditions (2005: 74, 82). The poor professionalization of journalists across the continent further damages democracy when junior journalists seemingly

cannot criticise oligarchs or the government, while donor funding means the alternative press often flounders.

### 2.1.2 Global/local media coverage

Little research compares the differences and similarities of global and local media coverage of African elections. The 2008 post-election violence in Kenya is one of the few events covered by both African and global media and where that coverage was studied. Crucially, the difference between local media coverage of ethnic or post-election violence and that of the global media is stark: local media tend towards “peace” (Onyebadi & Oyediji, 2011: 219) journalism but content was overwhelmingly superficial due to technical reasons (Onyebadi & Oyediji, 2011: 226; Ndlela, 2011: 77; Waldahl, 2005a, 2005b; Kpaduwa, 2013: 23), while European media often worked with episodic frames and as a “mayfly”, simplifying content and ignoring context, mostly due to the reliance on framing stereotypes of Africa (Somerville, 2009; Hall, 2015; Ndlela, 2005; Goval, 2016; Willems, 2005: 95-101; Franks, 2010: 74). Ultimately, the comparison between the global and local media coverage of these traumatic events showed that global media gave little depth and context to the crises, while local media were hampered because of access to funds and information.

## 2.2 Research on global media coverage of African elections

There is also scant coverage of Africa in mainstream Western media overall (Golan, 2008; Franks, 2010; De Beer, 2010). While some studies investigated the general coverage of Africa in global media (Levistky & Way, 2002, 2005; Willems, 2005; Danker-Dake, 2008; Franks, 2010; Goval, 2016), few spoke directly to the narratives of African democracy and elections. Two themes emerged from the relevant research, however: the

impact of the end of the Cold War on global media coverage of African democracy, and reductionist coverage of African elections.

### 2.2.1 Post-Cold War frames

Since the end of the Cold War, democracy has emerged as the most favoured political system, with elections as the key component for legitimacy (Windrich, 1994: 18; Sisk, 1994: 144; Hawk, 2002: 168; Ndlela, 2005: 87). In her analysis of the post-Cold War news era in America, Pippa Norris argues that the Cold War effectively divided the world into “friends” and “enemies” (1995: 359), based on American foreign policy. As Windrich (1994) explains, and Norris (1995: 359, 1997: 14) echoes elsewhere, the Cold War stereotypes of conflict and communism influenced story priority and worked as a framing narrative for the early to mid-1990s news representation of African elections. “The Cold War frame ran like a red thread through most coverage of international news in the past because it dominated American foreign policy”, Norris posits (1995: 359), and the “schema simplified and prioritised coverage of international news by providing certainties about friends and enemies”. After the Cold War, and without this frame through which to classify international stories, American news media changed the way stories were prioritised and classified: instead of focusing on war, civil unrest, and military rivalries, themes shifted towards international relations through economic cooperation, development of trade agreements, and security, rather than military investments (Norris, 1995: 366).

### 2.2.2 Binaries and complexities

Ndlela (2005) analysed the representation of the Zimbabwean election in 2000 in Norwegian mainstream print media using critical discourse analysis and found, in much the same vein as Waldahl (2005a), that a lack of context propelled a typical, negatively stereotyped African story that neglected context, critical analysis, or investigation. The

Norwegian media relied heavily on binarised representations of the elections in 2000 and 2002, framing Zanu-PF as the unquestioned “villain” and the MDC as an opposition party that reflected ideal democratic values – that is, regime change as a panacea for all political and economic woes (Ndlela, 2005: 88). This reductionist framing left little room for neutrality and objectivity because the Norwegian media rallied behind the MDC without evaluation of the calibre of their policies, leadership, or programmes. Ndlela argues that the binary narrative of Zimbabwean elections undermines context and agency and perpetuates the “negative African story”. Hall’s (2015) report on the Burundian post-election violence in 2015 notes that the global media “acted like a mayfly” and reported on the “crisis *de jour*”, taking little time to explore context or evaluate consequences. “Such traumas are covered by the world press with the type of breathless excitement of a boxing match shorn of context and personality, with anonymous combatants temporarily given names for the duration of an event”, Hall (ibid.) claims. While a pessimistic argument on the global media’s attention on African elections and crises, this statement is a reflection of global political journalism’s push towards mediatisation combined with a complicated history of colonialism in Africa. Nyamnjoh reiterates that Western news values are often entrenched in stories about Africa, both from local and global news media, which results in a “talking without listening” (2005: 57).

Global media perspectives of African elections reflect the “failed state” binary, which Nay (2013: 7-8), Grinker, Lubkemann, and Steiner (2010: 587), and Spurr (1994: 19) refer to as a binary of progress: if an African state does not demonstrate Western democratic values such as regime change, then it automatically falls on the “failure” side of the binary. If democratic values are in place – even problematically – then the nation “progresses” correctly. By framing democracy as an “either-or” concept, the Western perspective thus ignores democracy’s “package deal” (West, 2008) – democracy is a

complex concept, and should not be reduced to election campaigns only. Binarising African experiences of democracy in this way trivialises issues and negates context.

So, even though many African journalists seem to suffer a difficult relationship between the media and government, opposition media are still able to present significantly different narratives about the elections, even though the reach is not wide and the content is somewhat superficial. The push towards event-based, superficial media coverage of elections, and thus mediatisation of politics, is visible in the style of African media coverage of elections. Westernised media coverage of African elections apparently rests on a colonial understanding of governance on the continent, and is sometimes based on reductionist stereotypes and binaries. However, the paucity of actual narrative analysis of this media coverage shows that a qualitative understanding of the representation of elections on global and local media is an under-researched area.

### 3 RESEARCH ON SOUTH AFRICAN ELECTION COVERAGE

South Africa is a national broadcaster is a major player in Africa (Zegeye & Harris, 2003: 11), and the unique history of apartheid complicates the narratives told about the country's democracy. South Africa is the gateway to the rest of the continent (Guest, 2005), both in terms of economic viability and of South Africa's regional and continental hegemonic status (Zegeye & Harris, 2003: 11).

The lead-up to the first democratic election in 1994 was no romance story, nor did it have a fairy-tale ending. Bird (2008: 59) states that the local media coverage of the 1994 election emphasised the safety of voters and on-going violence throughout the voting

period. A negotiated settlement won out in the end but at a high cost to human life and, as Klein (2007: 208) argues, the ANC's Freedom Charter ideals. Since 1994, the ANC government has consistently won over 60% of the popular vote but voting turnout has decreased since 2009. With protest action and conflict against the ruling party increasing over the last two decades (Demian, 2015), critical media coverage under threat of censorship (Reid, 2014; Louw, 2014; De Beer, Malila, Beckett, & Wasserman, 2016), and political strife tearing the ANC apart internally (Hamill, 2009: 3; Du Preez, 2013; Holmes & Shoup, 2013), political communication and the resultant election narratives in South African media is complicated. This section encompasses research categorised by election year. While there are some studies of global media coverage of South African elections, the majority of the focus is on local coverage, and so this review reflects the extensiveness of this scholarship. Literature on the 1994 election is almost exclusively angled toward narratives of global media; 1999 and 2004 had very little analysis of global or local media perspectives; while 2009 and 2014 literature was dedicated almost entirely to local perspectives.

### 3.1 Pre-1994

As one of the few pre-democracy studies, Grabe's (1996) study explores the SABC's 1987 and 1989 election coverage. With terminology replicated in Kress and Van Leeuwen (2006), Grabe details the visual bias of representing political candidates and parties through television news: she argues that shot length, camera angles, movement, and editing contribute to the representation bias (1996: 2–6). In terms of a visual analysis of election narratives on television news, Grabe's research is the most thorough in a small pool of scholarship. Grabe concludes that the SABC favoured the ruling National Party over the opposition Conservative Party, with the latter having the highest negative

visual bias, but an explanation of the methodology used to measure this bias, including semiotic theory, is notably lacking.

## 3.2 1994

### 3.2.1 The US perspective

Peterson (1994), Anglin (1995), Guelke (1996) and Jacobs (2003) have analysed the mythologizing of the 1994 election in South Africa from a political science perspective, but few scholars look at the type and style of media coverage, and analyse the narratives therein. The authors mentioned below look at the United States (US) media perspectives of the 1994 election. The US was chosen as a site location for research because media coverage of elections is somewhat of a national pastime in North America, the end of apartheid reflected the nation's own civil rights movement, the US was heavily invested in the South African story both economically and metaphorically, and there is little literature on the perspectives of other countries. In the literature about the US perspectives of the 1994 election, three main themes were present. The US media presented the election as a catharsis exercise for the US public, the negotiated settlement was highlighted, and democratic values shaped the way in which US media framed the political parties and events during the election.

Timothy Sisk's (1994) contemporary study of the United States press perspective of the 1994 election is seminal and he argues that, for the North American media, telling the election story in the form of a great literary tale became a cathartic exercise for the US public. The anti-apartheid narrative mirrored the US' own struggle with the civil rights movement and became a "reflection in American society's mirror, a metaphor for the expunging of a racist evil" (ibid.: 157). Beverly Hawk agrees, noting that Nelson Mandela



was often called “South Africa’s Martin Luther King Jr” (2002: 171), while the civil rights movement comparison occurred primarily because of the lack of context afforded to African news stories, and the cultural and narrative similarities between the two countries (Hawk, 2002: 160, 173). Going further, Silke and Schrirer suggest US (but also South African) media prioritised the “razzmatazz” (1994: 140) of celebrity rather than investigate policy or issue debates.

Rassool and Witz (1996: 339) note that Western media recoded South Africa as “acceptable” in the early 1990s, because conflicts could finally be resolved through negotiation. This type of negotiated settlement as conflict resolution was the ideal outcome for the Clinton administration and warranted the pro-democracy rhetoric in the post-Cold War period (Sisk, 1994: 149; Hawk, 2002: 158). Much of this rhetoric took the form of a “morality play” in which the American media played moral judge, where facts articulated and promoted normative agendas (Leman-Langlois & Shearing, 2013: 222), and where South Africa had finally “come to its senses” (Rassool & Witz, 1996: 339). The negotiated outcome of the election showed that South Africa was a stable ally for the Americans, thus fitting neatly into the power-sharing model that US policy-makers had long thought a viable means of conflict resolution in Africa.

Reta (2000) conducted a frame and content analysis on North America print news during the 1994 election period and found that the American democratic values of dialogue and negotiation were inherent in the papers’ representation of the election. Emphasising the post-Cold War values of social order (Norris, 1995: 359, 1997: 14; Windrich, 1994: 22; Evans, 2014: 34) and framing the political parties based on the way in which they used democratic values underlines the US perception of the South African election. Reta argues that democracy trumped racialism in the way that the Zulu-ethnic Inkatha

Freedom Party (IFP) and the Afrikaans-ethnic Freedom Front (FF) were represented in the US newspapers. While both political parties campaigned for cultural and ethnic homelands, the framing of these issues could not be more different. Reta suggests that because the IFP used violence, intimidation, and refused to participate in the elections, both the *Washington Post* and the *New York Times* were harsh in their representation of Buthelezi and the IFP, using terms such as “destabilising behaviour”, “deliberately obstructionist”, “edgy”, “erstwhile”, and “playing the tribal card” (2000: 530). Conversely, she argues, the papers framed the Freedom Front almost sympathetically, because the Freedom Front applied democratic values (negotiation, joining the election, canvassing the electorate through media) to their campaign.

Therefore, the North American reporting on the 1994 election, in newspapers and broadcast media, seemed to rely on already-known stereotypes of catharsis, communism, conflict, and event-based mediated coverage of Westernised democracy (Sisk, 1994; Norris, 1997; Turkington, 1997; Reta, 2000; Hawk, 2002). The main focus of these studies is on newspapers, with only a passing mention of broadcast news. There is very little research on the perspective of British media, Eastern or Asian news, or even African reporting on the South African 1994 election. One exception is Turkington’s 1997 dissertation on the 1994 election coverage in various papers including the English *Times of London* and the South African *The Star*. She noted that because of the sheer number of journalists covering the election, journalists presented distinct differences in bias and journalistic professionalism (1997: 39), making it difficult to compare papers.

### 3.2.2 Local perspectives

Despite a scarcity of literature about the local broadcast news coverage of this poll, important South African studies show that the role of free access to media and freedom

of expression in the elections cannot be underestimated. Further observations about media depictions of the first election include the use of a horse race frame and narratives that were angled towards global media.

The primary concern with studies about the 1994 election coverage is the political economy and freedom of South African media, rather than narratives about the elections. Gouws and De Beer (2008: 273) argue that during the 1994 election, democratic, political, and media discourses in South Africa were still in their infancy and struggled with the legacy of apartheid. The SABC's monopoly of local broadcast media is a main concern in literature of the time. The binarised structure of the press seemed to contribute to problematic local coverage of the election (Silke & Schrirer, 1994: 142; Berger, 2002: 5; Gouws & De Beer, 2008: 274). The SABC was also under a harsh spotlight from the United Nations Mission Observers in South Africa (UNMOSA) and the Independent Media Commission (IMC), which likely contributed to the national broadcaster's balanced reporting of the election, suggest Silke and Schrirer (1994: 141), Anglin (1995: 540), and Sparks (2012: 208).

Researchers also commented that South African media often framed the 1994 election as a "horse race" between the ANC and ruling NP, highlighting the "changes" either party had to make for the election (Silke & Schrirer, 1994: 140; Giliomee, 1994: 43; Bertelsen, 1996; Gouws & De Beer, 2008: 279): the NP attempted to shed apartheid iconography, while the ANC transformed from an armed Struggle liberation movement to reliable government-in-waiting. Louw and Chitty argue that mediatisation of the election process increased as South African politicians themselves learnt how to "play the PR game" (2000: 285). Mandela, as the "shamanized leader" (Evans, 2014: 80) of the ANC, formed the lynchpin around which the local PR opera was scripted and was eager to play this

PR-ised game of politics, with sound-bite items designed for global journalists (Louw, 2005: 181). While the “cacophony of ... discordant voices became somewhat difficult to hear above the sound of gunfire” (Louw & Chitty, 2000: 290) during the political campaigning, two groups eventually emerged and the media machine ran with the resultant horse race.

Louw and Chitty (2000: 291), echoing Sisk (1994: 144), conclude that most SABC coverage was designed for global audiences and presented a more positive view of South Africa: telling a great literary tale of the miracle transition, gearing the election to the US love of spectacle, and contributing to the morality play rhetoric (Rassool & Witz, 2013: 339) of demonising villains – such as the IFP, Conservative Party, AZAPO, and homeland leaders – while sanctifying heroes who were pro-reform. Their findings confirm the studies of Reta (2000), Windrich (1994), and Ndlela (2005) who propose that democratic values drove US media narratives in African election coverage. Evans (2014: 169) investigates the broadcasting of the transition period in South Africa, and also reports that the SABC borrowed journalism formats from the United States. Formats and narratives on local media during this first election seemed to be angled towards a global, or at least American, audience.

### 3.3 1999 and 2004

Unlike the mythologised 1994 general election, the second and third polls received far less media coverage and this is reflected in the lack of dedicated research on the coverage itself. Researchers suggest this absence was because these elections were perceived as “boring” (Khosa, 1999: 97; Bird, 2008: 59), not a euphoric “uhuru” or liberation election, as in 1994, but more as an assessment of the ANC’s governing ability (Jacobs, 1999:

147). Louw and Chitty argue that the global media perceived that democracy had apparently become “normalized” (2000: 293) in South Africa and thus the event slid off the world’s news agenda. In this small pool of research, Jacobs (1999) provides the most insightful conclusions about the 1999 election. As with the 1994 literature and an overarching criticism of most South African election research however, the focus is often heavily on the press, which neglects broadcast media in general and television news in particular. For my own research, this neglect means that I will have to present original research for many of the years, as television news is a rarely analysed medium in this field. Much of the research of these following two elections is based on Jacob’s (1999) conclusions and Davis’ (2005) analysis, and includes themes of the horse race and press freedom as paramount.<sup>7</sup>

Jacobs (1999: 148) argues that opinion polls dominated the 1999 coverage, and that issue-based coverage was abandoned in favour of vote-catch events such as rallies and marches. The Media Monitoring Africa (MMA) project (1999: 28) says that this event-focused style of reporting resulted in fairly uncritical and narrow media coverage of the election. This horse race style of reporting continued in the 2004 election, as Gouws and De Beer (2008: 280) suggest. Jones and Lodge (1999: 324) argue that the trend towards event-based coverage and mediatisation at the SABC was due to inexperience, rather than prejudice, but it appears media logic, both globally and in South Africa, is driven by audience capture and ratings (Hawk, 2002: 169-171), regulation (Cushion et al., 2015: 1525), a thirst to break the story first (Cushion & Sambrook, 2015; Beckett, 2016; Glasser, 2016), source availability (Silke & Schrirer, 1994: 140; Cross, 2010: 424, 428),

---

<sup>7</sup> Despite their importance, these two arguments do not adequately take into account broadcast news. Some studies and reports briefly mention the SABC’s transformation policies over the years (Jacobs, 1999: 147; MMA, 1999: 23; Jones & Lodge, 1999: 373; Davis, 2005: 233; Berger, 2002: 5; Nyamnjoh, 2005: 54), but a complex analysis of shifting narratives is mostly absent. Davis’ suggestion that a plurality in voices was achieved by the 2004 elections is somewhat flawed, mainly because his argument ignores television news context and content, relying only on Jacobs’ print analysis, of the same year.

agenda-setting choices (MMA, 1999: 28), and changes in reporting styles and ethics (Gouws & De Beer, 2008: 278; Cushion et al., 2015: 1525). Duncan (2009: 217) notes that this focus on events does not adequately inform voters about party policies.

Davis (2005) argues that the biggest story of the 2004 election was the independence of the media. Gouws and De Beer (2008: 281) explain the tension in South Africa's 2004 election was mostly between the freedom of press and the ANC's criticism of what constituted the national interest (see also Reid, 2014). ANC MPs often assumed the independent print media attacked the party personally, rather than simply upholding Fourth Estate media ethics (Gouws & De Beer, 2008: 281; Louw, 2014; Duncan, 2014). South African journalist Stephen Grootes opines that the ANC government tends to view any criticism of their party as "anti-majoritarian" and "anti-liberation" (2013: 29), while Malila analyses the ANC's history of criticism of the media across the two decades of democracy, and concludes that the "paranoid self-awareness" (2014: 15) of South Africa's journalists has grown along with the ANC's control the media.

### 3.4 2009

Despite some rather large media events occurring around the election period that drew the global spotlight, there is a tremendous dearth of research about the 2009 election media coverage. Calland (2013) speaks at length about these events, including Jacob Zuma's corruption trial, the xenophobic riots in South Africa, the country as upcoming host of the 2010 FIFA World Cup, and the political infighting between the incumbent Thabo Mbeki and his rival, Jacob Zuma; yet the lack of analysis of these events and the 2009 election on broadcast media, both local and global, is astounding. This section contains only local media perspectives, as there were no significant studies about global

media coverage of the fourth election. Predominant media narratives included the “3.5 horse race” game frame, citizen voices and issues on the SABC and eTV, and Jacob Zuma’s controversial background represented on conservative Afrikaans newspapers.

Duncan’s (2009) analysis is the most thorough of the 2009 election on South African media. She bases much of her conclusions on the MMA’s 2009 report, as do many of the subsequent evaluations of general South African media coverage (such as Schulz-Herzenberg, 2014b). Duncan suggests three concerns of the role of the media in 2009: the “3.5 horse race” (2009: 220) of the ANC, DA, and newly formed ANC break-away party, the Congress of the People (COPE), with the SABC’s airtime coverage slightly biased towards COPE; high personalisation of media content; and a difficult reporting environment due to political and economic pressures on South African newsrooms. My own study may differ from Duncan’s conclusions because I use a different methodology to the MMA report and include visual and semiotic data rather than relying solely on content analysis.

With eTV’s rolling news channel eNCA (then named eNews) launched in 2008, South African audiences had more diversity of news choice than ever before. However, as Hubbard (2010) and the MMA (2009) report, the diversity of voices and content on these two channels were limited to mostly authority-elite sources, rather than reflecting citizen’s concerns, creating what Stephen Friedman terms the “view from the suburbs” (2011: 109). Friedman writes that South African media has traditionally been biased towards a middle-class, white understanding of the world. Here, he suggests that the evidence of this bias is “derived less from what the mainstream press writes, than what it ignores” (ibid. 110). The neglect of grassroots or citizen voices, issues of concern, or

events therefore points to a “view from the suburbs” rather than a “view from the ground”.

This seems to be an on going concern, where the media do not reflect citizen issues but rather personality and campaign topics (Silke & Schrirer 1994: 140; Jacobs 1999; Gouws & De Beer 2008; MMA 2009; Duncan 2014). Via a critical discourse analysis method of news broadcasts, Hubbard finds that the SABC in 2009 was less likely to “rock the boat” (2010: 22), and presented a government-friendly narrative of the election coverage.

Hubbard’s eTV news findings are less clear, but he notes that the channel gave less opportunity for citizens to speak than on the SABC, as citizens were usually re-voiced (2010: 12). A key problem with Hubbard’s research is that the tone of the broadcasts was marked homogenously as either negative, positive, or neutral: there was no distinction between topic and framing. Hubbard concluded therefore that the ANC received more negative tones than the DA because of topics such as Nkandla and the corruption trial, but his study significantly neglects framing and bias.

In 2009, the local and global media scrutinised the charismatic, populist leader of the ANC,<sup>8</sup> but academic analysis thereof is in short supply. One of the most thorough investigations of Zuma’s framing in South African media comes from Geersema-Sligh (2015) in her analysis of South African newspaper *Die Burger*. She found that the conservative Afrikaans newspaper highlighted and framed Zuma’s polygamous lifestyle through Western cultural perspectives. Through critical discourse analysis, Geersema-Sligh concludes that Zuma was generally framed negatively (2015: 182), and the traditional polygamous marriage ceremony was often juxtaposed with Western wedding

---

<sup>8</sup> see the Reuters blog tag of Zuma, for an example that outlines the leader’s biography <http://blogs.reuters.com/global/tag/jacob-zuma/>



imagery, framing his lifestyle as a conflict and something of a “morality play” (2015: 184). Geersema-Sligh concludes that the conflict of modernity (framed as positive civility, development) and tradition (as offensive, backward) asked readers to consider the juxtaposition of a traditionally Zulu man in the role of a Western leader by “symbolically annihilating Zuma through its condemnation and trivialisation” (2015: 188) of polygamy.

Just as Zuma’s portrayal in the media is overlooked, so too is the tussle between Jacob Zuma and Thabo Mbeki, despite being a critical political issue in the years and months leading up to the election. Only Hamill (2009: 4) mentions this “*broedertwis*” (meaning a fight between brothers in Afrikaans) as a key element to the 2009 election, because the infighting assisted oppositional politics within the country. Louw admits the failure of Thabo Mbeki as a “PR darling” (2005: 181) was ultimately because he refused to simplify issues to sound-bite solutions, a PR game preferred by journalists. Louw argues that this may be one of the reasons for Mbeki’s media image failure, but could not foresee (in 2005) how far that image would fail – Mbeki was eventually ousted of the ANC in the “Zunami” of Polokwane (Southall & Daniel, 2009).<sup>9</sup> Although this event is described in detail in observations by Calland (2013), Southall and Daniel (2009), and Du Preez (2013), there is hardly any significant analysis of this event on broadcast news.

### 3.5 2014

By 2014, the South African electorate was the youngest, largest, and most urbanised in the country’s democratic history, but the fifth poll also held the lowest voter turnout since 1994 (Southall, 2014: 5; Schulz-Herzenberg, 2014a: 34; *National vote turn out*, 2014).

---

<sup>9</sup> Although this event is described in detail in Calland (2013), Southall and Daniel (2009), and Du Preez (2013), there is hardly any significant analysis of this event on broadcast news. As discussed in Chapter 7 and 8, the reason for the lacuna in analysis of this event is because journalists themselves ignored the scandalous ousting of Mbeki. In fact, Mbeki’s presidency was all but wiped out in the 2009 and 2014 election coverage on both local and global news.

The election was also increasingly framed on local media as a battle between opposition and the ruling ANC (Southall, 2014: 5). Predominant themes of media coverage in 2014 include the shallow and narrowness of local coverage and an on-going concern for the freedom of the media.

Both Duncan (2014b) and Mattes (2014: 178) argue that the local media's representation of the 2014 election was shallow, event-driven, did not depart from general trends of mediatisation and neutrality, and lacked in contextual analysis. Again, the lack of analysis of international media perspectives is disappointing: the majority of research looks at South African media, which is a big difference from the 1994 scholarship, wherein the majority of studies looked at global media coverage. Duncan (2014b) acknowledges that although local media had a generally good and fair performance of covering the five democratic elections, there was increasingly shallow content. She notes (2014: 153) that the newly-formed EFF received most of the airtime coverage on the SABC; however, this airtime bias did not translate into EFF's performance at the polls and Duncan concludes, in much the same way that Jacobs did in 1999 and her earlier research in 2009, that the media do not really set the agenda in South African elections. The MMA (2014: 3) report found much the same: the depth of local coverage was shallow and superficial, while the narratives were minimal, or narrow.

Following with concerns raised in previous years, Duncan underlines the ANC's pressure on the "feisty press", under the guise of transformation (2014: 143). Consequently, *The New Age*, a new "government-friendly" and Gupta-owned paper, was launched in 2010. Although Duncan (2014: 143) finds no significant differences between South African newspapers, in 2015 and 2016 media freedom took an even greater turn for the worse with the ANC criticising "negative news" (Krüger, 2014) and demanding 70% "good

news” on the SABC, at the expense of covering citizen protests (Grootes & Essop, 2016; Shezi, 2016). Media freedom in South Africa is under increasing threat from government influence, political interference, and funding crises, and it is within this context of production that the news media covered the 2014 elections.

#### 4 SUMMARY

Overall, studies about the role of the local media during South African elections suggest that there has been a sharp decrease in the depth of political analysis on the media during the election years (Jacobs, 1999; Duncan, 2014; MMA, 2014), a widening gap between the citizen’s concerns and the media’s coverage of those issues (Jacobs, 1999), harsher political pressure on media freedom (Malila, 2014), and increasing tension between the media and government regarding political narratives, freedom, content, and ownership (Reid, 2014; Louw, 2014; De Beer et al., 2016). Finally, the international perspective of South Africa’s elections has sharply decreased since 1994, with 2004 and 2009 mostly unrepresented in global media research.

Significant gaps in the literature identified are firstly the neglect of broadcast news in analysing media coverage of the elections, and secondly the lack of semiotic data when analysing broadcast news coverage. This study will contribute significant data to both of these oversights in both breadth of analysis of South African election media coverage and depth of analysis in semiotic data about television news coverage. Chapter 2 sets out the methodology designed for this project.

## Chapter 2: Methodology

This chapter specifies the broadcast sampling method, qualitative nature of the analysis, and the triadic instrumentation approach devised specifically for analysis of a large-scale television news data set. Rudestam and Newton (2007: 111) suggest data collection for qualitative research should focus on fidelity and structure, and I have attempted to ensure both through a method I have developed specifically for analysing the multimodal medium of television news. The sample was chosen purposefully rather than randomly to meet the theoretical needs of this study, and so multiple sources of data were obtained – many broadcasts from many channels located on numerous sources – in order to provide theoretical saturation and confirmation of my emerging model. Continuing with Rudestam and Newton’s (2007) suggested checklist for qualitative research methods, I completed an “audit trail” – that is, a meticulous record of processes. All raw data and their locations were catalogued, evidence of how the data was reduced, analysed, synthesised, and processed was kept in comprehensive notes. This chapter outlines the processes conducted in collecting, reducing, synthesising, and preparing to analyse the news broadcasts – frequently referred to as the “data set”.

### 1 SAMPLE

News broadcasts are the predominant subjects of analysis in this study, and so the sampling design focused on collecting, reducing, and preparing this data set for analysis.

This section deals with the analysis subject: the sample dates, channels, search engines, archive access and organisation, and limitations of this sample.

### 1.1 Subject of analysis

The election periods of analysis were 1994 (26 – 29 April), 1999 (2 June), 2004 (14 April), 2009 (22 April), and 2014 (7 May), the five democratic general election dates in South Africa. The sample dates were chosen as the culmination of the election, where journalists would focus on the voting day(s) and events surrounding the election to ensure some kind of homogeneity to the topics covered. These sample dates do not ordinarily take into account the political campaigning or electioneering, and so most substantive election information will be missing from the sample. Selecting a wide sample time suggested a broader array of narratives throughout the sample years and “theoretical saturation” (suggested by Rudestam and Newton, 2007: 107, discussed later in this chapter) was reached during this sampling process: broadcasts were chosen from numerous channels until no new broadcasts, narratives, or themes were discovered during and about the voting days. The literature review contextualising each election year assisted in discovering the theoretical saturation point (*ibid.*) of the data collection.

The type of narrative analysis used in this study is qualitative and based on grounded theory developed from a literature review and observation of empirical data. As Rudestam and Newton (2007: 107) suggest, such studies are inductive and the theory evolves as more data is collected and explored. As such, a precise sample is “neither possible nor advisable... [while] open sampling might be the most appropriate” (*ibid.*) in these situations. Further sampling is often required to saturate a concept to explore it comprehensively so that it becomes theoretically meaningful (*ibid.*). Such theoretical

saturation occurred during the second stage of sampling – which I term “coding for interest” – as described in sections 1.2 and 1.3.

#### 1.1.1 The channels

This study originally began with a sample of nine news channels – Al Jazeera English (AJE); Sky News; BBC World; CNN International; SABC 1, 2, 3, and SABC online; and eNCA. However, as the study progressed, it appeared that very few broadcasts were available (either online or in offline paid-for archives) from these nine channels. For example, AJE only started broadcasting in 2008 and so the first three election periods were unavailable on this channel. Therefore, the sample of broadcasts was extended to a more nonspecific, purposive, and accessible style – the time period was of more importance than the channels, and so I collected as many broadcasts as possible from a range of possible channels during the timeframe. I used a variety of search and retrieval methods including search engines and news archives.

#### 1.1.2 Search engines

Despite being the first point of entry into the field, single search engines were not the only data sampling methods because Google, and other web crawlers, have ranking systems that inherently delimit the number of results contained in any one search. In 2005, Brophy and Bawden conducted a comparative study between the accuracy and efficiency of web-based search engines (Google, for instance) and traditional library-based searching. They concluded that Google was vastly superior in coverage and accessibility, but acknowledged that the researcher’s skill in using the information technology could skew the repeatable results in searching via Google (2005: 510–511). While their study is out-dated, mostly because of the speed with which IT develops and the increased efficiency and breadth of Google algorithms in recent years, their conclusions remain valid. The researcher’s skill in searching Google with semantic

variations of keywords definitely affects the results. The University of Bristol's document (*Search Engines*, 2015) on the use of search engines over traditional library searches reflects Brophy and Bawden's concerns almost a decade earlier regarding the quantity and quality of sources. Many sources are hidden from search engines because they are old or outmoded (*Search Engines*, 2015), while researcher bias in choosing certain keywords over others may skew the delivered results.

Boeker, Vach, and Motschaller (2013) conducted an investigation into the efficiency and quality of Google Scholar searches with regard to medical journal references. The study looked at referencing and citations, but the findings can be applied to the overall limitations for search engines as a sole method of data collecting. The authors argue that all sources are not guaranteed to be available at the time of doing the search, because the web crawler may miss certain sources: "Search results will change over time when indexing changes due to accessibility of source documents or databases" (2013). The authors explain that the Google search engine technology uses ranking algorithms that, "by [their] sheer size and technological power... are able to index everything which is accessible via the Internet, store it in large distributed databases and deliver results in milliseconds" (ibid.). These algorithms, however, do not make any claims to be "complete", as stated in the legal disclaimer of Google – when resources are closed, for instance like the paid-for archives on Getty Images and the SABC, Google is unable to rank the documents or data. Therefore, the search engine is ultimately "dependent on the fundamental accessibility of scientific texts over the internet, of the will of the publishers and libraries to cooperate and open their repositories for indexing" (ibid.). I therefore acknowledge that the Internet is not a static repository of information and that certain inherent biases do exist in the archival techniques.

Therefore, in this study, I started using YouTube, Vimeo, ITN Source, and AP Archive to search for free broadcasts, but moved to paid-for access once these sources were expired. I contacted Getty Images, BBC Motion Gallery, and the SABC and eTV archives to gather broadcasts during the sample periods. Media Tenor and Media Monitoring Africa were unhelpful in this regard despite numerous contact attempts to gather data.

### 1.1.3 Archive organisation

South African digital news archives are difficult to access, available only through dedicated paid-for search teams. While some archives are well maintained yet expensive, others are disorganised but affordable. Both mainstream and independent South African news channels have recently used free-to-access digital video upload websites such as YouTube to catalogue the archives. However, in the case of the SABC and eTV/eNCA, these archives do not stretch back further than 2011. Archivist Carmen Whitcher at eTV was particularly helpful in negotiating an affordable price for 10 eTV/eNCA broadcasts. Given extra time and money, further broadcasts could be sought, but at the time funding only allowed the use of 10. The SABC provided 29 suitable broadcasts for a much smaller fee.<sup>10</sup> The 2014 election sample was greatly bolstered by the digitisation of the archives from these mainstream broadcasters post-2011.

Global archives were much easier to access – Getty Images teamed up with the BBC Motion Gallery in 2014, allowing for a more convenient search. Getty does not necessitate paid-for archival searching, as viewing of low-res broadcasts is free. CBC,

---

<sup>10</sup> The SABC provided basic overviews and transcripts of the broadcasts available, and I requested the broadcast title for retrieval by the archivist. When the DVDs arrived, however, some of the broadcasts were not as per the transcript (two were Nguni news, three had 2016 cricket matches recorded over the end of the broadcasts, and some contained raw footage that was unsuitable for this analysis). Archival techniques at the SABC left a lot to be desired, although the hard work of Duma-Sandile Mboni and Sias Scott at the SABC lessened much of the frustration.



ITN Source, and AP Archive were further free-to-access television news archives. Ultimately, the digitisation of news has improved access, allowing researchers to view and analyse historical broadcasts with ease. Convergence journalism in recent years means that channels now frequently upload directly to dedicated websites (Sky News, AJE, EWN, and EuroNews catalogue broadcasts by year and by type). Therefore, the jump in broadcast availability was significant post-2009.<sup>11</sup> Of course, “ease of access” depends on the scholar’s location. This research was conducted at the University of Cape Town in South Africa between 2014 and 2017, and so internet access, speed, and cost were less of a problem than for, say, a scholar in a less digitally connected part of the world. Streaming live broadcasts is extremely data-heavy, while delivery of archival material from eNCA via encrypted download relied on a stable and high-speed internet connection. Unlike print news, broadcasts are necessarily large files that need to be stored, delivered, and re-watched using up-to-date technology. The digital divide may therefore limit the repeated analysis of this data set in future research.

#### 1.1.4 Limitations

Focusing on the sample time rather than the channels ensured that theoretical saturation was reached across a number of local and global news channels. However, a range of factors limits this methodology, from the sample medium and dates and language of the study, to the content actually analysed. First, this sample contains only those broadcasts available online or through paid-for archival companies, with the 2014 broadcasts being the exception – these broadcasts were sampled at the time, via a personal video recorder and by screen capturing the broadcasts live onto the computer. As such, the number of broadcasts in 2014 is far in excess of the previous years, which may skew the results of

---

<sup>11</sup> The total broadcasts analysed for this study numbered 153, and the entire data set has been donated to the Centre for Film and Media Studies at the University of Cape Town post submission of this thesis. See Appendix 1 for a brief description of all channels sampled in this study.

this study. The data sets for each year are uneven, which affects the conclusions able to be drawn about the election coverage.

Second, the digitisation of the 2009 and 2014 election periods again distorts the number of broadcasts available. Barring the 2014 elections, all broadcasts were collected and analysed in retrospect, and thus the data collection relied on external sources to upload and archive broadcasts. There may have been reasons why certain broadcasts were not included in their archives (perceived as uninteresting, censorship, access to digitisation techniques, and so forth).

Third, I sampled only English-language broadcasts that had been archived and digitalised – this neglects non-Western non-English perceptions of South African democracy, as well as those broadcasters who do not have access to digitisation equipment. This bias was unavoidable due to time and funding constraints of this study. Further development of this research project could take into account the language barriers by employing translators as well as finding access to non-digitalised broadcasts.

Fourth, this methodology is limited in the context of the analysis – it is only the encoding of media messages into the text and only the text itself that forms the basis of this study, rather than any type of perception or decoding on the part of the audience. This study only evaluates content, and so can only speculate as to the reasons behind particular frames and narratives and their effects.

Finally, this sample takes into account only the election years and voting week of South Africa's democracy, rather than an overarching view of the country's experience with democracy. A few notable example broadcasts are included outside of the sample time

(see the next section on broadcasts for a description of this), but overall this study only looks at a narrow timeframe of the elections. As such, the findings from this sample cannot be generalised to the entirety of South Africa's experience of democracy because that is much more than just the elections. Each chapter will include a historical discussion that will attempt to address this limitation and contextualise the (dis)engagement of democracy in the country.

## 1.2 Sample 1: All broadcasts

The sample of this study is based on a two-step sampling design. The first sample included all known broadcasts obtained through an accessible or purposive design: keywords were typed into multiple search engines and downloaded onto a computer for later analysis. Search engines included the Google Videos search, DMOZ<sup>12</sup> topic search, Wolfram Alpha, Vimeo, and YouTube. Archival companies that provided both free and paid-for broadcasts included Getty Images (which houses the BBC Motion Gallery and the Sky News archive) and archives from AP, ITN, Internet TV, the SABC, and eTV.

During the data collection, I contacted SABC Digital Archives, eTV, Media Tenor, and Media Monitoring Africa for assistance in gathering footage. While SABC Digital Archives and eTV provided 30 broadcasts and 10 broadcasts respectively at cost, both Media Tenor and Media Monitoring Africa were not forthcoming with broadcasts or assistance. Keywords used within the search engines included various permutations of the following: [Year] South African election / [Year] South Africa / South African election / -voting / -democracy / -president / Jacob Zuma / Thabo Mbeki / Nelson Mandela. All broadcasts that related to democracy, the elections, any of the presidential

---

<sup>12</sup> DMOZ stands for Directory Mozilla search engine, which closed in March 2017

candidates or political parties, political campaigns, the electorate, the democratic process, or any of the issues in the various election manifestos were selected and downloaded, regardless of length, channel, reporter, or location.

This sample took place predominantly between February and August 2014, but new data appeared continuously until February 2015 when theoretical saturation was achieved.

Data collection relied heavily on access to broadcasts via the Internet due to geographical location (many broadcast archives are only available in South Africa via an internet connection), time, funding, and space.<sup>13</sup> Gathering broadcasts for academic study through paid-for archives comes at great cost, and many broadcasters are unwilling to allow temporary access. However, some companies offer a preview of larger broadcasts (such as Getty Images and BBC Motion Gallery), which meant I could watch the watermarked and pixelated broadcasts without needing to pay for the full-sized broadcast. Paid-for archival footage from both the SABC and eTV archives were accessed at considerable cost, co-funded through the National Research Foundation Innovation scholarship, the Centre for Film and Media Studies, and Next Generation Social Sciences in Africa fellowship sponsored by the Carnegie Foundation.

### 1.2.1 Theoretical saturation

Sampling continued until there was theoretical saturation of the narratives – I noted themes and narratives of each year until no new relevant narratives emerged from analysis of the available local and global broadcasts. Rudestam and Newton (2007: 108) suggest that real saturation never really occurs because the data, in this case each broadcast, has something unique to contribute to the study. “It is usually the researcher

---

<sup>13</sup> Because of the reliance on ease of access and digitisation of broadcasts, the sample of channels selected for this study is not all encompassing. Missing from this list are, notably, Fox News from America, RT from Russia, any African channels barring the South African SABC, eTV, AfricaNews, and AmandlaTV, or Kenya’s NTV, and any regional channels such as ITV 3 in the UK. With greater resources and more time, the sample could be increased and further narratives discovered.

who becomes saturated,” they suggest, and that “it is important to collect sufficient data to represent the breadth and depth of the phenomenon without becoming overwhelmed. The longer, more detailed, and intensive the transcripts, the fewer the number of [broadcasts]” are needed (ibid.). The detailed transcript and analysis process conducted in this study is described later in this chapter and in Jones (2016).

Sampling was halted in February 2015 because theoretical saturation occurred, but with better digitisation processes and techniques and increased time and funding, more news broadcasts prior to 2009 may be accessible and add to the findings presented in this study. I watched the total number of broadcasts for a first time (referred to as “the first pass”) and noted narratives and important events. This first sample resulted in 366 broadcasts across five election years. Not all broadcasts were suitable for final analysis, however, and the final number had to be reduced to match the research questions, discussed in the next section.

### 1.3 Sample 2: Coding for interest

Because of the initial size of this study, it was not feasible to semiotically analyse each news spot that was broadcast during the sample time periods and I therefore implemented rules for selection and rejection from the final sample. This study analyses the shifting and continuous narratives of the South African elections, focusing on the stories told by local and global television news channels. Therefore, the principals for inclusion and exclusion were based on the research questions and predominantly focused on framing and mediation. In order to reduce the 366 broadcasts to a relevant and manageable sample for discourse and semiotic analyses, I employed a method of “coding for interest”. Sample 2 took place between December 2014 and August 2015.

### 1.3.1 Selection and rejection

I watched all broadcasts again (which I termed the “second pass”), and selected any broadcast narrative that related to democracy, voting, voters, the South African election legacy, presidential candidates, campaigns, the electorate, any of the issues in the election manifestos, or any broadcast/package that gave important background information to these themes. Additionally, the “coded for interest” list included any broadcast that was a package, insert, documentary-style programme, journalist direct-to-camera address, outside broadcast, vox pop compilation, or news spot, so long as mediation was present in the form of editing and narration.

Conversely, broadcasts that had minimal framing by journalists and mediation from the broadcasters were disregarded because it is mediation and juxtaposition of audio and visual that creates the framing narratives of interest to this study. The only broadcasts relevant were those that represented South African election processes, democracy, and so forth, with news values. Content analysis is not the only method of this study – quantifying the number of broadcasts dedicated to South Africa during each election year does not reveal the narratives about the elections, and so the principals for exclusion focused on content and context, rather than simply quantity. I therefore disregarded any broadcasts that consisted of only speeches from leaders with no input or mediation from reporters; that didn’t have audio input from journalists (such as raw packages as found in the AP and SABC archives); that were unaired or non-finalised broadcasts (such as the many hours of raw broadcast data provided by the SABC archives); that didn’t have visual input (such as the podcasts from multiple radio archives); that didn’t represent the South African democratic process (such as CCTV’s Zimbabwean package from 1999, which mentioned Nelson Mandela but centred on China’s involvement in Zimbabwean politics); or that were simply clips of people voting or speeches from candidates without

significant input from journalists. None of these broadcasts reflected the narratives of mediation from broadcasters, and had no active framing of news values, and were thus disregarded.


Finally, I included some broadcasts that were outside the sample timeframe (such as the Born Free discussion on CNN in January 2009 – *Inside South Africa: South African youth vote*, CNN, 2009) or that were not entirely related to democracy (such as the BBC’s gangland investigation in April 2009 – *Grassy Park*, CNN, 2009), because these packages are important to understand the context of the elections as represented both locally and globally, such as electoral issues (crime/corruption) and electorate (the Born Frees/gangs in the Western Cape), or journalistic practices when reporting on South African democracy (*The Big Story*, CNN, 1994; *World Insight*, CCTV, 2009).

### 1.3.2 Coded for interest excel sheet

Through the above process, the total 366 broadcasts were reduced to a final total of 153 “coded for interest” broadcasts across the five years (see Graph 2.1 for a breakdown per year). I created a separate excel sheet entitled “[Year] Coded for Interest”, which was placed within the respective year’s computer file along with the year’s broadcasts. This excel sheet had seven columns, including 1) Number of Broadcast, 2) Title of Broadcast, 3) Channel, 4) Journalist, 5) Themes, 6) Events, 7) Parties. This excel sheet formed the major analysis document. I then reduced this master list into separate sheets for each channel, and repeated the columns. It was therefore possible to have a quick overview of the number of broadcasts per channel, theme type, political party depicted on each broadcast, and so forth. This was repeated across each election year.

#### 1.4 Final tally


Of the 153 broadcasts on 24 channels selected for analysis, the majority centred on the 2014 election as seen in Graph 2.1. The sudden jump in broadcasts from 2009 onwards could be because of increased digitisation and improved archival techniques over the years. The paucity of broadcasts available in both 1999 and 2004 represented two things: firstly, the gap across 1999 and 2004 broadcasts is a finding in itself, explored throughout this thesis in Chapters 4, 5, and 8, and secondly, the scarcity of broadcasts means that the sample was uneven, making it difficult to analyse these two years with the same amount of detail devoted to other years. Despite attempts to increase the sample size for both years, the final tally was poor for both 1999 and 2004.




Graph 2.1

Despite a problematic archiving process at the broadcaster, the SABC provided the most broadcasts for each sample year, with a total of 29 over the five sample dates. As seen in Graph 2.2, the range of channels for this project is diverse. Channels were divided into geographic regions (Graphs 2.3 – 2.6) to investigate any narrative differences that may occur due to location. At the start of each analysis section in Chapters 3 through 7, I outline the channels analysed for that particular election year.






Graph 2.2<sup>14</sup>




Graph 2.3




Graph 2.4

<sup>14</sup> See Appendix 1 for a brief discussion of these channels



Graph 2.5



Graph 2.6

A total of 51 broadcasts were available from the African channels, 33 from North American channels, 44 from European channels, and 25 from Asian and Middle Eastern channels. As seen in the above graphs, the major contributors to broadcasts were mainstream news channels: the SABC, CNN, the BBC and Sky News, and AJE, but were complemented by newswires (AP, AFP, and Reuters) as well as non-mainstream channels in later years (PressTV, NTDTV, AfricaNews, and AmandlaTV).

Each broadcast was viewed a third time, and a brief outline of the narrative (the story narrative, vox pops and journalist discourse, campaign/election issues, visuals, and juxtapositions) was noted in the seventh column, including any supplementary information such as my own reactions or reflections on this information. Conducting this third pass of the sample ensured cognizance with the broadcasts, themes, and the

narratives. This final pass included a three-step methodology of analysis using the following instrumentation.

## 2 INSTRUMENTATION

This study of television news broadcasts analysed the data with an instrument of my own adaption and design. The triadic multimodal methodology of analysis has been published elsewhere (Jones, 2016), and I detail the qualitative instrument in full below, starting with the characteristics of the data, including its visualness and rhetoric, and then moving to the characteristics of the instrument itself, including discourse analysis, semiotics, and acknowledging the production context of the broadcasts.

### 2.1 Characteristics of the data

#### 2.1.1 The visual-ness of television

While scholars tend to focus on the ‘top down’ analysis of media coverage of elections (that is, from a political science perspective, rather than visual or cultural studies), many studies identify key terms and concepts within the television coverage. For example, Bucy and Grabe (2007) identify the “lip flap” (2007: 662), where the candidate is shot in a medium close-up in formal speech stance but is not heard; instead, the journalist conducts a voice-over. This term is similar to their later discussion on “image bites” (Grabe & Bucy, 2009), but includes the ‘re-voicing’ by a journalist. Bucy and Grabe argue that this is unflattering and discouraged. The authors also identify “visual primacy” (2007: 656), whereby the audience more readily remembers visuals than content. This ties

into the arguments of Louw (2005: 33), Strömbäck (2008: 231), and Bennett (2012: 2) where television alters the way political information is packaged.

Most research about television news sorely lacks grounding in semiotic theory (Grabe, 1996; Norris, 1997; Druckman, 2005; Bucy & Grabe, 2007; Cushion & Strömbäck, 2015; Cushion, Thomas, & Ellis, 2015), which would significantly enhance the visual analysis. Schieß (2007) considers the semiotics of television coverage of the election night, in terms of graphics, editing styles, and studio sets, but he too criticises previous television researchers: “Both media analysts and critical discourse analysts seem to have closed their eyes to visual analysis” (2007: 277), and this is despite the ground-breaking visual work of the Glasgow University Media Group (1976, 1980, 1982) and the constant reminders of the importance of the visual (Fiske & Hartley, 1978: 15; Montgomery, 2007; Bucy & Grabe, 2007: 653). Only recently have researchers started acknowledging *television* (Schieß, 2007: 277). Kress and Van Leeuwen (1996, 1998, 2001) and Scollon (2004) have stated that multimodal analysis methods emphasise the interconnections between the varieties of communication methods on television news.

In much of the recent scholarship dedicated to television coverage of elections (Eargle, Esmail, & Sullivan, 2008; Strömbäck, 2008; Cushion, Thomas, & Ellis, 2015; Holtz-Bacha, 2016), election narratives, biased coverage, and themes of representation are often measured in the length of time participants appear on the screen. Context and visual analysis is significantly overlooked. Even research that is supposedly dedicated to the visual (Grabe, 1996; Bucy & Grabe, 2007; Schieß, 2007) and discourse content (Hubbard, 2010; Rose, 2014) gets caught up in the quantitative length measurement while at the same time espousing the necessity of visual analysis of election and campaign portrayal on television news. Of course, taking into account only the length of time a

political party is on air when considering bias and favourability of media is extraordinarily limiting – Grabe argues that “a stop watch cannot entirely measure matters of judgement, and counting words omits nuance” (1996: 7).<sup>15</sup>

### 2.1.2 Multi-layered rhetoric

Because television news is a multi-layered rhetoric inclusive of audio (discourse, language, speech acts), visual (semiotics, visual rhetoric, gestures), and the context of production (media ownership, financial structures, political economy), using one research methodology on such a medium would be limiting and would negate much of what makes television news an intricate meaning-making vehicle. Therefore, I wanted the instrumentation of analysing these broadcasts to meet the following criteria: it should allow for both audio and visual denotative and connotative values; it should allow for these two tracks’ oppositions or juxtapositions to one another; it should consider the context of production of the broadcasts; and it should be coherent, efficient, systematic, and detailed. This study is primarily qualitative in nature, with some basic quantification to highlight narrative frequency within the broadcasts, and as such makes no real claims of validity or reliability. Still, it considers efficiency and organisation a priority. Thus, the accurate transcribing of each broadcast along with the subsequent analysis thereof leads to an enhanced trustworthiness of both the data and the discussion, as the analysis is empirically grounded in those broadcasts that are the focus of the study. Accurate and straightforward transcriptions of broadcasts allow for consistency in decoding the latent

---

<sup>15</sup> There may be a common-sense reason for this focus. Strom (2007: 2) suggests that a political party’s access to the media is often regarded in three levels: Proportional Access, whereby the larger the party’s support base, the greater the coverage dedicated to that party; Positively Biased, whereby the smaller the party, the greater the access to airtime; and finally Equal Access, where all parties have the same amount of airtime and newspaper space. Perhaps these levels, in particular the latter, dictate why television news researchers are so focused on the length measurement as an indicator of media bias – the more airtime given to one political party, the more ‘biased’ the newspaper or broadcaster.

and manifest meanings, while the analysis that follows draws heavily on these transcriptions and readings of oppositions or juxtapositions.

## 2.2 Characteristics of the instrument

I adapted various sources of multimodal analysis to design an original instrument of analysis. I drew on Sandra Dueck's (1995) Master's thesis on the rhetoric of television news provided the model of transcription, while Montgomery (2007) and Chandler (1994c) provided the knowledge to unite the visual with the audio transcriptions. The inherent rhetoric of a television news broadcast is multi-layered with three potential levels to the broadcast: the audio, the visual, and decisions made in the production. Each level was examined with a separate research approach. News broadcasts are also polysemic. The visual track combines and juxtaposes with the audio to create this multi-layered text. The linguistic and visual syntagms, symbolism, cultural allusions, and tropes may shed light on news values and agenda setting, framing, and bias in much the same way as discourse analysis helps us to understand print or semiotic analysis unpacks photojournalism or film.

### 2.2.1 Encoding and decoding

This method deals predominantly with the encoding (Hall, 1973) of messages into a medium, rather than the decoding or audience engagement with the text, but acknowledges the inevitable gap between the encoding and decoding of the news media text. This methodology lies between the structural and post-structural application of news media analysis. While the method draws on structural semiotics and discourse analyses, further development is needed to close the 'decoding gap' between the author's encoding of meaning into the text and the audience's involvement in and engagement with a plurality of meanings, which is outside the scope of this study.

While post-structuralists may argue that a single meaning is ultimately uncertain (Pope, 1998: 127), primarily because of the cultural location and the prioritisation of decoder over encoder (Fourie, 2007:173), this methodology does not speak to that argument. Television news broadcasts are, by their very nature, polysemic and so one certain meaning is naturally impossible to locate. Using social semiotics and a limited critical discourse analysis method for the visual and audio tracks allows the researcher to subject the text to paradigmatic substitutions without implying one certain *priori* meaning, but rather infer the multitude of juxtaposed and interacting meanings within the text.

To this respect, semiotics and discourse analysis are useful tools to pick apart the interwoven layers of meaning in a television news broadcast in order to suggest a preferred reading of the text, while political economy theory of the media can be operationalized to investigate the external influences on production of meaning within the text. While political economy of the media is not a method, per se, but rather a theory, the categorisation process of this method allows for and anticipates the application of this theory at a later stage, when analysing the themes within each channel and election year for example.

I present here what I term the triadic multimodal approach to analysing news broadcasts. The triadic approach starts with the discourse, moves on to the semiotic analysis of visuals, looks for juxtapositions between the two, and then considers the external pressures of media production on the news texts. I outline each method in turn.

### 2.2.2 Discourse

Wodak (2011: 40) suggests critical discourse analysis does not necessarily have a fixed method but begins with the research topic, is informed via theory, and further refined to

construct the objects of the specified research. In this way, discourse analysis takes its form from the research problem rather than a deductive methodology. Discourse analysis often overlaps with visual rhetoric in both semantics and syntactics. While the visual rhetoric perspective analyses the symbolic signification in meaning creation, discourse analysis looks at the words, metaphor creation, phrases, and allusion. Paradigmatic and syntagmatic analyses are present within discourse analysis, and as such should be analysed in a similar qualitative fashion. Machin and Mayr (2012) alight upon this overlap too, and discuss the semiotic choices within analysing discourse, allowing for an in-depth critical analysis of speech and language choices. However, when analysing television news, it is important to remember that the juxtapositions between the semiotic visuals and the discourse speech are important, rather than focussing too heavily on one aspect or the other. When researching television news, it is not necessary or advisable to delve too far into critical discourse analysis. Doing so would make the analysis large and unmanageable. The objective with this methodology was to find juxtapositions and oppositions between the image *plus* the audio, as this opposition between tracks provides the most significant meanings. A deep textual analysis on either the visual or the audio may negate the focus on the juxtapositions.

Before any discourse analysis can take place, accurate transcriptions should reflect both the audio and the visual tracks to decipher juxtapositions. Dueck's (1995) Master's thesis on the rhetoric of television news was extremely helpful here. Montgomery (2007), too, gives a detailed discussion of transcription guides, but Dueck has a more straightforward style that incorporated the juxtapositions between visual and audio. Her transcriptions illustrated the line-by-line discourse of the speakers with a brief description of the images alongside. The spoken and written word anchors the images to a preferred reading (Bignell, 2002: 42; Van Heerden, 2008: 216) and is a key aspect to news analysis. Such in-



depth transcriptions made it far easier to analyse the overall tone of the broadcast as well as to discover the latent and manifest focus of individual stories.

For this study, Dueck's structure was adapted with additional columns to locate specific televisual elements and juxtapositions in line with a combination of semiotic and discourse methodologies. The transcription method is explained in depth in my article, Jones (2016), and Table 2.1 gives a short example. Column 1 separates the discourse into "paragraphs" – each change in the visual, the event, or the speaker separates the paragraphs. Column 2 details the speaker (journalist, vox pop, interviewee, and so forth). Column 3 lists arbitrarily split lines, making specific discourse analysis at a linguistic or word-item level easier. Column 4 details the words or audio in the broadcast. Column 5 is the time code for the broadcast, helpful to locate the specific scene for the author, reader, or future scholars. Column 6 lists a brief description of the images on screen, using filmic terminology, for future semiotic analysis and reference. Finally, column 7 holds space for any remarks or reflections from the researcher. This careful transcription method makes discourse analysis easier and allows for the simultaneous semiotic analysis on the visual track to occur without additional transcriptions. All "coded for interest" broadcasts were transcribed thus.

Pa	Speaker	Li	Audio	Time Code	Visuals	Remarks
1	Emma Hurd	1	You're looking at South Africa's next	0:00 - 0:16	Zuma singing on stage with ANC elite, swaying to Umshini Wami	Simplification of Struggle songs, separation of participant and viewer
		2	president, a man who's zulu anthem			
		3	is Bring Me My Machine Gun. And			
		4	Jacob Zuma is about to shake up this			
		5	country for better or worse.			
2		6	Nelson Mandela turned out to support	0:16 - 0:26	Mandela smiling but passive, zoom out to dancing Zuma and Winnie	
		7	him at this final triumphant election			
		8	rally, entrusting his legacy to the ANC's			
		9	most controversial leader yet.			
3	Jacob Zuma	10	Working together, we can do more	0:26 - 0:32	MCU on Zuma speaking on stage	
		11	to build a better life for all.			
	Emma Hurd	12	Jacob Zuma's rise to power	0:32 - 0:35	MCU on Zuma in skins	
4		13	has been remarkable.	0:35 - 0:38	LS on Zuma in skins (with white takkies on)	
5		14	He has no formal education	0:38 - 0:40	Zuma seated in skins and pushing glasses up with middle finger	
6			15	and still practices a traditional	0:40 - 0:50	Zuma dancing in traditional skins, misteps, and falls over into the crowd as he dances
	16		polygamous lifestyle. He's also over-			
	17		come allegations of rape and corruption			
	18		that might have felled his political			
	19		career.	On "felled" JZ falls over		

Table 2.1: Example transcription<sup>16</sup>

### 2.2.3 Semiotics

Considering only the audio of news broadcasts and ignoring the visual would be extraordinarily limiting, as television news is a visual and culturally located product. Thus, to gauge the various meanings of such a medium, visual semiotics must be analysed similarly. Two types of semiotic theory were considered for this study – traditional, based on Barthes' research, and social semiotics, taking into account Kress and Van Leeuwen's analysis technique.

The traditional semiotic method of Barthes' (1968) three levels of meaning – connotation/signification, denotation, and ideology/myth – is a logical point from which to depart in semiotic analysis of the media, but the scale of study involved in this project

<sup>16</sup> Transcript excerpt from Emma Hurd, *ANC's Jacob Zuma divides South Africa*, Sky News, 2009

complicated the use of this method. With over 150 broadcasts of about 3–5 minutes each, three levels of meaning applied to the visual in such a close textual analysis was inappropriate. Barthes' method of analysis appears suitable for a smaller analysis of imagery – such as still photography or frame analysis. Thus, the semiotic theory of visual analysis was investigated further to encompass this data set.

All three segments of traditional semiotic theory are located in news broadcasts: semantics in the denotation of words, images, phrases, signs, and symbols; syntactics regarding the paradigmatic and syntagmatic elements within the texts; and pragmatics in the investigation of the connotative value of the texts and context. Paradigmatic levels of signification assist in identifying latent or obscured meanings within the texts, or elucidate manifest meanings, while paradigmatic substitution illustrates additional latent meanings, and thus this section of traditional semiotic theory was widely used throughout the analysis of these news broadcasts. When discussing paradigmatic analysis, Daniel Chandler (1994a) suggests,

analysing textual absences can help to reveal whose interests are served by their omission. Such analysis pays particular attention to the issue of which questions are left unasked... The analysis of paradigmatic relations helps to define the 'value' of specific items in the text.

Gestures, imagery, symbolism, framing, and photography can be analysed according to the paradigmatic, syntagmatic, and different levels of signification to discover themes of representation within news broadcasts. Entman (1991: 6–7) explains that news framing consists of symbols and signification, metaphors, and visual imagery. These combine, repeat, and become a news narrative. Frames can often be detected by probing for words and imagery that appear consistently and convey semiotic meaning. Hence, traditional semiotic theory that stems from linguistics is useful and necessary in understanding news

narratives. However, traditional structuralist semiotics can be limiting when analysing news broadcasts because the theory does not allow for contextual analysis of media production or cultural studies. These external pressures on the meaning-making process of news broadcasts must be considered, otherwise a large section of what makes television news important would be neglected. Thus, social semiotics and visual rhetoric form part of this multimodal approach.

In terms of social semiotics, Kress and Van Leeuwen (2005) present useful terminology designed to analyse images. While predominantly designed for analysis of static imagery (such as print advertising or photojournalism), their research is still helpful when analysing moving images, because camera shots, angles, participant positioning, and vectors still occur in news broadcasts with frequency. Using this terminology for analysis of a complex text such as broadcast news enables an easier interpretation of the text's symbolic meaning.

In reference to the binaries often found within news texts, Berger (2004: 22) says, “discerning meaning without finding polar oppositions is like listening to the sound of one hand clapping.” He sets out a step-by-step guide for analysing television items semiotically, in line with Chandler's (1994b) *Grammar of Film and Television*. The first step, Berger (2004: 35–36) suggests, is to isolate and analyse the important signs and signifiers within the text, and second to identify the paradigmatic structure, including oppositions. Third, find the syntagmatic elements and structure of the text. Fourth, echoing McLuhan's (1967) call to consider the medium of the message, Berger suggests that the medium of television could affect the text, and so elements such as shot scale, angles, editing, and *mise-en-scene* considerations should be discussed. Both Berger and Chandler developed guides that are powerful multimodal analytical tools. While semiotic analyses

are inherently limited by their subjective nature – as well as by the post-structural struggle that exists with the nature of meaning – Berger and Chandler’s step-by-step guides assist in expedient coherence when researching a complicated sign vehicle like television news.

With close textual analysis using both semiotics and discourse analysis, the television news broadcasts in this data set were, for the most part, efficiently and effectively analysed to discover latent and manifest meanings, but one layer of meaning still lay hidden: that of the encoder or author, and the context within which the broadcast was produced. Media studies does not exist within a vacuum and so the possible external influences and pressures on the meaning-making process were analysed in conjunction with the visual and audio.

#### 2.2.4 Production context and juxtapositions

Authors of media texts are not only journalists and participants, but gatekeepers and editors and owners too. Eduardo Galeano once posited that “never have so many been held incommunicado by so few” (cited in Christiansen & Koeman, 2015: 66), a pessimistic view that suggests an oligopoly of expression and communication represses the mass communication structures. While these levels of control are not necessarily repressive, the gatekeeping structures certainly affect the encoding process of media texts. The interplay between economic and symbolic dimensions of communication is the object of study in this layer, while the impact of economic organisation on cultural industries (such as television news sources) on the meaning production and circulation provide a deeper understanding on the overall preferred reading of the text. Whether the text authors are able to secure this preferred reading amongst their target audience is a subject best tackled in a separate, dedicated study, as this is not the focus here. Political economy of the media asks questions about the access to and production of news media,

and is rooted in the social sciences including economics, political science, and sociology. While political economy of the media is a wide and diverse field of thought, this methodology focuses on the context of the news item or channel in question, rather than the field at large. The aim of this style of study is efficiency and coherence, with a focus on the juxtapositions between the multimodal levels of meaning creation, and delving into the wide field of political economy theory would only complicate the objectives.

Moreover, newsroom politics change over time and the analysis of broadcasts from a range of years (1994 to 2014) requires acknowledgement of this shift. While inferences of media production processes are not possible from within the bounds of this study, as it is primarily a semiotic and qualitative content analysis, it is important to acknowledge the production context of each broadcast and each election year. The external influences on the meaning construction process are, according to McQuail (1987: 203) and Chandler (1994c), a key issue that separates news media from other forms, such as films or fiction television. Additionally, all news texts are numerous authored, from the cameraperson and journalist to editors, schedulers, scriptwriters, and news owners and funders. Each contributor to the news broadcast infers a certain amount of gatekeeping in the message construction, and so their influence should be acknowledged when analysing the message and medium. This methodology acknowledges the influence, using Fiske (1987), Zellizer (1990), and Chandler (1994c) as a basis for identification of the author. Because the focus of this study is the juxtaposition between various elements within the broadcasts, the inference of newsroom culture and political economy of the media serves as a contextual exercise to the juxtapositions.

A final step in this triadic multimodal methodology is the most important: drawing meaning from juxtaposition and difference, framed against the context of media

production. Through a method of paradigmatic substitution (Chandler, 1994a), some of the numerous possible visible and hidden meanings of the news broadcast can be inferred. Differences between the audio and the visual narratives may show ideological meanings: for example, a journalist speaking of the government's plan for economic stability post-apartheid and showing the Marikana massacre at the same time (*What issues face the ANC after South African elections*, BBC, 2014) creates a brutal juxtaposition that frames the government unsympathetically and suggests the ANC represses protests for the control of the economy. Contrasts between audio and visual cannot be overstated for importance.

Juxtaposition also took place at a second level of data analysis: the channel, year, journalist, and participant. Channels reporting on the same event (the car bombing in 1994, for example) could evaluate the events differently, presumably based on the assumed ideology of that channel. Possible perspectives of the channel are informed partly through the literature review as well as through investigation into the channel's political economy. The juxtaposition between channel and event (CNN's *Bloody Sunday at High Noon* reporting of the car bomb in 1994 versus Sky News's reporting on the same car bombing *Sky News Sunrise* is very different), year and participant (Thabo Mbeki's profile as candidate in 1999 versus his glorification as president in 2004), and journalist and event (Emma Hurd's Zuma profile on Sky News's *ANC's Jacob Zuma divides South Africa* versus Nkepile Mabuse's Zuma profile on CNN's *Inside Africa: South African election*, both from 2009), form further analyses of this data set.

Multiple phased data analysis started at the broad observation of themes to focusing down on individual words and signs. Overarching themes and narratives of the election broadcasts per year comprised the broad, top level of investigation; juxtapositions between discourse and audio, and between variables such as years, Western/non-Western channels, global/local channels, were noted at the middle level; and individual discourse and semiotic data, such as words and signs, were noted at the micro level.

For example, the broad analysis of the 2009 election narrative on Sky News included a tendency to mythologise political candidates and the election process in the country through themes of conflict, corruption, and a breaking of democracy. At the middle level, Sky News conducted most of the mythologizing through the juxtapositions used during their broadcasts, particularly in relation to the political leaders – Sky News mocked Jacob Zuma as corrupt, controversial, and clumsy, falling into a crowd of people and singing off-key at a rally (*ANC's Jacob Zuma divides South Africa*, Sky News, 2009). At the narrowest level, the individual data analysis, Sky News's representation of Jacob Zuma during the 2009 election campaign is most exemplified by Hurd's description of Zuma: "He has no formal education and still practises a polygamous lifestyle. He's also overcome allegations of rape and corruption that might have felled his political career" (Hurd, *ANC's Jacob Zuma divides South Africa*, Sky News, 2009). On the word "felled", Zuma overbalances in his dance moves and falls backwards into the crowd, shield and shoes flailing into the air.

While this data analysis is predominantly qualitative and thematic, a brief content analysis was also conducted to analyse frequency. Political parties, events, speakers, and policy



issues<sup>17</sup> were counted across each election year sample and visualised through pie charts and bar graphs, separated into regions or channels as appropriate, and compared. Doing so gave a useful overview of which channels referred to which political parties, events, and issues. Additionally, the “speakers” during the sample showed which channel gave airtime to the type of voices: political leaders, citizens, protesters, or political analysts. While these frequency findings are interesting, the time and frequency measurement alone does not adequately show how these themes and issues were depicted in the broadcasts. For example, even though the ANC was mentioned far more often, across all channels, than the opposition in 2009, the narrative analysis showed how the journalists viewed not only the ANC, but also the future of democracy in South Africa.

Each chapter that follows comprises of a historical background discussion of events leading up to the election period, political participants in the election years, and any other important information that would contextualise the sample. The broadcasts contained in each election year were analysed using the triadic multimodal analysis method, as presented here, which is of my own design.

---

<sup>17</sup> “Political parties” included any broadcast that showed parties including regalia, commentary about the party, spokespeople from the party, leaders voting, and so forth. “Events” include incidents reported on other than the voting day such as the car bomb in Johannesburg in 1994 or the protest action in the Western Cape in 2014, additional story topics such as references to the Struggle in 1994 or the housing crisis in the Western Cape in 2014, and locations for journalists to base their story from such as the long queues forming the backdrop in 1994, 2004, and 2014. “Themes” were observed patterns in the broadcasts that were prominent and interesting to show how journalists portrayed the elections.

## Chapter 3: 1994

Three research questions directed the investigation for each election year: how did global and local news represent South Africa's election during the voting days; was there a difference between local and global or Western and non-Western channels; and finally what, if any, were the factors driving this representation? This chapter presents the findings from a multimodal analysis method of 25 television news broadcasts from the 1994 election week.<sup>18</sup> To contextualise these findings, a brief background of the context and political parties opens the chapter. The findings section starts with a quantitative analysis of the frequency of event and political party coverage, followed by a qualitative analysis of the themes. A discussion of the frames used in the sample weaves together the narratives and an overall summary ends this chapter. Each subsequent analysis chapter follows a similar structure.

This chapter posits that the Anglo-American, hereafter also termed “global”, coverage of the 1994 election was overwhelmingly dramatized with a heavy focus on the visualisation of violence, leading to a horse race between binaries. Local SABC broadcasts were more cautious and hesitant in the dearth of broadcasts available. The negotiated settlement – between white and black South Africans, between the ANC and the NP, and the IFP and the ANC – was highlighted as a triumph of logic and reason, but this emphasis neglected context and explanation of South Africa's complicated first election. Finally, global

---

<sup>18</sup> The sample for the 1994 election year was unevenly heavy in favour of the global broadcasts. The SABC provided only three broadcasts suitable for analysis and was the only broadcaster in the country at the time. Hence, part of the reason global narratives are more prominent in this analysis is because of this paucity.

channels presented contradicting narratives that seemed symptomatic of the shift towards a more mediatised political communication style in the early 1990s.

## 1 BACKGROUND TO 1994

*“An election of similar proportions in a developing country would normally take between 18 months and two years to arrange. But in South Africa, we do it our normal way, at the last minute and on a wing and a prayer.”*

(Harris, 2010: 50)

### 1.1 Getting to this point

Long queues of shivering people snake into the distance, the rising sun providing some warmth to the voters who queue in single file for many hours. Mielies braai on open trashcan fires and singing spontaneously erupts amongst the multi-race crowds. On dusty roads, on manicured lawns, inside well-kept schools, inside flimsy tarpaulin tents, out in the freezing morning air, South Africans of all races stand patiently and, without fear, wait for the voting booths to open at 7am. “The queues assume their own hierarchy,” Peter Harris remembers, “with the elderly and infirm being pushed to the front, followed by women with babies... the atmosphere is almost one of devotion” (2010: 209).

These scenes in April 1994 signified South Africa’s first democratic general election.

Reaching this point had not been easy – for the politicians, many sleepless worrisome nights were spent around the negotiating table. For the citizens, fear of the low-level civil war brewing in the townships and in the city centres caused widespread panic. But over

four days in late April, 86% of the South African voting age population turned out to cast their ballots in a chaotic, clumsy, crisis-ridden first election.

In the weeks and months before the election date, South Africa was under siege.

Widespread violence between warring factions – spurred by political unrest, brinkmanship, a deeply unequal society, and systemic racism – led politicians, journalists, and ordinary South Africans to think that a democratic election would never come to pass. In December 1991 and again in May 1992, political parties and leaders, including then president FW De Klerk of the ruling National Party and recently released African National Congress president Nelson Mandela, attempted a negotiated settlement to end apartheid: the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) laid the path for multi-racial discussions. CODESA II attempted further negotiation, only to fail in a deadlock after the opposing ANC could not agree with the NP on the constitution and governing process.

With political parties failing a vital compromise, civil society exploded in anger and frustration. Groups of young men aligning to the various factions, particularly along ethnic lines, took to the streets with homemade bombs and weapons, chanting slogans and Struggle songs. Zulu men residing in townships attacked Xhosa families. Xhosa youth fought a guerrilla war within the alleyways of Thokoza township in Johannesburg. Families lost their children to bloody gunfights. Schools were burnt, homes demolished, caches of weapons and ammunitions found in buried locations across the country. Ill-trained and racist police could not keep up with the violence, and some accounts put the death toll at over 20,000 people in the decade before 1994 (Jeffery, 2009). In the weeks and days prior to the election, bombs exploded in Ventersdorp at the NP offices, in Johannesburg outside the ANC headquarters, and at a taxi rank. Rich Mkhondo recalls

that, “mass mobilization had become a permanent, structurally ingrained feature of South African political life” (1993: 5).

## 1.2 It would have been a miracle

Against this backdrop of a low-level civil war, the very idea of having a free and fair, peaceful election seemed far-fetched. The subsequent transition from autocratic racist rule to multi-racial democracy appeared, on the surface at least, like a miracle. Deborah Posel (2013: 29) reiterates the problems with classifying the transition of South Africa as a “miracle”:

A conviction of living in miraculous times provided an enabling way of thinking, a structure of belief. The idea of a miracle effaces process, and renders discussion and analysis thereof unnecessary. A miracle simply *is*, and is compelling and captivating for that revelatory certitude.

If one assumes the transition is like a “miracle”, the process no longer requires discussion. Tensions between ethnicities, races, and political parties divided South African society in the years running up to the first democratic election, and it took considerable negotiations and compromises to quell the unrest. A miracle, this was not.

Not only was South Africa deeply divided because of racial categorisation, the divisions reached to the infrastructure available to races too – rural, predominantly black people lived without running water, electricity, or other basic amenities afforded to the urban, predominantly white populace. Holding an election in areas where there was no census data, no electoral register, no telephone system, no electricity, and where illiteracy ran at

65%<sup>19</sup>, “where whole swathes of the country are simply not in a position to run a bath, never mind an election” (Harris, 2010: 55), the IEC had their hands full attempting to orchestrate this difficult process. Despite some glitches in the system, the IEC pulled off the monumental task with relatively little upheaval. Crucial to this process was the harmonising ability of the ANC’s presidential candidate, Nelson Mandela.

### 1.3 Qunu cattle herder to freedom fighter

Rolihlahla Mandela was born in July 1918 in a small village in Mvezo, in what is now the Eastern Cape. His chieftain father bestowed upon him the name that translates roughly as “troublemaker”, but Mandela (1995: 3) denies any prophesising on his father’s part. After a few formative years as a cattle herder, instilling in the future president a sense of belonging, humility, and respect for ancient Xhosa traditions, Mandela was removed from the village to the Great Place, *Mqhekezweni*, after his father died. It was here that he was schooled in British culture, tradition, and language and where he gained the English name “Nelson”. At age 16, he underwent the traditional initiation process, the circumcision transforming him from a boy to a man, and conferring a third name, “Dalibunga”. At the Great Place, he was introduced to what he calls the “purest form” (Mandela, 1995: 22) of democracy, where people openly criticised Chief Jongintaba Dalinyebo in an informal setting. Mandela took his Xhosa traditionalism to Johannesburg, where he spent years as an advocate, and was introduced first to the Communist Party and later the African National Congress. He (1995: 95) notes that there was no defining moment in which he became politicised.

---

<sup>19</sup> Prinsloo and Robins acknowledge that literacy statistics in the early 1990s are not particularly reputable, but suggest that 15 million people out of the total population of 23 million had less than 5 years schooling. (1996: 35-36).

I had no epiphany, no singular revelation, no moment of truth, but a steady accumulation of a thousand slights, a thousand indignities, a thousand unremembered moments, produced in me an anger, a rebelliousness, a desire to fight the system that imprisoned my people.

When the National Party won the 1948 election, Mandela's life was turned upside down. "I was more certain in those days of what I was against than what I was for", he proclaims (1995: 119). As the National Party became more zealous in its implementation of racial purity and separation, the young advocate threw himself into the resistance movement, sacrificing his marriage to Evelyn for his strength of belief.

He was active in the ANC's long-running Defiance Campaign and strongly disagreed with the party's multiracial policy and non-violent protest methods. Mandela later regretted his pugnaciousness, noting that he "was a young man who attempted to make up his ignorance with militancy" (1994: 159). As Mandela matured, his views softened but the Africanist ideal of an "African government for Africans run by Africans" still held sway among many – in 1957, the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) was born under the leadership of Robert Sobukwe. The PAC rejected multiculturalism and communism outright, which made the movement an unlikely ally with both the NP and the Western press, which "hailed its birth as a dagger to the heart of the African left" (Mandela, 1994: 229). The PAC was a driving force in mobilising sections of the black population, particularly around resistance to pass laws and the Bantu Education Act. The PAC organised a peaceful demonstration in the Sharpeville Township in Johannesburg in 1960, which ended in one of South Africa's bloodiest massacres. Sharpeville was a turning point in the country's history, and thrust the apartheid state into the minds of global audiences. There are not many more harrowing images than that of Mbuyisa

Makhubo, carrying the fatally wounded Hector Pieterse, followed by Hector's distraught sister Antoinette Sithole.

By 1960, South Africa was under a state of emergency, with the military in control of structures of governance. Here, Mandela, Sisulu, and 100 other ANC members were arrested under various pretences – high treason and conspiracy to overthrow the government being paramount. In an atmosphere of increasing paranoia, under a racist government petrified of loss of control, Mandela was eventually sentenced to life imprisonment on Robben Island at the end of the Rivonia Trials in 1963. He was to remain imprisoned until 1990, when he emerged a changed man walking into a radically different South Africa.

#### 1.4 The first all race election

The 1994 election was South Africa's first all-race election, and a total 19 parties competed, with the IFP joining the process one week before the voting day. The main parties in the 1994 election were the National Party (NP), the African National Congress (ANC), the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), and the Democratic Party (DP).

The NP had been in control of the country since 1948 and was of conservative Afrikaner politics. By the early 1990s the ruling party was riddled with paranoia, secret societies, and corruption (Mkhondo, 1993: 10). PW Botha led the NP from 1978 to 1989 until a debilitating stroke meant younger, cautious centrist FW De Klerk took over and led the party until his resignation in 1996. Mkhondo (1993: 5) suggests that it was ultimately De Klerk's pragmatism that ended apartheid as he saw the continuation of the system as a cul-de-sac for the nation. The NP's campaign leading up to the 1994 election consisted



of successes (freedom and the end of apartheid assured, a free and fair secret ballot), warnings (of the ANC as a dangerous party, of the ANC's policy costs, and of black squatters in coloured houses), and promises (reconciliation through job creation, home building, universal healthcare, and free enterprise) (Giliomee, 1994: 60).

Oliver Tambo led the ANC until 1991, when the recently released Nelson Mandela took over. The ANC's 1994 campaign almost exclusively used Mandela's smiling face as iconography on posters (Bertelsen, 1996: 231),<sup>20</sup> and the party divided their campaign strategy between "hearing" at people's forums and "telling" at mass rallies (Lodge, 1994: 24). The ANC's core message of the 1994 campaign centred on hopes and aspirations of the party to provide a "better life for all", manifested through job creation, land redistribution, low cost housing, and better living standards. Lodge (1994: 25) says that the ANC's campaign manifesto was not particularly radical, but easily plausible.

The IFP, led by its originator Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi since its inception as a nationalist movement,<sup>21</sup> is the ethnic and political home of the Zulu nation. Mkhondo calls the charismatic leader a "juxtaposition of pin-striped suits and animal skins, political posing and bloody praise singing" (1993: 63). Initially, the IFP refused the negotiation process and bilateral agreements in 1992, concerned that Zulu national interests would not be protected in the negotiations (Hamilton & Marè, 1994: 79). Eventually, with a week left before the election, the IFP formally joined the process.

---

<sup>20</sup> While the majority of South Africa and the world treated Mandela as a saviour, as Moses, and as a myth, (Mkhondo, 1993; Bertelsen, 1996: 230; Evans, 2014: 233), the white neo-Nazis and far right in South Africa and the UK chanted "Hang Mandela" (Reed, 1990; Borger, 2013) and said that De Klerk had betrayed them.

<sup>21</sup> "Inkatha" means "crown" in isiZulu. Buthelezi began the Inkatha National Cultural Liberation Movement in 1975, but based the structure of the movement on the earlier Inkatha cultural organisation, started in 1920 by Zulu King Solomon kaDinuzulu. The movement laid claim to the Zulu region with traditional power structures in loyalty to tribal chiefs, Buthelezi, King Goodwill Zwelethini kaBhekuzulu, and was ethnically exclusive, limited to Zulu people (Hamilton & Marè, 1994: 74).

The DP was formed in 1959 as the Progressive Party, when their parent United Party refused to repudiate racial discrimination, and was a major player in the negotiation process. The party's 1994 campaign focused on promoting liberal democratic values among a new electorate, adopting the moniker "true liberal conscience" (Welsh, 1994: 108). The DP's poor showing in the first poll (at only 1.73% of the national vote) was probably due to its failure to secure the black and coloured vote nationally. The party found it hard to shake off the "urban, English, white, middle class" (ibid.: 114) image of liberalism.

The White Right, so named because of the racial and ideological composition of the parties, consisted of three political parties<sup>22</sup>: the Conservative Party (CP), as the official opposition to the National Party from 1982 to 1994, led by Andries Treurnicht; the Afrikaner Volksfront (AVF), founded amidst the violence and tension after Chris Hani's assassination in 1993 and consisted of 21 right-wing groups; and the Freedom Front, a breakaway party from the AVF, headed by General Constand Viljoen. While the political frames of the parties were diverse, the drive for racial separation and a *Volkstad*<sup>23</sup> for Afrikaners, based on racial purity, linked them all.

Ultimately, only two parties competed with any significance for the position of government in the 1994 election: the ruling NP and the ANC, the leading liberation party. Hamilton and Maré suggest the fact that 90% of the IFP's national assembly representation in 1994 came from KwaZulu indicates "that despite its national thrust, supposedly separate from the claims made by the king and Buthelezi, to represent the

---

<sup>22</sup> The separatist neo-Nazi Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB), was headed by former Special Guard Warrant Officer Eugene Terre'blanche, and is often linked with the White Right, even though it did not participate in the negotiation process.

<sup>23</sup> The *Volkstad*, or People's State, describes proposals to establish an Afrikaner homeland or land based on federal principals for self-determination. For a detailed explanation of what the *Volkstad* means to far-right Afrikaners, Du Toit (1991) and Schönteich & Boschhoff (2003) are recommended.

ethnic component of Zulu nationalism, the party has little hope of representing in the national assembly on any basis than its regional strength” (1994: 86). Harris (2010) reveals that there was a major computer error or hacking conspiracy during the 1994 counting process, so the true numbers of voters who chose the IFP in KwaZulu and nationally may never be known. Table 3.1 reveals the percentage of votes won by each major party in the first poll, out of a total of 19.5 million votes cast.

	<b>ANC</b>	<b>NP</b>	<b>IFP</b>	<b>FF</b>	<b>DP</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
Percentage	62.65	20.39	10.54	2.17	1.73	19.5 mil


Table 3.1: Percentage of votes per party in 1994 election<sup>24</sup>

## 2 FINDINGS


For the 1994 election year, 24 broadcasts across eight channels were available. Four channels originated from the United States (CNN, CBS, ABC, AP), three in the United Kingdom (ITN, Sky News, BBC), and the only South African news channel at the time (SABC). The majority of broadcasts, 13, came from the US, 8 broadcasts from the UK, and three from South Africa (see Graph 3.1 – 3.2).

---

<sup>24</sup> Statistics gathered from Reynolds (1994: 182).



Graph 3.1



Graph 3.2


Each broadcast was analysed with the triadic multimodal methodology to observe the themes and narratives, and note the frequency of political party and event coverage across the broadcasts, in order to investigate how, if at all, the three regions differ in the coverage.

## 2.1 Frequency analysis


### 2.1.1 Events

The frequency of event coverage was identified across the sample broadcasts, with every topical event shown or spoken about in the broadcasts noted (see Graph 3.3 for the total spread of events, and Graph 3.4 – 3.6 for the region spread). Many broadcasts covered more than one topic at a time. A total of 14 events were observed: the bombings in Johannesburg, the voting days, the flag hoisting ceremonies, references to the Struggle (including visits to Robben Island, video footage of protest action during apartheid, and the Rivonia Trial), the IFP joining the election process, voter education, the run-up to the voting day, visits to the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, the political party rallies, deaths at IFP and ANC rallies or marches, allegations of election sabotage, and land


conflict (particularly poor rural black people forced off ancestral land or the tension between white farmers and black farm workers).




Graph 3.3



Graph 3.4



Graph 3.5



Graph 3.6


The most frequently covered event in the US channels was the bombings, but this rivalled the discussion of the IFP joining the campaign at such a late stage, as well as references to the Struggle. Conversely, in the UK sample, broadcasters seemed more interested in the bombings (at 63% of the coverage) than the voting day itself (queues, vox pops, and the election process, at 23%), while the voting day vied for attention with an irate Nelson Mandela reprimanding the government for the shoddy organisation and alleged sabotage (*Mandela alleges election sabotage*, ITN). Interestingly, the SABC was obvious in their omission of any reference to violent events, including the bombings, and instead dedicated most of their three broadcasts to the lowering of the old flag, and the manufacture and hoisting of the new. Of course, the sample provided by the SABC included only the voting day broadcasts, and so the channel's limited focus could be due to a limited sample rather than ideology.<sup>25</sup>

### 2.1.2 Political parties

Graph 3.7 depicts the number of broadcasts where political parties were mentioned in total, in the UK channels, the US channels, and the South African channel.

<sup>25</sup> In subsequent election years, however, South African broadcasters were noticeable in their ignorance of the framing or issues that other global broadcasters highlighted.

The ANC received the lion's share of coverage in all channels. The party also dominated the SABC broadcasts, which was a surprise given that the SABC was still perceived to be an apartheid mouthpiece at the time (Evans, 2014: 237).<sup>26</sup>



Graph 3.7


The AWB's coverage on the UK channels was particularly interesting, given that the movement was not a legitimate political party and did not run in the elections. The broadcasters referred to the AWB as a "party", however, and its neo-Nazi iconography seemed to appeal to these broadcasters. Given that half of the UK broadcasts depicted the movement, yet the AWB was neither a political party nor in the running for the election, overinflates the sense of its following and power. Despite having 5—7% of the white South African support under apartheid (Battersby, 1988), the movement lost significant support by 1994.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>26</sup> There were significant staffing changes to the national broadcaster from 1993 onwards and governed by an ANC-NP alliance – see Evans (2014: 165) and Louw and Chitty (2000: 291).

<sup>27</sup> Part of the reason for the AWB's plummeting membership include the Bophuthatswana coup in March 1994, which proved to be a PR disaster for the movement, as well as De Klerk's announcement that apartheid would end. The *Volkstad* idea was no longer viable, and AWB membership shed rapidly. (See Arthur Kemp's 2012 definitive eyewitness account of the AWB.)


### 2.1.3 Who speaks in the coverage

Cross (2010: 417) analysed the political sources that speak in Canadian political news during elections, and found that the type of source reliance has shifted from political leader voxes to punditry from analysts, echoing Louw's earlier discussion on "punditocracy" (2005: 80). She argues that pundits give the impression of objectivity on the behalf of the broadcaster, while still employing framing and news values, and Louw suggests that an increase in "smooth talkers" offer "cultural fast-food – pre-digested and pre-thought" (2005: 81). Cross argues that this shift indicates an increased media-centric style of political communication. She describes Knowns as people who are politicians, officials, or the elite, (2010: 417) and argues that Knowns make up four fifths of Canadian television news sources during elections. Unknowns, conversely, are the general public, protesters, victims, participants, or voters. Ultimately, the trend of speakers throughout the five election years shows a swing towards using political pundits as Known speakers but in this sample, Unknowns spoke slightly more than the Knowns (see Graph 3.8), with 51 Unknowns and 42 Knowns.



Graph 3.8





Graph 3.9

As seen in Graph 3.9, out of the 42 Knowns that spoke during the sample, political leaders were the most prominent: Mandela spoke in 21% of the broadcasts, President De Klerk in 17%, and Buthelezi 14%. Global broadcasters presented most of the speakers in this sample, as the SABC showed only four Unknown speakers and one Known speaker in all three broadcasts. Knowns were almost always political leaders or party spokespeople.

As noted in Graph 3.1, only 13% of the 1994 sample broadcasts came from the SABC, the only broadcaster in the country at the time. This lack of South African perspective meant that the themes of coverage were primarily focused on the global perspective instead. The four main themes of representation observed in the 1994 coverage played out mostly on global channels. Journalists depicted the election through poetic and dramatized language and imagery, represented the ethnic and political violence that

bookended the election, played prophet as to the type of changes the transition to democracy might bring to the country, and binarised rural South Africans through simplistic racial narratives.

## 2.2 The election

Broadcasters presented the election as the start of South Africa's new democracy, heralding the dawn of a new era of dignity and the end to 300 years of white rule. The overriding sense was that democracy was achieved if free and fair elections could be held on the set date, an inference that is typical of literature on elections (Windrich, 1994: 18; Sisk, 1994: 144; Hawk, 2002: 168; Ndlela, 2005: 87). Windrich argues elections are often perceived in Western countries as “synonymous with democracy” (1994: 19).<sup>28</sup>

Throughout the 1994 coverage, global journalists depicted poignant voting scenes and meandering queues filled with newly enfranchised black people, who turned out to vote despite problems in hosting the election and violence that bookended the election. Some broadcasters framed the 1994 election as a kind of cure-all for South Africa's ills including ethnic violence and structural poverty, and assumed it would bring immediate dignity and development. Finally, the lack of South African perspectives is a common finding throughout this thesis, and begins with the ignorance of important topics and frames in 1994 so prevalent on international channels.

### 2.2.1 A poignant voting day

South Africa's budding democracy was illustrated through a combination of images. Pre-election, political parties campaigned and negotiated, while a noisy black electorate attended chaotic mass rallies, and journalists visited the wary white minority on the eve

---

<sup>28</sup> This type of framing is problematic: democracy does not simply occur if elections are held. The reality is far more complex than that, but for ease of categorisation, this study uses a broad albeit reductive sense of democracy as synonymous with elections for explanation, but does not ascribe to this idea.

of the country's first all-race election. On the voting day, peaceful, patient queues of newly enfranchised black voters stretched far into the distance (see Images 3.1 and 3.2), a dramatic visualisation of South Africa's commitment to universal suffrage. All global broadcasts depicted the voting day through these poignant scenes.



Image 3.1: *Vote, the beloved country*, AP, 1994. “Queues stretch into the distance”



Image 3.2: *Vote, the beloved country*, AP, 1994. “Queues stretch into the distance”

Journalists describe these scenes at voting stations poetically: “At this moment in South Africa’s newly-born democracy, its most revered architect made sure it’s recorded for posterity, a fulfilment of his lifetime struggle” (*South Africa elections*, ITN) says journalist Michael Nicholson, as the tall statesman Mandela lowers his first vote into the ballot box. As a young black man pushes a thinner, older version of himself in a wheelbarrow, journalist Mark Austin admits, “for thousands here in Soweto, this is their biggest day... but it was the day the blacks of this country took to any means possible to cast their

votes that will change South Africa forever” (*South Africa – election voting*, ITN). On the US channels the view was not so different: ABC’s anchor on *South Africa’s first free elections* primes the broadcast with “for black South Africans, it is the moment to reclaim their forefather’s dignity”, while Jim Laurie later describes the scenes: “They had waited a lifetime for this day, a father carried to and from the voting station on his son’s back. A mother arrived by wheelbarrow. An emotional day for all.” For global broadcasters, the voting day was a culmination of years of suffering and heralded the dawn of a new era.

Sisk claims that US print media framed the 1994 election as a great literary tale, a cathartic exercise for the US public where David finally bested Goliath and expunged a racist evil (1994: 157). The poetic, emotive reporting about the snaking queues at dawn and physical exertion South Africans endured to simply cast their ballot played into this tale. However, not all journalists romanticised the election as the voting day progressed.

### 2.2.2 The host

Despite the similarities in the Anglo-American depiction of the poignant voting day, there were also differences in how the US and UK channels viewed South Africa as host. Global channels ultimately portrayed the election as poorly organised, chaotic, and unconventional, but with slight differences across the two regions. ITN reported on the technicalities of the election, showing understaffed polling stations without ballots, chaotic and violent campaign rallies, and spoke of sabotage and election officials who “simply couldn’t cope” (Austin, *Mandela alleges election sabotage*, ITN). Polling stations “with no ballot papers and no officials, [where] three thousand [voters] are fighting for transport to voting centres that are working” (ibid.). Despite these problems at voting stations, ITN reported that voters turned out “despite” the bomb blasts and terror

threats in the days before the election. For ITN, South Africa seemed an enthusiastic but disorganised host of this first election.

On the US channel CNN, meanwhile, journalists proclaimed that South Africans treated this first election as “something like a shiny new toy” (Hanna, *Bernard Shaw and Mike Hanna discuss election*, CNN), that voter education was “providing some of the day’s entertainment” (Sadler, *The Big Story*, CNN), or that rural populations simply “played politics”<sup>29</sup> as they “played football” (Mattingly, *Earth Matters*, CNN). While ITN focused on the technical problems of holding a Westernised election, CNN suggested South Africa simply “played” with the election, undermining the real struggles South Africans took to gain suffrage for all.

### 2.2.3 Election violence

A second difference between the US and the UK regional channels was the representation of violence surrounding the election. These channels focused on the violent context to the election, especially the bombings on the Sunday and Tuesday before voting, but the narrative differed slightly between regions. US journalists implied that the bombing campaign on the eve of the election and the factional violence *directly* threatened the election. Joe Oliver reports, “if the last few weeks are any indication, [democracy] will come with more violence, in the homelands, in the cities, and in the townships” (*Earth Matters*, CNN). Black people run across a field in low angle, police fire at protesters, and the aftermath of the bomb blasts fill the screen (see Images 3.3 – 3.6). Mark Watts admits that “mass action has often been used to settle disputes in South Africa” (*Update*, CNN), while protesters clash with police on screen.

---

<sup>29</sup> The phrase “playing politics” is usually used to refer to a situation that is used for political gain rather than principle, but in this instance the phrase combines the two: “That’s because they’re more pre-occupied with the modern way of life and that includes playing football or playing politics”, indicating the subjects play *with* or *at* politics, as a game, rather than taking it seriously.



Image 3.3: *CBS Evening news*, CBS, 1994. “Johannesburg car bomb aftermath”



Image 3.4: *Bloody Sunday*, CNN, 1994. “Casualties of the car bomb”



Image 3.5: *Earth Matters*, CNN, 1994. “Police clash with protesters in sepiá”



Image 3.6: *Electing the Future spot*, CNN, 1994. “Police clash with protesters”

In a short spot for CNN's *Electing the future*, an ominous voice-over questions, "South Africa's violent road to democracy. As the nation gets ready for a history-making election, which will prevail? The bullet or the ballot box?" while white police officers fire deafeningly at unseen targets; protesters spear Mandela's face; and white police assault black protesters with sticks and leather straps. The segment ends as Mandela and De Klerk shake hands and walk across a stage to a podium. The seemingly unending violence of two opposing sides (the spears of the IFP and the ANC's Mandela, and white police and black protesters) juxtaposes the hope of peace through negotiation. This is an "all or nothing" approach to democracy, where factional and ethnic violence directly threaten the election.

The UK broadcasts also mention the bombing campaign and faction violence, but treat it differently. Journalists focused more on the bombing campaign than ethnic violence: "Nine people were killed yesterday... With tension mounting in the last few hours before the elections, four members of the ANC were shot" (Werge, *South Africa report*, BBC). "This attack marks the deliberate change of tactics by the terrorists, with this strike at an international target... But millions of blacks were up at sunrise, queuing at the polls, undeterred by the spate of bombings, and relishing the opportunity to vote for change" (Austin, *South Africa Elections bombing*, ITN). Both ITN and the BBC foreground the bombing but mention the election will happen "regardless" of the violence. The violence appears to exist in the same space and time as the election, but does not directly threaten it. Rather, the actual threat to democracy for the UK channels is South Africa's technical incapability as host; a concept ties into Evans and Glenn's (2010: 14, 15) idea that Afropessimism often involves the belief that Africans simply cannot handle democracy.

#### 2.2.4 The miracle panacea

When the car bomb exploded in downtown Johannesburg on the Sunday before voting, journalists scrambled to report how this violence disrupted what was going to be a “peaceful end” to 300 years of white rule (Alan Pizzey, *Evening News*, CBS). The violence seemed unending, not just because of the terror attacks in the bomb blasts, but also because of the IFP’s bloodthirsty warrior signification. On CBS’ *Evening News*, ANC spokesperson Carl Niehaus states that the “best way to deal with this kind of political thuggery is to make sure democracy wins against intimidation and violence”, and on the words “intimidation and violence”, the scene cuts to a high angle of black hands raised, each holding weapons including spears, *knobkerries*, axes, and guns. The editing here implies that the IFP are behind this violence, an assumption that was incorrect – the Johannesburg car bombs were carried out by AWB members, although the AWB leader Eugene Terre’blanche distanced himself from the events. Later in the broadcast, a khaki-clad soldier holds a gun as a large group of black men march and dance behind him, and the warrior group move quickly towards the camera, hands raised clutching spears, sticks, and shields. Bill Whitacker provokes, “When you see this, it’s hard to believe that this week South Africa is to undergo a revolution. Not through the power of weapons, but through the power of the vote” (*Evening News*, CBS). Finally, on the voting day, as Nelson Mandela drops his ballot into the box, Michael Nicholson (*ibid.*) says that his act of voting is in “fulfilment of his lifetime struggle”.

The election, then, may act as a calming palliative to this discordant society, the revolution of democracy quelling intimidation and fear of ethnic violence. Indeed, as the voting occurred and citizens turned out in their millions, civic pride and the enthusiasm for the election brought to an abrupt end much of the violence in KwaZulu and the Transvaal. On the first voting day, ITN’s Michael Nicholson (*South Africa Elections*)



reports, “most welcome considering the bombings elsewhere is the discipline, especially among the people in the black townships”. He walks towards the camera, past a queue of black voters in an open field, and explains,

A week ago this simply would not have been possible. This piece of open ground was then no-man’s land and to be seen here was to invite sniper fire from both sides. And yet this morning, here they are standing peacefully, queuing, waiting to vote. So our report this morning is that from KwaZulu, so far, so good.

The election appears to have calmed deep-seated IFP/ANC tensions, and these citizens now stand on a no-man’s land because it. The reality was more complex, with IEC observers risking their lives in areas of KwaZulu to educate residents under the suspicious scrutiny of IFP members, and the ANC/IFP/NP negotiation process brought to a halt much of the intimidation and violence. Nicholson’s report mentions none of this, but rather emphasises the event-based nature of the election, rather than the process. Hawk explains that when journalists focus on elections “as events rather than democracy as a process, the news obstructs our view of African life and the focus for change in it” (2002: 169), and Nicholson’s report flattens the tremendous effort taken by various sides to bring about a relatively calm, free, and fair election as a “surprise” or a miracle.

CNN’s Sharon Collins echoes this sentiment when she opens *Earth Matters*, standing amidst a tin-shack township: “Slums inside of a city’s shining spires. Few places are as infamous as South Africa for dramatic differences between the haves and have-nots. In two weeks much of that will start to change”. Mike Hanna (*The Big Story*, CNN) interviews Johnson Anthony, a gravedigger in the Eastern Cape: “[He] dug many of the graves for the victims of political conflict. And he hopes that the man he votes for next week will ensure that he’ll not dig any more”. These journalists thus imply that the

election could solve deep-seated violence, structural poverty and inequality, quickly and effortlessly. This simplistic perspective of South African society plays into the myth of 1994 as a “miracle” (Guelke, 1996) election. Although the election did indeed appear to “solve” ethnic violence, the structural divisions of South African society were not wiped away simply because the electorate were able to vote, but because of the ANC’s winning of hearts and minds in KwaZulu (Southall, 1999: 1) and dedicated ANC policy to alleviate the impoverished circumstances in the townships (Gevisser, 2007: 699).

When describing the voting, some journalists also framed this election event as an assumed cure-all for South Africa’s divided, violent, unequal society, reflecting Ndlela’s (2005: 88) findings that the international papers often presented the regime change in Zimbabwe in 2000 as a panacea for all political and economic woes. Mutua (2002: 12) also describes the Othering process that creates clones of Westernised democracies in Africa: so-called “savage” cultures are often seen as outside the realm of political democracy and need “saving” by a Western benefactor. Thus, Mutua suggests, democracy is often seen as a panacea to cure Africa’s ills.<sup>30</sup> Mutua’s “savage-victim-saviour” (2014: 12) metaphor plays out in the international footage of the IFP’s seemingly inherent savagery and the apparent cure-all that democracy will bring to the violence and inequality. The problem is not that journalist suggest the election will bring calm, but that the event-based reporting style ignores the complicated process behind this seemingly sudden calmness, and that decades of structural inequality and racist policy will immediately change once the election takes place.<sup>31</sup>

---

<sup>30</sup> Lamb (1983: 58) and Wiarda (2014: 54) rightly argue though that there are other, more pressing needs that “Africa” faces other than good governance and fair and free elections, but Wiarda (*ibid.*) suggests that democracy is a step in the right direction.

<sup>31</sup> Of course, 20 years post-democracy, South Africa still suffers from deep-seated and race-based inequality because of the legacy of apartheid, while much of this inequality actually worsened in the decade after 1994. See Marais, 2011: 210 and StatsSA, 2002, 2008, and the background to 2004 in Chapter 5.

### 2.2.5 South African perspective

Silke and Schrirer (1994: 140) argue that American media prioritised the razzmatazz of the 1994 election at the expense of policy discussions and political analyses, which resulted in shallow narratives that removed any sense of context. Louw and Chitty meanwhile note that the “cacophony of ... discordant voices became somewhat difficult to hear above the sound of gunfire” (2000: 290). My own study confirms both statements as we saw more evidence of violence threatening the election than political issues. The SABC, however, did not produce the same drama present in the Anglo-American news broadcasts; instead, journalists stood at polling booths in the early morning, reported on flag manufacturing and the historical aspect of the flag, and provided brief mentions of the voter turnout. These stories did not adequately contextualise the election insofar as the pre-election violence and transition to democracy was mostly skimmed over. Additionally, the studio piece was technically clumsy, as live crossings failed, audio tracks were mixed up, and the anchors Penny Smythe and Tim Modise fluffed lines routinely, which is in stark contrast to the slick narrative journalism seen on international coverage.

SABC reporters stood shivering in the cold morning and described the Soweto queue in direct address to the camera as “very long, but the cold weather doesn’t deter them”. Live crossings to polling stations were often technically clumsy and formulaic. Reporters at the flag lowering ceremonies described it as “poignant”, “sombre”, “a time to say goodbye”, while the hoisting was a “party”, filled with “resounding optimism”, and the “dawn of a new day” (*Flag lowering ceremonies*, SABC). The SABC journalists appeared apprehensive to show any kind of opinion or bias, which fits with the research (Silke & Schrirer, 1994: 141; Anglin, 1995: 540; Jacobs, 1999: 154; Berger, 2002: 5; Sparks, 2009: 208). At the time of broadcasting, the SABC was under a harsh international spotlight

from UNMOSA and IMC, which may have contributed to the apparent neutrality of the SABC broadcasts in this sample. Temin and Smith (2002) and Waldahl (2005a), analysing the Ghanaian and Zimbabwean election coverage respectively, suggest state media is often topical, superficial, and lacks critical analysis. Most of the news coverage of African elections by African media is superficial and hampered by funding, legislation, access to information, as well as professionalization of journalism (Waldahl, 2005a, 2005b; Onyebadi & Oyediji, 2011: 226; Ndlela, 2005: 77; Kpaduwa, 2013: 23; Akoh & Ahjabenu, 2013: 63) and so perhaps the SABC suffered the same fate. The sample was, however, limited to three broadcasts during the voting day, and so perhaps additional footage if available may present different frames.

In summary of the depiction of the first election, then, Anglo-American broadcasts to some extent neglected critical analysis and investigation of the causes, symptoms, and ramifications of problems during the election period. Instead, reflecting Ndlela (2005) and Waldahl (2005a), news coverage was often simplistic and dramatized, fixated on the violent imagery during the election. There were differences between regional depictions of the election, however. The US coverage framed the election as a knife-edge, all-or-nothing, where “hope runs neck and neck with danger” (Rather, *FF and IFP have common ideals*, CBS). Factional and tribal violence threatened to derail the election at any moment. The UK, conversely, was far more critical of the technicalities of hosting a free election, but still did not adequately explore causes or consequences. For the UK channels, South Africa’s ineptitude was a greater threat to democracy than violence. Finally, the South African perspective was far narrower and did not reflect the violence or the negotiation process – but this is likely due to the uneven sample available from the SABC.

### 2.3 Violence

A second prominent theme in the 1994 media coverage was the depiction of violence. Two thirds of all broadcasts depicted violence in the form of bloodshed, civil war, terrorism, bombing campaigns, tensions between police and protesters, and factional or ethnic fighting. Other significations of violence included threats of violent action (weapons drawn, intimidating marching, camera movements to suggest violence is imminent), the aftermath (debris, injuries, blood, traumatised people), and direct discourse (through commentary or vox pops). Violence in the 1994 coverage was split into two types of depictions: ethnic violence where the IFP were perpetrators and ANC the victims, and the military presented as in control of this violence. This theme was only seen on global news channels as the SABC ignored the context of violence so prominent in other channels. The only two instances of violence were latent and implied on *Election 94*: a reporter wore a prominent flak jacket at the voting queue in Vosloorus (see Image 3.7) without any discussion of the reasons, and a Ciskei reporter mentioning that the previous area of unrest now had a “calm, relaxed atmosphere”, referring to earlier factional bloodshed at Bisho.<sup>32</sup>



Image 3.7: *Election 94*, SABC, 1994. “Reporter in prominent flak jacket in Vosloorus”

---

<sup>32</sup> Vosloorus was one of the most prolific areas for township violence in the run-up to the 1994 election. In one year, over 1800 people were killed in Vosloorus and neighbouring Thokoza townships, and the ANC had declared the area a National Disaster Zone (Carlin, 1994). Bisho in the Transkei was the scene of a bloody massacre when the Ciskei Defence Force killed 29 people and injured 200 on 7 September 1992.

### 2.3.1 Ethnic violence

Through creative camera techniques and dramatic framing, global broadcasts, particularly from US channels, depicted the IFP as inherently savage and perpetrators of much of the pre-election violence, while binaries of democracy versus savagery played out in the representation of the IFP and the ANC.

The IFP, synonymous with the Zulu nation, were almost entirely framed on global broadcasts<sup>33</sup> as bloodthirsty, violent, exoticized, unthinking savages who have improbable designs on politics through their war-loving leader, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi. Global broadcasters frequently implied that IFP members, and Zulus in general, are rule-breakers, belligerent, and thrive on drama and the theatre of war. Dramatic and creative visual footage about the IFP members presented the group as threatening and intimidating through low angle shots of dominating Zulu men, loud *impi* marches and chanting, and spears pointed to the sky accompanying loud Struggle songs and drowned out journalist dialogue (see Images 3.8 – 3.10).



Image 3.8: *Profile of a Zulu Nation*, CNN, 1994. “Prominent spears in the crowd”

---

<sup>33</sup> The SABC did not refer to the IFP in this sample at all.



Image 3.9: *Profile of a Zulu Nation*, CNN, 1994. “Armed IFP members”



Image 3.10: *Profile of a Zulu Nation*, CNN, 1994. “Brett Sadler drowned out”

In CNN’s *Profile of a Zulu nation*, the IFP are framed in deep low angles as the *impi* march, through the loud chants of Zulu men as they crush dusty roads beneath their feet, in fish-eye lenses to accentuate sharp spears and staring white eyes of the IFP members, and in the traditional dress of Zulu women (see Images 3.11 – 3.13). This broadcast in particular highlights the exoticism of the Zulu nation, while creative camera techniques such as low angles, fish eye lenses, and the “hands up” framing suggest an intimidating and aggressive group. As with Sisk’s (1994: 146) findings of the US press, the majority of global channels in my own sample used emotive reporting when presenting the IFP.



Image 3.11: *Profile of a Zulu Nation*, CNN, 1994. “Fisheye on a large IFP crowd”



Image 3.12: *Profile of a Zulu Nation*, CNN, 1994. “Silhouette on Zulu dancers”



Image 3.13: *Profile of a Zulu Nation*, CNN, 1994. “Fisheye on Zulu dancers”

The exoticism and seemingly inherent savagery of the Zulu nation was not the only element highlighted on global broadcasts: the IFP’s belligerency was presented as a problem for democracy. Standing on a ridge, as a large group of black men<sup>34</sup> march behind him, journalist Brett Sadler (Image 3.10) shouts above the chanting that a “ban

---

<sup>34</sup> Consistent with Fair and Astroff’s (1991) earlier analysis, the Zulu nation comprised almost entirely of young black men. Women were depicted as mourners, cooks, dancers, and occasionally illiterate voters, but the men are intimidating “tribal regiments” and warriors.



on traditional Zulu weapons has no impact on the ground. Clubs, knives, spears, handguns, and automatic rifles, they're all here in open disregard of the new emergency regulations" (*Profile of a Zulu Nation*, CNN). Sky News also frames the IFP negatively – Sarah Crowe notes all South Africans were called on to put down their weapons but in the accompanying images, IFP banners flutter in the wind above spears, *knobkerries*, and shields, suggesting they ignored this call entirely (*Sky News Report on South Africa*, Sky News). Linking the discussion of the IFP's disregard for the law with images of weapons highlights that this movement are deemed the "perpetrators" of the ethnic violence.

While the IFP were seen as perpetrators, the ANC were conversely democratic and loyal to the negotiation process. Their posters line the roads (at times ripped off by IFP members), members sombrely mourn the death of their community leaders, and the ANC headquarters in Johannesburg was the "target" for IFP-led violence. Mike Hanna in CNN's *The Big Story* foregrounds the ANC's involvement in the Struggle and shows ANC members visiting Robben Island prison. He speaks from a graveyard: "50 miles away, the township of KwaNebuhle, and the graves of the hundreds who died in the forefront of the Struggle... just some of the people of the Eastern Cape who died in the struggle for freedom" (*The Big Story*, CNN).

In contrast to these ANC's deaths as "freedom fighters", later in the same broadcast Brett Sadler describes Buthelezi as the leader of a war-hungry *impi*, without the freedom fighter connotation. He calls IFP support a "throng" of "Zulu power on the march", "tribal regiments", "tribal loyalists", and that "illegal weapons are beyond the control of the government" in KwaZulu. Buthelezi waves to IFP supporters from a vehicle, amongst piercingly loud ululations. The enormous crowd of Zulu men storm through

the roads in “hands up”<sup>35</sup> mode, the group extending far into the distance (Images 3.14 – 3.15). In this one broadcast, the IFP and ANC are starkly different from one another: the ANC are seen as victims of ethnic violence, Struggle heroes, and the government-in-waiting, representing the “democracy” side of a binary. The IFP, however, are presented as tribal, ethnic, violent perpetrators, uncontrollable, and intimidating, and represented “savagery”.



Image 3.14: *Profile of a Zulu Nation*, CNN, 1994. “Hands up”



Image 3.15: *Profile of a Zulu Nation*, CNN, 1994. “Hands up”

In opposition to Fair and Astroff’s (1991) discussion of the US media coverage of apartheid-era violence, it seems these US news broadcasts take care to differentiate between the IFP and the ANC. Fair and Astroff note that the US news media tended to

---

<sup>35</sup> “Hands up” is a visual term of my own description. Broadcasters often framed IFP members in a crowd formation, with a focus on their hands in the air holding weapons or forming a fist, silhouetted against the sky. The crowd’s faces are not the focus; instead it is their raised hands, prominent spears, or the expansive crowd that are highlighted. The effect is intimidating. Sometimes shot in low angle, the framing disempowers the viewer and projects the aggressive participant looming over the camera, with only weapons and sky visible in the frame.

“reduce the violence to race, and that race is black” (1991: 59). Rather than homogeneously describing “black-on-black” (ibid.: 58) violence within this sample, the Anglo-American news channels differentiated between the IFP and ANC, even when speaking of factional violence under apartheid. The IFP were positioned as bloodthirsty warriors, while the ANC were heroic politicians. None of the reporters across any channels referred to “black-on-black”, “tribal”, or “factional” (ibid.: 63) violence outright. Violence in this sample was chiefly perpetrated by a specific group of black people – usually the IFP – although the motivation behind such violence was unclear. Perhaps the broadcasters were more invested in differentiating the ethnic and political groups involved in the violence because of the election: the political campaigning separated the once “undifferentiated mass” (ibid.: 66) into ideological factions. For all the desire to differentiate between the IFP and the ANC, global broadcasts, in particular *Profile of a Zulu Nation* and *Sky News Report on South Africa*, depicted a horse race between democracy – the moderate, government-in-waiting ANC – and the savagery threatening to derail the election – the aggressive and bloodthirsty IFP masses that perpetrated ethnic violence throughout the election run-up.

### 2.3.2 Military in control

Pre-election, the ethnic and factional violence in South Africa drove the country to the brink of disaster. US reporters highlight this tension through discourse – “Zulu power on the march, massing in tribal regiments” (Sadler, *The Big Story*, CNN), “Hope runs neck and neck with danger” (Rather, *FF and IFP have common ideals*, CBS), “Which will prevail, the bullet or the ballot box” (*Electing the Future*, CNN) – and through visuals (Images 3.16 – 3.21) The military was often portrayed in control of this violence, either through might or through mercy. Global journalists were there to frame the military as they rolled in to “trouble spots” (Aslett, *South Africa voter education*, ITN). Smiling white soldiers in army

tanks rumble down a dusty road “rolling into KwaZulu” as a “hammerhead sent in to crack down on violence in the embattled province of Natal” (Sadler, *Profile of a Zulu nation*, CNN). Low angles of tanks and wide shots of smiling soldiers emphasise the military might sent in to save the day (Images 13.16 – 3.18). The mercy of the military was also under the spotlight: children jump joyously around and wave to passing army trucks as CNN’s Peter Arnett narrates: “the South African Defence Forces rode in to the rescue to the evident relief of the residents” (*The Big Story*, CNN) (Image 3.18). In global 1994 coverage, the military was a peacekeeping force to ensure that democracy was achieved at all costs.



Image 3.16: *Profile of a Zulu Nation*, CNN, 1994. “Tanks roll in to KwaZulu”



Image 3.17: *Profile of a Zulu Nation*, CNN, 1994. “Low angle tanks to keep the peace”



Image 3.18: *Big Story*, CNN, 1994. “SANDF rode in to the rescue to the evident relief”

Apartheid-era protests were shown too, and the violence was excruciatingly noticeable. Visuals of the “all guns, full ammo” approach to peacekeeping in the 1980s and early 1990s dominated coverage – police charge at groups of protesters in wide shots, fire live rounds into crowds, whip protesters with *sjamboks* and leather straps, and deploy stun grenades into scattering crowds. Despite the brutality of these images, at no point were the authorities reprimanded either in visuals or discourse (as the IFP were, seen above). At this stage the broadcasters seemed to present violence and “dodging bullets” as “a way of surviving” (Oliver, *Earth Matters*, CNN), while the police and authorities aid “survival” rather than add to the “violence”.

With a title evocative of Alan Paton’s classic South African novel that highlighted poverty and pain under apartheid, AP’s long form *Vote, the beloved country* explores the bloody pre-election era. There are 47 out of the 128 sections of the broadcast that portray violence, intimidation, marches, death, blood, bodies, carnage, or fighting. Out of these 47 sections, the police or the army were shown 12 times, 10 as an “observer” to the violence (watching the marches, standing along the road, and in a long shot with hands on the trigger of automatic weapons – see Image 3.19 – 3.20) in du Plooy’s “subjective camera angle” (2009: 171), once chasing black protesters, and once arresting a black man.

In this broadcast, and overall in the sample (Images 3.19 – 3.20), the authorities were viewed as right, just, and neutral in their actions against distant black people, who were conversely framed as threatening, savage, and violent. Camera proxemics kept viewer and protester apart, often mediated through the police and military placed in mid-foreground between the camera and black people.



Image 3.19: *Vote, the beloved country*, AP, 1994. “Subjective angle as an observer”



Image 3.20: *Earth Matters*, CNN, 1994. “Subjective angle as an observer”



Image 3.21: *Bloody Sunday*, CNN, 1994. “Subjective angle as an observer”

Fair and Astroff (1991: 60) suggest that this type of framing, particularly during the apartheid era, undermined the agency of unrest and positioned the white/authoritative government as “bringers of law and order” (ibid.: 58). This signifying practice equates white-on-black violence with “control”, and black-on-black violence with “chaos”. My own study confirms these conclusions too – the military were almost always white, almost always in “control”, while protesters and perpetrators of violence, such as the IFP, were almost always black and almost always framed as “chaotic”.

## 2.4 Transition and contradictions

Change occurred in South Africa when apartheid gave way to democracy and white minority rule to black majority rule. Global broadcasters<sup>36</sup> viewed this transition through a number of binaries and stereotypes, centred on how the election will bring about change to South Africans’ immediate lives. Firstly, the traditions and culture of rural black South Africans were stereotyped and reduced to shallow depictions of poverty and strangeness, where the change to democracy may finally offer these people a chance to be lifted out of their impoverished, backwards existence. Secondly, journalists pitted the black majority’s indistinct hopes against clear white minority fears, emphasising neoliberal concerns of economy and tourism. Thirdly, the idea of land ownership and belonging was split between black and white people, observing farming in South Africa and the recent Zimbabwean independence where “nothing had changed”. In attempting to explain the complexities of South African society, journalists seemingly could not adequately explore these depths because of shallow frames. The result was contradictory, confusing, entangled narratives that did not explain, but rather entertained.

---

<sup>36</sup> SABC narratives were again narrow in the three packages available: no broadcast referred to the transition in any significance, instead focusing on the “change” from the old apartheid flag to the new multi-coloured flag in ceremonies. The first package looked at how the new flag was stitched together, and the second package was a montage of flag-hoisting ceremonies around the country, presented matter-of-factly without much mediation from the journalist in either editing or discourse.

In order to explore why change is required, journalists travel to the homelands of the Eastern Transvaal and Venda to observe the ancient traditions and existence of rural black South Africans. In doing so, however, journalists fall into the traps of using already-known and racist stereotypes to depict rural South Africans and emphasise the benefits of democracy.

#### 2.4.1 Rural people play at politics

CNN's long-form broadcast *Earth Matters* spent very little time discussing the election itself, focused instead on the protection of wildlife under the new government, the rural South African existence in homelands, and the migration of tribes to urban centres under the apartheid government. As David Mattingly ventures into a rural village, he frames rural black South Africans in the rolling hills of the Eastern Transvaal homelands:

In the shade we pass adolescent males loitering and gambling for pocket change. All the while we can hear the beating of drums. Echoes of an older way of life. These traditional dances have lost a lot of their meaning in modern day, and that's part of the problem here in the homelands. If you notice, there aren't many young adult males participating. That's because they're more pre-occupied with the modern way of life and that includes playing football or playing politics... Some stay, spending their time fighting political battles with graffiti and mocking the white government.

The framing of these young men is problematic. Firstly, the words "playing politics" undermines the black population's struggle from independence, for equality, and for basic human rights. Secondly, Mattingly's framing disconnects culture with modernisation, assuming that the two cannot coexist comfortably and that rural black South Africans must forgo culture, traditions, and rituals for development, politics, and democracy. Mattingly makes no attempt to explain which culture he observes – instead,



he assumes some kind of immemorial homogeneous black culture, and falls into the trap that Fair and Astroff (1991: 65) caution against.

These rural people now suddenly face democracy and are seemingly “scared of voting” and “illiterate” (Whitaker, *Evening news*, CBS). Saths Cooper (1994: 118) notes in his analysis of the 1994 commentary that media tended to foreground the voter illiteracy of the rural population, and these “do-gooders” (ibid.) tend to mistake a lack of education for the inability to choose between parties and understand policy relevance. ITN framed rural people this way: “[Akanani, the voter educators, are] at first treated with some scepticism. Most of the people are illiterate and wary of outsiders. It’s also the first time any of them have come across a ballot paper. For the educators, it’s an uphill battle” (Aslett, *South Africa voter education*, ITN). Not only are rural people afraid of outsiders, they are also dependent on old rituals (ibid.):

Back in the lush hills of Venda, making predictions comes a little easier. Here, one of South Africa’s most respected witch doctors rolls the bones to see what the future will bring. He predicts that the country will go through a period of conflict but eventually it will prosper.

Aslett’s framing of the rural Venda people is not unlike Mattingly’s problematic description on CNN’s *Earth Matters*. These rural people seemingly have no place in sophisticated, Westernised democracy and this assumption is, as reiterated in Saths Cooper’s (1994: 118) criticism of global commentary at the time and Spurr’s binaries (1994: 19), poorly reductionist. Framing rural people in this fashion undermines their agency in selecting leaders in a democratic poll – equating illiteracy with incapability borders on racist framing (Prinsloo & Robins, 1996).

#### 2.4.2 Black hopes and white fears

Global broadcasters explore the change that the new era of democracy could herald for South Africa by outlining the hopes and dreams of the black populace as well as the fears of the white minority. What exactly these black hopes constitute is indistinctly explored, however. Very few black people were interviewed about their desires for post-apartheid South Africa: Solly Mahule (*Earth Matters*, CNN) desires ancestral land returned to his family, Trophus Dlamini (*South Africa's youngest voters*, CNN) wants better education, and Musa Zondi and Lokswayo (*Earth Matters*, CNN) pray for better living conditions, while other unnamed vox pops want “change”, that “I must be free” (*South Africa – election voting*, ITN), or simply “to vote” (*Evening news*, CBS). Because of the lack of citizen voices on these broadcasts, global journalists are forced to make assumptions on behalf of the black majority in explaining these desires: a change in government signals alleviation of poverty (Laurie, *South Africa's first free election*, ABC; Mattingly, *Earth Matters*, CNN; Rather, *Mugabe reassures white South Africans*, CBS; Crowe, *Sky News report on South Africa*, Sky News), better education (Arnett, *The Big Story*, CNN; *Vote the beloved country*, AP; Maite, *South Africa's youngest voters*, CNN), and modernisation (Mattingly, *Earth matters*, CNN), all of which are expected to occur overnight with the election. Despite visiting rural enclaves of South Africa, journalists rarely interview villagers themselves and instead use the binaries of the modern and traditional to show how change is so obviously required (as in *Earth Matters*, CNN).

Although the “change” that black people assumedly desire is undefined in both quantity and time scale in this sample, that desire is presented as something to fear. James Maite suggests, “South Africa's blacks are demanding reform. There's clearly apprehension about just how much the blacks will want” (*South Africa's youngest voters*, CNN). Dan Rather says something similar when speaking about Zimbabwe's democracy: “What has

happened in Zimbabwe is this: neither black hopes nor white fears have been fully realised. For blacks, who were expecting, hoping, for dramatic change, poverty remains a common experience” (*Mugabe reassures white South Africans*, CBS). The fears of white people are more clearly outlined: a destruction of civil liberties (Rather, *Mugabe reassures white South Africans*, CBS), of minority rights and Afrikaner culture (Rather, *FF and IFP have similar ideals*, CBS), the faltering economy under black rule, and an escalation of on-going violence.

#### 2.4.3 Change in Zimbabwe

In order to reassure white South Africans that transition is possible, peaceful, and their civil liberties will remain intact, Dan Rather (*Mugabe reassures white South Africans*, CBS) interviews Zimbabwean citizens and leaders about their “peaceful” transition to democracy. Rather highlights how the country thrives and that capital still exist in white hands. The broadcast might seem ironic now, but at the time Zimbabwe was prosperous, although only for the white minority.

Rather states that the key to Zimbabwe’s success is in preserving the natural and mineral wealth in the form of tourism and mining, rather than giving over to a bloody revolution. He interviews President Mugabe, who reiterates, “Have no cause to fear at all. Be at peace... The whites are here. They still are in control of the economy. They have most of the land in the country.” Rather then shows two white Zimbabweans, one a farmer and the other a boules player, who agree that peace exists in post-independence Zimbabwe and that change has not occurred. He says that “those who have stayed would tell their neighbours in South Africa how little has changed compared to how much more has stayed the same”. That which had “stayed the same” centres on the poor black majority: rural villagers are still without electricity and water, black women look after

white children, black gardeners still toil in the sun while their bosses relax in the shade, and, crucially, the capital and the land still exists in the hands of the white minority.

Rather's broadcast framed this status quo as "reassurance", that white people were still in their natural place – in control of the land, the wealth, and the power – and perhaps therefore the rural black population were also in theirs, toiling in the midday sun. South Africa, therefore, despite the indeterminate desires of the newly enfranchised black population, could be assured of white capital protection post-election. Connie Chung, at the start of the broadcast, says exactly that over images of Mandela visiting the Johannesburg Stock Exchange: "Nelson Mandela went to the stock exchange to assure investors that he is committed to economic stability", thus priming the broadcast for an economic frame.

As an explanation of why Zimbabwe's society remains the same, Rather says that "real change occurs across generations". Judy Aslett from ITN agrees: "Even after the country has a black government, real change for people here will take time" (*South Africa voter education*, ITN). Jim Laurie from ABC explains that even though the black population turned out in droves to vote for change, "three days is just not enough to change history" (*South Africa's first free elections*, ABC). Laurie (ABC), Maite (CNN), Rather (CBS), and Aslett (ITN) argue that a transition – from poverty, racism, autocracy, and violence – might not occur overnight. Framing the elections through this "transition" theme is contradictory to the broadcaster's images of democracy: in the first analysis section, I posited that broadcasters depicted democracy as a panacea for South Africa's ills, reflecting Guelke (1996), Ndlela (2005), and Waldahl (2005a), and that these problems would somehow start to disappear immediately post-election. However, the same broadcasters suggest that "change occurs across decades" and one election cannot simply

wipe away hundreds of years of oppression. These narratives are contradictory and confusing, entangled in two conflicting arguments at the same time. Part of the reason for such a difficult narrative is the use of simplistic and binarised frames to depict a deep and contradictory topic. Without giving clear context to the problem of the transition to democracy in South Africa, it is no wonder journalists end up contradicting themselves and falling into unhelpful stereotypes.

#### 2.4.4 Land ownership

Black, rural people are framed throughout this sample as ethnic, traditional, culturally homogeneous, and often exoticized. White people, including Afrikaner farmers or *boers*, are not treated in the same way. Instead, white people are seen as landowners, managers, businesspeople, and belong on their farms as much as black people have rights to their ancestral land. The white fear of loss of the land and black desires for land redistribution was seen in Rather's broadcast above (*Mugabe reassures white South Africans*, CBS), as well as in CNN's *Earth Matters*: David Mattingly follows two farmers who compete over what seems to be the same rights to the land.

Mattingly explains that white commercial farmer Carl Webber "benefitted from the apartheid system where white settlers assumed ownership of tribal land. Even though that was generations ago, Webber still enjoys all the benefits that good land and cheap labour provides" (*Earth Matters*, CNN). We are taken through Webber's Cape Dutch house filled with antique furniture, set in rolling green gardens serviced by toiling black servants. The white farmer's lifestyle is then intercut with close-up shots of subsistence farmer Lokswayo's tatty bible in his mud-floored hut, a "prized possession" (Mattingly, *Earth Matters*, CNN) placed next to a candle in a holder and an empty tube of Colgate toothpaste (see Images 3.22 – 3.23). Both the white commercial farmer and the black

impoverished subsistence farmer appear to have “rights” to same land: Mattingly says that Lokswayo “prays to return to the land where his father is buried. A land now owned by whites” but Carl says, “the land is special to us because it was bought through hard work”. CBS’s Dan Rather frames white land owners in much the same way: “This rich land has been prized and fought over by South Africans for centuries” (*FF and IFP have common ideals*, CBS). Freedom Front leader Constand Viljoen walks the fields at his farm, cows amongst the bush and green hills extending into the distance. “I love this land, I’ll defend this land with every little bit of blood I have within myself,” he says (*FF and IFP have common ideals*, CBS). CBS’ framing of Viljoen, and indeed Afrikanerdom, in this broadcast is sympathetic.



Image 3.22: *Earth Matters*, CNN, 1994. “Juxtaposition of white and black farmers”



Image 3.23: *Earth Matters*, CNN, 1994. “Juxtaposition of white and black farmers”

As with CBS’ *Mugabe reassures white South Africans*, the idea of “belonging” on the land is entangled. The black desires of land reformation and expropriation are contrasted with the white farmer’s ancestry and heritage, while both seem to have equal rights to the

same contrasting desire. Consistent with Fair and Astroff's (1991: 71) argument, the "moderate" Afrikaners in this sample are legitimised through elements of their own discourse: we hear their desires in their own voices, unlike the indistinct black desires. Afrikaner and *boer* ancestry is implicitly connected with the land and their rights to own it; the Afrikaners attempt to validate their rightful place in South Africa, on the land, and in cultural capital, and are given space to do so.<sup>37</sup> The neglect of black voices in this sample is telling of Friedman's "view from the suburbs" (2011: 109) - the bias towards white voices informs the audience of only some realities.

Entanglement occurred in the global journalists' exploration of land ownership in South Africa not because the journalists presented the inherent contradictions of land rights, but because they did not acknowledge these contradictions as such. Had the journalists said something akin to, "both farmers feel they have equal rights to the land, blacks because of ancestry and whites because of purchase", or that "land ownership in South Africa is complicated because of the history of apartheid and colonisation", the broadcasts might not have been so confusing. These broadcasts might then have gone some way to explain the difficult issue, rather than relying on juxtaposing Webber's "rich" lifestyle with Lokswayo's "poverty", which was an unhelpful stereotype. Instead, Rather and Mattingly show both white and black farmers as having equal rights to the

---

<sup>37</sup> What is the reason for this type of framing of white Afrikaners? Could it be because the Americans have a vested interest in legitimising the "White Tribe of Africa" (Harrison, 1982)? Louw identifies the foregrounding of Europeans in non-Western stories as the "voice of the Anglos" (2009: 170), reflecting Myer et al.'s (1996: 34) suggestion that Western news relies on Western sources and voices when representing non-Western issues and problems. Westernised culture is often deemed "valid and incontestable" (Louw, 2009: 157), and anything that falls outside those bounds is symbolically wrong and odd. Perhaps the moderate Afrikaner *boer* was, to the international broadcasters, more similar to the "Anglo voice" than black politics in 1994. It could also partly be because the Freedom Front adhered to the Western ideal of democracy (Windrich, 1994; Reta, 2000) and are treated with sympathy by a US media that single-mindedly promoted Westernised democracy. More likely, however, is the cathartic nature of the 1994 narrative in US news (Sisk, 1994) and the rhetoric of post-Cold War news frames (Norris, 1995: 359, 1997: 14). Negotiated settlement as conflict resolution was the ideal outcome for the Clinton administration (Sisk, 1994: 149; Hawk, 2002: 158), and allowing this peculiar White Tribe of Africa its place in the sun was perhaps part of this negotiation.

same space, without exploring the causes, consequences, and realities experienced by both. Neoliberal concerns of ownership, business, capital, and individual rights are foregrounded more often in these broadcasts, while the African realities of ancestral rights, traditional cultures, and subsistence farming are framed as backward, impoverished, and strange. In this respect, instead of giving equal explanation to both white and black desires for land ownership, US channels tended to instead contradict their own narratives, resulting in flattened and confusing broadcasts reliant on binarised stories of rich and poor, traditional and modern.

Overall, global narratives in 1994 became muddled because of the desire to highlight the negotiated settlement, and thus neoliberal news frames, seemingly at all costs. The lack of proper context and investigation into the election and complexities of South African society resulted in flattened, binarised themes focused on the dramatic and the violent. Anglo-American channels appeared to have broadly similar framing, yet the SABC was more hesitant, almost neglectful, of important narratives. As the only mainstream broadcaster in the country at the time ignored stories of the pre-election violence, the transition from apartheid to democracy (save for the brief and superficial packages about flag making), and citizen voices from the long queues, the SABC seemed neglectful of grassroots realities and instead reflected only the “safe” narratives. The SABC was disappointingly narrow in their coverage of the voting day in the limited number of broadcasts available for this sample.



Three narratives pervaded the 1994 election coverage, which stemmed from a push towards mediatised political communication. Firstly, Anglo-American coverage was overwhelmingly dramatized, with visualised violence underscoring the election, especially on US broadcasts. Secondly, global channels presented this first election as a triumph of logic, reason, and negotiation over the savagely violent past of South African society. The thrust towards this neoliberal narrative seems to be a symptom of post-Cold War frames and mediatised political communication. The fascination with the details of violence as well as the inability to explain its causes or consequences, and a fixation on economic concerns and negotiation as *de facto* universal values is typical of the literature (Sisk, 1994; Windrich, 1994: 22; Norris, 1995: 359, 1997: 14; Evans & Glenn, 2010: 15; Evans, 2014: 34). Finally, these frames, narratives, and stereotypes are entangled: broadcasters contradict themselves frequently and fall into already-known stereotypes of catharsis, communism, conflict, and event-based coverage, which is also consistent with the literature of the time (Norris, 1997; Turkington, 1997; Reta, 2000; Hawk, 2002). This entanglement is evidence of the episodic reporting of which Iyengar (1991: 18) speaks, and can be traced back to the global reliance on mediatised coverage of the election. The discussion tracks each of these three points in turn.

### 3.1 Dramatic and poetic global coverage

The Anglo-American perspective of the 1994 election was more prominent than the local, South African perspective, but this was mostly because of the lack of available SABC broadcasts. Additionally, the SABC broadcasts were dull and fact-based with little mediation, while global narratives tended to be visually rich. Global channels tended to

use frames reminiscent of the post-Cold War news values, defined by Norris (1997: 14), Windrich (1994), and Hawk (2002: 168) as conflict resolution attained through negotiated settlement, a focus on neoliberal interests such as economics, trade agreements, and the security of Western democratic values such as multi-party democracy and competition. Meanwhile, the SABC broadcasts tended to ignore the majority of narratives and issues highlighted on global channels and focused instead on the flag ceremonies and early morning queues. This hesitation to highlight controversial or difficult issues was most likely due to the apparent “balanced” and “neutral” perspective of the SABC at the time,<sup>38</sup> or because of the limited sample of broadcasts provided by the broadcaster. None the less, global coverage was overwhelmingly dramatic, with creative camera proxemics to represent the 1994 election in a series of poetic broadcasts. Most channels centred on the violence that surrounded the election.

### 3.1.1 Violence

South Africa’s approach to democracy seemed chaotic and hampered by riots, terrorism, and armed men marching down streets, and these images dominated Anglo-American broadcasts. Journalists framed black South Africans as having as a seemingly inherent propensity for violence, which echoes Spurr’s (1994: 107) concept that when given the promise of development, in this case through democracy, failure is inevitable because of the African’s incorrigible violent nature. Violence was both manifest – in the debris, bloodshed, explosions, and drawn weapons bookending the election – but also in the framing narratives journalists used to explain the election.

Violence was portrayed firstly in a visible, manifest threat of danger and bloodshed, which seems obvious because of the Johannesburg bombings in the week of the election.

---

<sup>38</sup> See the above discussion on the UNMOSA observation under “South African perspectives” of democracy.

Close up shots of ruined cars and buildings, scattering black South Africans as police shoot into crowds, a seemingly unending *impi* marching in low angle towards the camera, and black Zulu men holding spears up towards the sky. On closer inspection, however, the narrative of violence was not simply because the broadcasters covered the bombings and marching Zulu warriors; instead, global journalists highlighted the prolonged terror campaign that ran through the various ethnic and factional tensions. Violence in this respect was caused by ethnic groups (often Zulus), controlled by the military, and threatened to derail the election and therefore democracy, a fragile concept and not easily attained in South Africa. The broadcasters did not speak of this violence as homogeneously “black” (as in Fair and Astroff, 1991), but instead distinguished black ethnicity as bloodthirsty IFP Zulu warlords and the ANC as the victims of such violence and heroes of the Struggle. Black people still fought other black people, though, and were controlled by white authorities, a narrative that appears to be consistent with Fair and Astroff’s (1991) analysis.

### 3.2 Binaries and the horse race

In attempting to explain the complicated stories of pre-democracy South Africa, journalists used binaries that tended to flatten these complexities into easily understood stereotypes. The negotiated settlement narrative, so paramount to news values in the post-Cold War era, played out in the portrayal of two sides competing, in a kind of “morality play” (Rassool & Witz, 1996: 339): land ownership in South Africa and Zimbabwe where white and black people had equal but contradictory claims, factional violence between the IFP and the ANC where peace ran neck and neck with war, rural South Africans hamstrung by their tribalist culture faced need for modernisation that the election promised, and overarching hopes and fears of the 1994 election. Broadcasters

played prophets in commenting on how these conflicts would develop. In this respect, a horse race was visible but not in the sense of a two-party contest (as in Patterson, 1980; Aalberg, et al., 2011; Benoit, 2004: 105): instead, the horse race was between peace and war, modernisation and tribalism, a bloodthirsty *impi* and a government-in-waiting, and hopes and fears, reflecting Nyamnjoh's observation of the "polarised" media (2005: 235).

Beverly Hawk (2002: 159) suggests that the binaries of promise and disappointment of development, of which democracy is a key element, created racial duality in the coverage of the first South African election. She scathingly calls the coverage "a composite of images from fictional entertainment than the result of personal experience in Africa or with Africans" (ibid.: 160). The horse race binary in my sample is less extreme than in Hawk's observation, but the binaries observed in global coverage do tend to simplify and entertain, rather than enlighten and explain. The SABC's narratives in this were not much better: although fact-driven, the omission of important events and issues (such as the violence before the election) gave a narrow view of the 1994 election. One hopes that additional broadcasts, if available, would show a deeper investigation of the first poll.

### 3.3 Entangled, contradictory narratives

Achille Mbembe once described perspectives about Africa's attempts at democracy as an "entanglement" (2015: 67). Indeed, Africa's conflict with traditional territory governance and the demands of democracy placed upon it by the straight lines of colonialism has resulted in a struggling and chaotic approach to governance. As Mbembe describes the struggles of governance, he mentions the binary opinions of the "hope" of African democracy that "reduce the range of historical choices gestating in Africa to a stark alternative of either 'transition' to democracy and the shift to a market economy, or

descent into the shadows of war” (2015: 77). The simplistic binaries on US channels often resulted in contradictory reporting on the 1994 election. The one-dimensional dramatic stories, fixated on the visualisation of conflict and trauma, left little room to explore deeper consequences and acknowledge inherent contradictions through contextualised reporting.

The US seemed to identify the cure-all for South African society as a free and fair election (in that poverty, racial inequality, unequal land ownership, education imbalance, and violent crime and factionalism would begin to disappear when the election occurred), but at the same time acknowledged that these deep-seated societal problems could not be swept away in one election. Black living conditions may improve by gaining access to wealth and land through suffrage, but that would mean handing over white capital to an unknown future. Democracy seemed a panacea for what ails South Africa, but at the same time journalists acknowledge that this cure-all is fundamentally impossible. White landowners “belong” on the land they purchased fairly and deserve rights to it, but so do black tribes who were forced off the land by these white settlers. The powerful juxtaposition between black desires, white fears, and the inequality of the two existences resulted in a binarised and entangled depiction of South African society during the election.

Mbembe bemoans the representations of African democracy that are flattened into sides of a binary, similar to Spurr’s (1994) “failure” and “promise” of development. In this sample, the promise of development, democracy as dignity, is pitted against the disappointment of a violent, chaotic, fragile process, and is thus reduced to simplistic stereotyped stories that tend to favour dramatic reporting, rather than in depth coverage.

The episodic reporting seen on the global broadcasts in this sample is symptomatic of both the thrust towards post-Cold War news frames and mediated coverage.

### 3.4 Mediatized reporting

Most channels in this sample focused on the personalisation of politicians: Buthelezi's love of war theatre was highlighted at the expense of any IFP policy discussion, and Mandela and De Klerk's symbolic handshakes dominated coverage while the actual negotiation process was glossed over. Similarly, symbolism and visualisation were favoured over context, consequence, and explanation: the colourful new flags were hoisted over a jubilant, emotional populace on the SABC broadcasts, but little context was explored. For the Anglo-American broadcasts, the rural black masses were not only illiterate and unable to distinguish between parties, but also treated the vote as a toy to be played with, quite apart from the serious, sombre, and fearful white minority. Issue-based or thematic reporting (Iyengar, 1991: 18) was low in this sample, especially in the Anglo-American channels, which fits with the modern style of political journalism that Louw (2005: 66) and Bennett (2012: 44) describe. Part of this mediatization trend is that political journalism transforms elections into spectacle, obliterates context and therefore fragments news stories in order to focus on the dramatic, the violent, and the visual.

### 3.5 South African perspective

While Anglo-American broadcasts fixated on visually rich and violent events, the SABC did the opposite: a dry and dull view of the voting day was punctuated by a symbolic lowering of the old flags. The brief South African perspective seemed to focus more on the "peace" brought by democracy, rather than the change from a violent past. While Ndlela (2011: 77) and Waldahl (2005a, 2005b) suggest local Zimbabwean state-owned

media was overwhelmingly superficial due to the problematic access to funds and information, in this study it seems superficial South African coverage was due to the media-monitoring spotlight from UNMOSA but also because of the small available sample of broadcasts. Additional broadcasts may suggest the SABC was far more explorative of the 1994 election, but previous literature suggests this was not the case (Silke & Schrirer, 1994: 142; Berger, 2002: 5; Gouws & De Beer, 2008: 274).

Ultimately, the 1994 election coverage was far less negative than expected, given that literature of the time fixates on news media's Afropessimism during the early 1990s (Schraeder & Endless, 1998; de B'Berl & Louw 2009; Evans & Glenn 2010; Nothias, 2012). De B'Berl and Louw (2009: 337) suggest Afropessimistic discourse implies that there is inherently "something wrong with Africans" rather than that there may be something amiss with democracy:

The heart of this discourse derives from the fact that Africans are failing to live up to a set of criteria developed by Westerners who want to develop Africa.

Specifically, Westerners want Africa to function socially and economically in such a way that the continent would mesh neatly into the globalised economy built by Europeans and Americans over the past two centuries.

Indeed, Anglo-American representations of democracy implied that it was South Africa at fault for being incapable of hosting a "proper" election. Instead of being inherently Afropessimistic, however, the news coverage was flattened and stereotyped, which reduced the complexities of South African pre-democracy society to simple, but not always negative nor incorrect, binaries. Rather than assuming South Africa could never progress politically, the journalists presented confusing and entangled narratives that entertained, rather than explained, itself a symptom of mediatization in global political communication.

Anglo-American broadcasts were diverse and contradictory in nature, while the SABC broadcasts were simplistic and cautious, and most coverage was symptomatic of a push towards mediatisation. The overarching narratives of the 1994 election included presenting South Africa's chaotic and inept approach to democracy, pitting black desires against foregrounded white fears, with broadcasters playing prophet about the changes that democracy would bring to a divided South African society. The reporting style from Anglo-American broadcasters emphasised the visualisation of violence and media logic, at the expense of political information. The SABC, meanwhile, had very few meaningful narratives due, in part, to the strict spotlight on objectivity at the time. As demonstrated later in this thesis, the South African broadcasts tended to be very hesitant in exploring controversial narratives overall, so perhaps the UNMOSA spotlight is not the sole reason for the SABC's 1994 caution.



## Chapter 4:

### 1999

The 1999 election has been called “boring” (Khosa, 1999: 97; Bird, 2008: 59), a treatise in “normalcy” (Louw & Chitty, 2000: 293), a “popularity contest” (Saul, 2002: 32), and the “ethnic census” (Seekings, 2001: 164). This second poll drew very little media coverage, and as an event was thus almost incomparable to the media spectacle of 1994. Broadcasts were scarce for this election sample. While the South African news media landscape had changed with the inclusion of eTV, an independent news and entertainment channel, access was difficult due to the poor archiving techniques and expensive access present at the time of analysis.<sup>39</sup> Only three channels from two regions were available, with nine broadcasts in total meeting the criteria for selection. In this small sample, both journalists and citizens showed a growing concern about politicians being fit-for-purpose. Mandela was criticised, subtly, while Mbeki was portrayed as the new hope for the future, able to rein in wayward ANC members and tackle looming crises head on. Although the narratives were mostly poorly explored, both local and global broadcasters ultimately denounced the Mandela presidency’s failure to bring about change to the electorate’s satisfaction. While the global media gave but a cursory glance to important issues, local media attempted a view from the ground.

---

<sup>39</sup> As stated in the methodology chapter, archival access for eTV came with a high price tag – R35 per second of broadcast data. It was only through a long process of negotiation that the eTV sample became financially viable. Because of this, for the 1999 sample year, only two prime-time news broadcasts were available for analysis.

Although Mandela and his leadership are often glorified (Marschall, 2004; Posel, 2013; Dowden, 2013; Carlin, 2013; BBC, 2014; Biography, 2016), the first five years of South Africa's new democracy were turbulent. Richard Calland calls Mandela's government "one big laboratory" (1999: 1) of experiments: the Government of National Unity (GNU),<sup>40</sup> the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC),<sup>41</sup> the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP),<sup>42</sup> the Growth, Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR) project,<sup>43</sup> and the new Constitution were all implemented during Mandela's presidency. These policies were the responsibility of the deputy presidents, and from 1996 that fell squarely on the shoulders of Thabo Mbeki when joint-deputy FW De Klerk resigned from parliament. Meanwhile, Mandela improved the global image of South Africa and ensured nation building was a top priority for the country, which Du Preez calls "Project Rainbow Nation" (2013: 25). His thrust towards unification of the divided country came at a price, however. Gevisser notes that Mandela was "a far better liberator and nation-builder than... a governor" (2007: 699). Saul (2002: 48) too notes that Mandela's "mythos of consensus" and the narrative of a unified nation muffled societal contradictions and tensions.

---

<sup>40</sup> The GNU consisted of 12 ANC officials, 6 NP, and 3 IFP, with Mbeki (ANC) and De Klerk (NP) as Deputy Presidents. Lawson (2003: 215) notes that the GNU was hardly a match made in heaven: slanging matches between Mandela and De Klerk in 1995 highlighted the tempestuous relationship.

<sup>41</sup> The TRC was a transitional justice body that gave victims of past conflict a chance to tell their stories of gross human rights violations, and offered amnesty to perpetrators who fulfilled certain criteria.

<sup>42</sup> The RDP attempted to address the socio-economic consequences of apartheid through alleviating poverty and addressing the social services shortfalls, which were seen as mutually supporting objectives.

<sup>43</sup> GEAR replaced the RDP and was adopted in June 1996 in order to cut expenditure, reduce budget deficit, and rationalise the public sector. Habib (2013) argues that sanctioning GEAR was probably because of intense international pressure from investors. See Saul (2002: 33-39) and Klein (2007) for examples of how the ANC adopted neoliberal policies that were radically different to the movement's proclaimed socialist ideology.

## 1.2 The outgoing king

Politician Van Zyl Slabbert (1999: 212) describes Mandela's era in office as "the politics of charisma" and hints that spectacle and image came at the expense of effective governance. Jacobs and Calland (2002: 3) also suggest that Mandela could "float above" these politics because of his apparent mythic status, unencumbered by the realpolitik within the ANC. He was a modern politician yet in touch with traditional and tribal structures, and he embodied whiteness and blackness, privilege and deprivation simultaneously. However, it seems that his endeavour to straddle two contrasting worlds and the desire to promote an international image meant sacrificing the depth of political analysis required in order to "hold the centre": divergent thrusts within the ANC during the first term of government threatened to pull the former liberation movement apart.

For many South Africans, the heady promises of 1994 had not come to fruition by 1999. The dream of rapid change, promised in the ANC's Freedom Charter and 1994 manifesto, seemed eternally deferred. In his cynical and critical account of the ANC's apparent capitulation to capitalism, John Saul (2002: 33) reflects Chris Landsberg's (1994: 290-1) observation that foreign governments (the UK, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the US) drew the ANC away from its socio-economic policies – including nationalisation – and persuaded the party to embrace Western-style free market principals in 1994. Mandela's evolving fiscal responsibility was due to pressures from investors and governments, rather than an organic internal decision from the ANC NEC, Naomi Klein (2007: 207) reiterates. Saul's essay on the "post-apartheid denouement" (2002: 27-33) outlines the ANC's withdrawal from any form of genuine class struggle that might directly help the vast impoverished masses, while appeasing the smirking wielders of corporate power.

This “precipitous rush to the right” (ibid.) perplexed many critics; the ANC’s almost total capitulation to market forces begged the question of whether it was pushed into capitalism, or jumped in with both feet. Saul argues that the ANC may have had genuine misgivings about socialism based on the recent Soviet history and that the institutions the ANC inherited were weak and broken, which precluded the implementation of some of the founding principals in the Freedom Charter. Russell (2009: 12) asserts that

The ANC would stabilise the nation’s tottering finances by bending to the winds of globalisation then gusting across the world and adopting an orthodox free-market programme. In short, opponents on the left argued, [Mandela’s deputy, Thabo Mbeki] advocated the approach of the ANC’s Western ideological foes of the eighties, Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher.

Ultimately, the electorate were given a raw deal in the first five years of the democracy. Fixing the broken institutions inherited from the brutal apartheid system necessitated a capitulation to capitalism, but doing so meant that many of the hopes and promises from the ANC’s socialist 1994 campaign were necessarily sacrificed.

### 1.3 Problems in paradise

Important achievements during the presidency occurred through the hard work and realpolitik of the ANC and the GNU. A democratic and innovative constitution was lauded as one of the most progressive in the world (Du Preez, 2013: 42); economic infrastructure was stabilised rapidly; service delivery occurred in critical areas; a trouble-free 1999 election ran smoothly thanks to the IEC’s coordination; and the country witnessed a dignified changeover between presidents, from Mandela to Mbeki. Gevisser observes that the overriding legacy of South Africa’s first president is “a country where the rule of law was entrenched in an unassailable Bill of Rights, and where the

predictions of racial and ethnic conflict did not come true. These feats, alone, guarantee Mandela his sanctity” (2007: 699).

Despite improvements in South African society in the five years after 1994, cracks began to appear in the Rainbow Nation: the inheritance of an anachronistic and shambolic National Executive set the scene for a turbulent presidency, while the increasing HIV/AIDS pandemic meant that as many as 25% of pregnant South African women had contracted the virus by the end of 1999, and the government was slow to respond.<sup>44</sup> Mandela’s crumbling marriage to Winnie Mandela grabbed local headlines. A burgeoning crime wave wracking the country led one writer to conclude that South Africa is “a “country at war with itself” (Altbeker, 2007). Inequality deepened among South Africans (Lang, 2013; Padayachee & Desai, 2008),<sup>45</sup> the education system – especially in rural areas – crumbled, and promises were first extended and then broken, leading to criticisms of Mandela’s leadership skills (Lang, 2013). Additionally, the innovative GNU was at best schizophrenic (Calland, 1999: 6): the IFP and the NP found themselves in opposition and in cabinet simultaneously. Saul (2002: 30) remarks that although the new Constitution is internationally lauded, it is also vilified as a document designed to protect capital interests at the expense of transformation – referring in part to the “sunset clauses” that allowed certain privileges to whites for a certain period, and that the Freedom Charter was given little consideration in the draft.

---

<sup>44</sup> The 2011 National Antenatal Sentinel HIV & syphilis prevalence survey in South Africa, National Department of Health of South Africa available: <http://www.doh.gov.za>. Mandela later acknowledged that the ANC’s early response to the pandemic was one of the major oversights of his administration (McNeil, 2012; Sampson, 2013).

<sup>45</sup> Padayachee and Desai give a detailed explanation of the deepening inequality, including a critical discussion of the Black Economic Empowerment and GEAR programmes. In 1995, 28% of households lived below the poverty line while in 2000 the figure was roughly 33%.

While these issues may have faded from public memory, the first five years were challenging. Saul (*ibid.*: 41) writes that the best point of reference for analysing the liberation movement's acclimatisation to government might be Franz Fanon's notion of "false decolonisation", that the ANC gradually adopted their position as "intermediaries" of the global empire through capitalist policies rather than conducting true revolution, but this seems an extreme interpretation.

One of the more alarming threats to this consolidated democracy was the government's animosity towards the mainstream media. Jacobs (1999: 155) explains that the first ANC government had to deal with being on the wrong side of the press, and was not impressed with the criticism from editors and journalists once considered part of the liberation allegiance. Saul (2002: 41) writes that newly liberated African politicians often find themselves on the side of "them" (the enemy) rather than the "us" (the persecuted) in Fourth Estate media. The ANC struggled with this difficult binary throughout the first term in office, as evidenced by hostility towards the mainstream media (Berger, 2007; Jacobs, 1999; Malila, 2014). In 1999 ANC partisanship at the SABC remained strong; scholars (Jacobs, 1999; Russell, 2009: 74) suggest this bias was partly due to ANC members dominating senior management and editorial staff positions.

#### 1.4 The favourite son

Part of the tension between the ANC and mainstream media was owing to Mbeki's distaste for opposition. The deputy president barely tolerated any rebellion in the mainstream press and was accused of Machiavellian tactics to destroy any threat to his power (McGreal, 1999). From the outset, Mbeki was reluctant, almost "allergic" (Jacobs & Calland, 2002: 6), to play the "mediatised" political communication game so favoured

by the wider media and the first five years as deputy president caused a dampening of Mbeki's previous charm. Although his international allure was strong, Mbeki lacked the common touch for his electorate and had something of a political tin ear (Russell, 2009: 22). Mandela was able to straddle the traditional and modern with ease, acknowledging tribal leaders and Western democrats with the same easy demeanour. Mbeki, however, was "enigmatic" at best to his electorate: the arcane, besuited man was visibly out of place in the rural enclaves of South Africa, while Washington loved Mbeki; he was seen as "urbane and brainy" as the "West's best hope for a continent mired in poverty, corruption and disease" (Masland & King, 2000, cited in Jacobs & Calland, 2002: 5).

Although Mbeki finally won the position of deputy president, Mandela was reluctant to nominate another Xhosa politician to the upper echelons of the ANC cabinet, as he was concerned it would otherwise be seen as a "tribal" party (Calland, 1999: 5). He favoured Cyril Ramaphosa, a Venda, for the position instead. While second in charge, Mbeki ensured that there would be no further threat from Ramaphosa or any others to his quest for presidency. Russell (2009: 64) remarks that Mbeki's series of coups split the ANC into the Exiles (those who fought apartheid from outside South Africa) and the Inziles (those who remained in South Africa for the Struggle), with Mbekites being almost exclusively Exiles (ibid.). In the run-up to the 1999 election, Mbeki ensured that he had elbowed out any perceived threat to his position as the favourite son (Gevisser, 2007: 698; Russell, 2009: 20 – 21).

### 1.5 The second election

At the end of the 1999 election, and in a break from the African norm (Jacobs, 2003: 47), President Nelson Mandela stepped down after only one term in office, despite the

Constitution allowing him a second. The ANC therefore fought the second election with a new candidate in mind, deputy president Thabo Mbeki. The ANC's slogan during the 1999 election was "A Better Life For All" although, Saul (2009: 31) and Graham (2014: 180) assert, the ANC tended to float on its credibility as the liberation movement rather than its service delivery during its first term in office. As in 1994, on the advice of Bill Clinton's 1992 election advisor Stanley Greenberg (Sampson, 2011: 476), the ANC based its campaigning on actual physical contact with voters rather than through print or radio (Lodge, 1999: 66), supplemented with a sophisticated media perspective (Evans, 2014: 172). The major campaign promises included a reduction in crime and stabilising the economy, but in the Western Cape the ANC attacked white privilege and focused on coloured-African solidarity.

As one third of the GNU, the National Party was in an invidious position by holding at once a position in opposition and in government. As a result of this bipolar approach to politics, FW De Klerk resigned as deputy president in 1996 and retired from politics altogether in mid-1997. By 1999 the party was unrecognisable. The New National Party (NNP), as it was subsequently known, had a new look and a new candidate – Marthinus Van Schalkwyk – but even this reimagining was unable to arrest the decline. The party was forever "tainted with the fatal apartheid brush" (Welsh, 1999: 90) and the skeletons uncovered during the TRC damaged the party's reputation further. The NNP also had no experience in being in opposition and so policies and campaigns were ultimately poorly conceived and executed.

The DP was almost decimated in 1994, gaining only 1.7% of the national vote. In the subsequent years, however, new party leader Tony Leon was responsible for the significantly improved DP appearance and performance (Welsh, 1999: 89). Leon, a



lawyer by training and involved in the CODESA processes, was intelligent, adept at debate, sharp, cutting, and gutsy. Welsh remarks that he “never hesitated, inside or outside of parliament, to tackle the most sacred of cows” (ibid.: 89). The party became the single biggest host to white Afrikaners (ibid.: 91), effectively swallowing up the NNP and the Freedom Front electorate. With a new campaigning style and message, the DP electorate was more racially mixed than in 1994 but was still three-quarters white (Reynolds, 1999: 183).

As the remaining third of the GNU, the IFP support had been practically decimated, not least because of Mbeki’s charm: the deputy president wooed Buthelezi so well that the IFP leader spoke in glowing terms of a party he once loathed, although this was to be a one-off statement: “I hold him in high esteem”, Buthelezi said of Mbeki. “I would say the country will be in good hands if he becomes president” (cited in McGreal, 1999). As with most opposition parties in the 1999 election, the IFP’s campaign manifesto was mediocre, while policies differed only slightly from the ANC (Marè, 1999: 105). The IFP relied on ethnic voting patterns, rather than debates over policy in the 1999 election.

The 89.3% turnout for the 1999 election showed that the IEC polling administration was far more efficient than in 1994, while politically motivated violence (both real and perceived) was almost non-existent (Reynolds, 1999: 177). Instead, emotions ran high with euphoria, enthusiasm, and civic pride. Although the election was plagued by some problems, Reynolds (ibid.: 173) admits

[t]here was a beauty in the boredom, hope in the uneventfulness, pride in the lack of attention. In 1994 the eyes of the world watched South Africa to see if the fragile child would survive its traumatic birth, but five years on far fewer friends attended the youthful democracy’s birthday party.

That global media ignored South Africa's second elections could be a testament to the strides the country had made in normalising democracy, as Louw and Chitty (2000: 293) suggest, but also that the 1999 poll lacked the drama inherent in the 1994 election. South Africa held a calm, free, and fair multi-party election and thus took another step closer to democratic consolidation. Table 4.1 gives the spread of votes for each major party in the 1999 election.

	<b>ANC</b>	<b>DP</b>	<b>IFP</b>	<b>NNP</b>	<b>UDM</b>	<b>FF</b>	<b>PAC</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
Percentage	66.35	9.56	8.58	6.87	3.42	0.80	0.71	16.2mil

Table 4.1: Percentage of votes per party in 1999 election<sup>46</sup>


Saul (2002: 28) argues that apartheid was the epitome of capitalist super-exploitation, and the criterion for advance or progression in South Africa was a revolution over this super-exploitation. Notwithstanding the protection of capital interests during the negotiated settlement, South Africa made significant gains during the transition period to the 1999 elections. In the early 1990s, the country was “still a killing field” (ibid.), but South Africa was “able to realise and stabilise the shift to a constitutionally premised and safely institutionalised democratic order – making peace without suffering the potentially crippling backlash from the right wing, both black and white” (ibid.). The very mundaneness of the 1999 election confirmed this stability.

## 2 FINDINGS


The findings below answer these three questions through a multimodal analysis of the broadcasts. The broadcasts available for 1999 were scarce, with only nine broadcasts across three channels from two regions (Graphs 4.1 – 4.2).

---

<sup>46</sup> Statistics gathered from Reynolds, 1999.



Graph 4.1




Graph 4.2

eTV provided three broadcasts: one studio interview and two packages. The two packages were suitable for analysis but the studio interview was a talking-head piece between the Cape Town studio and the NROC and was thus unsuitable, based on this project's research questions that take into account mediation between journalist and images. The SABC provided many hours of unedited and thus unsuitable raw footage barring five packages that were selected for analysis. Similarly, Getty Images provided raw data from the US newswire AP, but again this footage was unsuitable as there was no journalistic voiceover or finalised editing. Only two packages were suitable. The visuals in the analysed broadcasts for this year were particularly dull and straightforward, lacking the narrative journalism approach as seen in 1994, and so the focus for this analysis was mostly on discourse. As in previous chapters, the frequency of events and political party coverage, as well as the narratives of the election, are set out below in order to investigate how, if at all, the two regions differ in the coverage of the election.


## 2.1 Frequency analysis

### 2.1.1 Events


A total of four events were observed (Graph 4.3), with some broadcasts reporting multiple events at a time (Graphs 4.4 – 4.5): the voting day generally including ballot paper preparation, polling station preparation, and problems and successes of the election so far; long queues of people waiting to get into the polling station; the transition from Nelson Mandela as president to Thabo Mbeki; and Mandela casting his vote. The two global broadcasts from ITN showed all four events equally on each broadcast.



Graph 4.3



Graph 4.4




Graph 4.5


Fewer events were covered in this second poll, because the sample size was much smaller than in 1994. ITN focused on the “personalities” of the election: Mbeki’s transition to president and Mandela voting next to his new wife Graça Machel. The South African broadcasts seemed more interested in the voting process, covering the leaders of all major political parties voting in dedicated broadcasts on both SABC and eTV.

2.1.2 Political parties

Graphs 4.6 and 4.7 show the total political party representation as well as the spread across three channels. The SABC represented all major political parties over five broadcasts, while eTV focused on the ANC but still represented competing parties. Meanwhile, ITN showed the ANC, the DP, and the NNP only.



Graph 4.6




Graph 4.7


As with 1994, the ANC dominated coverage on both local and global broadcasts, but the South African broadcasts were more diverse in the representation of political parties than ITN. The lack of political party coverage on the very few global news broadcasts available indicates how far South Africa had slipped off the global news radar (Louw & Chitty, 2000: 293) compared to the news media “circus” of 1994.

### 2.1.3 Who speaks

As in 1994, the type and frequency of speakers on the broadcasts were listed based on Cross’s (2010) study. Some 24 Unknowns and 19 Knowns spoke across nine broadcasts (Graph 4.8), and of the Knowns, the majority of speakers were political party representatives (Graph 4.9).



Graph 4.8



Graph 4.9

Distinct subsequent years, the 1994 and 1999 election years contained no political analyst speakers and instead focused on political party sources as Knowns.

Unlike 1994, the sample for 1999 contained more broadcasts from the local channels than international channels, signifying just how far South Africa had “slipped from the

global radar”. Themes that existed on the few broadcasts available included the depiction of democracy, the lack of violence in the second election, race, and the fear of a two-thirds majority. This next section outlines how the AP newswire and two South African channels represented the second election.

## 2.2 The process of democracy

The most prominent theme on the broadcasts was that of the process of democracy. All three channels, ITN, eTV, and the SABC, described the lengthy queues and the experience of the election as well as the differences between Mandela and Mbeki, but the tone between the South African and UK regions differed.

### 2.2.1 Queues

On the SABC’s *Election 99 Journalist Recap*, long queues snake into the distance seemingly as proof of the enthusiasm for democracy in South Africa as journalists explain:

“Election excitement just starting to build up in Mitchell’s Plain”

“The situation is very exciting. The day started for most of the voters around half past four”

“This is Vosloorus this morning where at least 600 people were ready to vote before the polls had even opened”

“The IEC officials bought the chairs out but people have not had time to sit down because the queue is moving so fast”

“The figure stands at around 300 with another 200 people in the queue. So the IEC are coping very well; this station is running very smoothly indeed”

“At the moment we’re flying over Pretoria, not many queues here”

These queues signify an enthusiastic, excited electorate and both SABC and eTV journalists commend the IEC for running the poll smoothly. Hence, the voting lines



were simply due to the sheer number of people arriving to cast their ballot rather than any IEC inefficiency. The SABC appeared proud of the length of queues, choosing to focus on reporters that mention queues or with visuals of smiling voters in unending lines (see Images 4.1 – 4.3).



Image 4.1: *Election 99 Journalist recap*, SABC, 1999. “PTC in Khutsong”



Image 4.2: *Election 99 Journalist recap*, SABC, 1999. “Smiling queues”



Image 4.3: *Election 99 Journalist recap*, SABC, 1999. “Robyn Curnow PTC”

ITN, however, took a different stance. Journalist Tim Ewart explains that “democracy is a slow process” in South Africa and “it’s taken several hours to reach the front of the longest queues” (*Elections polling day*). A visibly agitated voter later says, “I’m sick of this. They’d better do something better” (*Polling day 2*, ITN). “People queuing in the dark were assured that polling stations wouldn’t close until they’d been able to cast their vote” Ewart explains. ITN thus show long queues and exasperated voters as evidence of inefficiency. Although one could argue that frustration and queuing might indeed be “normal” in a democracy, ITN framed it rather as a “disappointment”.

### 2.2.2 Transition between Mandela and Mbeki

Just as the UK and South African news channels differed in the depiction of voting queues in 1999, the regional news also differed in the portrayal of the incumbent Mandela and the candidate Mbeki. For example, both the SABC and ITN show a clip of Mandela casting his vote but they framed this event differently. On the SABC (*Election 99 Journalist Recap*), Mandela explains that the feeling was not as “intense” as 1994:

Well I’m saying it’s a very wonderful occasion to be in here to vote. And now I’m doing so for the second time, it gives me a wonderful feeling. The feeling is not as intense as it was in 1994, because I was exercising this right for the first time. But now I’m comparatively relaxed, and I’m very happy today to have exercised that right. Thank you.

While using the same clip, ITN cuts his speech short at “wonderful feeling”, ignoring his further explanation. This editing might have been simple time constraints, but the resultant framing removes Mandela’s normalisation – that he has multiple emotions about the event – and chooses instead to focus on the “kiss” for his “new wife” Graça Machel (*Polling day 2*, ITN). Mandela appears one dimensional in this global broadcast, and the portrayal seems superficial compared to the SABC’s full quote.

The SABC was surprisingly critical of Nelson Mandela and his cabinet, but presented this criticism indirectly. SABC journalist Linda van 'Tilburg (*Election 99 Sowetan Youth*, SABC) hosts a focus group with various Sowetan youth, who openly criticise Mandela:

“I don’t believe the present government has done much and nobody has impressed me yet.”

“If they mess up a second time then they aren’t good enough.”

“But you don’t chow R14-million when people’s health is at stake. Oh our dear minister of health. I *am* bitter. People are dying of AIDS and she chows the money. That money could have been used to make the AIDS drug.”

Critical voices about Mandela and his presidency are rare on mainstream media and to hear these comments on the SABC in 1999 were unexpected. Literature of the time suggests the broadcaster hesitated in criticising the ANC (Jacobs, 1999: 154; MMA, 1999: 28; Berger 2002; Gouws & De Beer 2008; Russell, 2009: 74), so this long-form SABC broadcast containing multiple vox pops condemning Mandela is rare.

Mbeki, conversely, is the president-in-waiting on all channels. ITN calls him “less charismatic than Nelson Mandela but a hard-nosed politician” (*Polling day 2*, ITN) with a focus on reform and transformation. eTV interviews his parents in the Eastern Cape, where Epainette says that she is voting for her son, and the austere Govan has a few words of wisdom: “As long as he carries out those policies [of the ANC], South Africa is going to be happy” (*Mbeki in the Eastern Cape*, eTV). Similarly, SABC journalist Linda van 'Tilburg’s Sowetan youth focus group states:

“Somehow I think he’ll do a better job [than Mandela]. He seems like somebody who has a better hold, so to speak, on the politicians.”

“Mr Mbeki has to get out there and pull his weight. And out of all the politicians that I know now, I think he’s got the weight.”

“Thabo Mbeki, he’s a suitable candidate. I wouldn’t have anyone else fill Mandela’s shoes.”

Gevisser observes the tension between Mandela and Mbeki as a would-be Napoleon filling King Lear’s “ugly shoes” (2007: 697). In a classic misstep, Mbeki spoke at the official conference of the ANC presidency in December 1999. “Madiba,” Mbeki proclaimed to the ANC assemblage, “members of the press have been asking me how it feels to step into your shoes. I’ve been saying I would never be seen dead in such shoes. You wear such ugly shoes!” (ibid.). Far from filling Mandela’s shoes, the favourite son desired new shoes all of his own.

Both the SABC and ITN implied that Mbeki might be a more effective president than Nelson Mandela, while eTV did not mention this transition at all in the two available broadcasts, focusing instead on the ‘wise words’ from his parents (*Mbeki in the Eastern Cape*, eTV). Meanwhile, ITN’s Tim Ewart visited a township and claims Mbeki “promised to speed up reform here”, indicating that perhaps the outgoing president did not do enough to change the township residents’ lives. Later, Mbeki votes sombrely and explains, “It should be a very proud moment for us as South Africans because indeed this demonstrates a commitment to the democratic system, a commitment for people to choose a government that they like” (*Polling day 2*, ITN). Mandela’s quote, however, highlighted only his emotion regarding the voting process (ibid.). Ergo, it seems ITN viewed Mbeki as a more “hard-nosed” politician that could bring rapid change to the country, while Mandela was simply excited in the election process.

These channels suggest that transformation – service delivery, health care reform, closing the inequality gap – had not been as forthcoming as was hoped because of Mandela’s ineffective governance. ITN proclaimed that voters wanted “rapid change”, and young

Sowetan students discussed corruption, expenditure waste, and arrogant politicians on a 10-minute SABC broadcast. eTV meanwhile represented vox pops that demanded more service delivery from government, because “during the country’s first democratic election, they voted for their freedom; now the election is about bread and butter issues” (Ismail, *Western Cape voters*, eTV). Unfortunately, because the channels committed very little airtime and depth to the campaign issues, the type of transformation that voters desire from Mbeki’s new government is mostly unclear.

### 2.3 Lack of violence

In 1994 coverage, journalists fixated on the visuals of violence and South Africa’s ability to host an election in this violent context. In 1999, however, South African and global journalists instead highlighted peace and the lack of political unrest. Mbeki hoped for a “peaceful” and “trouble-free” election three times in the SABC’s *Election 99 Elites Voting* broadcast, and that his government was on “standby for any emergencies that might arise” during the polling day. Reporter Kgomotso Sebetso (*Election 99 Elites Voting*, SABC) went further:

We wanted a democratic system, we can vote in conditions of freedom, of peace, of stability. It’s a confirmation of that. And I think the commitment of the South African people that we’ve seen in the registration, you’ve seen it in the campaigning, and you see it in the queues... the hope that today’s elections will be peaceful so that at the end of the day, all South Africans can say the elections were free and fair.

Back in the studio, the anchor for the broadcast remarks:

South Africans owe it to themselves and the rest of the world to ensure that the second democratic election proceeds smoothly, IFP leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi said in Ulundi.

The peaceful election is seemingly down to South Africans' inherent ability to police themselves. Journalist Colleen Lemawana observed "a visible presence of the South African National Defence Force troops together with the police dog unit" (*Election 99 Journalist Recap*, SABC), which was the only mention of military or police control of the election on South African channels.

Later in the same broadcast, a journalist in a helicopter observes, "we have been flying over the East Rand area, Katlehong, Thokoza, and Vosloorus, and there have been tremendous queues there" (ibid.). These three areas witnessed some of the worst factional violence in the run-up to the first election, but the journalists avoid mentioning this outright – instead the focus is on "queues", despite grouping the three areas together seemingly intentionally. eTV frames the lack of violence in much the same way, referring to the long, peaceful queues (*Western Cape voters*, eTV). In this sample, it seems that the local journalists deliberately avoid mentioning violence or showing previous instances of unrest, a decision that might be a form of "peace journalism" (Onyebadi & Oyediji, 2011: 219) that highlights peace and avoids war terminology and themes, but also an attempt to normalise the elections.

ITN's *Polling day 1* is the only broadcast to directly reference the bloody tensions from the previous election. Tim Ewart visits a long queue stretching into the background, and speaks as black faces smile at the camera: "But there's been little sign of trouble, and certainly none of the violence that marred these last elections five years ago." The focus of all broadcasts is on the *lack of violence*, rather than simply peace. The broadcasters'

disregard of previous violence was seemingly a tacit acknowledgement of the 1994 experience.

## 2.4 Depictions of race

Reynolds (1999) implies that this second election was underscored by race throughout the campaign, coverage, and results, and Seekings (2001: 164) calls the election a “racial census”. And yet only a third of the 1999 broadcasts mentioned race, which was underwhelming. Both the SABC and eTV referred to the coloured community’s support of the NNP in the Western Cape, but the SABC gathered information directly from the citizens themselves, while eTV mentioned the NNP’s support offhandedly.

In the SABC’s extended view of voting around the country (*Election 99 Western Cape community*), reporter Faizel Cook visits a coloured family in Manenberg. As the large family walk in the dawn to the long voting lines, they discuss some of their concerns in Afrikaans:

“They cut the water off there in Manenberg, and then, yesterday, the Bantus got money, and the brown people didn’t get money.”

Cook acknowledges that the “ANC is desperately trying to make inroads to win the coloured vote”, but “many blame it for the ills that have befallen this community, plagued by poverty and crime”. The SABC once again subtly criticises the ANC by interviewing discontent citizens:

Basier Petersen: “With the old government, you weren’t white enough. Now all of a sudden you’re not black enough. I don’t know where I stand anymore in South Africa.”

Coloured woman: “Don’t even want to vote, because you don’t even know who to vote for, because there isn’t a coloured party we can vote for, so that we coloured people can also become something in life.”

The SABC was the only broadcaster to overtly single out any particular racial group in this way, and investigated citizen voices from the coloured community about their concerns in the new South African democracy. As such, the SABC was far more investigative than any other channel in 1999, but the small sample size precludes firm conclusions. However, it was surprising that the SABC criticised the ANC government, based on the previous research (Jacobs, 1999: 154; MMA, 1999: 28; Sparks 2012: 209) that suggest a pro-government bias.

## 2.5 Fear of a two-thirds majority

Jacobs (1999: 148) argues that a focal story in the 1999 election was that the ANC might win a two-thirds majority stake of the votes cast, giving the party, amongst other things, the ability to change the Constitution. Jacobs suggests that the 1999 media (presumably local, South African) called this two-thirds majority a “danger to democracy”, and that “white material reality was at stake” (ibid.).

While in 1994 global journalists emphasised white concerns about black hopes and dreams, the fear in the 1999 election was more about the ANC gaining an overwhelming, unopposed majority. ITN reporter Tim Ewart emphasises six times in two broadcasts that the ANC would win the election against a negligible opposition. The fear is, he states, that the “target is two thirds [of the vote], allowing them to change some parts of the Constitution. They’ll know tomorrow if they’ve achieved it” (*Elections polling day 2*, ITN). He predicts that the ANC is “guaranteed to win by a wide margin” because “there



is little opposition to the ANC”, and that Mbeki’s “ANC party is heading for an overwhelming majority” (*Elections polling day 1*, ITN). This perceived lack of opposition seemed to be a concern for democracy. The only time the SABC referred to this “threat” was through quoting the Freedom Front Plus: “Opposition parties should negotiate to form an alliance to prevent South Africa from being governed by a centralised government with a two-thirds majority, [Constand Viljoen] said” (*Election 99 Elites Voting*, SABC). Hence, a dominating party with negligible opposition appeared to be the central “fear” in the 1999 election coverage, an idea that aligns with Jacobs (1999). However, as with the black hopes in 1994, what the ANC would do with two-thirds majority was not explored and left as an indistinct fear.

### 3 DISCUSSION OF 1999

#### 3.1 Slipping off the global radar

Louw and Chitty acknowledged in 2000 that South Africa had seemingly fallen off the global radar since the media frenzy of 1994. The narratives contained in the few broadcasts available for this sample were rudimentary and somewhat dull. There was much less of the mediated journalism seen during the 1994 election, and certainly less of a media spotlight. This was surprising because the nature of consolidated democracy would be such that broadcasters may have been interested to see if the “revolution” so feared by white capital in 1994 had come to pass by 1999. When only nine aired broadcasts were available for this data set, Louw and Chitty’s remark seemed ratified. South Africa had indeed slipped off the global radar. But why would this be?

Part of the reason might be the sheer “mundaneness” (Saul, 2002: 28) of the 1999 election, or its “normalcy” (Louw & Chitty, 2000: 293). The lack of drama, violence, and

visually rich events in 1999 might point to the lack of global media attention. The SABC's Linda van Tilburg suggests that the "apathy" of young voters could "be a sign that South Africa is returning to a normal society" (*Election 99 Sowetan Youth*, SABC). Indeed, the lack of violence, the optimism of the voters, and the efficiency of the IEC's organisation could have contributed to the inattention of global news because, as media scholars (Fiske, 1987: 285; Hartley, 1982; McQuail, 1987; Chandler, 1994a) are firmly aware, news is inherently negative and if it bleeds, it leads. News values dictate that negative or bizarre news lead headlines, and in this respect the narratives of the 1999 election was radically different to 1994, which were characterised by visuals of violence. Perhaps, then, the global news spotlight shone away from South Africa in favour of other news stories (the war in Kosovo, for example, began in March 1999).

But what of South Africa's lack of broadcast data? Only seven broadcasts were available from two channels. The lacuna here is because of the organisation in the archival system or the quality of broadcasts archived. eTV supplied two broadcasts at high cost. The SABC archival crew retrieved nine 1999 broadcasts that fit the election keywords or dates, but only five were finalised and aired broadcasts. The rest comprised raw data, were insufficiently recorded (in that they cut out in the middle of the broadcast or were recorded over with cricket matches from 2015), or were of entirely different stories than specified in the log data. The SABC's ineffective organisation, therefore, might be responsible for the paucity in this section.

### 3.2 Democracy in 1999

Two illustrations of democracy dominated the 1999 coverage: firstly, local news attempted to normalise the experience by showing a "committed" electorate. Secondly,

ITN presented a narrative about the “disappointment” of democracy. Local channels viewed the IEC as efficient, voters as enthusiastic, opinionated, and patient, while democracy itself was normalised through the dignified manner in which the election occurred. The SABC criticised the ANC through vox pops, an action that was seemingly an effort to demonstrate “objectivity” in the face of accusations of partisanship. Russell observes that Mbeki’s desire for absolute loyalty influenced the SABC management structures and by 1999 “the party was completely in control” (2009: 74). While the fierce tension between Western and African media ethics (cf. Wasserman, 2010, 2013) in South Africa’s media had yet to truly transpire in 1999, the signs were there in the careful, almost dull way that the SABC treated electorate concerns in this sample.

ITN, however, portrayed disappointment in the experience of democracy in South Africa: voters were left frustrated and abandoned in the long lines, and the failure of transformation, especially in poor areas, led to angry outbursts. Mbeki was presented as more of a “hard-nosed” politician than Mandela, who was in turn reduced to a smiling, jovial elderly man with a new wife. The only policy discussion that occurred on ITN was the implication that none of the promises in 1994 had been kept, or at least not happened quickly enough. Indeed, in 1994 ITN mentioned that the overall struggle against apartheid was “to vote” (Nicholson, *South Africa elections*; Austin, *South Africa – election voting*), and that the IEC was unable to cope with the strain of the first election. In 1999 the channel’s reporters still seemed disappointed in the speed of this change. For ITN, South Africa had mostly “failed” in some of the promises of 1994, and thus in development of an efficient and well-run election and society, suggestive of Spurr’s binaries of failure and development. Spurr (1994: 19) argues that democracy is often measured against the level of progress of Westernising developing countries, and if an

African state does not demonstrate American democratic values such as regime change, then it automatically falls on the “failure” side of the binary.

### 3.3 Disparity with literature

The sparse literature about the 1999 election media coverage highlights the disjuncture between media issues and those of the electorate. Jacobs (1999: 149, 158) and Duncan (2009: 218) note that the press focused on immigration and land rights as paramount concerns for South Africa, while job creation and unemployment topped opinion polls. This disconnect was not visible in the above sample, as only a few campaign issues were touched upon (crime, service delivery, HIV/AIDS, corruption, and education). Consequently it is not possible to verify the discussions that Jacobs and Duncan raise, as this data sample was too small.

The Media Monitoring Africa project (MMA, 1999: 28) found that vote-catch events such as campaign rallies were prioritised on local media in 1999, which resulted in uncritical and shallow media coverage of the election. Based on the SABC and eTV data available, this statement seems inaccurate. While the campaign trail may have included such media coverage, the sampled election broadcasts were dull but not uncritical. In *Election 99 Sowetan Youth* for example, Linda van Tilburg depicts five young Sowetan students criticising the government on everything from its approach to HIV/AIDS to the growing systemic corruption. Faizel Cook interviews the coloured community in Cape Town (*Election 99 Western Cape Community*, SABC), who call the politicians’ attempt to woo them “a bunch of hot air”, and that no political party represents their community. In this respect, the SABC allowed deeply critical voices on air, and more so than both eTV and ITN. Mattes, Taylor, and Africa (1999: 37) argue that the 1999

electorate were sophisticated, engaged, discerning, critical, and mostly satisfied, and not likely to be as blindly loyal as often depicted. The SABC broadcasts bear out their argument.

### 3.4 The political economy of the SABC

Despite transformation occurring immediately after 1994, the SABC was still accused of partisanship by unfairly favouring the ANC in television and radio news, and Jacobs (1999: 154) suggests that this partisanship was partly due to ANC loyalists dominating senior management and editorial staff at the SABC. Board members were cherry-picked to be prominent and loyal ANC supporters. Hence, I expected to see more manifest endorsement of the ANC in the 1999 SABC broadcasts. However, the type of ANC references was almost always critical on the broadcaster: the vox pops disparaged the overall Mandela presidency, and reporters highlighted racial tensions in the Western Cape, a key contested province. This study does not find the SABC to be particularly biased towards the ANC in 1999, which goes against the literature of the time (Jacobs, 1999; MMA, 1999; Duncan, 2009). The discrepancy with the literature on both the vote-catch event coverage and the SABC's bias towards the ANC can be explained by the small broadcast sample but also the different methodology employed to analyse the narratives. Researchers such as Jacobs (1999), MMA (1999), Davis (2005), and Duncan (2009) rely on mostly content analysis coding schema that take into account discourse only, while my study employed a multimodal analysis that looked at juxtapositions, nuance, and the vox pop format.

Although the 1999 election drew little media attention, sampled broadcasts showed a growing concern about fit-for-purpose politicians. Although the narratives were narrow, in that not many stories or topics were investigated, all broadcasters denounced the failure of the Mandela presidency to adequately bring about change to the electorate's satisfaction. Vox pops explained that crime and poverty did not improve, that education systems crumbled, and that corruption was extensive. While the global media gave but a cursory glance to these issues, if at all, local media attempted a critical view from the ground. This was surprising because the literature noted that the SABC was reluctant to show failures of the ANC government, presumably because of the government's increasing involvement with the SABC board.

With Mbeki in charge for almost a full decade, the forthcoming chapters are dedicated to his increasingly paranoid approach to leadership, his African Renaissance project, and scandals that haunted his campaign trail in 2004 and ended in his ultimate undoing in what was essentially a coup in 2008.

# Chapter 5:

## 2004

Louw and Chitty's (2000: 293) remark that South Africa had slipped off the global radar post-1994 endures in the 2004 election sample. The SABC provided eight finalised, aired broadcasts and eTV provided two. Equally, global news broadcasts were astoundingly scarce: only one broadcast was suitable for analysis despite many hours spent dedicated to a comprehensive search in local, global, free, and paid-for specialist archives. Perhaps additional broadcasts could be found, given extra time and funding, but this data set remained paltry at best.

This analysis chapter begins with a background of South African society in the intervening five years, including the lacklustre vestiges of the “miracle”, the profiles of the electorate and the president, and an overview of the media during Mbeki's presidency. While 1999 election coverage saw local channels criticise the incumbent government, the same channels in 2004 glamorised both the authorities, such as police and IEC officials, and Mbeki's government. Mediatisation played an important role in the global journalist's perspective of South African society during the election.

### 1 BACKGROUND TO 2004

Berger argues that global powers tend to perceive South Africa as “beacon of light” in a continent “to be evaluated not against the realities of postcolonial Africa but rather

within the context of the liberal democratic societies of Europe and North America” (2004: 77). There is a view, therefore, that postcolonies with racist legacies experience the transition to democracy with difficulty, but Berger argues that in South Africa this transition seemed painless. By 2004, the ANC had achieved ten years of majority rule in the country. At the time, Steven Friedman (2005: 19) acknowledged that much of the voting since 1994 followed identity politics, and that any threat to the ANC dominance would have to come from a vibrant opposition party made up from splinters within the ANC itself.

### 1.1 Profiles of the electorate

Seekings (2005) explains that a third of the electorate in 2004 were young post-apartheid voters with a demography of 83% African, 8% coloured, 7% white, and 3% Indian. By 2004 a low birth rate and high emigration reduced the potential white electorate while the accelerated growth of the black middle classes and the elite was dramatic. “Active policies of affirmative action and, to a lesser extent, BEE have inflated the demand for black and especially African personnel. This last factor provides the growing African middle classes with strong incentives to support the ANC” (Seekings, 2005: 25). However, despite this rise in the black elite, unemployment rose from 30% in 1994 to over 40% in 2004 (ibid.).

The potential electorate in 2004 were therefore predominantly young, poor, and unemployed. Mattes (2005: 52) points out that public opinion between 1999 and 2004 ranged from a widespread popular acclaim for Mandela’s presidency (70% to 80% approval), to “mere majority approval” for Thabo Mbeki (between 50% and 65%). He suggests (ibid.) that



such approval ratings clearly do not show the type of massive dissatisfaction one might expect in a society with 40% unemployment and declining life expectancy.... This is not because South Africans fail to realize how bad things are, or that, playing Pollyanna, they simply turn a blind eye to these problems. Rather, they balance significant disappointments in some areas against a range of impressive achievements in others.

As the voter turnout declined between 1999 and 2004, foreshadowing the imminent decline until 2014, Mattes (2005: 62) notes that, “dissatisfied voters must either swallow hard and vote for the ANC as the least bad alternative or simply not vote at all.” The lack of a main opposition party encouraged this disillusionment, too.

## 1.2 The froth of the miracle has disappeared

Having followed Madiba, the icon of the nation, in 1999, Mbeki had large shoes to fill. Mandela’s presidency was mainly concerned with uniting the disparate South African society (Jacobs & Calland, 2002: 3; Van Zyl Slabbert, 1999: 212), and it was up to the pragmatic Mbeki to make this inheritance work economically. But all was not well in the Rainbow Nation. Giliomee observes that by 2004 “the froth of the miracle had disappeared” (quoted in Russell, 2009: 147), with sections of society pulling in different directions. Crime, inequality, the economy, and an HIV/AIDS pandemic haunted the start of Mbeki’s presidency.

An estimated 25% of all pregnant women in the country were already HIV-positive in 1999 and this statistic had risen to 30% by the start 2004 (Gevisser, 2007: 728; Kharsany, Frohlich, Yende-Zuma, Mahlase, Samsunder, Dellar, & Karim, 2015). Over 5 million South Africans out of 46 million were HIV positive at the time, reducing the life

expectancy for South Africans to 48.5 years for men and 52.7 years for women (Donnington, Bradshaw, Johnson, & Budlender, 2004). AIDS orphans totalled 1.1 million. Although the full impact of Mbeki's HIV/AIDS policy had not yet been felt by 2004, Russell (2009: 216) reveals that in order "to understand Mbeki's stance on AIDS, you had to appreciate that he was an intellectual president who raises questions", and he approached the issue as an academic, rather than a president. Mbeki's sin, Russell notes, was that he raised the question first rather than dealing with the problem. Despite allowing Antiretroviral (ARV) drugs in 2003, Mbeki's cabinet still implied that people had a choice between nutrition and medicine to cure the disease, indirectly questioning the effectiveness of ARVs. Yet again, it was the poor black masses that bore the brunt of the government's procrastination in providing adequate healthcare.

While there was growing evidence of salience in class by 2004, with the black middle class on the rise, Seekings (2005: 23) argues that inequality had instead shifted from race to class. Over the decade post-apartheid, various socio-economic problems had escalated that caused disjuncture in a presupposed "Rainbow Nation". As Russell noted in 2009, South Africa's crime statistics are "extraordinary" (2009: 109), with the murder ratio at 43 per 100 000 people (Burger, 2009: 5), one of the highest in the world. In addition, statistics often centre only on murder, failing to take account of all other crimes committed. Complaints about the crime rate under Mbeki's administration were scoffed at as a symptom of "white angst" (Marais, 2011: 226), yet the cycles of violence in the country affected all races. According to polls, a third of black Africans felt personally unsafe most days (Roberts, 2009); roughly 1.8 million South Africans sought medical assistance due to assault (Seedat, 2009); and 18 000 South Africans were murdered per year (SAPS, 2008).

Russell (2009: 113 – 116) suggests that South African society's propensity for violence rested on three pillars: the collocation of poverty and wealth, where one exists almost in the other's back yard; the legacy of resistance to apartheid, where the brutal Struggle collapsed many of the traditional codes of behaviour; and the desperation of poverty, leading young men to participate in burgeoning syndicated crime networks, from drug-dealing to car jacking. The legacy of apartheid also left inequality scar tissue, which a few simple government policies of redistribution and empowerment did not and could not resolve in a decade. Instead, the culture of inequality was deeply moulded in South African society.<sup>47</sup>

The distribution of income is exceptionally unequal in South Africa. In 2008, the Gini Coefficient<sup>48</sup> ranked South Africa at 0.8, possibly the worst in the world, and the gap had widened 0.2 points between 1995 and 2005 (StatsSA, 2002; 2008). While social grants implemented during these years narrowed the gap slightly, the nature of this inequality is still alarmingly racial – the wealthy are overwhelmingly white and the poor are almost exclusively black. Wealthier households benefitted disproportionately from the economic upturn in the early 2000s, while poorer families struggled to make ends meet (Marais, 2011: 210). The implementation of the ANC's economic policies (such as RDP and GEAR) seemed to do little to rectify the structural inequality existent in the country.

---

<sup>47</sup> Russell (2009: 151) notes the peculiarity of “maid culture”: supposedly “liberal” white South Africans still treated black domestic workers as the underclass, erasing their existence not only from the “above stairs” white household but also from politics. The maid in Russell's anecdote “worked for 11 years without a pension”, and was summoned with “a dog whistle” by a white academic who supposedly abhorred apartheid.

<sup>48</sup> The Gini Coefficient measures inequality, with zero (0) representing complete equality (all people have equal income) and one (1) being complete inequality (one person owns all the country's wealth).

### 1.3 Profile of Thabo Mbeki

Mbeki's well-documented (Gevisser, 2007; Russell, 2009; Jacobs & Calland, 2002) awkwardness in straddling the urban and the rural – a technique that Mandela seemingly mastered – appears to have originated in the Mbeki household in a rural village in the Transkei. Govan Mbeki, an accomplished academic, and Epainette Mbeki, a similarly educated egalitarian, left Johannesburg to start a small village shop in the hills of Mbewuleni, a “frontier of Western civilisation and traditional Xhosa culture” (Gevisser, 2007: 50). While Mbeki was born, raised, and educated in this tiny village, he always felt, according to Gevisser (2007: 57), an outsider, most at ease when engulfed in a mess of literature. The “African Pride” narrative, so distinctive of Mbeki's presidency, was rooted in his upbringing in both the small village in the Transkei hills and the education instilled through his parents. Gevisser (2007: 32) emphasises that Mbeki

born in 1942, was thus suckled on the era's optimism and many of the ideas he was later to embrace have their roots in the [1930s] ideals of the New African: his mission for redemption through an African Renaissance, his quest for personal autonomy and African self-sufficiency, his particular combination of urbanity and African nationalism.

Mbeki was torn between two worlds. The traditional village surrounding conflicted with his parental progressive ideology, and Mbeki was never really suited to the rural setting. After an education at the private Lovedale College, Mbeki, now in exile from South Africa, joined his mentor Oliver Tambo to study economics at Sussex University in England.

After completing a Masters degree, Mbeki joined other Struggle icons including Walter Sisulu's son Max, Albert Dhlomo, Jacob Zuma, Essop Pahad, and his mentor Oliver Tambo in multiple African nations to bolster the anti-apartheid movement from outside

the borders. Tambo, now president of the still-banned ANC, appointed Mbeki to conduct private talks with the representatives of the NP government in the early 1980s. It was here that Mbeki made his name as the “seducer”. Charming, self-assured, a joker, and able to smooth ridges between disparate parties with tact and diplomacy, the Mbeki of the transition era is held high on plinths by all who met him: Gevisser (2007), Du Preez (2004: 148; 2013: 51-52), and Russell (2009) write nostalgically for this charismatic Mbeki, rather than the overly paranoid academic visible in 2004 that relied on the African Renaissance concept. This African Pride narrative drove his overriding policy for governance in the first five years as president.

### 1.3.1 African Renaissance

Vale and Maseko (2002: 121 – 123) claim that throughout South Africa’s history, politicians have suggested the country should play a larger role in Africa’s modernisation and development. Mbeki’s notion of an “African Renaissance” was just one such instance in a long line of leaders promoting South Africa as hegemonic across the continent, and was similar in many ways to Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “New Deal”. Despite being “mysterious, obtuse, and puzzling” (ibid.: 124), the concept was meant to promote science, technology, and globalisation in Africa’s thrust towards development. Mbeki’s fascination with new technologies, globalisation, education, and African identity was strongly evident in his conception of the African Renaissance. His comprehension of Africanism is not racial, Ryklief (2002: 114) argues, but regional: Africans are those who are born on the continent, rather than delineated by race. The idea of an African Renaissance does not draw a line between the traditional and the modern but is driven by economic development through modernisation.

Allison Bullen (1999, cited in Ryklief, 2002: 115) claims that Mbeki's use of an African identity in an anti-colonialist framework is problematic, however. The concept does not challenge existing power structures; the regeneration encompasses competitive global capitalist systems rather than socialist communitarian method; and the discourse around the role of South Africa in relation to the rest of the continent is ambiguous at best. Not all African countries agreed that Mbeki's African Renaissance was fit for purpose: what is good for South Africa was not necessarily good for all of Africa, and there does not exist a "final identity that is African" (Appiah, 1992: 117). Too much difference, too many fractures, and too much oppression existed on the continent to enable a single thrust towards "modernisation" in Mbeki's utopic concept. "Without acknowledging the anger and economic discrimination people of colour fair in what has been termed 'global apartheid', African Renaissance can never succeed," Vale and Maseko (2002: 130) assert. Mbeki's concept<sup>49</sup> mirrored his own tension between the traditional and the modern: his political "tin ear" (Russell, 2009: 22) and austere demeanour rendered him unapproachable by the majority of the rural poor in South Africa, yet that very disposition was enchanting to the Western leaders.

### 1.3.2 Tension with the media

During Mbeki's first term in office, his paranoia was "palpable" (Jacobs & Calland, 2002: 3). He seemed obsessed with an overarching plot to harm him, and the president's hostility towards the media caused ructions throughout the government. His demand for absolute loyalty within party structures and an overarching paranoia is characteristic of ANC members who remained a long time in exile (Russell, 2009: 64; Du Preez, 2013: 65, 76). When the media turned against the government "post-froth", his hostility towards it increased. Mbeki quickly turned into the media's whipping boy, termed the "power-

---

<sup>49</sup> African Renaissance was built on Mbeki's perspective alone, which also indicates his demand for absolute loyalty and to follow the party line in all matters.

monger” and “arch-manipulator, wooer of factions” (Jacobs & Calland, 2002: 12). In typical ANC fashion (*ibid.*), the government attacked anti-Mbeki depictions in the press. Sparks (2009: 210) and Louw (2005: 91) report that the SABC adopted a procedure ensuring that the president and his ministers appear at least four times in each news bulletin. Part of this intervention was rooted in Mbeki’s African Renaissance concept: positive news about the government was supposed to counteract the negative media perception of African governance. Sparks (*ibid.*) observes that mechanisms designed to strengthen ANC control over the editorial process were put in place in 2003, and Berger suggests these were part of “an increasing effort to exercise greater political influence over the nature of broadcasting” (2004: 73). The dominance of the ANC on the SABC board and management may have resulted in media coverage that favoured the ANC. Myburgh (2006) documents how the ANC captured the SABC through three waves of purging independence and populating the upper echelons of board members with government supporters. By 1999, three loyalists ruled the news channel: Enoch Sithole, chief executive of news; Phil Molefe, head of television news; and Snuki Zikalala, deputy editor-in-chief. By 2004, the board was packed with Mbeki-stalwarts. Myburgh opines that the “most noticeable is the jarring contradiction between the legislative and constitutional requirements for the public broadcaster and the lived reality” (2006), whereby the diversity of views and promotion of fair and objective reporting clash with the “encroaching spirit of ANC power” (*ibid.*).

#### 1.4 The third election

The 2004 election proved a difficult period for most political parties. A culture of ANC affirmation had sprung up in the celebration of ten years of democracy, whereby opposition parties were often seen as “unpatriotic” or “anti-liberation” (Booysens, 2005:

130; Gouws & De Beer, 2008: 281; Russell, 2009: 155; Grootes, 2013: 29). The NNP's decimation and subsequent merger with the ANC meant that the DA became the official opposition party in claiming most of the NNP's electorate. Smaller parties suffered too, with the left being almost entirely unrepresented in the National Assembly in 2004<sup>50</sup> due in part to their competition with the ANC for the same constituency of black voters (Hoeane, 2005: 204).

For the 2004 election campaign, as in previous years, the ANC used a combination of advanced electioneering techniques learnt from American election strategists and traditional mass organisation methods (Lodge, 2005: 109). For the first time since 1994, the party was able to penetrate the rural enclaves in KwaZulu-Natal IFP strongholds, and managed to exploit the power of holding office in their campaign strategy in these areas (ibid.: 119-120). The ANC's 2004 campaign approach differed little from previous strategies, and the campaign message centred on improving services, giving more but improving on the same, as well as "celebrating freedom" (ibid.). Party manifesto issues included job creation, poverty reduction, turning the tide against the HIV/AIDS epidemic, and significantly reducing crime (ibid.). The sophisticated election campaign combined with old-fashioned "listening" gatherings ensured the party reflected the electorate's needs and concerns, and the ANC was voted into a third term in government with 69.68% of the popular vote.

The Democratic Alliance (DA)<sup>51</sup> was at unforeseen crossroads in 2004: Booysens comments that "robust opposition was perceived to be unpatriotic" (2005: 130) mostly

---

<sup>50</sup> With the exception of the South African Communist Party (SACP), which held seats due to its allegiance with the Tripartite Alliance of the ANC, most of the left-leaning parties (including the PAC and AZAPO) did not garner enough votes to gain parliamentary seats in 2004.

<sup>51</sup> The Democratic Party (DP) of 1999 became the Democratic Alliance (DA) after a brief merger with the New National Party (NNP) subsequent to the latter party's dismal showing at the 1999 election.



because the celebration of ten years of democracy centred on the ANC's Struggle affirmation, rather than the government's vulnerabilities. However, the DA managed to hold the torch as the primary party political watchdog (*ibid.*), continuing to highlight scandals, wrongdoings, and poor policy choices (Russell, 2009: 152). During the 2004 election campaign, the party tried to gather votes from the decimated NNP, please its liberal heart, and make inroads into the "black voter market", all the while exposing its dualities and inconsistencies. Nevertheless, the party did reasonably well in the election, as the only opposition party to register significant growth. The campaign addressed issues of poverty, crime reduction, development, and unemployment through nation building, privatisation of the economy, and tackling the housing shortage. The party jumped from 1.9% of the popular vote in 1994 to 12.4% in 2004.

Scholars often find it difficult to talk about the Inkatha Freedom Party without mentioning violence, and Piper acknowledges, "the relative absence of violence and intimidation in 2004 is all the more remarkable" (2005: 148). Politically motivated murders dropped from over 1 000 people in 1994 to just 15 in 2004, and Piper (*ibid.*) reports the IFP had jettisoned the militant nationalism of the 1980s and 1990s and instead embraced more liberal-democratic policies. This process was not complete by 2004, however, ultimately placing the party in a no-mans-land between traditional Zulu nationalism and liberal-democratic policies comparable to the ANC. With an invasive and successful ANC canvassing strategy in rural KwaZulu-Natal, the IFP's showing at the 2004 election was dismal.<sup>52</sup> The party's campaign rallies were, like its policy shift, divergent. Gatherings differed in style from "a hybrid between a charismatic church

---

<sup>52</sup> Another part of the IFP's problem is, sadly, the structure of South African rural societies. Albert Mncwango, national election committee chair, implied in 2004 that a lack of resources and costs of transporting people to the voting stations played a majority role in the IFP's poor election results (cited in Piper, 2005: 153). Rural townships simply did not have adequate voting stations, and the costs of transport were seemingly too high or not appropriately considered in the 2004 election.

meeting and a rave” (ibid.: 156) to a more menacing assembly, *amatbutbo* (Zulu warriors) mock fighting with weapons drawn. For the first time since its existence, the IFP found itself out of power in KwaZulu-Natal and the party dropped from 10.54% of the national vote in 1994 to 6.97% in 2004.

The last major political party in South Africa at the time was mostly out of the contention for the third poll. Shortly after the 2004 election, NNP leader Marthinus Van Schalkwyk announced the end of the party and a merger with the ruling ANC government. This was not their only attempt at collaboration: after the 1999 election the NNP and DP combined forces, which ultimately led to a coalition government in the Western Cape that elbowed the ANC out of that province. The two parties joined under the name Democratic Alliance, with Tony Leon as leader and Van Schalkwyk as deputy, but the partnership backfired in 2001, mostly because of differences in party ideology (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2005: 167). Schulz-Herzenberg notes, “these shifts and experiments suggest that since 1994 the NNP has struggled with questions of tactics and strategy” (2005: 168). Despite the cooperation with the ANC, the NNP gave a half-hearted attempt to woo the black voter populace in 2004 and had very little presence in black communities, resulting in a weak and ambiguous campaign. The biggest challenge for the NNP, Schulz-Herzenberg believes, was to convince the South African populace there was room for consensual opposition, especially as this message came from the “former apartheid party” (2005: 184). It seems this message was unclear or unpopular to voters, as the party only gained 1.64% in 2004, a staggering 94% loss of its 1994 support.

Piombo & Nijzink (2005: 257) observe that, by 2004, political leaders were more concerned about voter apathy than political violence. This shift “signifies that politics have become increasingly routine. Certainly, this is a sign of the institutionalization of

democracy in South Africa” (ibid.). The European Union, United Nations, Commonwealth, and Carter Centre refrained from sending election monitors to South Africa during the decade of democracy (ibid.: 253). Table 5.1 provides the percentage of the popular vote won for the largest five parties in 2004.


	<b>ANC</b>	<b>DA</b>	<b>IFP</b>	<b>UDM</b>	<b>NNP</b>	<b>Total</b>
Percentage	69.69	12.37	6.97	2.28	1.65	15.6mil

Table 5.1: Percentage of votes per party in 2004 election<sup>53</sup>


Despite this apparent “normalisation” of democracy, the turnout of the voting age population decreased from 86% in 1994 to 72% in 1999 and 58% in 2004.

## 2 FINDINGS

Despite the disappointing representative sample of 11 broadcasts that limits conclusions drawn from this 2004 election year, the observed narratives are still interesting. Graphs 5.1 and 5.2 depict the spread of broadcasts for this sample.



Graph 5.1



Graph 5.2

The SABC provided the eight broadcasts for this sample, eTV provided two, and the single AP broadcast was the only one suitable for analysis from any international channel


<sup>53</sup> Statistics gathered from Piombo & Nijzink (2005).

available. As in previous chapters, the frequency of events and political party coverage, as well as the narratives of the election, are set out below in order to investigate how, if at all, the two regions differ in the coverage of the election.

## 2.1 Frequency analysis


### 2.1.1 Events

A total of five event types were observed in the news coverage of the 2004 elections (see Graph 5.3 for the total coverage and Graphs 5.4 – 5.6 for channel specific spread): the campaign trail, including final rallies and meet-and-greets from politicians; the election eve; following the IEC in their set-up and the IEC process during voting; the actual voting day<sup>54</sup>; and everyday life, particularly focused on the new black elite.




Graph 5.3


<sup>54</sup> Fewer broadcasts focused on the actual voting day, but that is probably down to the archival records rather than any meaningful connotation: the SABC provided unedited, raw broadcast data of thousands of Unknowns voting, but all this data was unusable because it was not finalised. Despite attempts to retrieve it, the SABC were unable to provide the aired broadcasts that presumably contained this footage.



Graph 5.4



Graph 5.5




Graph 5.6

eTV focused on the voting day, depicting leaders and Unknowns voting and speaking, while the SABC preferred the campaign trail and process of democracy – such as the IEC setting up voting tents and handing out ID documents. Additionally, the AP broadcast was a snapshot of a wealthy and successful black lawyer juxtaposed with urban township slums.

### 2.1.2 Political parties


Graph 5.7 shows the total spread of parties covered in the 2004 sample, but this graph is somewhat misleading. The single AP broadcast mentioned only the ANC, eTV mentioned the IFP, DA, and ANC, and the other parties were all contained on the eight SABC broadcasts. Again, as in previous election years, the ruling ANC garnered the majority of coverage across all broadcasts – six in total.




Graph 5.7

### 2.1.3 Who speaks

As seen in Graph 5.8 and 5.9, the most frequent speakers in the 2004 sample were Knowns at 25 out of a total 32 speakers. Mbeki, the IEC, and the police were the most frequent Known speakers of all.



Graph 5.8



Graph 5.9

Authorities and the government were the most frequently sourced during the 2004 coverage. Political leaders of other parties were allowed a brief statement on the SABC broadcasts, but ultimately the authorities – Mbeki, the IEC, and the police – spoke most often.

The frequency analysis shows that authorities and the government were more frequently voiced in this small sample, while the ANC received the lion's share of the political party coverage that was diverse. The next section explores the narratives on the limited broadcast sample, starting with the portrayal of the election. Problems in South African society were also highlighted for the first time, as embedded SABC journalists followed the police on a heavy-handed raid to quell pre-election crime. AP's journalist exposed the stark realities that black people experience in South Africa, harshly divided by both geography and economics. Ultimately, the local news channels glorified the government and authorities, while the international broadcast highlighted divisions and disappointment of democracy.

## 2.2 The personalities of the election

Journalists in 1994 and 1999 focused predominantly on the act of voting to show the experience of the election: there was little evidence of campaigning or the election preparation, and the majority of visuals showed the electorate arriving at the polls, standing in long queues, or actually voting. In 2004 however, there were far fewer visuals of the voting, and only the South African broadcasts depicted this action. Local journalists predominantly showed firstly the process of the election (focusing on the IEC), and secondly the personalities (treating Mbeki as a celebrity).

### 2.2.1 IEC are heroes

The IEC took centre stage in the depiction of the 2004 election, especially on the SABC broadcasts. IEC officials were portrayed as helpful, efficient, acting above and beyond the call of duty, and framed as heroes on both local channels. SABC reporter Clayson Monyela visits Taba-Nchu in the North West province on voting day, where IEC officials “had a busy day helping residents who were sick and bedridden to cast their special votes” (Monyela, *IEC Special Votes*, SABC). A white-shirted IEC official enters a small tin-roofed house and assists a frail bed-ridden woman (see Image 5.1). The official could be mistaken for a nurse, if not for the branded IEC shirt.



Image 5.1: *IEC Special Votes*, SABC, 2004. “Assisting the bedridden”



Later in the broadcast, more IEC officials push a wheelchair-bound woman up a ramp into the voting station, feed an elderly woman while she waits in the queue, and guide a disabled or frail voter toward the ballot box. The compassionate officials seem at the ready to help the citizens, and voters smile gratefully up at the IEC's assistance, while the IEC officials smile down benevolently. eTV mentions that "for many, elections have brought not just democracy, but also development" (Bramdeo, *Election 2004*, eTV) where electrification of halls and schools used for voting stations had been a direct result of the IEC's involvement. This eTV broadcast plays into the binary of elections being synonymous with democracy and, in this case, development.

In preparation for the main day of voting, SABC journalist Altaaf Khazi (*IEC preparation and election briefs*) follows IEC officials setting up a voting tent in Thabong, Welkom. The officials are hardworking, hammering in the tent pegs quickly and efficiently in close-up, while the IEC spokesperson Archie Jonas is concerned with bringing facilities to as many people as possible.

Archie Jonas: "This is where we've got former informal settlements being turned into formal settlements where we don't have, like, building structures where we can have our voting. So we are using the tents... It is quite important because it has also to do with the distance. Because we always say people should just get out of their house, so to say, and to go to their nearest polling station, without any help for transport or taxis, to go to the furthest point."

Piper (2005: 153) notes that one of the main reasons why the IFP did so poorly at the 2004 poll was because the supporters simply had no resources to get to the voting stations in rural KwaZulu-Natal. So while the IEC seemed to be attending to informal structures adequately, as in Khazi's report, the rural former homelands seemed to be lacking the same attention, an issue that is overlooked in these broadcasts.

eTV acknowledged that the IEC had made blunders in the Special Voting days (*Election 2004* follows a disabled voter who complains that no IEC officials had turned up to the voting station), but ends the piece with a “happy ending” (Debora Patta, *Election 2004*, eTV) as the IEC chairman personally invites all Special Vote citizens to vote in the regular ballots. Overall, both local channels present the IEC as efficient, heroic, and effective problem-solvers, even though the reality of the 2004 election was likely more ambiguous.

While Western journalists reproached the IEC of incompetence in previous election years, the only international broadcast available in 2004 did not mention the process of democracy at all. Louw and Chitty (2000: 293) claim that the country had dropped off the global radar post-1994, and this seems evident in the lack of focus about the election on any news channel during the sample dates. Even local news media presented astounding normalcy in the democracy narratives of erecting tents, feeding frail care patients and, as seen below, endorsing the government, which further confirms Louw and Chitty’s (ibid.) conclusions.

### 2.2.2 Mbeki is popular

While the international broadcaster did not mention political leaders at all, local channels tended to personalise these leaders through visual proxemics and discourse. The SABC illustrated that Mbeki’s prodigious intervention alleviated the poverty that affected voter registration and eTV showed Mbeki cracking jokes as he voted while the IEC officials and journalists stood “laughing at his Afro hairstyle” (Titus, *Election 2004* 2, eTV) in his ID book photograph. The SABC in particular continued its personality-driven coverage with the focus on the President Mbeki’s various appearances at vote-catch events. We see him at an ANC rally in the Mpumalanga region in KwaZulu-Natal (*Campaign Trail*), at

the Rand Easter Show in Gauteng (*Thabo Mbeki visits the Rand Show*), and as a guiding spirit in *ID Books*, whereby his representative hand-delivers an ID book.

During *ID Books*, anchor Mahendra Raghnuath states,

By now you can't really blame people for being sceptical of politician's promises. But there's one who kept his word. Two weeks ago, ANC president Thabo Mbeki was on a door-to-door campaign... and promised to help [Francina, a township pensioner]. And today, he delivered.

Although we never see him, Mbeki is presented as a helper, saviour, and keeper of promises. Instead, we see ANC members walking up a dirt road to a small tin shack community, while an elderly woman pleads with the officials that she cannot receive grants from the government because her ID document is incorrect. Home Affairs officials, wearing bright white shirts with the IEC logo, return in a few weeks and Francina Mkhabela, now also dressed in an overly large IEC shirt, gratefully receives her new ID book. She says that it will change her life and "lift me out of poverty" (Mkhabela, *ID Books*, SABC). Thus, by becoming the saviour and delivering on his promises, Mbeki and his government apparently cures the plight of poverty.

Mbeki also visits the Rand Easter Show in a broadcast of the same name. He laughs, smiles, and speaks jovially with the gathered crowd. In another medium close-up, Mbeki signs an autograph for a young Indian girl on the back of her sweater, and she receives it with delight (see Image 5.2). In *Campaign Trail* and *Thabo Mbeki visits the Rand Show*, Mbeki waves to the crowds in eye level mid shots, shakes hands in with the electorate medium close-up, and speaks to the crowds in a packed stadium in wide shots, moving to mid shots (Images 5.3 – 5.5). Edward T Hall referred to close-up shots as the "personal proxemic" (1982: 118) while Gianetti (1990: 64) maintains that the distance between the

camera and the subject on screen mirrors the emotional distance between subject and viewer. Bucy and Grabe (2009: 203) observe that television close-ups promote the illusion of face-to-face contact with the candidate. Ergo, the closer Mbeki appears to the audience on screen, the greater the viewer's supposed emotional attachment to him. The propensity of medium close-up shots in these various broadcasts present Mbeki in a conversational distance, emphasizing emotion and relation to the viewer.



Image 5.2: *Mbeki visits the Rand Show*, SABC, 2004. “Mbeki and the Indian girl”



Image 5.3: *Campaign Trail*, SABC, 2004. “Mbeki mid-shot at rally”



Image 5.4: *Mbeki visits the Rand Show*, SABC, 2004. “Mbeki in MCU”



Image 5.5: *Mbeki visits the Rand Show*, SABC, 2004. “Mbeki waving in mid shot”

While the SABC frames Mbeki in this “personal distance” frequently, implying his emotional attachment with the electorate, Mattes (2005: 51-2) refutes this attachment, arguing that the public opinion dropped 20 percentage points between Mandela’s presidency and Mbeki’s. Davis observes that “an SABC spokesperson [alleged] on radio that the SABC had to ‘compensate’ for the ‘Mbeki-bashing’ characteristic of other sections of the media” (2005: 232). The SABC’s apparent framing of the president as a “man of the people” was seemingly part of this demand and plays into Mbeki’s concept of the African Pride – positive news framing might counteract the perceived negativity surrounding Africans. Myburgh’s (2006) concern that the SABC lacked objectivity throughout 2004 also seems to play out here. So, while 1999’s SABC coverage was

critical of the ruling government, in 2004 the channel appeared far more biased towards positive frames of the ANC, in particular Mbeki.

### 2.2.3 Personalities fix problems in paradise

While the first ten years of democracy in South Africa are generally considered a consolidation of the democratic process (Friedman, 2005: 4), the decade was not without its problems, and local media picked up on these issues. Each of the smaller parties – the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP), the New Labour Party (NLP), and the NA represented on the SABC’s *Small Party Campaigns* – had an anti-crime proposal in their manifestos. However, at no point in the sample was the issue of “crime” overtly tackled. Instead, the SABC presented a pro-police broadcast where officers tracked down and apprehended criminals, including drug dealers, murderers, car thieves, illegal immigrants, and what appeared to be prostitutes (*Police*, SABC), but without acknowledging that the government had largely failed to control crime in the city centres.<sup>55</sup> Finally, although the SABC’s *ID Books* was quite clearly designed as a pro-ANC campaign message, it implies that government grants are the only way out of poverty for some elderly South Africans, without raising the problem of slow government bureaucracy.

Jacobs (1999: 149, 158) and Duncan (2009: 218) argue that there was a disjuncture between the media and the electorate’s priorities of issues in the second and third elections. While the 1999 and 2004 samples are small, the few broadcasts from the SABC and eTV suggest that the local media do in fact attempt to portray citizen concerns, albeit from the authority’s perspective. In the SABC’s *Police*, *ID Books*, and *Small Party Campaigns*, and eTV’s *Election 2004*, crime and poverty seem pervasive problems.

Unfortunately, it seems that the local media – particularly the SABC – were influenced in

---

<sup>55</sup> Robert Mattes conducted large-scale public opinion research and found that South Africans were broadly critical of the government’s efforts to control crime (2005: 51).

the African Pride narrative and thus unable to adequately criticise the government's response to either of these two issues. In a personality-driven narrative, the police *control* crime and Mbeki *alleviates* poverty.

## 2.4 Profiles of the electorate

The small sample did not give as much breadth to the portrayal of the 2004 electorate as other years, but four interesting themes were noted: the singing and dancing electorate on local channels, the rising black middle class, the poor black majority, and a much shallower view of the youth vote (as compared to the SABC's view of the youth in 1999).

### 2.4.1 Singing and dancing electorate

As the only channel to report the run-up to the election, the SABC portrayed the members of the IFP, NNP, AZAPO, DA, PAC, and the New Labour Party singing, dancing, and applauding leaders during the election campaign. Multiracial DA members sang and danced to contemporary music in town halls, while AZAPO and the PAC danced while marching up the streets. These swaying bodies of supporters are reminiscent of Mbembe's (2015: 129) observation that the "postcolonised subject" provides fealty to the ruling party through dance. Mbembe remarks that when "the body that dances, dresses in the party uniform, fills the roads, 'assembles *en masse*' to applaud the passing presidential procession in a ritual of confirmation", these very acts "dramatize its subordination through such small tokens of fealty" (ibid.). The only people seen to move in this way are black supporters, however – white supporters are often sombre, solemn, and, when they do dance, awkwardly stiff. The ANC, National

Action (NA)<sup>56</sup>, and Freedom Front Plus (FF+) members were sombre in sharply juxtaposing imagery. The FF+ hosted a poorly attended conference in an indoor venue; the NA members sat in a quiet, elegant garden setting; while depiction of the ANC, in contrast to previous and subsequent election years, was entirely without singing, dancing, or jubilation, only business.

A large IFP rally on the SABC's *DA/IFP Campaigning* signifies Piper's allegation that the party was "a hybrid between a charismatic church meeting and a rave" (2005: 156).

Anchor Joanne Josephs observes, "Ancient and modern converged in KwaZulu-Natal today as thousands of people came together for a traditional gathering of IFP supporters" (*DA/IFP Campaigning*, SABC). A wide shot of dancing young Zulu girls, each wearing traditional clothing, cuts to hand-held shots of a close-up Kwaito star dressed in a gaudy yellow suit. Zulu men in warrior clothing stamp their feet and tell the story of their ancestors, before a low angle of two besuited men sing Kwaito songs into microphones, punching their fists into the air in close-up. The jarring cutaways (Images 5.6 – 5.8) juxtapose the traditional with the modern and echo the IFP's eternal struggle, in both politics and a shifting society, which Piper highlights too (2005: 155).



Image 5.6: *DA/IFP campaigning*, SABC, 2004. "Reed skirt dancers"

---

<sup>56</sup> The National Action was a short-lived political party formed by Cassie Aucamp during the floor-crossing period in 2003. Other Afrikaner-centric parties joined the FF+, but the NA wanted to remain separate. With no seats won in the 2004 election, the party eventually died out.





Image 5.7: *DA/IFP campaigning*, SABC, 2004. “Warrior dancers”



Image 5.8: *DA/IFP campaigning*, SABC, 2004. “Kwaito stars”

As a side note to how the SABC represented the IFP, *DA/IFP Campaigning* ends with a wide shot of policemen standing around a Nyala truck,<sup>57</sup> demonstrating anchor Joanne Josephs’ priming: “20 000 policemen stood by in Nongoma as IFP leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi renewed his call for a peaceful ballot”. Piombo & Nijzink suggest political violence had almost completely ceased by 2004, although there were still some “hotspots” of conflict (2005: 253). Because of this relatively calm process, the focus on control of politically motivated violence seems a paranoid action on the behalf of the SAPS to send such a large contingent of police to the event and a strange angle for the SABC to take. The channel seemingly fell into already-known stereotypes of the IFP as

<sup>57</sup> The RG-12 Nyala Armoured Personnel Carrier, or just *Nyala*, is specifically designed for the South African Police Service for riot control. The vehicle can carry 6 crew and has mesh-covered, bullet resistant windows.

“traditionally” violent, ergo the framing the party as a “threat” to be controlled. Fair and Astroff argue along much the same lines: South African authorities are often positioned as “the bringers of law and order” (1991: 58) while (US) news media assume homogeneousness in violence and blackness (ibid.: 65). Yet the SABC do not frame all black political parties in this way – just the IFP. The traditionally black PAC and AZAPO are shown marching under a banner and singing in church halls, without the same kind of intimidating “hands up” stance symbolic of the IFP. Fair and Astroff’s argument thus seems pertinent to the SABC too – the IFP must be “controlled” by the authorities, which come in the form of 20 000 police officers standing by at an IFP rally.

#### 2.4.2 The rising black middle class

AP’s *South Africa preview* is a snapshot of the wealthy lifestyle Sisa Ngebulana enjoys in the suburbs of Johannesburg. The journalist follows the Billion Group property executive from his mansion in the gated Dainfern housing estate in Johannesburg to his luxury Mercedes Benz, until he arrives at his sparsely furnished office. Ngebulana speaks about how grateful he is for the opportunities afforded to him through democracy and that he “would never have imagined it”. He is clearly one of the “beneficiaries of democratic rule” and “black empowerment”, as the journalist states. To signify his success, Ngebulana, dressed in a snappy black suit, steps out of the front door of his mansion (Image 5.9) and opens the boot of his luxury Mercedes Benz, the number plate personalised with “Ngebs”. Strangely, Ngebulana’s messy car seems to be the focal point during these scenes – the litter-filled boot is a focal shot and, when Ngebulana enters the car, the camera films this through the passenger-side door, showing a foot well covered in paper and junk food wrappers (Image 5.10-5.11). It seems unnecessary to show this, and the mess contradicts Ngebulana’s polished appearance expected of a “top executive”. When Ngebulana arrives at his office, the sparse furniture and piled up

papers (Image 5.12) don't signify a successful executive of one of South Africa's largest property development and investment groups. The messy car, the "gratefulness" Ngebulana proffers for democracy, and the sparse office evoke the controversial "window dressing" narrative.



Image 5.9: *South Africa preview*, AP, 2004. "Ngebulana's mansion"



Image 5.10: *South Africa preview*, AP, 2004. "Ngebulana's messy car boot"



Image 5.11: *South Africa preview*, AP, 2004. "Ngebulana's messy car"



Image 5.12: *South Africa preview*, AP, 2004. “Ngebulana’s sparse office”

Berliner explains that this term refers to policies and actions that are “impressive to international donors and media but of little use for real social or political action” (2015: 2), while Magubane suggests window dressing indicates policies with “very little substance” (2006: 752). During the early years of transformation in South Africa, there was a perception that companies placed people who simply “looked right” in executive positions to fulfil Black Economic Empowerment transformation guidelines, while continuing as usual behind the scenes. In the AP broadcast, Ngebulana appears hastily thrown into the wealthy position – the sparse office he holds doesn’t fit with his lavish mansion and luxury car, while the messy interior of the car sits uneasily with the anchored label of a “top executive”.<sup>58</sup>

#### 2.4.3 The poor black majority

Ngebulana’s lush lifestyle contrasts starkly with the lived experiences of the majority of black people in the country, and the AP broadcast is a harsh reminder of that divide.

“For thousands, democracy has brought nothing but empty promises” (*South Africa preview*, AP), the journalist explains, as we watch smoke rise over tin roofs, creating a layer

---

<sup>58</sup> Sisa Ngebulana is a highly qualified lawyer, holding an LLB from the University of KwaZulu-Natal and a Masters degree from the Rand Afrikaans University. He has also held directorships in multiple property and investment companies (cf. <http://whoswho.co.za/sisa-ngebulana-8453>). Despite this impressive CV, Ngebulana’s portrayal on the AP broadcast is simplified and stereotyped into a “window-dressing” narrative.

of smog over the expansive township. Black people meander up a mud path lined with rubbish; children in tattered clothing cycle down the dirt road between silver shacks; black men pump water into containers and the journalist explains how “people are bitterly disillusioned” in the township of Jerusalem, Johannesburg. The township’s name refers to the ‘promised land’, and the irony is striking. The AP journalist deliberately highlights the juxtaposition between Ngebulana’s fortunate existence and the dire hardship of the majority to show, he states, just how much further the ANC government has to go to “improve the lot of the masses”. While the SABC promotes the government’s ability to improve the lives of all by delivering on promises (in *Police* and *ID Books* particularly), AP suggests the electorate is increasingly “disillusioned” and the ANC has to work much harder to keep their promises.

#### 2.4.4 The youth

The IEC did not capture demographic information such as age and gender differences during the 1994 election; neither was there a voter’s roll (Ballington & Fick, 1999: 91). Hence, the number of young people voting in the first election was not identified. Even in 1999, the youth registration or turnout statistics are difficult to ascertain. By 2004, however, the IEC appeared to have galvanised their efforts in recording the statistics of the youth: 44.5% of all registered voters were aged between 18 and 35, representing the “youth”. The Electoral Commission of South Africa’s Election Report (Tlakula, 2004) states that this percentage

gives us a reason to believe that ours is not a crisis of youth being lost as a generation, as others have said before. To the contrary, this is an indication of the growing support and appreciation by South Africans of all ages of the value of the vote as a means of participation in the governance process of their country.

Tlakula's claim might be an overstatement – most researchers (Piombo & Nijzink, 2005: 252; Schulz-Herzenberg, 2014a: 189) bemoan the drop in voter turnout between 1994 and 2004 (and onwards), of which the meagre youth registration is part. By 2014 the disillusionment in political parties and the process meant that only 33% of 18—19-year-olds eligible to vote actually registered (Tracey, 2014: 21). Tracey argues that the reluctance to register has more to do with disillusionment in South African political parties rather than mere apathy.

In the SABC's 1999 broadcast *Election 99 Sowetan Youth*, journalist Linda van Tilburg interviews five Sowetan students and concludes that the South African youth are "apathetic". Upon analysis, these young people seemed quite the opposite. The five students were critical of the government, engaged in the political process albeit quiet disillusioned, and enthusiastic about future political developments. In the SABC's only youth-focused broadcast *Mbeki visits the Rand Show* in 2004, young people crowd around Mbeki at a vote-catch event as the president rejects the idea that the youth are apathetic. While the youth of 1999 were allowed critical voices on the SABC (about corruption, the AIDS crisis, and Mandela's cabinet), in 2004 they are only spoken *about*, signalling the SABC's focus on pro-government narratives rather than electorate profiles.

## 2.5 Control of violence

In the final theme of the 2004 election sample, local journalists highlighted the control of the threat of violence on broadcast in particular. This theme was already touched on in the depiction of democracy and how personalities fix problems in paradise. Local channels focused on the police and military as an intermediary force in a personality-driven narrative style.

On the SABC's *Police*, Preshane Pillay follows the police officers on a raid in Pretoria, to “make sure the polls are safe on Wednesday”. Police raided suburbs and arrested 66 people and “seized Mandrax, cocaine, dagga, and stolen vehicles” (Raghnuath, *Police*, SABC). The discourse and the visuals are particularly telling of how the SABC view this authoritarian crackdown on the eve of the election. A high-speed police chase, filmed from within the following vehicle, leads to a side-of-the-road arrest in dim torchlight. Uniformed police form a line in the foreground with suspects barely visible beyond. An armed police officer marches up a flight of stairs, with the camera light focused on a gun tucked into his trousers and the journalist follows the officer from room to room. Uniformed officers apprehend Indian men on the side of the road, scrutinising documents, and rooting through their open car boot. Police officers are often in the foreground of shots with the “criminals” or suspects in the background, and so shots are framed from the authorities’ point of view (see Images 5.13 – 5.16).



Image 5.13: *Police*, SABC, 2004. “Cops foregrounded”



Image 5.14: *Police*, SABC, 2004. “Cops in subjective angle”





Image 5.15: *Police*, SABC, 2004. “Cops followed into rooms”



Image 5.16: *Police*, SABC, 2004. “On the side of the police”

The viewer always “follows” the police officer, rather than watches the authorities enter the room or scene, implying that the journalist is on the “side” of the authorities rather than the “side” of the suspects. This “subjective narrative angle” (Chandler, 1994; du Plooy, 2009: 171) positions the subject on screen either facing the same direction as the viewer, or allows the viewer to see the action through the subject’s point of view. For example, watching the police chase inside a police vehicle is a subjective angle, while watching it from the street as the vehicle passes would be objective. Du Plooy argues that subjective camera angles assume “the viewpoint of one of the persons who are involved in the scene... This camera position is frequently used for instructional and marketing purposes, or to increase the tension in a dramatic scene because it increases the reader’s involvement” (2009: 171). This broadcast not only seems to enhance the



drama of the otherwise “boring” election, it also reiterates Fair and Astroff’s argument that the authorities in South Africa are viewed as unambiguous “bringers of law and order” (1991: 58). The embedded journalists almost automatically take the side of the authorities and the SABC again shows signs of Mbeki’s African Pride concept – highlighting the positive attributes of authorities, rather than the negative.

### 3 DISCUSSION OF 2004

Despite the small sample available, two main themes characterised the 2004 election: local and global perspectives about South Africa’s decade-old democracy differed greatly, and broadcasters approached the election with stark binaries. Ultimately, the global broadcast’s disparaging view of post-apartheid South Africa contrasted with South Africa’s formulaic and pro-government African Pride narratives.

#### 3.1 Images of democracy

##### 3.1.1 Perception of the government

Local channels tended to take a sympathetic view of the government in 2004, which is different from the 1999 coverage. Mbeki was glamorised throughout the SABC coverage, signing autographs like a celebrity, laughing and joking with officials and the electorate, and acting as a guiding spirit in alleviating poverty. Mbeki seemed “in touch” with his electorate, but the reality could not be further from the truth. Along with having a “political tin ear” and perceived as being aloof and academic, Mbeki was detached from the majority of his electorate by 2004. It seems that eTV and the SABC ignore this flaw; instead, a kind of “sunshine journalism” is applied and problems are glossed over in

favour of highlighting the simplistic, the good, and the positive news. This kind of journalism is reminiscent of Mbeki's African Pride concept, whereby journalists were prompted to be an African first, a journalist second, and avoid negative typecasting of Africa (Saidykhan, 2007).

Unfortunately, this kind of framing flattens the experiences of South Africans. Duncan warns that local media that does not adequately represent its populace "has serious implications, as it fosters a society that is unable to see itself, and respond to its most pressing problems" (2014a: 92). Temin and Smith (2002: 593) and Waldahl (2005a) suggest that shallow and narrow frames exist on some African media because of government involvement, which ultimately hinders reporters in presenting "watchdog" journalism. While it's not clear that the ANC had a direct influence in local journalism, researchers (Jacobs, 1999: 156; Davis, 2005<sup>59</sup>; Gouws & De Beer, 2008; Sparks, 2009; Wasserman & De Beer, 2009; Malila, 2014) suggest that a chilling effect did occur, largely due to Mbeki's quest for unquestioning loyalty from the media.

In the single AP broadcast, the government was implicitly to blame uplifting the few at the expense of the many – Ngebulana lives the life of luxury while the majority of black South Africans wallow in disappointment and disillusionment, dire poverty a harsh reminder of the ANC's failure to deliver in the last decade. Democracy *should* have brought development to the nation, but the government appears to have "window-dressed" a lucky few and carried on as normal.

---

<sup>59</sup> Davis (2005: 234) finds that there was no real quantitative bias towards the ANC on television in 2004. He maintains that the ANC received more coverage, time wise, on eTV than the SABC, which is not reflected in my own study. While my own sample doesn't cover nearly as many broadcasts as Davis – he also analysed pre-election broadcasts – there was only a slight quantitative bias in the ANC coverage compared to other parties in the SABC sample, while qualitatively the ANC got much more in-depth and favourable coverage than other parties on both eTV and the SABC. My methodology differs from Davis and takes into account narratives and semiotics, which may account for the discrepancy.

As with the findings of 1999, the representation of the ANC in 2004 is far more nuanced than the literature of the time suggests. The authorities, including Mbeki, are glorified through discourse but also through camera angles. Most research about the elections in South Africa only takes into account discourse and tones (Davis, 2005; MMA, 1999), rather than looking at the visualisation. This analysis of the 2004 election therefore highlights how the authorities are often revered on local media through angles, discourse, and juxtaposition.

### 3.1.2 Problems in paradise

While the SABC inferred that poverty still exists in South Africa (*ID Books*, SABC), the issue is manifest on the AP broadcast (*South Africa preview*). Ms Mkhabela states that the new ID book “will change my life and lift me out of poverty” in *ID Books*, but we do not see anything like the kind of miserable existence evident on the AP broadcast. It is only AP that juxtaposes the wealth afforded to the black middle class and the desperation of the majority of South Africans. Instead, the SABC tends to take a “sunshine journalism” view of South African society in this sample: the only mention of South Africa’ “crime wave” (Russell, 2009: 109; Burger, 2009: 5) is that the police ensure a safe election through a large-scale raid in Pretoria in *Police*; and poverty, while a systemic issue confirmed by the increased Gini Coefficient (StatsSA, 2002, 2008), does not appear merciless or dire in *ID Books*. The AP broadcast, however, uses narrative journalism and juxtaposition to highlight just how stark the divisions still are in South Africa, yet does not explore the many contradictions and obstacles facing the government in addressing structural inequality.

### 3.2 Juxtapositions

As seen throughout the sample, reporters depicted stark juxtapositions in political party atmosphere, images wealth and poverty, and the ancient and modern approach to the IFP's political rallies. Intercutting these images and sound resulted in sudden and often jarring contrasts. On AP's *South Africa preview*, Sisa Ngebulana's immense wealth, signified through his ownership of a luxury vehicle, a mansion in a gated community, and a top executive job, is sharply contrasted with images of desperate poverty experienced by the black masses in South Africa (see Images 5.17 – 5.18). Sewage seeps down mud streets, water is only accessible through communal taps, and children play in filthy conditions. In pitting one side of fortune against the dismally poor other, AP thus creates the narrative that the ANC government has not yet fulfilled its promise of "A Better Life for All".



Image 5.17: *South Africa Preview*, AP, 2004. "Starkness: Dainfern wide shot"




Image 5.18: *South Africa Preview*, AP, 2004. "Starkness: Jerusalem wide shot"

Yet this polarised starkness was not limited to global broadcasts only – the SABC also employed juxtaposition. During *Small Party Campaigns*, the SABC reporter follows the NLP, a small regional Cape Town party, as supporters jovially shout and dance in the streets of Atlantis. The shrill audio matches the brash actions of the coloured NLP supporters as they ride six abreast on car rooftops, waving at the camera and provoking onlookers with vulgar hand gestures. Suddenly, the report cuts to a silent, sombre garden party where white NA supporters sit contentedly around tables in the shade. The sudden change from shrill audio to flat silence is jarring. The SABC report creates, very clearly, a narrative of two distinct sections of South African society, separated not only through race, but also class and the approach to campaign rallies. The SABC and AP thus create binaries between two sides: wealth and poverty, shrillness and silence, and party campaigning. Binaries were commonplace in the 2004 election coverage on both local and global broadcasts, and creatively depict the accurate divisions between sections of the South African population, but without any depth as to the causes and history of such divides.

#### 4 SUMMARY

In summary, then, the sampled 2004 election broadcasts presented two main narratives: the local broadcasts, but especially the SABC, told the story of a government in charge and successfully assisting a diverse electorate, with a president who was a popular “man of the people”. This pro-government narrative is a symptom of the ANC’s increased involvement in the public broadcaster’s policies and editorial board. The global broadcast from AP, however, juxtaposed wealth and poverty as a way as to comment on the failure of the South African government to bring a “Better Life for All”, without taking into

account the many economic, social, and cultural hurdles that prevent efficient transformation. It ultimately framed democracy through binaries reminiscent of David Spurr's (1994: 19) writings on postcolonial Africa. Spurr and Nay (2013: 5) believe that global news coverage of African elections tends to fall on one side the development binary: the promise of development (becoming an idealised Westernised state), or the disappointment of development (failure of that Westernising influence). Framing democracy in this way, as an "either-or" concept, tends to trivialise complex political issues and negates context.

## Chapter 6: 2009

The number of broadcasts available for 2009 increased sharply due to improved digitisation and storage techniques, and the final tally came to 46. The channels available ranged from state owned broadcasters to online-only, alternative channels. Chapter 6 follows a similar structure to previous chapters and opens with a background of the election, including societal and political issues that set the stage for the 2009 “Zunami”<sup>60</sup>. It then moves on to presenting the findings, first the frequency analysis of event and political party coverage, and then the qualitative analysis of themes. These themes were broadly grouped into three sections: the portrayal of Jacob Zuma and the repercussions of framing the candidate as a celebrity; democracy in action on global channels, where populism and the game frame take precedence in the coverage; and democracy in action on local channels, portrayed through process-oriented coverage that was disappointingly narrow. The chapter ends with a discussion of the main narratives and a summary of the findings. Chapter 6 posits that the international broadcasters depicted a lingering doubt over Zuma’s fitness for office, and presented the game frame between the pragmatism of the youth and opposition and the ANC’s threatening populist tendencies. Additionally, global journalists appeared to seek out the “why” in the ANC’s mysterious victory, but were hindered because of shallow frames. Local broadcasts, however, did not even seek the “why” and instead focused on process-oriented coverage that remained mostly ignorant of controversial topics.

---

<sup>60</sup> “Zunami” refers to Jacob Zuma’s unstoppable win at both Polokwane in December 2007 and the general election in April 2009. The term was coined by COSATU secretary general Zwelizima Vavi (Du Preez, 2013: 119) and is the title of Roger Southall’s detailed analysis of the 2009 election.

*“South Africa had had the liberation saint. It had then had the African intellectual. In 2009 it looked set to embark on rule by a charismatic populist.”*  
(Russell, 2009: 259)

### 1.1 The ousting of a king

Mbeki's nine-year presidency was turbulent. His denialist attitude towards HIV/AIDS caused an explosion in the disease, resulting in a pandemic that killed 18.5% of the country's adult population by 2007 (*South Africa - CIA Factbook*, 2017). Mbeki negotiated the global financial crisis towards the end of 2007 and, in May 2008, a period of xenophobic violence that left 62 dead, thousands displaced, and an ill taste in the mouths of South Africans and investors alike (Neocosmos, 2010). Southall (2009: 2) observes three issues that precluded the 2009 elections: demographic changes among the potential electorate, including a brain drain and increased HIV/AIDS deaths and infections; inequality and poverty that exacerbated the despondency towards the ANC; and service delivery backlogs increased community protests. Butler (2009: 66) also notes that citizens no longer trusted national institutions by 2009 and the increase in protest campaigns pointed to increased intolerance for cronyism and corruption at the local level. At the same time, the ANC was on the verge of a catastrophic split in ideologies that resulted in the “Mbeki camp and the Zuma camp” (Du Preez, 2013: 102). Yet this split had not always existed.

In 1999, Mbeki had insisted that Zuma be his deputy president: the two had a long history and they often operated as a team, but were extremely different men. Mbeki, the well-educated, austere, urbane intellectual fashioned himself as a modern African leader yet conservative Western politician, a diplomat. Zuma meanwhile prides himself on his



traditional Zulu roots, is a practising polygamist, an “anti-intellectual” (Calland, 2013: 11), and a former ANC intelligence chief. When Mbeki appointed Zuma as deputy president, he was aware that Zuma’s traditional identity would go down well with the Zulu speakers in KwaZulu-Natal (Du Preez, 2013: 98). In 1997, the IFP was still running the province but, as Du Preez (*ibid.*) acknowledges, it has become the ANC’s strongest province since Zuma took office. Mbeki chose Zuma as his deputy because no one, “not even Zuma himself, thought he had what it took to be president” and what better sidekick “than a man who could never have presidential ambitions and thus could never become a threat” (Du Preez, 2013: 98)?

## 1.2 Polokwane 2007

When Mbeki attempted to run for a third term as ANC president in 2007, it was his ultimate undoing. As one of South Africa’s most surprising political outcomes post-1994, the ANC’s national elective conference (NEC) in Polokwane in December 2007 has been touted as a “spectacle of a lifetime” (Du Preez, 2013: 102). Political leaders shouted each other down during planned speeches, with some professing allegiance to the newcomer Jacob Zuma and others remaining aggressively loyal to the incumbent Thabo Mbeki. “Looking back now,” veteran journalist Max Du Preez admits, “Polokwane 2007 signalled the moment when cheap populist politics, the culture of insults and threats, started flourishing in South Africa” (2013: 103).

Jacob Zuma, the charismatic Zulu politician with the loud, rambunctious support of the ANC Youth League, had won the 2007 ANC election to the humiliating defeat of Mbeki. This moment signalled a shift in South African politics towards Stalingrad tactics that

would eventually create a split in the ANC not seen for forty years.<sup>61</sup> In September 2008, the long-running corruption trial against Zuma suddenly floundered as high court judge Chris Nicholson declared, *inter alia*, that “undue political interference in Zuma’s prosecution” was at the hands of Mbeki. The Zuma camp moved quickly – on the 22<sup>nd</sup> of September, ANC secretary general Gwede Mantashe and deputy president Kgalema Motlanthe demanded Mbeki resign, visiting his official residence late at night. The next morning, Mbeki announced his resignation with dignity but rejected Judge Nicholson’s report. The country was briefly without a president until Motlanthe was sworn into office on the 25<sup>th</sup> of September. Du Preez echoes Frank Chikane<sup>62</sup> and calls this recalling “close to a coup d’état” (2013: 105), arguing that it was “clearly in violation of the constitution. The president is elected by parliament and cannot be ‘recalled’ by a political party” (ibid.). The National Prosecuting Agency (NPA) shortly afterwards served Zuma with an indictment for corruption, fraud, and racketeering. Nevertheless, the Zuma camp had got what they wanted – Mbeki was officially out of the picture and Zuma was free to run for president in the general election in 2009. The new, fresh start was about to begin, supporters declared, as Zuma’s touted progressiveness heralded a significant step to the left. As Du Preez contends, “they were wrong on both counts” (ibid.).

### 1.3 A push towards populism

A strange hand gesture was often seen during the Polokwane conference: the “wheeling hands that football managers use when they wish to signal a substitution” (Calland, 2013: 159). These were the hands of Julius Malema, president of the ANC Youth league, a

---

<sup>61</sup> In 1959, a group of Africanists broke away from the ANC as they opposed the party’s collaboration with white and Asian people. They formed the rival liberation movement, the Pan Africanist Congress, which later organised the ill-fated Sharpeville march.

<sup>62</sup> Chikane was director-general of the presidency from 1994 to 2010, and author of bestseller *Eight Days in September: the Removal of Thabo Mbeki* (2012).

position once occupied by Nelson Mandela in the 1940s, and his many Youth League followers. Calland is particularly indurate when describing the “neo-fascist” Malema, his followers, and the rising populism within the ANC, which is apparently “denuded of political principle or any ideology, driven only by the politics of voracious self-enrichment” (2013: 187). Malema, he suggests, relies on military rhetoric and populist demagoguery politics to stir emotions of disgruntled working classes in order to mobilise the masses to acquire power.

The push towards populism was iconic of Malema’s style of politicking during this period. Malema famously stated that he would “kill for Zuma” (Du Preez, 2013: 119), and frequently led rousing renditions of Zuma’s campaign theme song “*Umsbini Wami?*”.<sup>63</sup> Zuma very clearly had the support of the rowdy Youth League, which helped the Zunami sweep away all opposition. Butler (2009: 69) observes that this populism marked the beginning of a period of extravagant incendiary rhetoric, directed not only at opposition parties but also the NPA and the judiciary.

#### 1.4 100% Zulu boy

Zuma represented a refreshing gasp of air after Mbeki’s austere presidency. His Zuluness and traditional identity set him apart in the rising feeling amongst South Africans that the rural poor were not represented in government. Russell (2009: 255) finds that Zuma “has the populist trait of tending to say what his audiences want to hear” and that when he speaks to his followers in Zulu, “he was behaving not as a tribalist but as a true African leader” (ibid.: 258). His heritage also ensured that the book was ultimately closed on IFP

---

<sup>63</sup> *Umsbini Wami* translates as “Bring me my machine”. The song originated from MK soldiers during the Struggle. The implication is that “machine” refers to “machine gun” and the armed struggle against apartheid, but Dubin (2012: 69-72) fears that Zuma’s use of the song post-apartheid is misplaced; firstly because of the sexual connotation and Zuma’s repugnant rape trial, and secondly for inciting violence during the xenophobic attacks in 2008.

nationhood in KwaZulu-Natal (Du Preez, 2013: 98). During Zuma's high profile rape trial, swarms of loyal supporters wore shirts depicting Zuma's smiling face with the words "100% Zulu boy" emblazoned below (see Image 6.1).<sup>64</sup>



Image 6.1: "100% Zulu Boy"<sup>65</sup>

As a child, Zuma was a cattle herder in the rural hills of Nkandla. He had no formal education, learned to read and write only as an adult, and was arrested in June 1963 while conspiring with MK to overthrow the government. He spent a decade on Robben Island and as soon as he was released back to Nkandla, resumed his political activities as recruiter and transporter of soldiers for MK, under Harry Gwala. In 1975, Zuma fled into exile following Gwala's arrest. In 1987, he was appointed as the ANC's Chief of Intelligence at the movement's exile base in Lusaka, Zambia, and commanded the Mandla Judson Kuzwayo (MJK) unit, an underground counter-intelligence unit. In early 1990, Zuma re-entered South Africa to work with the ANC steering committee on the negotiation process in KwaZulu-Natal. In December 1994 Zuma was elected as

---

<sup>64</sup> The use of "Zulu boy" in connection with Zuma's rape trial has always been problematic. Supporters of the then-deputy president accused the media and the courts of being "anti-Zulu" in their depiction of the trial, and that Zuma was simply being true to his Zulu heritage. Robins (2008) analyses the sexual politics surrounding the rape trial, in particular the tension of rights and culture, and the modern and the traditional.

<sup>65</sup> Source: <http://www.gettyimages.co.uk/detail/news-photo/johannesburg-south-africa-to-go-with-afp-story-safrica-news-photo/57552136>.

Chairperson of the ANC in the province as well as national Chairperson of the ANC.

From 1999 to 2005, Zuma served as Mbeki's deputy president.

His Zulu name, Gedleyihlekisa, is constructed from the Zulu phrase that translates as, "the one who smiles in your face while causing you harm" (Du Preez, 2013: 97). His political career has certainly followed that aptronym. Zuma's rise to power had not been easy, nor without controversy, yet he always managed to return to office smiling. In 2005, he was sacked as deputy president over allegations of corruption with his disgraced financial adviser Schabir Shaik, yet remained deputy president of the ANC. This divided the party, with a groundswell of support for Zuma rising within the ranks of the ANC. The Schabir Shaik court case led to further investigations of Zuma's financial records. On top of these mounting problems, he was accused of raping Fezekile Ntsukela Kuzwayo, known as Khwezi, in October 2005 but denied the charges. The matter went to court in February 2006 and Zuma stated he knowingly had unprotected sex with HIV-positive Khwezi but had a shower afterwards "to protect himself" from the disease.<sup>66</sup> He was acquitted of rape in May 2006 after an extensively publicised trial and subsequently reinstated as ANC deputy president. The NPA finally withdrew the corruption charges in May 2009, two weeks before the general election.

Zuma inherited a delicate political position as president of the ANC. He faced the challenge of keeping the party together as well as his winning alliance in the aftermath of Polokwane. The party had, at that point, "no real ideological underpinning. [The ANC] are together in opposition to something, not in promotion of something. All experience of political science suggests that, unless you are together for something, you stand the

---

<sup>66</sup> This statement has been the focus of many mockeries of Zuma, including local cartoonist Zapiro's caricature of the president with a shower on top of his head.

risk of being pulled in all directions at once” (Saki Macozoma, Mbeki confidant, quoted in Russell, 2009: 256). The ANC’s campaign manifesto was thus wide-ranging, detailed, “boring, and low-key” (Butler, 2009: 72), with unemployment, health, education, rural development, and a reduction in crime and corruption as top priorities. Their campaign also revolved around Zuma’s personality, his Zulu identity, and popularity with the masses. Zuma visited the many disparate sections of South African society and courted both the rich white suburbanites and the rural black Zulus. Russell was particularly concerned about the “Big Man” (2009: 259) personality cult that followed Zuma around during the campaign trail, fearing that it masked the growing social and economic problems. Flamboyant rallies and mass meetings held in stadia packed to the brim with chanting and swaying loyalists included brief sightings of the frail, mute Nelson Mandela wheeled onto the stage and through the crowds in a golf buggy. Despite the ANC’s use of symbolism that promoted unity and using Mandela to appeal to ANC loyalty, Zuma’s on-going controversy caused an irreversible rift not only between Mbeki and Zuma, which Hamill calls the “*Broedertwis*” (2009: 4), or fight among brothers, but also the ANC itself: those who were loyal to Mbeki and those who followed the new blood, Zuma.

### 1.5 Splitting of the rock: opposition

Some of the ANC national executive members who voted for Mbeki at Polokwane in 2007 agonised over whether to leave the movement to which they had devoted most of their lives (Russell, 2009: 270). When Mbeki was recalled in September 2008, their thinking was cemented. On December 16<sup>th</sup> 2008, South Africa’s Day of Reconciliation, and in a deliberate echo of the Freedom Charter launch that met in 1955 under the same name, the Congress of the People (or COPE) was launched. Headed by Mosiuoa “Terror” Lekota and Mbhazima “Sam” Shilowa, former ANC senior members and

Struggle activists, the party appealed to the black middle class who were wary of the left-wing rhetoric of Zuma's allies, as well as dispirited Mbekiites.

Some hoped that the party would break the explosion-fizzle mould of start-up rival parties, and Calland notes that the party "might have some important attributes that previous new parties did not have or did not have enough of: cash; ANC genetics and, therefore, legitimacy decent leadership; and mobilising capacity on the ground" (2013: 241). Major problems plagued the new party right from the start, however: the three main leaders, Mosiuoa "Terror" Lekota, Mbhazima "Sam" Shilowa, and the party's eventual presidential candidate Mvume Dandala competed endlessly. The campaign also lacked visibility, strategy, and funding, and the ANC countered COPE on all levels, resisting the use of the name, disrupting meetings, and opposing by-elections (Booyesen, 2009: 89-100). The party's manifesto was not dissimilar to the DA's in that the core ideology consisted of progressivism, a belief in human rights, social justice, sustainable democracy, human development, and the rule of law and equity, and as a result, voters had little distinction between the two.

The DA's 2009 campaign effectively consolidated their position as the official opposition. Former investigative journalist and anti-apartheid activist Helen Zille took over from Tony Leon as party leader in 2007 and eventually became Premier of the Western Cape in 2009. For the first time, the DA gained an absolute majority in the Western Cape and contributed to keeping the ANC below the two-thirds parliamentary majority. However, the party was still unable to increase their coloured or black votes. The DA's manifesto in 2009 focused on the eradication of poverty, the establishment of a quality education system, improving the fight against HIV/AIDS, and ultimately

promoting their Open Opportunity Society.<sup>67</sup> Jolobe (2009: 146) notes, however, that a major weakness of the DA's campaign strategy was targeting black voters because the lingering perception was still that the DA was a white, wealthy, middle class party.

## 1.6 The 2009 election

Calland exclaims that, “actually, there is not a lot to say” about opposition parties (2013: 239). With the exception of the DA, the opposition has struggled in leadership, access to resources, and ultimately in competing with the ANC's Struggle credentials. The IFP membership had been mostly amalgamated into the ANC thanks to Zuma's reflection of Zulu ideals, while other smaller parties had been unceremoniously wiped off the parliamentary representation bill over the years. Calland believes that new parties are eventually “welcomed into, and smothered by, the warm embrace of the ANC's commodious bosom” (2013: 161), while Heyn suggests a less cosy embrace as smaller parties are “squeezed into oblivion” (2009: 163). The UDM, ID, ACDP, Freedom Front Plus, and AZAPO all found attracting attention difficult because the spotlight was on the ANC, COPE, and the DA the majority of the time (ibid.). Ultimately, voters tended to see a vote for the smaller parties as a “waste”, as only the big three parties were capable of delivering: if voters did not support the government, then their vote often went to the most effective opposition grouping (ibid.: 177). Table 6.1 depicts the spread of votes in the 2009 election. The ANC received 65.9% of the vote, just 3.8% less than in the 2004 election. This was mainly due to the masses of IFP supporters defecting to the ANC, which now had a traditional Zulu leader.

	<b>ANC</b>	<b>DA</b>	<b>COPE</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Percentage</b>	65.9	16.6	7.42	17.6million


Table 6.1: Percentage of votes per party in 2009 election<sup>68</sup>

<sup>67</sup> This system meant that outcomes were linked to opportunities, effort, and ability, rather than race-based.



## 2 FINDINGS

The sample size for the 2009 election represented a gargantuan jump from the paltry 2004 sample. A total of 46 broadcasts across 16 news channels from nine countries were available and, as seen in Graph 6.1, the majority of broadcasts came from CNN, the SABC, and the BBC. The considerable jump in the number of broadcasts might be symptomatic not only of the renewed interest in the South African election, but also of the enhanced technology: YouTube was founded in 2005 and the improved capabilities of digitising and storing broadcast news data online is an on-going process.




Graph 6.1<sup>69</sup>

As Graph 6.2 depicts, channels were grouped together based on region for ease of explanation, with 14 broadcasts from five African channels, 16 European, 10 North

<sup>68</sup> Statistics gathered from Southall & Daniel (2009).

<sup>69</sup> Under “African channels”, only two channels are from the continent: NTV, a Kenyan TV network and AfricaNews, broadcast from the Republic of Congo. The rest are broadcast out of South Africa. In 2008 eTV launched its rolling news channel eNews in 2008, which subsequently rebranded as eNCA (eNews Channel Africa) in 2012. For ease of explanation, this study uses eTV for the pre-2009 broadcasts and eNCA for the post-2009 rolling news broadcasts. As with previous chapters, see Appendix 1 for a brief explanation of these channels.

American, and six designated as “Other”, including China (2), New Zealand (1), and the Middle East (3).



Graph 6.2


The following sections, as in the previous chapters, outline the frequency of event coverage and political party coverage, and the themes throughout the broadcasts, in order to investigate how, if at all, the four regions differ in the coverage of the 2009 election.

## 2.1 Frequency analysis


### 2.1.1 Events

Overall, seven events were noted across all channels including: the actual voting day including set-up of stations, queues, and casting ballots; political party rallies and campaigns; Zuma’s court trial for corruption and rape; a frail Mandela voting in Houghton; the ANC victory celebrations; the standoff between Zuma and Mbeki; and


finally the vote counting process. Graph 6.3 depicts the total spread of event coverage, while Graphs 6.4 – 6.7 show the regional split.




Graph 6.3




Graph 6.4



Graph 6.5



Graph 6.6



Graph 6.7

The 2009 coverage focused more on the actual voting day than previous election years.


North American and European focused on rallies, his court appearance, and the celebrations of the ANC victory more often than the African and Other channels.

Conversely, these predominantly non-Western channels focused on vote counting and the actual voting day. These results point to the Western fixation on dramatizing the election: Zuma's court appearance, the exuberant rallies, and victory celebrations were all visually entertaining, and all Western channels mentioned Zuma's scandalous past in almost every broadcast. Conversely, despite the five African channels referring to the ANC (see Graph 6.4) no African journalist discussed or depicted Zuma's court case, his background, or the standoff between Zuma and Mbeki. Instead, the election process was key for African and Other channels: vote counting and the voting day seemed the most important.


### 2.1.2 Political parties

Graph 6.8 shows the total spread of political parties across all channels, while Graph 6.9 represents the split between the regions, with the Other region representing only the ANC. As a common trend in the overall election coverage, the ANC received the largest representation on the news broadcasts, across all regions. The European channels dedicated the most broadcasts to the ANC, while the least were the North American

channels. Typical of previous election years too, the African channels gave more representation to different parties: six different parties were mentioned on African channels.



Graph 6.8



Graph 6.9

The majority of coverage was dedicated to the top three parties, the ANC, COPE, and the DA, effectively turning the election into, as Jane Duncan suggests, “a three and a half horse race” (2009: 220). The SABC tracked all “major” political parties as their leaders


voted on the polling day, which is why the UDM, the IFP, and the ID appear in this sample. The inclusion of these smaller parties may be due to the Proportional Access used in South Africa (Strom, 2007), whereby media coverage is based on the strength of support, and this makes it difficult for opposition parties to garner media coverage against the ruling party.

CNN's *Election Oddballs* broadcast focused on AZAPO's race-based exclusion policy, KISS' charismatic founder, and the gendered WomanFirst party. The inclusion of these three minority parties in CNN's ANC-dominated coverage is unclear if one only looks at the quantitative aspects of the coverage. Unlike the SABC's trend of covering as many political parties as possible, global broadcasters tend to only focus on the "big three" over the years – the DA, ANC, and interchangeably the IFP, COPE, NP, and so on. As seen later in this section, Western news channels tended to favour the 2009 opposition in South Africa by implying that the diverse nature of the many parties would eat away at the ANC's "guaranteed win". It therefore seems that CNN's inclusion of AZAPO, WomanFirst, and KISS play into this narrative. Thus, time measurement alone does not adequately show how opposition was depicted in the broadcasts. Even though the ANC was mentioned far more often, across all channels, than the opposition, Western broadcasters gave more extensive coverage to opposition leaders than the ANC.


### 2.1.3 Who speaks

As noted before, Cross (2010: 417) describes Knowns as people who are politicians, officials, or the elite. She (ibid.: 428) argues that the lack of political leadership sources points to the media-centric depiction of election strategies and activities, which trivialises the amount of information that the political leaders can provide. Graph 6.10 shows the split between the Knowns (65%) and Unknowns (35%) speaking during the sample

across all broadcasts.<sup>70</sup> More Knowns spoke overall, and Graph 6.11 shows the breakdown of the most frequent Known speakers.



Graph 6.10



Graph 6.11

<sup>70</sup> "Speaks" was coded as being both a "lip flap" (Bucy & Grabe, 2007: 662), whereby the speaker is seen speaking but not heard – usually the journalist speaks over the top of the images, as well as synchronous sound – being heard at the same time as seen speaking.

Known speakers were predominantly political leaders – other Knowns included pundits, including business and political analysts, and Archbishop Desmond Tutu. Simple frequency numbers do not give an adequate picture of how these sources spoke during the sample, however. This section therefore explains that Mandela and Zuma were shown in “lip flap” rather than voiced directly; that punditry increased the distance between the political leaders and audience even further; and finally that the opposition were voiced directly more often, which gave these leaders more time and space to explain policy issues and campaign promises.

Nelson Mandela was mute in this sample: the only time the former president “spoke” was in a lip flap<sup>71</sup> from a previously recorded, formal speech that was reused across four broadcast, but he was not the only leader to appear in unflattering lip flap sound bites. As expected, due to the man’s plentiful appearances across the channels, Jacob Zuma “spoke” the most during the sample: journalists fixated on his image as if he were already president, yet the candidate hardly ever spoke directly to journalists. He spoke most frequently in prepared speeches that were depicted as lip flaps. Bucy and Grabe (2009: 202) suggest that lip flaps are unflattering and are generally discouraged in political journalism:

Lip flap is a type of audiovisual incongruency, which has been shown experimentally to prompt tune-out of the verbal channel (the reporter’s voice) and tune-in of the visual channel. Visual scenarios where attention is drawn to a candidate who appears voiceless but is awkwardly mouthing words cannot be taken as neutral coverage.

---

<sup>71</sup> Bucy and Grabe (2009: 202) describe a lip flap as where the candidate is seen speaking on screen but not heard.



This type of framing positions Zuma as seen, but not heard, in a trend that Bucy and Grabe (2009: 74) suggest is common in Western political journalism. Zuma “speaks” most frequently in the 2009 sample, which highlights his importance, yet because of the lip flaps and prepared speeches, he remains distant and unknown. Zuma is essentially “re-voiced” in that the journalist speaks over the top of him, or uses political analysts to interpret his actions, words, and policies.

The 2009 election coverage represented the first time that political analysts, or “pundits” (Cross, 2010: 417; Louw, 2005: 80), represented such a large slice of the Known speakers. CNN’s Nkpile Mabuse (*South Africa election: inside Africa*) interviews business analyst Karima Brown about Zuma’s effect on the rand, Sky News’s *ANC’s Jacob Zuma divides South Africa* voices a political analyst about Zuma’s corruption case, while Roxanne Lawson from TransAfrica Forum speaks about rifts within the ANC in VOA’s *South Africa’s parliament selects a new president*. On the SABC (*Small party campaigns*), Dr Chis Landsberg notes the ANC has restored its legitimacy and credibility, while Professor Susan Booysen refers to the “liberation narrative” surrounding the party, where people continue to vote for the ANC despite issues of delivery. As journalists use pundits to explain Zuma’s background, the corruption trial, and the ANC, these topics are reduced into small, “bite-sized” information quotes rather than a deep investigation with first-hand sources from Zuma or the ANC. The lack of first hand sources indicates Zuma’s disdain for the media (discussed at length in Calland, 2013 and Duncan, 2009). Yet the use of pundits in place of first hand quotes increases the distance between Zuma and the viewers. This particular use of punditry to prophesise Zuma’s effect on South Africa post-election illustrates Cross’s (2010: 417) suggestion that pundits give the impression of objectivity, while Louw argues that “smooth talkers” offer “cultural fast-food – pre-digested and pre-thought” (2005: 81). The increase in punditry indicates media-centric

election coverage, or mediatisation, but also highlights the deterioration of the relationship between the ANC and ANC leaders and journalists.

While Zuma and the ANC were most frequently re-voiced in pundit quotes, opposition leaders were interviewed directly on both local and global channels, and given more time and space discuss policy issues and campaign strategies in their own voices. These leaders spoke chiefly about policy strategy, issues affecting South Africans, the strength of the opposition, and spoke most often through one-on-one interviews or at press conferences, rarely in a lip flap. Journalists interviewed opposition political leaders on the campaign trail and gave leaders adequate time to describe and explain their manifestos. Robyn Curnow from CNN interviews a COPE member in a bustling Sowetan marketplace about policy issues such as land, corruption, and implementation of policies (*South Africa Today*). The BBC's Jack Fisher follows the COPE and DA campaign trail, interviewing Dandala on his branded party bus about siphoning ANC support and bringing morals back into politics (*South Africa gets ready to vote*), and the SABC follows Helen Zille as she returns to Cape Town, stating the DA will “realign politics” in South Africa (*DA and ANC in the Western Cape*). The direct contact with these leaders presented the opposition as knowable, understandable, and with detailed policy that could dislodge the ANC's majority.

Even though the opposition seems diverse, vibrant, willing to engage with journalists, and enthusiastic in these pieces, the overall narrative visual framing in the sample positions Zuma as a cult-like leader with an unshakably loyal support base that ensured a “guaranteed ANC win”, ultimately undermining this opposition party framing. The following section explores this contradictory framing through three narratives from

global and local broadcasts: the “Jacob Zuma Show” that visualised the leader’s cult-like following, and democracy in action on both international and South African channels.

## 2.2 The Jacob Zuma Show

Although Zuma was framed as a personality on almost half of the 46 broadcasts, as journalists focused on his “controversial” nature and his image as a traditional “man of the people”, South African and indeed African channels did not mention either of these frames, instead choosing to focus only on the leader voting in his home town Nkandla. Hence, the majority of framing narratives came from global, Western channels. This section details how the global channels present Zuma. Firstly, the portrayal of his corruption trial showed a leader nonchalant in the face of serious allegations, and his vehement support and cult-like status seemed at odds with this controversial background. Secondly, Zuma was seen as a traditionalist buffoon and a man of the people, quite unlike the silent Nelson Mandela whose “Rainbow Nation” may be under threat from this new leader. Ultimately, these frames tended to wipe out contextual information about the 2009 election, including the transition from Mbeki to Zuma and the complexity of Zuma’s Zulu background in garnering key support for the ANC.

### 2.2.1 Corruption and controversy

Zuma’s corruption trial was strongly emphasised on Western channels, and the most visually engineered broadcasts came from Sky News and CNN. Sky News’s Emma Hurd and CNN’s Nkepile Mabuse employ juxtapositions between audio and visual to depict Zuma as nonchalant in the face of serious allegations, while the tone of the reports suggest a convenient coincidence in the charges moments before the election. Sky News’s Emma Hurd refers to the trial (*ANC awaits South African election result; ANC’s Jacob Zuma divides South Africa; Zuma’s ANC closing in on election victory*), but instead of giving

any sense of background to the court case, Hurd repeatedly says the “charges were dropped suddenly” two weeks before the election. Similarly, CNN presents Zuma’s smiling face in close-up while reporter Nkepile Mabuse states “just two weeks before the election, those charges were suddenly dropped” (*South Africa election: ANC under fire*, CNN) before cutting to Zuma laughing heartily in the court room – the audio of his laughter competes with Mabuse’s voiceover: “He was also charged with rape but was acquitted in a high-profile trial.”

The most frequent representation of Zuma on global channels is his “controversy” – that is, his difficult personality, his mishandling of events in the run-up to the election, and his “cult-like status” (Mabuse, *Inside Africa: South African election*, CNN). Mabuse claims Zuma is a “populist”, which comes with problematic consequences, including that his “supporters don’t care about any of that” – meaning his controversy, his corruption charges, or his lack of education. AFP’s journalist also states that Zuma is a “charismatic leader, but also a controversial one” (*Results from Wednesday’s election*, AFP), going on to repeat the corruption and rape charges. Journalists were preoccupied with assessing how Zuma could derail South Africa’s democracy, but without any real discussion of policy from the ANC themselves.

### 2.2.2 Traditionalist, man of the people

While most journalists take a slightly more formal stance on Zuma’s controversial leadership, repeating concerns of populist politics and suspicious judgements on his court cases, Sky News was particularly disparaging of Zuma’s traditionalist character and personality. Journalist Emma Hurd’s broadcasts employed creative editing, camera angles, and her voice tone to imply that Zuma was not “fit for purpose” in taking over Mandela’s “Rainbow Nation”. In *ANC’s Jacob Zuma divides South Africa*, Hurd frames

Zuma as a buffoon and a tyrant, surrounded by bodyguards and silent on controversial issues such as HIV/AIDS and Zimbabwe. Interestingly, Hurd seems to have made a spectacular mix-up here. It was Mbeki who was “silent” on these issues, not Zuma. This kind of inaccurate reporting might be a simple oversight, but as noted later in this chapter Western broadcasters effectively wiped out Mbeki’s presidency by inferring Zuma took over from Mandela, rather than Mbeki. Later, Hurd goes further. As Zuma, dressed in skins, performs a traditional Zulu warrior dance surrounded by a crowd, Hurd narrates, “He has no formal education and still practises a polygamous lifestyle. He’s also overcome allegations of rape and corruption that might have felled his political career” (ibid.). On the word “felled”, Zuma overbalances in his dance moves and falls backwards into the crowd, shield and shoes flailing into the air. Not only is Zuma controversial, he is also a buffoon and slightly ridiculous in this broadcast.

North American and European journalists also frequently referred to Zuma as a “man of the people”, with a carefully cultivated working class image (*Challenges await South Africa’s future leader*, AFP) that can reinvigorate the grassroots electorate (*South African election day*, CBC), and has traditional roots as a practicing polygamist (*South Africa today*, CNN).

These references seem to hint at an attempt to explain Zuma’s cult-like status among black South Africans, but journalists never quite go far enough to explore why Zuma holds such sway with the majority. This focus on Zuma’s profile as a “man of the people” hints at the ideological differences between Mbeki’s austere presidential style and Zuma’s traditionalism. CNN’s Mabuse is the only reporter to go into depth about the 2008 split between Mbeki and Zuma in the ANC: “Zuma also enjoys the support of those who loathe his predecessor in the ANC, Thabo Mbeki. Mbeki was seen as aloof, and disconnected, an intellectual, while Zuma, who rose to the top despite being born into poverty, is regarded as a man of the people” (*South Africa Today*, CNN).

### 2.2.3 Mandela endorses Zuma

At the start of *ANC's Jacob Zuma divides South Africa*, Zuma sings a loud rendition of “*Umsini Wami*” on stage at an ANC rally, as Hurd narrates: “You’re looking at South Africa’s next president, a man whose Zulu anthem is Bring Me My Machine Gun... [Nelson Mandela] entrusting his legacy to the ANC’s most controversial leader yet”. The judgemental simplification of Struggle-era songs and separation between viewer and participant aside, Hurd’s narration suggests Zuma might harm Mandela’s legacy, the precious jewel of democracy in South Africa. Global journalists often compared the controversial Zuma to Nelson Mandela, the apparent father of the nation, and suggest that Zuma’s presidency would be a turbulent time for the young democracy. Mandela, meanwhile, appeared to endorse this controversial newcomer. The BBC’s Karen Allen says that Mandela’s attendance at Zuma’s rally is a “ringing endorsement” (*Final election rallies*, BBC) while CNN’s Nkepile Mabuse notes that “a public endorsement by the Nelson Mandela family is as precious as gold” (*South Africa election: ANC under fire*, CNN). The strong themes of Zuma’s unsavoury background and his perceived threat to the “Rainbow Nation” make Mandela’s endorsement seem strange.

Broadcasters used and reused broadly similar footage of the elderly man seated silently on stage at an ANC rally, a seeming statue behind the animated Zuma that acted as an “endorsement”. We do not hear or see Mandela speak directly about this endorsement: he only appears on screen as an elderly man, mute, frail, and smiling (see Images 6.2 and 6.3). Only South African broadcasters SABC and eNCA noted that Mandela was “too frail” to manage more than a “warm smile and a wave” (*Leaders vote*, eNCA). Mandela’s health was indeed, at this time, in decline, but Western broadcasters didn’t refer to Mandela in these terms. Mandela’s mere presence at a few ANC rallies was considered emphatic endorsement for Zuma’s controversial presidential campaign (*Final election*

rallies, *Huge turnout in South African election* BBC; *South African election: ANC under fire*, CNN). Mandela's framing in this way reduces him into a one-dimensional smiling, mute symbol, whose only contribution to this election is as keeper of the kingdom.



Image 6.2: *ANC's Jacob Zuma divides South Africa*, Sky, 2009. "Mandela on the stage"



Image 6.3: *Challenges await South Africa's future leader*, AFP, 2009. "Mandela on stage"

Martha Evans writes about how Mandela's image can be "bent (almost) to mean just about anything", and that Zuma attempts to "create some kind of continuity between South Africa's beloved first president and the divisive Zuma figure" (2013: 28). Many South Africans were puzzled by Mandela's appearance at this particular rally, held at Johannesburg's Ellis Park Stadium (symbolic too, for this is the location where Mandela, in an iconic No. 6 rugby jersey, presented the Webb Ellis Cup to the victorious

Springbok captain at the 1995 Rugby World Cup final). There was a resultant backlash from both South African media and the Nelson Mandela Foundation who criticised the party for putting the 90-year-old's life at risk (Evans, 2013: 29). However, broadcasters acknowledged none of this controversy: in fact, Karen Allen repeats that Mandela "requested to be here" (*Final election rallies*, BBC).

#### 2.2.4 Wiping out context

International broadcasters, and particularly CNN, Sky News, and AFP, continually referred to the ruling party as "Mandela's ANC" (*Results from Wednesday's election*, AFP) and South Africa as "Mandela's Rainbow Nation" (*Inside Africa: South African election*, CNN; *ANC awaits election result*, Sky News; *ANC's Jacob Zuma divides South Africa*, Sky News), under threat from Zuma's populism. Throughout the sample, Mandela appears to symbolically hand over the reins directly to Zuma, but this effectively wipes out Mbeki's presidency. Despite CNN's portrayal of the Mbeki/Zuma split on *South Africa Today*, Mbeki was notably absent in this sample. The transition between cabinets seemed to pass the torch from "Mandela's Rainbow Nation" to the turbulent Zuma administration, where the future was uncertain and Mandela's legacy was at stake. What this narrative fails to mention is that the transition is not from Mandela to Zuma, but from *Mbeki* to Zuma. Interestingly, by framing this transition in this way, Mbeki is all but written out of the narrative across the various regional broadcasts. The fixation on visually appealing Zuma at the expense of dry and dull Mbeki is neglectful, reductionist, and inaccurate.

In a reflection of Cross's (2010) findings, Zuma was mediated as a "symbolic representation" of the election race, rather than as a "substantive definer" of news content. Combined with Zuma's representation on international news channels as a controversial and corrupt populist, his mediated speeches on the broadcasts highlight his



role as a symbol rather than political actor. Despite this fixation on Zuma's personality, journalists neglected any kind of depth about the ANC's campaign style, manifesto issues, or policy. Instead, international journalists presented a lingering doubt about his fitness for office because of his inherent controversial nature and scandalous background.

### 2.3 Democracy in action: global coverage

So, while the overriding sense of the global coverage of the election was of Zuma's symbolic representation, international broadcasters also presented the election as a kind of horse race between two competing sides: first, the populist ANC support and the pragmatic youth voices that represented a potential swing vote and second, the loyal ANC support but the disappointing ANC leadership and service delivery.

#### 2.3.1 Populist, frightening support

Out of 16 broadcasts that visualised the electorate, 69% were from the North American and European channels, and the majority showed ANC supporters. These depictions were often threatening: low angles, close-ups, overly loud audio that drowned out the journalist's piece to camera, and tight camera proxemics and low angles made these celebrations seem intimidating and claustrophobic (see Images 6.4 – 6.6).



Image 6.4: *Final election rallies*, BBC, 2009. “Extreme low angle ANC support”



Image 6.5: *Inside Africa: South African election*, CNN, 2009. “Close framing ANC support”



Image 6.6: *Zuma's ANC closing in on election victory*, Sky, 2009. “Close framing vehement ANC support”



Image 6.7: *Zuma's ANC closing in on election victory*, Sky, 2009. “Extreme low angle”



Image 6.8: *Zuma's ANC closing in on election victory*, Sky, 2009. "ANC supporters carry coffin effigies"

The low angles of Images 6.4 and 6.7 show ANC support as powerful and intimidating, as supporter dance and *toyi-toyi*<sup>72</sup> above the camera. Meanwhile, the close, claustrophobic frames of Images 6.5 and 6.6 make it seem as if the supporters crowd the camera, threatening to overrun the journalist in their flamboyant and vehement support of the ANC. Image 6.8 shows ANC supporters carrying coffin effigies of opposition party leaders, filmed in "hands up" framing. The supporters then *toyi-toyi* in a circle around these coffins, clapping their hands and sing loud Struggle-era songs.

More than the claustrophobic and intimidating proxemics, the loud audio of the supporters was particularly noticeable on global broadcasts. Global journalists were frequently drowned out in their pieces to camera. The BBC's Andrew Harding is drowned out twice on the BBC, once while standing among singing children in *Grassy Park*, and again in a stadium amongst COPE supporters (*South Africa gets ready to vote*). Crowds of boisterous ANC supporters routinely disrupt Emma Hurd's pieces to camera for Sky News. In *ANC awaits South African election result*, Hurd interviews four young black men in red jackets about their first time voting. "It could be another generation before the ANC electoral dominance is dented here, and it might take even longer for voter apathy to set in", she says, as the young men's singing almost drowns out her voiceover. The young men dance and crash into each other, lurching towards the camera and sing Zuma's "*Umsbini Wam?*", the volume steadily increasing towards the end of the broadcast. The "enthusiasm" these young people show is intimidating. Hurd goes further in another broadcast. *Zuma's ANC closing in on election victory* opens with a low-angle

---

<sup>72</sup> To "*toyi-toyi*" means to dance the war dance of black South Africans, says Lisa Nevitt (2010), and dates back to the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya. "Throngs of people charge forwards, stomping and chanting political slogans. Such energy struck fear into the hearts of the armed forces who tried to contain them."

medium close-up of a black woman wearing an ANC shirt depicting Zuma's face. She screams "Viva ANC" into the camera and later says "Zuma is the president of South Africa, like it or not", surrounded by fellow supporters who fill the screen. Hurd states that Zuma's "supporters here are jubilant" but this jubilancy almost drowns out her piece to camera (see Image 6.9). In extreme low angle, an ANC supporter claps his hands at the camera (see Image 6.7), singing so loud it distorts the audio. Later, ANC supporters in medium close-up shots dance carrying homemade "coffins" adorned with the faces of COPE leaders (Image 6.8). Hence, on these Western channels, the "noisy" electorate are not only exuberant but also intimidating through this visualisation. These intimidating camera proxemics highlight the vehemence of ANC support throughout the election days, and present the ruling party's patronage as something to be feared.



Image 6.9: *Zuma's ANC closing in on election victory*, Sky, 2009. "Hurd drowned out"

### 2.3.3 Youth voices

While the ANC's support seems threatening, other voices in the sample were not presented in this way. In 2009, the "Born Free"<sup>73</sup> description had not yet taken hold in the narrative about South African democracy. However, journalists still focused on the youth as an important section of the electorate, interviewing young people about their

---

<sup>73</sup> Born Frees is a term used to refer to those South Africans who were born shortly before or after 1994 and are eligible to vote. The Born Free theory suggests that those born after apartheid hold no or very little party loyalty because they were not subject to the racist regime, and have had free access to education and information (Du Preez, 2013: 14).

decisions and concerns about the poll, whether they would vote, and what they thought of the ANC. The overriding narrative seemed to be that the youth had little or no allegiance with the ANC because, journalists implied, they were too young to remember apartheid. As the 2014 chapter will explore, this argument is a fallacy: apartheid has had long-lasting structural implications and effects.

An AFP broadcast (*Youth in South Africa*) opens on a multiracial group of pupils seated on school bleachers, and the journalist remarks, “A scene South Africa would be proud to hold up to show how far it’s come. These pupils were all born in 1994, the year of the country’s first all-race democratic elections”. Two black girls and two white boys voice their opinions about apartheid, discrimination, and the Afrikaans language schools. “I really don’t like thinking about the past, because it’s in the past, and it doesn’t really matter to me,” one girl explains, while another boy says, “I just think that it was a terrible mistake in the past and we did learn a lot from it and we are growing as a country.” This snapshot of young people without perceived allegiance to the ANC nor a memory of apartheid is repeated on other broadcasts too: Mpho Lakaje (*First time South African voters*, BBC) notes, “A new generation of voters are likely to have less emotional attachments to the ANC than their parents.”

While conducting a focus group with multiracial young South Africans, CNN’s Nkepile Mabuse (*Inside Africa, South Africa’s youth vote*) also states:

There has been an impressive increase in voter registration among South Africa’s youth, many of whom are too young to remember the reality of apartheid....

Contrary to the views of this group, a recent poll conducted by Plus 94 research reports that 65% of young South Africans say they will vote for the ruling ANC.

Later in the broadcast, Zuma dances on stage, intercut with a high-angle shot of ANC supporters in “hands up”<sup>74</sup> framing. Vox pop Nebu Sill says in voice over:

The ANC has been there for a very long time now, and they are literally the face of democracy as we know it right now, so people are very afraid to let other political parties come into power and actually take control and leave the ANC behind. They will always want the ANC to be there, because the ANC was what took us from the apartheid era and they want it to stay the same.

This kind of framing suggests that ANC support is mostly driven by fear of change, and the juxtaposition implies that it is the *youth* in South Africa that are the hope for change as potential swing voters. It also implies that the ANC has a strong hold over older people who “remember” the dark days of apartheid, which apparently the youth do not. Mabuse admits that the focus group she interviews are the outliers, and the majority of South African youth say they will vote for the ANC reflected in a poll by Plus 94.<sup>75</sup>

Admirably, in an era where vox pops and sound bites are declining (Bucy & Grabe, 2007: 652; Bennett, 2012: 10), these journalists attempt to get vox pops from the youth directly, but seem to select the voices that adhere to their narrative where the youth have no memory of apartheid and little attachment to the ANC. If the Plus 94 poll is correct and over two thirds of young people identify with the ANC and would vote for them, then these voices are missing from the 2009 representation of youth.<sup>76</sup>

---

<sup>74</sup> Both the 1994 and 2004 chapters deal with this signification.

<sup>75</sup> Richards and Zakwe (2009: 17) confirm this statistic, noting, “more than 65 per cent of youth voters between the ages of 18 and 24 years indicated they would vote for the ANC. It would seem that youth allegiance to and identity with the ANC remains strong”.

<sup>76</sup> Despite this perception, the youth turnout in this election was still relatively low: Scott and Vawda (2012) from the HSRC observe that 72.9% of registered young voters turned out in 2009, below the national average of 77%. Young voters were regularly less likely to actually turn out on voting day than other age groups (ibid.: 21).

### 2.3.2 Loyalty to the ANC

Given the global coverage of the vehement support for the ANC and Jacob Zuma's controversial background, journalists appear to question why so many black South Africans still support the ruling party. When global journalists speak about Zuma's corruption trial, the next sequence is almost always a wide shot of jubilant supporters filling stadia at ANC rallies or rambunctious victory celebrations outside the courts (see Images 6.10 – 6.12). Even though Zuma may be “controversial” and apparently “corrupt”, it also seems this background has little to no effect on the masses of ANC supporters, yet journalists don't explore the reasons why this happens: instead, all we see is the corruption trial juxtaposed with mass ANC support, as journalists exclaim that “supporters don't care about any of that” (*Huge turnout in South Africa election*, BBC; *Election promises for South Africa*, BBC; *ANC's Jacob Zuma divides South Africa*, Sky News; *Zuma's ANC closing in on election victory*, Sky News; *Inside Africa: South Africa election*, CNN; *South Africa Today*, CNN). Journalists don't seek out the “why” of the support, choosing instead to focus on the visually rich images of celebration and fealty.



Image 6.10: *Inside Africa: South Africa election*, CNN, 2009. “Support outside court”





Image 6.11: *South Africa election: ANC under fire*, CNN, 2009. “Jubilant support”



Image 6.12: *ANC’s Jacob Zuma divides South Africa*, Sky, 2009. “Celebrations for Zuma”

During *Growing anger as South Africa goes to the polls*, Sky News’s Emma Hurd states this confusing loyalty openly as she walks around Alexandra township, just outside Johannesburg. She reveals the squalor and dangerous living conditions residents endure, and lays the blame on the ANC’s failure to deliver. Hurd asks a young black man if “this is what you expected after the end of apartheid”, while standing in his cramped, damp, filthy tin shack barely bigger than a cupboard. In the next shot, in a slow zoom from establishing shot to long shot over the tops of the tin shack roofs, Hurd states,

15 years after the end of apartheid, the squatter camps are actually expanding instead of shrinking. Unemployment is running between 30% and 40%, and for those who do have jobs the minimum wage is about 100 pounds a month. This is not the life the ANC promised its people.



As she finishes the broadcast, she asserts that despite this failure, “the ANC will win this election, in part because of its successes but also because it can count on the loyalty of those it liberated – for now.” As Hurd speaks, Zuma’s smiling face on an ANC poster fills two thirds of the screen in the foreground, while a woman scrubs clothes in the remaining screen space in the background (see Image 6.13). This juxtaposition, along with the rest of the broadcast, highlights the intense lack of service delivery in the townships, creating the narrative that the ANC has in fact failed “its people”, yet these same people will still vote for it.



Image 6.13: *Growing anger as South Africa goes to the polls*, Sky, 2009. “Zuma’s face in the township”

In trying to understand the seemingly unshakable support the ANC has in the South African electorate, Western journalists often rely on fragmented, mediatised framing. Suggesting that the electorate “don’t care about any of that” oversimplifies the issue – the ANC holds support in the country not just because the electorate turn a blind eye to critical issues. Mattes reports that South Africans are astutely aware of problematic issues in politics, and “balance significant disappointments in some areas against a range of impressive achievements in others” (2005: 52). While this may be the reality, journalists from Anglo-American channels delve neither deeply nor broadly enough to gauge this.

Instead, international journalists rely on already-known and easily digestible stereotypes of the black African voter blindly following a cult-like leader in populist political theatre.

It therefore appears that the 2009 election coverage on global channels consisted of a loyal electorate that followed a corrupt, controversial leader no matter what, and the hope for regime change came not from the threatening, noisy supporters, but the subdued and intelligent youth. These narratives pitted one side against the other: populism in Zuma's following and the pragmatism of the youth and reality that the ANC had not fulfilled all of its promises to the poor. The next section explores how the local South African coverage portrayed the election.

## 2.4 Democracy in action: local coverage

### 2.4.1 Process-oriented

South African and non-Western news channels explored the process of democracy more often than framing the personalities of the election. Process was key for these channels, where long-form broadcasts about the housing crisis, voting, and IEC efficiency were presented with numerous vox pops. Unlike the Western portrayal of the candidate, Jacob Zuma was simply another leader casting a vote and his controversial background was skimmed over or ignored. The primary narratives for the South African broadcasts were dedicated to the regularity of democracy in the country: leaders voting, calm and thoughtful queues, capable IEC officials, and a smooth transition between administrations. As reflected in Hubbard's (2010) analysis of the 2009 election, the South African broadcasts had a far more cautious approach to presenting the election. Hubbard notes that the SABC preferred to depict stability rather than conflict, which he suggests maintains and benefits the status quo. In my own study, both the SABC and eNCA were

far less critical of Zuma and the ANC as a whole when compared to international broadcasters.

eNCA's *Leaders voting* was the only African broadcast to mention Zuma's court trial and corruption case. Zuma clowns around with IEC officials, about to drop his ballot into the box, and the reporter says, "the man who was sacked as deputy president in 2005 and just recently had corruption charges withdrawn against him, votes here knowing he's almost certain to be South Africa's next president" (*Leaders voting*, eNCA). This was the only time in any African broadcast that Zuma's court case was mentioned. The disregard of this high-profile backstory appears to be an attempt to normalise democracy by ignoring this controversial element to Zuma's profile. Given that South Africans are probably already aware of these issues, the local broadcasters could be forgiven for not mentioning the court cases more often. The local journalists do not contextualise as often as their global counterparts presumably because they are aware that the audience lives within the context and is already familiar with many of the issues. However, the contrast in stories on the global and local broadcasts is starkly different, and the avoidance of themes on South African broadcasts looks like neglect, rather than audience targeting.

#### 2.4.2 Calm queues and eloquent electorate

Compared to the global portrayal of a noisy, intimidating, threatening electorate, with a particular focus on rambunctious ANC support, South African channels presented the electorate as quietly spoken about their excitement for voting, their concerns for the election, and their experiences of the voting queues. The SABC's *Voting starts* and *Youth vote* portray queues of voters standing calmly and silently, waiting to get into the station (Images 6.14 and 6.15), while young voters speak eloquently to the journalists.

AmandlaTV investigates issues of housing in the Western Cape (*AmandlaTV South African election: housing*), where citizens, in static mid-shots, relate their concerns (Images 6.16 and 6.17). The electorate in local broadcasts simply waited in the sun for their turn to vote, without the kind of mediated, striking framing seen on Western channels. This “normality” of the election on South African channels is a trend over all five election coverage years: consolidated democracy without controversy was a theme on local channels, rather than the controversial frames and narratives on Western broadcasts.



Image 6.14: *Youth vote*, SABC, 2009. “Reporter PTC next to calm, quiet queue”



Image 6.15: *Youth vote*, SABC, 2009. “Eloquent young voter”



Image 6.16: *AmandlaTV South African election: housing*, AmandlaTV, 2009. “Vox to camera”



Image 6.17: *AmandlaTV South African election: housing*, AmandlaTV, 2009. “Vox to camera”

### 3 DISCUSSION OF 2009

#### 3.1 Narrow South African coverage

Temin and Smith (2002: 595) suggest that coverage of the Ghanaian 2000 election across both private- and state-owned media was superficial, topical, and lacked critical analysis. Although South African and Ghanaian media are not especially similar, this study has some similarities to Temin and Smith’s analysis. Local South African media during the last four elections were narrow and uncontroversial, in comparison to the narrative journalistic style found on global broadcasts. Temin and Smith (2002: 603) suggest narrow frames in local media occurred because of partisanship to the government, but there is no clear link between the ANC’s interference with the public broadcaster SABC and this kind of coverage. Instead, the lack of exploration of controversial frames is a culmination of points over the years: in 1994 the UNMOSA spotlight was fixed on the SABC’s coverage to ensure balanced, neutral reporting; under Mbeki, local coverage became more pro-government due to the president’s African Renaissance concept that pervaded government structures, not least because the majority of the SABC board was made up of pro-Mbeki members. In 2006, the SABC was accused of self-censorship

when it refused to air a Thabo Mbeki documentary. Later in the year an SABC “blacklist” was discovered and leaked to the media. The document lists an arbitrary group of commentators who should not be consulted, including *Business Day* political editor Karima Brown, journalist William Gumede, businessman Moeletsi Mbeki, and activist Elinor Sisulu, and outlines the current affairs managing director Snuki Zikalala’s iron-fist rule in the newsroom (*Inside the SABC blacklist report*, 2006). In 2009 the SABC coverage was uncritical but also neutral – narratives were neither here nor there, banal and dull. Duncan (2009: 218) finds similarly, in that local media refrained from covering controversial, but important, topics. The combination of state interferences in the public broadcaster’s newsroom may have affected their coverage during the election.

A key difference in local coverage should be mentioned, however. The non-mainstream news broadcasts of AmandlaTV and AfricaNews depicted far more diversity in citizen voices that speak about issues of concern during the election. While the SABC tended to focus on the process of the election – the IEC coping with high volumes of voters, scanning ID books, setting up ballot boxes, and so forth – these non-mainstream channels interviewed citizens about the housing crisis and unemployment figures in the Western Cape, as well as what they thought about the new party COPE. These two channels attempted to seek the “why” far more often than mainstream global and local journalists, who appeared to be quite puzzled by the ANC’s continued victories at the polls. Friedman’s (2011: 109) observations about the “view from the suburbs” comes into play here: the non-mainstream South African media are far less biased towards a middle-class or neoliberal narrative than the mainstream media, which, he argues, has a “propensity to ignore the experiences and perspectives of people outside its suburban world” (ibid.: 110). The non-mainstream media in this sample seek out poor, rural, black voices rather than white, middle-class pundits, although these too are used sparingly.

### 3.2 The perplexing ANC win

That the ANC seem “bound” to win the 2009 election through the passionate support, despite numerous scandals and failures, seems perplexing. Global journalists present the two competing narratives of ANC support and Zuma’s scandals in juxtaposition segments, posing the question that one should not exist with the other. The ANC has failed poor black South Africans (as seen in Hurd’s *Growing anger as South Africa goes to the polls*, Sky News), Zuma is nonchalant in the face of serious allegations (in Mabuse’s *South Africa election: ANC under fire*, CNN), and threatens Mandela’s prized legacy of the Rainbow Nation (in Hurd’s *ANC’s Jacob Zuma divides South Africa*, Sky News), yet these very same people apparently follow Zuma with all the flamboyance of Mbembe’s aesthetics of the burlesque. This entangled narrative is confusing and contradictory, but is again symptomatic on the reliance of spectacle and scandal over explanation and issue-based reporting.

ANC supporters blindly follow Zuma and back him vehemently, and journalists visualise this fealty through the “burlesque” (Mbembe, 2015: 133) nature of their support. As in 2004, the “singing and dancing” theme continues in this sample and is reminiscent of Mbembe’s (2015: 129) proclamation that dance is a form of fealty to the political party. The portrayal of flamboyant black groups highlights the type of loyalty Mbembe notes: the “postcolonised subject” employs aesthetics of vulgarity to imitate the elites in power and “join in the madness” (2015: 133) of devotion. Coffins carried in silhouette by intimidating ANC supporters, journalists drowned out by rowdy singing, and party regalia covering supporters’ bodies in close-up shots depict this apparent fealty for all to see. The journalists assume that even despite the ANC’s continued broken promises, failure in delivering services, and scandalous presidential candidates, these swaying,

chanting black masses still blindly support the ruling party. It is an oversimplification of the reality of ANC support in the country, which Mattes (2005: 52) demonstrates.

Without an adequate investigation into the complexities of the ANC's loyal support, fixating instead on the singing, dancing, threatening appearance of the support base, it was unsurprising that the ANC victory and support seems so bewildering. Ndlela (2005), Willems (2005: 95-101), and Hall (2015) suggest that European media often work with episodic frames, simplifying content and ignoring context, when reporting on news out of Africa. "Acting like a mayfly" (Hall, 2015) leaves little time to explore context or evaluate consequences.

### 3.2.1 Seeking the "why"

Duncan noted that in 2009 local journalists failed to investigate the elections beyond a brief and superficial portrayal of parties and voters, and that US-style mediatisation, negative public interest, and issue-based reporting was prevalent in South African news coverage (2009: 230). The "who, what, where, when" were prioritised, resulting in a paucity of the "why" (ibid.: 219). This analysis of the 2009 media coverage shows that the "why" was missing from both local and global news. While local news avoided controversial frames and issues almost entirely, global journalists tended to flatten and simplify democracy in the country. Global journalists drew the conclusion that the ANC is bound to win the 2009 election simply because of loyal support that happened to be blind to all other controversies. The reality is, however, far more complex. These broadcasts fail to take into account the nature of the ANC's support in South Africa, Zuma's Zulu heritage and thus the almost complete decimation of the IFP (Du Preez, 2013: 98), and the ANC's sophisticated campaign strategy in 2009. Southall (2009: 3-5) argues that the ANC employed the same strategy as in previous years and worked hard to



maintain a majority stake in public opinion, rather than relying on Zuma's popular image with the people. Calland (2013: 5) asserts that Zuma's strategic win at the polls was due to his palpable and explicit desire to distinguish his ANC from the ANC of his predecessor, but this sample of news broadcasts mentioned none of this: instead, the myth that Zuma won on populism alone was cemented through narrative journalism, visualisation of intimidating vehement support, and juxtaposition in the voice and visuals of political leaders. Additionally, Mbeki's near-decade of presidency was all but wiped out on global broadcasts, as journalists favoured the visually rich "Zuma show".

The problem is not that these journalists mention the intense, apparently threatening support; the black electorate who are seemingly blind to all of Zuma's scandals or the ANC's failings; or the inherent contradictions in South Africa's democracy, but that they frame these issues as simplified stereotypes of unthinking voters showing fealty only through intimidation. Global journalists do not seek the "why" deeply enough, glossing over issues that could help explain the ANC's passionate support, and ANC political voices are mostly missing from this sample. The reality is far more complex and neither local nor global journalists portray this adequately enough, which is symptomatic of the thrust towards mediatised reporting: simplistic, fast news stories that focus on the spectacle rather than the issue.

#### 4 SUMMARY

As substantiation of Jane Duncan's analysis of the 2009 election media coverage (2009: 218), this chapter ultimately shows that local and global broadcasts lacked depth and largely failed to cover issues of concern to the electorate such as the housing crisis in the

Western Cape, the ANC's policy issues, or the growing non-participation of rural black communities in elections, choosing instead to present a mediatised snapshot of a "untidy but lively democracy" (Calland, 2013: 22) with high personalisation. Zuma's candidacy was framed as a "turbulent time" for the Rainbow Nation, where Mandela's legacy of democracy, unity, and triumph over adversity is at stake. The Zuma campaign in 2009 featured Mandela as an icon of unity and support, but this appeared to have backfired: global journalists juxtaposed the beloved first president with the controversial Zuma, usually to Zuma's disadvantage. The vehemence of Zuma's supporters is framed as threatening and intimidating, symbolically opposite to the youth, who were positioned as potential swing voters. For global broadcasters, populism and pragmatism vied for the winning line of the election, but local broadcasters simply ignored these frames and focused instead on the process of democracy in a narrow fashion.

## Chapter 7: 2014

The 2014 election occurred in a time of increased digitisation, Internet connectivity, convergence journalism, and social media awareness. Far more broadcasts were therefore available for this year than ever before, with 63 sampled broadcasts. In order to understand the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of democracy in the country, a background to the troubles faced by the government is necessary, not least because the election was flanked on either side by violent and lengthy community protests as well as allegations of ANC corruption. This chapter follows the same structure as previous chapters.

This analysis asserts that the 2014 election coverage was a continuation of narratives seen in 2009: competitive global, predominantly Western, channels presented mostly superficial narratives without much context or depth, while mediatised coverage mythologised South African democracy and the electorate. Conversely, the importance of South African channels lay in the omission of narratives rather than what was stated manifestly, as narratives were overall narrow and restricted to uncontroversial topics. Overall, the top-down organisation of media meant that grassroots voices, issues, and context were often excluded, with journalists instead favouring visual rhetoric, simplistic binary stereotypes, and a “view from the suburbs” (Friedman, 2011: 109). The 2014 election coverage represents mediatised political communication that resulted in contradictory and entangled news frames that ultimately supported the status quo. Although instances of profound coverage existed on both South African and

international channels, it could not find adequate expression and was lost in the symbolic, superficial, or restricted framing of the election.


## 1 BACKGROUND TO 2014

### 1.1 ANC on the defence

The ruling party entered the fifth democratic election on the defence, haunted by widespread labour disputes, mining sector problems, mismanaged parastatals (state-owned enterprises), as well as mishandled crises and scandals, ranging from violent protests to allegations of corruption. Additionally, the death of Nelson Mandela in December 2013 and the accompanying national mourning was the symbolic end of an era, heralding a new style of politics. The success of the ANC in election campaigns is usually accredited to voter loyalty and identification with the party's Struggle history, as well as the weakness of the opposition. An often-overlooked reason for the ANC's success, Butler (2014: 43) observes, is their organisational strength and adaptability. The 2014 manifesto centred on the idea that life was better in 2014 than it was in 1994, thanks to the ANC (ibid.: 54). The party also targeted groups in key constituencies, including religious leaders, black professionals, traditional leaders, and young people. Zuma proved an asset here as he could easily court both traditional leaders as well as young black businessmen. Ultimately, the party's ability to overcome the tumultuous years before the election was testament to its ability to adapt to its challenges by successful organisational innovations, Butler (2014: 56) remarks.

In many respects, the ANC has done a fair job governing the country in the last two decades, most pronounced is the reduction of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. The infection rate and AIDS deaths have dropped steadily since 2012 (Du Preez, 2013: 44), while the

number of patients receiving anti-retroviral drugs increased by 16% between 2012 and 2015 (*HIV and AIDS in South Africa*, 2017). The media is also diverse, freer from legal restriction than most societies, and protected by policies and NGOs that act as watchdogs. The IEC is efficient, reliable, and reputable worldwide. However, as Mattes (2014: 186) observes, the ANC has all too often tolerated incompetence, corruption, and ineffective policies, and had not been sufficiently punished at the ballot box. In the run-up to the 2014 election, the coalition of forces that thrust Zuma to the presidency had all but imploded, and the president himself had become, as Southall (2014: 1) puts it, an “election liability”. The *Economist* places South Africa’s “black hole in the economy” (*Rainbow stagnation*, 2016) squarely at the feet of Jacob Zuma, as business confidence and currency have both plummeted since the start of his presidency. South African Market Indicators presents a chilling graph that shows just how turbulent Zuma’s presidency has been for growth in the country (Graph 7.1).



Graph 7.1<sup>77</sup>

<sup>77</sup> Source: <http://www.southafricanmi.com/blog-31mar2017.html>

At this tumultuous centre was Zuma's chequered past that hung over him as a sword of Damocles (Calland, 2013: 50). No matter what Zuma did, how he governed, or the decisions he made, he could not shake off the corruption charges and rape trial that haunted and informed his every move. Calland (ibid.: 51) argues that it is *despite* Jacob Zuma, rather than because of him, that the Presidency still exerts significant power in the country. Zuma has little decisive leadership; instead he employs fear, patronage, and control of the security establishment to exert his power (ibid.: 49).

## 1.2 Zuma's Damoclean issues

The litany of complaints against Zuma is seemingly endless. He is blamed for weakening of the National Prosecuting Agency after a string of directors known to be loyal to the Zuma camp and/or faced multiple corruption charges were employed in quick succession. Yet by far the greatest damage to Zuma's popularity was the exposure of the "security" upgrades made at his palatial homestead in Nkandla, KwaZulu-Natal. In November 2009, Mail & Guardian journalists accidentally stumbled on the Nkandla homestead building work and broke the story in December (Roussouw, 2009; Roper, 2013). At least R200mil of the taxpayers' money (Du Preez, 2013: 124; Grootes, 2013: 227; Butler, 2014: 47) was spent on an underground bunker, two Astro turf soccer pitches, a "firepool", hospital facilities, a cattle enclosure that cost R1mil, and a tuckshop.<sup>78</sup> In a country with crippling poverty, a failing basic education system, and an exceptionally high unemployment rate, the Nkandla issue highlighted the inequality in South Africa and how little the majority of South Africans had benefitted from the ANC's rule. Du Preez (2013: 272) remarks that Zuma is often

---

<sup>78</sup> In 2016 the Constitutional Court found Zuma guilty of violating the constitution for ignoring the Public Protector's remedial action to pay back some of the money.

caught between his instincts as a Zulu traditionalist, an MK soldier, a security and intelligence operative, and a political street fighter on the one hand, and the restrictions and challenges of heading a modern constitutional state, a sophisticated market economy and an open, diverse society on the other.

To find a middle ground on the President is difficult because on one side his administration has delivered workable policies and maintained a functioning democracy, but on the other his presidency will be remembered for one of the biggest scandals in two decades: Marikana.

### 1.2.1 Marikana

On a late winter's day in 2012 in Rustenburg, the platinum mining belt in northern South Africa, a tragedy was about to unfold. Tensions between the ANC-aligned National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and the relatively new Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU) had been brewing for weeks. In numerous wildcat, thousands of mineworkers downed tools to demand a better living wage from Lonmin, the mine owners, and protest terrible working conditions. Mineworkers were not local to Rustenburg: most were from the Eastern Cape where they sent their minimal wages back every month to their rural families. Workers were tired of living in apartheid-style conditions under the ANC government that had promised so much (Du Preez, 2013: 58). In the days leading up to the tragic massacre, 10 police officers and miners were killed in clashes (Marinovich, 2016; Malala, 2015: 99). Then, on August 16<sup>th</sup> 2012, the watershed event occurred. It was Zuma's "9/11 moment" (Calland, 2014: 25) and the South African Police Services' (SACP) first post-apartheid massacre (Malala, 2015: 100). Journalists descended on Wonderkop hill and streamed worldwide the brutal images that harked back to pre-democracy in South Africa. Disorganised, petrified, aggressive, and predominantly black policemen mowed down advancing mineworkers on live television.

It was later revealed that 34 protesters were killed, some in the gunfire, some at point-blank range, some in the back, some crushed by police vehicles, and some in a second “kill site”, which was apparently revenge motivated for the police killings earlier in the week (Marinovich, 2012).

The ANC’s reaction to the Marikana strike and the resultant massacre has been called cold and half-hearted (Du Preez, 2013: 77), gutless (Malala, 2015: 102) and “appalling” (Naidoo, 2015: 2). Raymond Suttner (2015: 19) was startled by the lack of empathy the former liberation movement showed the families of the Marikana victims. The ANC was “slow” (Smith, 2012) to respond to the massacre, with Zuma concluding his business in Mozambique before returning to the site. “How a president responds to a crisis not only shapes both public and media attitudes, but also tells us about his presidency as a whole” (Calland, 2013: 26-27). The Marikana massacre was a symptom of the failure of governance: the ANC, Lonmin management, police and the police commissioner, the government in controlling and listening to people. The depths of the Marikana tragedy are still being felt years later, but in 2012 and 2013, the massacre became synonymous with “the willingness of the state to use brutal force against workers in protecting the interests of capital – *and* of an uncompromising spirit of resistance (or refusal to concede) to the impositions of such power” (Naidoo, 2015: 2). Duncan (2014b), Lancaster (2014), and Demian (2015) suggest that protest action in South Africa has increased rapidly since 2004, with the majority of these protests classified as frustration against the perceived lack of “service delivery” or disapproval of the incumbent government, and Marikana was seemingly the zenith of frustration against a government that ignored its citizens.



The first political representative on the scene at Marikana was not even a politician – it was the ousted, banned, former ANC youth league president Julius Malema, who had been involved with the striking mineworkers on the platinum belt for some time prior to the massacre (Robinson, 2014: 74). Marikana represented the catalyst for Malema’s instigation of his new political party, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). To view Malema’s presence at Marikana as “opportunistic” is too simplistic – he may have used the tragedy as a stepping-stone for his own political manifesto, but those people were crying out for leadership that they lacked from government and indicative of the increasingly frustrated citizenry in the country.

### 1.3 Protest action

Marais (2011: 457) speaks extensively about the increase in protests and their control under the ANC government. From 2004 onwards, there have been at least 6 000 protests each year, mostly about the lack of service delivery and directed at local government officials. These protests, Marais continues, are highly complex and disparate. “Common to most is indignation at the distant manner and scornful conduct of some local officials and the failure to involve residents meaningfully in decisions that shape their neighbourhoods and lives” (ibid.: 458).<sup>79</sup> These protests are seemingly in direct opposition to the ANC’s “good story to tell” and “better life for all” narratives, but as Marais (ibid.: 460) and others (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2014: 36; Mattes, 2014: 184) state, even outright anger at the government, symbolised through destructive protests, does not necessarily translate to disenchantment with the ANC or a vote against it in the elections.

---

<sup>79</sup> Marais elaborates that the local councils are often fiscally hamstrung and have little experience in appropriate management. Residents often protest for public service, rather than just delivery. He also notes that these protests are often romanticised as a rolling rebellion against the ANC and that reading them in this way, as some kind of index of opposition, misses inherent nuances and contradictions (2011: 459).

Duncan (2014a, 2014c) writes extensively about the lack of protester perspectives in the Marikana journalism, which resulted in a skewed understanding about the strikers' and the authorities' actions. The 'top down' organisation of media that focuses on voices of authorities yet neglects protesters "has serious implications, as it fosters a society that is unable to see itself, and respond to its most pressing problems" (Duncan, 2014a: 92). South African media is often angled "top down" (Wasserman, 2014), and the voices of the poor are often missing from mainstream media coverage about community protests (Wasserman, Bosch, & Chuma, 2016) where the razzmatazz of visually rich protest imagery is prioritised over context (Maserumule, 2016). Marinovich's (2012) Marikana investigation changed the way many news agencies viewed the tragedy, and Duncan (2014a) argues that community media create spaces that allow for the free flow of information and ideas. Sadly, the underfunded and pressure-filled mainstream newsrooms mean journalists rarely get the time or have the space to investigate protests adequately (Duncan, 2009: 222-223; Duncan, 2014: 153; Wasserman, 2014; Wasserman, Bosch, & Chuma, 2016).

#### 1.4 Changing electorate

A further challenge the ANC faced going into the 2014 election was the rapidly changing electorate, which was larger, younger, and more urbanised than ever before, impacting the ANC's traditional hold over the rural populace that remembered the party's Struggle credentials. The decline in ANC rural support bases and the disillusionment with politics in general meant that many voters simply stayed away from the ballot. Although the voting age population had increased to 31.4 million people, and while the registration figures are contested, Southall (2014: 6) and Schulz-Herzenberg (2014: 23) argue that 7

million people were left unregistered, the majority from the 18 – 19-year-old, or “Born Free”, category.

The term “Born Free” refers those South Africans born after the end of apartheid, in 1994 or later, and eligible to vote in the 2014 and subsequent general elections. The “Born Free theory” suggests that those born after apartheid hold no, or very little, party allegiance because they were not subject to the apartheid regime and have had free access to information, rather than rely on the party’s Struggle credentials when voting (Du Preez, 2013: 14). In 2013, Stephen Friedman argued that the Born Free theory had already been proven false in 2009 because those born after apartheid rarely vote differently to their elders. People who were newly eligible to vote in 2009 did not change voting patterns significantly. To suggest that a few years’ difference in age would suddenly wipe away the long-lasting effects of apartheid is “thinly-disguised prejudice, not voting analysis” (Friedman, 2013).

For all the speculation and hype surrounding the Born Free vote, only a third of 18 – 19-year-olds registered in the 2014 elections. Young people abstained from participating in the 2014 election, Schulz-Herzenberg (2014: 32) points out, because firstly the habit had not yet been formed and secondly the youth have less embedded traditional networks that enforce voter participation. She remarks that the reason for such significance placed upon the youth is primarily their unpredictability and responsiveness to short-term political events. It is also unfair and inaccurate to discuss the group as any kind of homogeneous mass as their experiences reflect the diversity of post-apartheid South Africa: Malema’s “young supporters” and the DA’s “youth” are, for example, incomparable (ibid.).

## 1.5 Changing face of the opposition

*“Politics in South Africa is really not for the faint-hearted, especially when opposing the ANC”*  
(Calland, 2013: 222)

Malala (2015: 154) remarks that there was never a better time for the opposition to thrive and grow in South Africa, and the 2014 election saw the birth of two new black-led parties: AGANG and the EFF. Calland notes “the media, ever-hungry for a black-led alternative to the ANC” (2015: 242) created a storm in a teacup over COPE in 2009. Despite the high hopes for COPE, the party fizzled. Leadership struggles between Lekota and Shilowa were disastrous and the party’s ideology so closely mirrored the ANC’s that the two parties blurred. The ANC eventually welcomed the defected COPE members back one by one. Other opposition parties, such as the once-contentious IFP, were nowhere to be seen. With its KwaZulu-Natal support base decimated by the ANC’s “Zulufication”<sup>80</sup> process, the IFP was but a shadow of its former self. The DA was the only party to grow every year and, Southall (2014: 13) thinks, will be the only party capable of unseating the ANC in 2019.

The DA’s ventures into uncharted (black) territories in 2009 unsettled the old guard of the ANC, yet the party still struggled with the ANC’s dismissal of the party as a “party for whites” (Jolobe, 2014: 59). Seemingly to counter this stigma, the DA appointed two new young black members to its ranks: Lindiwe Mazibuko, the “upper middle class, Johnny-come-lately” (Calland, 2013: 224) yet astute and passionate DA parliamentary leader, became the DA’s parliamentary spokesperson, while Soweto-born Mmusi Maimane became the DA’s Gauteng chairperson. The party’s 2014 election campaign centred on three strategic changes: the new narrative focused on the impact Helen

---

<sup>80</sup> Calland (2014: 59-62) sets out the ANC’s programme of placing Zulu cabinet ministers inside the party structures, particularly in the main security cluster. In 2013, 28% of Zuma’s cabinet was Zulu.

Suzman contributed to the struggle, ergo increasing the party's Struggle credentials; the DA's commitment to service delivery in the Western Cape was highlighted; and aggressive social media and television campaigns considerably raised Maimane's profile (Jolobe, 2014: 53-65). The DA finally had multi-racial leadership, but at the same time had to manage the competing interests of its core group of supporters as well as its new racially diverse group.

Launched in February 2014, AGANG SA, or simply AGANG, roughly translated from the Nguni as "Build South Africa", drew black professionals to its ranks including Vanessa Hani, daughter of slain ANC activist leader Chris Hani. AGANG was supposed to be, essentially, the DA for black people: "it was designed to appeal to black constituencies reluctant to vote for the DA with its reputation of representing the interests of whites" (Jolobe, 2014: 61). AGANG was led by former partner of Steve Biko, Black Consciousness activist, and businesswoman Dr Ramphele Mamphela. A botched attempt at a coalition between AGANG and the DA prior to the 2014 election meant that both parties suffered greatly. Zille and Ramphela attempted to coalesce yet never received the backing of their respective parties, and Ramphela withdrew from the merger within hours of the public announcement (Zille, 2016). Calland (2013) and Jolobe (2014) were left scratching their heads at the whole scenario, while Grootes' (2013: 199) predicted AGANG would struggle to compete, due in part to a significant lack of structure, and was ultimately proved correct.

The second major new black-led party in 2014 was the EFF, headed by the "commander-in-chief", former ANC Youth League president Julius Malema. Malema was ejected from the ANC ranks in 2012, but this did not end his political career. He was heavily involved with the platinum miners before, during, and after the Marikana

massacre and, as Robinson (2014: 74) observes, used the event as a lightning rod for the ANC's moral degeneration. Then, in 2013, Malema and an assortment of political figures met in Soweto to form the EFF. The party was officially launched in September and has been a vocal thorn in the ANC's side ever since. Their manifesto promotes radical nationalism, land nationalising with no compensation, 60% government ownership, nationalised banks, and aggressive BEE policies, which Robinson finds "grandiose" (2014: 77). The party draws members from diverse backgrounds including COPE, the ANCYL, Black Consciousness movements, unionists, and student activists. It appeals mostly, Robinson (2014: 84) remarks, to young black men who haven't benefitted from BEE or more general ANC policies.

Duncan (2014b: 137) also suggests that Malema's awareness of the mass-mediated politics and use of visually stunning material drove the pre-election news agenda pre-election in 2014. For all the EFF's bluster, the red berets, so evocative of socialist Thomas Sankara, acquired only a small percentage of the vote nationally. Even so, Prishani Naidoo (2014: 14 – 15) remarks that Marikana had opened up the potential for new political configurations on the left, and the EFF's "people assembly" tactic was a sign of the dissatisfaction with and a critique of existing forms of democracy in South Africa.

The reduced participation in 2014 was probably due to the inactive youth, a lack of opposition campaigning and strategy, and limited choices on the ballot paper, Schulz-Herzenberg (2014a: 20) suggests. The enormous stay-away in Limpopo, the worst treated province with the most disillusioned rural ANC voters, did not result in any votes for the opposition. The research often remarks that disillusionment with the ANC or with politics in general does not always mean a growing opposition. Instead, disaffected voters

simply move into the non-participatory electorate, staying away from the polls. Table 7.1 reveals the number of votes given to each major party in the 2014 election ballot.

	ANC	DA	EFF	IFP	COPE	AGANG	TOTAL
<b>Percentage</b>	62.2	22.2	6.4	2.4	0.7	0.2	18.4mil

Table 7.1: Percentage of votes per party in 2014 election<sup>81</sup>


## 2 FINDINGS

The increased digitisation of news channels meant that the 2014 sample was far larger than any other election year. I was also able to live record some of the channels available on South Africa’s satellite television service.<sup>82</sup> Graph 7.2 represents the spread of broadcasts per channel, while Graph 7.3 shows the spread of channels across the five geographic regions.


---

<sup>81</sup> Statistics gathered from Schulz-Herzenberg and Southall (2014).

<sup>82</sup> The BBC World, Sky News, eNCA, SABC, and CNN channels were available on the DSTV service. Other channels had dedicated news websites where the broadcasts were uploaded in real time as well as chronologically (SABC and eNCA for example have excellent digital archives on YouTube stretching back to 2011, while AJE’s website has a “live stream” of their current broadcast. This proliferation meant the sample had to be strictly delineated to broadcasts with mediation, rather than talk shows, studio interviews, or political analysis. Although each of the previous election samples had similar rules in place, occasionally packages that included studio interviews and talking head inserts were included because of the lack of data available. In 2014, the only broadcasts analysed were packages and live outside broadcasts (OBs).



Graph 7.2



Graph 7.3


The following sections follow previous chapters: the quantitative findings for frequency of event, political party, and issue coverage, lead to thematic analysis of the broadcasts. As in previous chapters, the sections below cover the frequency of coverage of events and political parties as well as the themes of the election coverage to discover how the different regions frame the 2014 general election.



## 2.1 Frequency analysis

### 2.1.1 Events


Graph 7.4 represents the total number of events covered across all channels and regions. Some broadcasts reported on multiple events at a time. Only five events were observed in 2014, with the act of voting was most frequently depicted, including with the set-up of voting stations, citizens queuing outside, and casting their votes. Protests also took up a large chunk of the reporting, as journalists covered the municipality protests at Bekkersdal in Gauteng, Sterkspruit in the Eastern Cape, and Malamulele in Limpopo. Footage of the De Doorns farmworker strike and various COSATU, DA, and EFF marches was also included. Campaigns and rallies were the next most frequently covered events at 22%, and leaders were shown voting in 19% of the broadcasts. Finally, the tragic Marikana massacre was singled out as an event because it was not only mentioned as a protest, but also as a catalyst for the EFF's political beginnings and as a symptom of South Africa's incomplete transition.



Graph 7.4


### 2.1.2 Political parties

Congruent with previous election years, the ANC received the most coverage across all channels, as in Graph 7.5.<sup>83</sup> Fewer political parties were covered with any kind of significance during the 2014 election, with only the DA, EFF, AGANG, and COPE gaining more than one mention on broadcasts. The once contentious IFP was relegated to one mention on an SABC broadcast, along with AZAPO, the UDM, and the ACDP.



Graph 7.5

<sup>83</sup> This was the highest percentage of coverage in any election year. The ANC was mentioned in 74% of broadcasts in 2009, 55% in 2004, 71% in 1999, and 68% in 1994. Caution should be noted, however, because the 1999 and 2004 election samples were very small. Comparison is more reliable between 1994, 2009, and 2014.




Graph 7.6


As seen in Graph 7.6, the ANC was represented most frequently on European and Middle Eastern channels, while the DA had a similar spread across all channels. The EFF, however, received the most coverage on European channels.

### 2.1.3 Who speaks

There were 128 vox pops in the 2014 election broadcasts, 66% from Knowns and 34% from Unknowns (including the Born Frees), as seen in Graph 7.7. The predominant Known vox pops were political analysts and Jacob Zuma (Graph 7.8).




Graph 7.7



Graph 7.8

Known sources in the 2009 election coverage can be split into three groups: experts, leaders, and spokespeople. Experts included political analysts, or “pundits” (Cross, 2010: 425), economic analysts, and journalists as experts. Leaders included President Jacob Zuma, DA leader Helen Zille, DA deputy chairperson Mmusi Maimane, former president FW De Klerk, AGANG leader Mamphela Ramphele, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, deputy president Cyril Ramaphosa, traditional leaders such as King Buyelekhaya Dalindyebo, and IEC president Pansy Tlakula. Spokespeople included voices from the political parties ANC, EFF, DA, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as Seskhona People’s Movement or Social Justice Movement, police captains, and the IEC.

Pundits were first used significantly in 2009 to explain the ANC’s policy and Zuma’s effect on South Africa. In 2014, political analysts overtook all other sources including the President in frequency of voice, and again explained policy issues (such as Zuma’s foreign policy and New Development Plan). Punditry created context that political leaders and journalists<sup>84</sup> seemingly could not, which somewhat coincides with Cross’s (2010: 425) findings. Pundits in this sample were far more analytical than in Cross’s study but similarly prophesied the election outcome and the implementation of policies that Zuma might make in the future.



Graph 7.9

Born Frees also dominated the coverage as they spoke in 53% of all Unknown vox pops, or 18% of the total speakers in the sample (Graph 7.9). They spoke about their enthusiasm for voting and that casting a ballot not only honours those who fought for the right but is also part of being a “responsible adult” (*South Africans wait in hour long queues*, ABC). Journalists voiced Born Free vox pops more than any other citizen in this sample, but asked them fairly inane questions about how they “felt” on the voting day,

---

<sup>84</sup> When journalists were used as experts (on Sky News and PressTV), they commented on the campaign rather than policies. For example, Sky News used multiple Skype interviews with South African journalist Khadija Patel to comment on the election seemingly because Sky News did not have embedded journalists in South Africa to cover the election, and so resorted to “journalists interviewing journalists” rather than finding political analysts or vox pops to explain the event.

rather than their attitude towards politics or policies. Interestingly, despite the protests making up 35% of all events, there were very few protester vox pops, concurring with Duncan's research. Duncan warns that neglecting grassroots voices, especially when covering conflict (2014c) and elections (2014b), results in a community that cannot see itself (2014a: 92).

This next section groups the major themes together and, using the triadic multimodal analysis method set out in the methodology chapter, attempts to extract the narratives about the 2009 election. Ultimately, global broadcasts presented homogenising mythologies of the election, including political parties and the electorate, with a few notable exceptions that explored contradictions. Local coverage was narrow and ignorant of important and controversial issues, again with a few examples that suggested an attempt at profound, critical coverage. A similar narrative presented on both local and global broadcasts was the military's control of protest action. The top-down organisation of the media that tended to focus on authorities over citizens excluded grassroots voices and issues, and this was a common thread on both South African and international broadcasts.

## 2.2 Global myths of democracy

International broadcasts portrayed the 2014 election in South Africa through a series of visualised myths – that is, the tale of Mandela as a protective father figure and the ANC as sole liberator and saviour of the country, the EFF framed almost entirely as an intimidating sea of red berets, and finally journalists presenting 1994 as a kind of benchmark for progress in the country. These stories tended to avoid discussing the voting day or the process of the election (such as ballot papers, voting stations, queues,

and so forth). In only broadcast to significantly explore the actual “process” of voting, the BBC’s Milton Nkosi (*South Africa in post-Nelson Mandela election*, BBC) walks through a voting station in Soweto and explains how the voters queue, receive the ballot paper, have their fingers marked, what the paper looks like, and what happens after voting has occurred. Nkosi’s brief broadcast is a good insight into South Africa’s electoral system, and is the only one of its type in a sea of myths about the election. The broadcast, however, is misnamed,<sup>85</sup> as Nkosi does not mention Mandela in his walkthrough, but this plays into global media’s mythologisation of Mandela throughout the 2014 coverage.

### 2.2.1 Mandela as the father figure

Mandela appeared frequently in this sample as a smiling ghost of a political party, whose death signified a new cycle of politics in South Africa (Curnow, *CNN NewsCentre SA Spot*, CNN). VOA’s Paul Cisco (*Polls indicate ANC leads*) and CBC’s Margaret Evans (*South Africa votes – ANC favoured to win*) both remark that Mandela was the “father of the nation”. CNN’s Robyn Curnow says that Mandela “led South Africa out of apartheid” but whose “presence is now just a part of the Born Free history” (*First SA vote since Mandela died*). Mandela is therefore the guardian of the Struggle; the founding father of democracy who watches over his seemingly disillusioned “children”. As in previous years and themes, the South African broadcasts did not frame Mandela in this way – the SABC was the only channel to visit the topic, following Mandela’s grandson to his voting station in Qunu. The broadcast was more to do with the young Born Free voting, rather than any story about his famous grandfather.

The BBC’s Nomsa Masego, F24’s Ayesha Ismail, and VOA’s Emily Jaab call the ANC “Mandela’s party”. These statements seemingly unwittingly play into the ANC’s election

---

<sup>85</sup> Most broadcast names were taken from the site from which they were downloaded. For example, the BBC broadcasts were downloaded from individual [bbc.co.uk](http://bbc.co.uk) pages, and hence the names were self-assigned. I named others, such as the SABC packages, as descriptive of the broadcast as possible.

campaign strategy of employing Mandela's image to urge voters to "do it for Mandela" (Bedawi, *World News* 2, BBC). Martha Evans writes extensively about the mythologisation of Mandela and describes "the gradual iconization of his image, which became a kind of logo for the Struggle movement, and later for post-apartheid South Africa" (2014: 83). In the 2014 sample, Mandela gazed down at queues of Born Free voters and elderly loyal ANC supporters from tee-shirts and posters (see Images 7.1 – 7.4).



Image 7.1: *First SA vote since Mandela died*, CNN, 2014. "Mandela shirt on voter"



Image 7.2: *First SA vote since Mandela died*, CNN, 2014. "Mandela smiles down on queue"



Image 7.3: *SA Elections*, VOA, 2014. "Do it for Madiba"





Image 7.4: *First SA vote since Mandela died*, CNN, 2014. “Mandela tee-shirt”

Symbolising Mandela in this way continues the 2009 narrative where Zuma’s meteoric rise to the presidency was a “threat” to Mandela’s legacy. What the “memory” and “spirit” of Mandela actually meant for the South African populace was unclear as citizens were silent on the matter, but journalists suggested he was synonymous with both the Struggle and the ANC. Mandela’s image vied for pride of place in the ANC’s lexicon of campaign slogans in 2014 and CBC’s journalist Margaret Evans writes elsewhere (2014):

‘Do it for Mandela’ has been one of the ANC’s rallying cries this election, a not-so-subtle attempt to exploit the Mandela memory, and to remind voters that the great man himself never broke with the party, unlike some other former liberation leaders who have left in disgust... Playing the Mandela card in these elections is sometimes a misguided strategy.

Journalists attempted some kind of scrutiny of this symbolism, referring to Mandela’s image perpetuated by the ANC in this election, but instead played into the ANC’s controversial slogan by not only calling the ANC “Mandela’s party” but also suggesting that Mandela and the ANC are synonymous with the struggle for liberation.

### 2.2.2 The myth of the liberation party

Almost all broadcasts referred to the ANC as the sole liberator of South Africa.<sup>86</sup> The BBC's Zeinab Badawi notes repeatedly that the ANC was "the party that delivered liberation to the majority" (*South Africa's economic challenges*, BBC; *World News Today with Zeinab Badawi*, BBC; *World News Today*, BBC), while Andrew Harding states, "many [voters are] loyal to the party that liberated them" (*World News Today*, BBC). CNN's Robyn Curnow finds the same: "Loyalty to the liberation party remains strong, with a strong connection to its political past" (*Millions head to polls in SA*, CNN). Sky News's Julie Hyde Mew repeats this sentiment: "The party that conquered apartheid still attracts voters, young and old" (*Sunrise Sky*). Reuters suggests the ANC "remains popular with the black majority after dismantling the apartheid system in 1994" (*SA police arrest 59*, Reuters). For the majority of broadcasts, then, the ANC is synonymous with the emancipation of South Africa and its sole liberator.

Associating the ANC as the sole liberation party swallows up the rest of the liberation movement, such as the PAC, UDM, and the Black Sash, who all played considerable roles in the struggle against Apartheid. This kind of framing from the journalists imagines the ANC as liberator, saviour, and the provider of a "better life for all", playing into the ANC's own mythology.

### 2.2.3 Visualisation of the EFF

If the ANC was "widely expected to win" at the 2014 election, as almost all global journalists remarked, two parties competed for second place. Yet few features distinguished the DA and the EFF's depiction on broadcasts, a marked departure from

---

<sup>86</sup> AJE and VOA acknowledged that the ANC is only *perceived* as being the liberation party: AJE's Mutasa notes, "For many black South Africans, it's the party that ended apartheid" (*SA opposition taps into discontent*), and is "seen by many here as the party that liberated the black majority" (*Jacob Zuma wins landslide victory*). VOA's Emily Jaab remarks the ANC only "contributed to ending white minority rule" (*SA elections protest vote*).

the style of framing in the 2009 election coverage. COPE, for example, was given extended airtime in 2009 to discuss their policies and stance on electoral issues. Even the smallest parties such as KISS were interviewed, although the tone of the broadcast was slightly mocking. In 2014, however, the DA and the EFF competed for simplistic narratives – both were seen only as a threat to the ANC. If any frame distinguished these two parties, it was that the EFF supporters were menacing and the DA’s relatively subdued. Unlike 2009, the policies of the parties were not given nearly the same consideration. For example, even though the EFF represented a extraordinary change in the type of politics in South Africa, hardly any coverage was dedicated to the party specifically. If any frame distinguished the EFF from the rest of the opposition, it was their visualisation on broadcasts across the regions.

The EFF appeared an intimidating sea of redness led by the “firebrand bad boy” (Masego, *Focus on Africa*, BBC) Julius Malema (see Images 7.5 – 7.7). As four grimacing black women with red berets grip hands to hold back the tide of red supporters behind them (Image 7.8), journalist Haru Mutasa narrates: “They want to seize land from whites without compensation, and nationalise the mines and banks” (*SA opposition taps into discontent*, AJE). The group then advance steadily towards a low-angled camera. eNCA documented the loudness of the EFF rallies too, as Malema arrives in a packed stadium to the piercing ululations of devoted followers, having “capitalised on the ANC weaknesses” (Hlubi, *Opposition parties eye out troubled North West*, eNCA). Supporters of the EFF often grimace, rather than smile (see Images 7.9 – 7.11), which is a different positioning to both the “singing and dancing” frame and also how the DA supporters are depicted (see Images 7.12 and 7.13).<sup>87</sup>

---

<sup>87</sup> One reason for the difference in facial expression is that the EFF were often depicted singing Struggle songs, inherently emotive.



Image 7.5: *South Africa protest vote*, VOA, 2014. “Sea of EFF red”



Image 7.6: *Sunrise*, Sky, 2014. “Malema and the sea of EFF red stadium”



Image 7.7: *South Africa’ economic challenges*, BBC, 2014. “Malema in a sea of EFF red”



Image 7.8: *SA opposition taps into discontent*, AJE, 2014. “Black women hold back a tide”



Image 7.9: *SA opposition taps into discontent*, AJE, 2014. “Grimacing EFF”



Image 7.10: *Sunrise*, Sky, 2014. “Grimacing EFF”





Image 7.11: *SA poverty 20 years later*, CCTV, 2014. “Grimacing EFF”



Image 7.12: *SA opposition taps into discontent*, AJE, 2014. “Smiling DA support”



Image 7.13: *South Africa elections promo*, AJE, 2014. “Smiling DA support”

These EFF supporters don’t seem to show “fealty”, as Mbembe (2015: 129) suggests, so much as a show of strength. Instead of contextualising how the EFF changed the political landscape of South Africa, the party are signified as caricatures of intimidation.

In a stark contrast to how COPE, the 2009 ‘new’ party, was allocated one-on-one

interviews, policy discussions, and direct voicing from journalists, the EFF were simply shown through the number of supporters and grimacing faces. Journalists symbolised rather than explained the new black-led party. One hypothesis of this type of framing might be to do with the EFF's symbolic similarity to socialist movements around the world (communist iconography usually relies on the colour red and yellow highlights, of which the EFF makes use), and the international broadcasters' hesitation to endorse radical left-leaning parties (see Norris, 1995: 359; Windrich, 1994), but this is merely conjecture due to the lack of EFF representation on this sample (21% of coverage, as seen in Graph 7.5 and 7.6).

### 2.2.3 1994

The 2014 election year was heavily symbolic of 1994 – the auspicious 20-year anniversary date was emblazoned on flags in major cities, celebrations on Freedom Day (27 April) included lavish concerts and events, while the death of Mandela only five months earlier added further impact to the election. Global, Western channels frequently referred to 1994, and presented the election year as a synecdoche for the ANC's failure to deliver. AJE notes, "Despite this [anniversary], people still live in tin shacks" (Page, *OB 2*) and questions "why do they still live like this" (Mutasa, *OB 3*), as the tin township zooms into focus on screen. The BBC concurs – "the optimism of 20 years ago has now evaporated, replaced by cynicism, frustration and, increasingly, violence" (Bedawi, *World News Today*). Other global journalists highlighted the emotional connection of the election: CBC's Margaret Evans noted that voters approached the election with "a lot of resonance" and the event "pulled at the heart strings" (*SA votes*, CBC).

Overall, the 1994 anniversary for global journalists appeared two-fold: the two decades had offered the ANC ample time to rectify basic living conditions for the poorest

citizens but the government had not fulfilled their promises, and the resonance of the date was auspicious for an emotional populace. International journalists determined that 20 years of democracy was seemingly enough time for the ANC to deliver on the promises of 1994, and the very existence of poverty in the townships was evidence that the party had failed on this promise. Of course, the reality is far more complex than these stories present: the ANC's RDP and GEAR policies attempted to redress the inequalities, and have significantly improved the lives of millions, but the neoliberal focus of these policies, coupled with the global economic downturn, has resulted in the inequality gap widening over the years (see StatsSA, 2002, 2008; Marais, 2011: 210). These global stories mention none of this background, but instead present the 20-year benchmark as somehow "time enough" to redress the ills of apartheid, including racially divisive living conditions such as townships. Strangely, South African channels did not mention the anniversary of 1994 in this way, the only references coming from two vox pops on eNCA and the SABC reminiscing about the voting queues. Local channels seemed more interested in keeping the focus on the present election, rather than looking to the past.

### 2.3 Global myths of the electorate

Along with mythologizing democracy, international journalists also tended to present a homogeneous story of the Born Frees, despite a few profound examples. Poverty is highly visualised but kept at a distance through camera proxemics, while the protests are almost always framed with the neoliberal concern of property destruction as a driving narrative.



### 2.3.1 Born Frees

Stephen Friedman writes that the Born Free theory is “either hopelessly naïve or based on a very strong desire to avoid unpleasant realities. It is not an explanation of voting behaviour” (2013). His concerns resonated in global broadcasts, but South African channels did not frame the Born Frees in this way.<sup>88</sup> Predominant frames of this group suggest they have no memory of apartheid and offer no allegiance to any party but particularly not the ANC, both of which tend to homogenise the diverse group of young South Africans into an electorate that acts and votes the same way.

Margaret Evans from CBC suggests, “The generation born after the end of apartheid [has] no living memory of it” (*South Africa votes – ANC favoured to win*, CBC) and CNN’s Robyn Curnow concurs, “First time voters who never knew apartheid [have] no memory of living under it. This is the generation that could have had an impact with ANC majority” (*NewsCentre South Africa spot*, CNN). Having “no memory of apartheid” seems to equal a lack of loyalty to any party, but particularly the “liberation” party. These broadcasters generally position the youth as potential swing voters, away from the ANC and perhaps to the opposition. Some channels tripped over their framing, however: the BBC and CNN in particular portray the Born Frees as a homogeneous, apathetic group that was not loyal to the ANC, yet packages on the same channel contradicted this majority narrative. For example, the BBC’s Zeinab Bedawi insists, “[The Born Frees are] not encumbered with loyalty to the ANC and the liberation: they don’t remember they years of apartheid” (*World News Today with Zeinab Bedawi*) and the they “never experienced apartheid and have no attachment to the ANC as the liberation party” (*World News*

---

<sup>88</sup> The Born Frees were described only once in South African broadcasts: the SABC reported that the “speculation that many of the Born Free generation would stay away from the polls today because of apathy proved to be unfounded” (*SABC 3 Prime Time 3*). Of course, this comment misses the point – the turnout of the youth might have been high, but the registration numbers were still very low: 30% of 18-to-19-year-olds registered to vote in 2014 (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2014: 32; Tracey, 2014: 21).

*Today*). Bedawi also admits that the Born Frees “haven’t turned up” (ibid.) to vote, suggesting a kind of apathy to the voting process. Yet on the same channel, Nomsa Masego’s *Security tight ahead of SA poll* shows a young black Born Free woman dressed in the ANC colours (see Image 7.14) at an ANC campaign rally.

Born Free 1: “I think we’ve come a long way since 1994, and I believe in the leadership core. I believe in what it stands for, I’m very familiar with the policies and I like the agenda. So for me personally, and for the majority, I think it speaks to us. And therefore I will be voting ANC.”

Her support of the ANC was surprising, given the previous narratives positioning the Born Frees as potential “swing voters” in 2009 and Bedawi’s statements on other broadcasts. These two narratives do not interact with each other: the Born Frees are *either* homogeneous, disenchanted with the ANC, and apathetic in Bedawi’s pieces, *or* astute, loyal to the ANC, and enthusiastic as in Masego’s package, and yet this Born Free vox pop contradicts the majority narrative on the BBC. Instead of exploring this, however, the framing is confusing and seemingly contradictory.



Image 7.14: *Security tight ahead of SA poll*, BBC, 2014. “Born Free at ANC rally”

Schulz-Herzenberg (2014a: 33) finds that the youth seem less likely to vote but are still interested in politics. CNN’s Robyn Curnow is the only journalist to touch on this point in the sample: she notes in *CNN NewsCentre South Africa spot* that the small percentage of

Born Free voter registration is in fact proof of the “normalisation of South African politics because 18 to 19 year olds are disenchanted with politics no matter where in the world you are”. Curnow determines that the low youth turnout might be an indication of a shift and new cycle of politics in South Africa, where the young generation have fewer reasons to automatically vote for the ANC. In another example that shows how channels tended to trip over their framing of the Born Frees, Curnow contradicts this statement almost entirely.

In *Millions head to the polls in South Africa* she explains, “In the rural hills of Nkandla, the political allegations and denials matter very little”, especially to young Nonkululeko Zuma (who is “unrelated” to Nkandla’s famous resident). Nonkululeko, dressed in ANC regalia emblazoned with Jacob Zuma’s face (see Image 7.15), is a Born Free who was apparently unable to vote in the 2014 election because of a lack of documentation – a common problem in South Africa, Curnow explains. Despite living in the shadow of the sprawling, controversial Nkandla homestead in rural poverty, and without a birth certificate or any identification documents, Nonkululeko campaigned tirelessly for Jacob Zuma and is typical of the youth, Curnow says, as “loyalty to the liberation party and its leader remains strong” (*Millions head to the polls in South Africa*, CNN).



Image 7.15: *Millions head to the polls in South Africa*, CNN, 2014. “Dressed in ANC flags”

As with the BBC, these two narratives of a “swing vote” generation and the “loyal youth” co-exist awkwardly and contradict each other. Instead of exploring the inherent inconsistencies in South Africa’s new democracy, admitting that some youth are loyal and some are disenchanted for a variety of reasons, global channels, and the BBC and CNN in particular, seem insistent on framing the Born Frees as a binary – they are either homogeneously disaffected, or fervently loyal to the ANC. Journalists may juxtapose two competing or contradicting frames in order to give the illusion of depth, but the resultant narrative here comes across as confusing and contradictory rather than enlightening.

The only broadcasts to explore and admit these contradictions came from AJE and VOA. In *South Africa heads to the polls*, AJE’s Haru Mutasa explains, “young people don’t like the term [Born Free] because it implies they are a cohesive group, when they have different experiences in a divided South Africa”. A young white man seated in his middle-class kitchen complains about the lack of jobs, and a young black man complains about the lack of privacy in his tiny room that he shares with his sister and parents. Both are disenchanted with the ANC and democracy in general and apathetic about the outcome of the election, yet have very different complaints and backgrounds. Mutasa takes care to show the differences between Born Frees, and AJE in general avoids using the term “Born Free” as a catchall term. Similarly, on VOA’s *South Africa Elections* Emily Jaab presents three Born Frees from different walks of life: a black university student is disenchanted with the process of democracy and is tired of ANC scandals; a young township resident doesn’t hesitate to pronounce her loyalty to Jacob Zuma and believes that 20 years is simply not enough time to fix all problems; while her neighbour, also a Born Free, will not vote in the elections as a “way of protesting” his parent’s insistence that the ANC still stands for liberation. Jaab explores the contradictions inherent in the

young South African electorate, and this broadcast is a good example of comprehensive, contextual, and investigative journalism.

Despite these two examples, the majority narrative about the Born Frees on international broadcasts relied on repeated clichéd phrases: “Born after the end of white rule”, “with no memory of apartheid”, and “didn’t turn up”. Global journalists, both Western and non-Western, seemingly did not summarise the stories for a better understanding of the electorate in a shorter period of time, but rather blended the Born Frees into one indistinguishable group without context and thus mirror the concerns Friedman (2013) raises about the Born Free theory. Binarising the youth vote and reducing the group to a simple stereotype is unhelpful in understanding voting patterns and the process of democracy in South Africa.

### 2.3.2 Poverty

The confusing binaries that tended to flatten the Born Free group and visuals that mythologise the political parties also oversimplify the poverty in South Africa. Nicholson (2015) states that 59% of South Africans live in poverty, and international journalists portray poverty by visiting the townships dotted around South Africa. Similar to the myth of 1994, journalists tended to use the depiction of poverty as a synecdoche for the ANC’s failure to deliver on their promises, and do not take into account the history of apartheid Land Acts, for example, or the post-apartheid neoliberal policies that have widened the inequality gap over the past two decades. In visiting the townships and discussing the poverty and inequality that exists in South Africa, camera movements were used to delineate distance between audience and the township residents.

AJE, the BBC, CCTV, and VOA employed similar camera techniques to show poverty in South Africa in a peculiar visual convention – an establishing shot across the vast tin shack township, sun glaring off the roofs, followed by a zoom into the township roads (see Images 7.16 – 7.21). The wide shot creeping into a closer angle shows firstly the intangible quality of township life to outsiders, and secondly the scale of the township. The audience is positioned on the outside of the township, while the journalist takes us on a journey inside it. As journalists walk along the streets narrating the scenes, the discussion is usually that ANC’s failure to deliver basic services is to blame for the poverty experienced by the residents. For example, the BBC’s Adrienne Murray says, “recent protests demand better basic services such as housing, schools, water, and electricity” (*South Africa’s economic challenges*, BBC) while the camera pans across an expansive tin-roofed township. CCTV’s reporter Emily Jaab suggests, “ANC support is based on historical legacy” (*SA Elections*, CCTV), as a wide shot over the tops of an expansive township moves to a street lined with litter (Image 7.21). This juxtaposition implies the ANC has failed to provide services but instead relies on its history as liberators to garner support.



Image 7.16: *South Africa’s ANC braces for toughest election*, AJE, 2014. “Wide on rooftops”



Image 7.17: *South Africa' economic challenges*, BBC, 2014. “Wide on rooftops”



Image 7.18: *SA poverty 20 years later*, CCTV, 2014. “Wide on rooftops”



Image 7.19: *SA Elections*, VOA, 2014. “Wide on rooftops”





Image 7.20: *SA poverty 20 years later*, CCTV, 2014. “Zoom into township roads”



Image 7.21: *SA elections*, VOA, 2014. “Zoom into township roads”

The majority of broadcasts from international journalists effectively Othered the poor black township residents through camera techniques. The wide shots over tin roofs emphasised the expansiveness of the township and the scale of the poverty, calling attention to the ANC’s failure to provide for the many residents, but also highlighted the distance and mysteriousness of the township itself. As wide shots moved closer through telephoto lenses or zooms into the streets, the journalist takes the viewer on a ‘tour’ through the township, allowing a brief, fleeting glimpse into this strange, other world. These kinds of proxemics, without discourse to contextualise the visuals, do not adequately explore the depths of South Africa’s complex democracy, but mythologise and simplify, rather than explain and explore. A good example of how journalists explore poverty and inequality exists on two local broadcasts, detailed later in this section.



### 2.3.3 The blindly loyal followers

These scenes of expansive townships signifying deepening poverty in South Africa clash with the support the ANC garners from these areas. Journalists often question how rural and poor black people could still vote for the ANC despite the perceived failures in basic service delivery. The enthusiastic support for the ruling party was less rambunctious and intimidating, as in 2009, but visualised fealty to the ANC was still widespread on international broadcasts.

In 2009, global broadcasters juxtaposed intimidating, vehement support for the ANC with discourse about Zuma's corruption and rape trials, suggesting that supporters "don't care about any of that" (see Chapter 7). In 2014 this narrative was less frequent but more blunt, employing direct discourse to suggest this confusing loyalty rather than editing and visuals. Journalists repeated that "despite" failures from the ANC government and Zuma's corruption scandals, supporters "still" vote for the ruling party. The BBC's Andrew Harding claims that Jacob Zuma "will almost certainly keep his job, despite being accused of corruption" (*World News Today with Zeinab Badawi*, BBC); while CBC's Margaret Evans suggests that the ANC "is favoured to win despite being mired in corruption and a struggling economy" (*SA Votes*, CBC). In Robyn Curnow's *Millions head to the polls in South Africa* on CNN, young Nonkululeko's support for Jacob Zuma "despite" a lack of identification documents seems that the ANC's rural support base ignores problems, "plays Pollyanna" Mattes (2005: 52) says, and votes for the ANC regardless how badly the government treats them. Of course, the reality of the ANC's support, in rural and urban enclaves, is complex and cannot be spoken of in any kind of monolithic way, but Western journalists still flatten the perplexing ANC support into binaries: the electorate are *either* young, apathetic, and potential swing voters, *or* blindly loyal to the ANC regardless of how poorly they are treated.

Part of the problem here is the lack of context afforded to political parties in South Africa – the on-going confusion as to why the ANC keeps its loyal support is because journalists fail to dig deep enough into the intricacy of South African politics during elections. Proportionate Representation clashes with identity politics: because South Africans do not vote for a leader, but rather a party, under the PR structure, ANC supporters can still be loyal to the party yet protest against the president, or be faithful to the liberation credentials of the ANC yet disagree with the current leadership (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2014: 25; Mattes, 2005: 53, 2014: 186). The journalists who tend to focus on the shocking and the bizarre cannot see the wood for the trees.

Past depictions of the “singing and dancing” frame pointed to a vehement loyalty, akin to Mbembe’s (2015: 133) aesthetics of burlesque to show fealty. The 2014 electorate were yet again depicted as jovial, rambunctious, and loud but with a difference in framing. On AJE, Jacob Zuma leads an off-key rendition of “*Umsbini Wami*” on stage, lumbering stiffly as ANC members follow his lead (*South Africa elections promo*, AJE). On AJE’s *SA opposition taps into discontent*, Zuma’s face emblazoned on a tee-shirt ripples absurdly across a large-breasted woman’s chest as she sways to unheard music. CNN’s *Millions head to the polls in South Africa* depicts Nonkululeko and her family dancing flamboyantly while dressed in flags bearing Zuma’s face, and his image is stretched across a woman’s expansive buttocks as she climbs in low angle the hill to the village. These images are framed with unnecessary absurdity – there are plenty of other shots to choose from, and yet the journalists continuously choose shots where Zuma’s face stretches over the body parts of supporters.

Mbembe’s (2015) concept of showing fealty through song and dance was apparent in the 2004 and 2009 election coverage, but less so 2014. Instead, participants were framed to

seem ridiculous in both their movements and attire. There seemed little of Mbembe's dramatization of subordination and fealty here and more a depiction of mimicry, burlesque, and vulgarity, which suggests a change in the journalists' perceptions. We look upon these subjects as "funny" rather than showing "fealty", and this narrative shows how the journalists treat ANC support – citizens follow the ANC regardless of how they are treated, and their movements and attire are equally as strange and puzzling to the gaze.

#### 2.3.4 Protests

Despite this joyful support of the ANC, protests against the ANC were also widespread. Journalists covered the protests mutually exclusively to the ANC support, in that the two topics were rarely discussed in conjunction with one other. In a recurring narrative of entangled framing in international journalism, black South African citizens were simultaneously passionately supportive of the ANC *and* violently disapproving of the party. Journalists rarely made any attempt to explore these two contradictions, but instead presented the myths of the blindly loyal followers and the protests almost in the same breath. The result was confusing, but possibly close to the truth: Schulz-Herzenberg (2014a: 20) remarks that disillusionment with the ANC or with politics in general does not always mean a vote for the opposition. Instead, disaffected voters simply move into the non-participatory electorate, staying away from the polls. However, journalists did not explore these inconsistencies any further than simply presenting both narratives at the same time: the passionate support and violent dissidence co-exist awkwardly, similar to the Born Free framing earlier in this chapter.

When depicting the protest action, Western and non-Western journalists tended to sensationalise the views of violence, focusing on fires, rubble, and other visually rich

images, showing the impact of the protests not through citizen experiences but through the destruction of property. This signifying practice reduces the context of the protests to concerns of property ownership and individual rights, which Mutua (2002: 12), Norris (1997: 14) and Hawk (2002: 168) suggest is a neoliberal frame. In CCTV's *SA poverty 20 years later*, a protester throws a burning trashcan around while dancing in the smoke (Image 7.22) as Akuffo says, "Soweto, home to some of the most violent political clashes.... people try to get the government's attention, sometimes through violence" (*SA poverty 20 years later*, CCTV). On a different CCTV broadcast, Guy Hendersen narrates over close-up shots of burnt rubble blocking a street: "By dawn, only the debris remained. To be heard here, many still prefer other means" (*Ruling SA party wins its fifth successive election*, CCTV). As we see a burning EFF poster in close-up, the Reuters' journalist says "Fires burn in a South African township..." (*SA police arrest 59*, Reuters) (Image 7.23). The journalist continues, "... As post-election protests turn violent", while brightly burning buildings blaze in the night sky from a distance. The fire is bright orange against the dark of the night, and debris closely scrutinised in shallow depth of focus (Image 7.24).



Image 7.22: *SA poverty 20 years later*, CCTV, 2014. "Man throwing trashcan in protest"



Image 7.23: *SA police arrest 59*, Reuters, 2014. “Burning EFF poster”



Image 7.24: *SA police arrest 59*, Reuters, 2014. “Bright orange fire against black”

Focusing on rubble instead of contextualising the protests through vox pops was a recurring theme in this sample (see Images 7.25 – 7.28). As Maserumule (2016) noted during community protests covered by mainstream media in 2016, “the razzmatazz is deafening”. Visuals of burning tyres, a mass of black people scattering under stun grenades, and close-up, floor-level angles of rubble blocking roads reduced the protests to one element. Wasserman (2014) suggests that it is unworkable to talk about protests in any kind of monolithic way because of the myriad communities, histories, and reasons contained within the events; focusing only on the visualisation of protests thus further excludes context. Researchers (Duncan, 2014a; Wasserman, 2014; Wasserman, Bosch, & Chuma, 2016) have already acknowledged that the voices of the poor are missing from mainstream South African media representations of protests, and this sample echoes

their findings but includes global mainstream media too. Only 17% of all 128 speakers in the sample were Unknowns (not including the Born Free group), and only two were directly involved in the protests (on CCTV's *SA poverty 20 years later* and AJE's *OB2*).



Image 7.25: *South Africans vote in general election*, AJE, 2014. “Destruction of property”



Image 7.26: *OB 3*, AJE, 2014. “Destruction of property”



Image 7.27: *Ruling SA party wins 5<sup>th</sup> successive election*, CCTV, 2014. “Destruction of property”



Image 7.28: *SA police arrest 59*, Reuters, 2014. “Destruction of property”

As an exception to this narrative, AJE’s Haru Mutasa attempts to contextualise the protests through the use of vox pops of those affected and by investigating the background to these protests. These citizens complain that the only way to get the government’s attention is through “violence” and say they are “tired of waiting” (*SA votes in general election*, AJE). They bemoan the lack of electricity, water, and commonplace crime and rape (ibid.). Tania Page found the same in De Doorns in the Western Cape – as one of the only direct protester voices in the entire sample, a farmworker representative states that if the government does not listen, “we are going to close the N1<sup>89</sup>” (*OB 2*, AJE). Despite this contextualisation, however, the channel still observed the protests through the rubble, burnt remnants, and destruction of property. In *South Africans vote in general election* and *OB 3*, Haru Mutasa points to the rubble of the IEC’s voting station, and the camera zooms in on a ruined, burnt building behind her.

---

<sup>89</sup> The N1 and N2 are the major trunk roads that link Cape Town to the rest of the country, and run through the Cape Winelands. A common protest tactic by farmworkers and township dwellers is to block these roads with concrete barriers, burning tyres, and pelt cars with stones in order to make their grievances known.

## 2.4 Narrow South African perspectives

While global coverage appeared to mythologise certain aspects of the election, local South African coverage was generally uncritical and ignored important or controversial frames. As seen above, global coverage was generally shallow – that is, a diversity of narratives but that were superficial or simplistic without adequate depth or context. South African narratives, conversely, were narrow – that is, exploring depth but restricted in the broadness of frames. The importance was rather what was omitted from the coverage, rather than what was manifestly discussed. Duncan (2014b: 151) also suggests that South African media framing of the 2014 election was banal and boring, leaving little space for a creative retelling of the election. However, this study shows that the South African news narratives were more nuanced than simply banal – the local broadcasts were hesitant and omitted important frames and issues.

### 2.4.1 Nkandla

The Nkandla corruption trial discoloured the ANC's campaign significantly, yet South African channels disregarded this issue. Global broadcasts frequently zoomed into or out of the sprawling homestead as journalists narrated with congruent pejorative statements to outline the scandal, mentioning the corruption trial, the findings from the Public Protector, or that Zuma spent millions of taxpayers' rands on upgrades. Yet, no South African channels mentioned this issue except for one blundering SABC broadcast.

*SABC 3 Prime Time 1* began in much the same way as global broadcasts that mention Nkandla, with a wide sweeping shot across the green rolling hills of KwaZulu-Natal. The zoom from the Nkandla homestead to the voting location foregrounds a school and a queue of elderly black people outside the local voting station. The journalist then conducts euphemistic acrobatics in order to avoid the elephant in the room: "In a remote



area with breath-taking scenery, rolling green hills and villages, it was here that the president arrived to cast his ballot. Residents here live simple lives, but their most famous resident has thrust them into the international spotlight”. This was the only allusion to the controversial issue on any of the South African channels, and the avoidance of the issue was palpable.

#### 2.4.2 Contextualising poverty

Although a frequent criticism of local journalism during this overall sample is that the frames are too narrow to get an adequate picture of the elections, a few notable examples from the 2014 election show the depth of coverage that South African broadcasters can accomplish. While the topic of poverty was not controversial on the same level as, say, Zuma’s rape trial or the Nkandla scandal, two South African broadcasts present a detailed view of the electorate’s experience with poverty, which remains a growing and concerning topic for all South Africans.

eNCA’s Phakamile Hlubi (*Opposition parties eye out troubled North West*) visits the town of Marikana on the Platinum Belt in the North West and depicts the grinding poverty that many miners and their families experience. Hlubi interviews multiple residents, from Born Frees to entrepreneurs and miners, and attempts to comprehensively cover the experience of poverty through the eyes of the poor. As with the other broadcasts, poverty is framed as a symptom of the ANC’s failure to provide services, but unlike the above visual convention on global broadcasts, Hlubi’s piece is investigative and extensive. Similarly, Bulelani Philip’s SABC broadcast *Khayelitsha vox pops* offers a broad overview of the portable toilet fiasco in the township, which led to multiple “poo protests” (Mkhize, 2015) during 2013 and 2014. Philip interviews leaders of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as well as citizens who lived with the “pota-pota”

system without flushable toilets, while giving subjective camera angles (du Plooy, 2009: 121) to draw the audience into the scene.

These contextualising broadcasts are good examples of how depth can be acquired to explain a difficult and contradictory topic, while still using narrative journalistic frames such as camera proxemics. Although neither local broadcast explores the relationship between poverty and the ruling party, shying away from any kind of controversial topic of frame, these broadcasts still present a view from the ground, through the eyes of citizens directly affected by the issues, which was rare profundity in a sea of mediatised, shallow, and narrow broadcasts.

## 2.5 The military in control

While local and global broadcasts tended to differ in the type of myths and narratives about the 2014 election, a similarity in narratives across regions was the depiction of the military involvement in the protest action. Despite a few notable examples where journalists attempted a view from the ground (such as AJE's OBs from Bekkersdal and De Doorns, and the SABC's investigation into the Pota Pota system in the Western Cape), the portrayal of protest action was predominantly framed through the military's presence in the various "hotspots". Compared to the proliferation of post-protest visuals on global broadcasts, South African broadcasts hardly mentioned these events, and instead focused on how the "security was tight" at the various voting stations pre-election. This section explores how the military were portrayed as being in control of the protests, either as "bringers of law and order" (Fair & Astroff, 1991: 58) or, more controversially, to intimidate protesters into behaving and even to vote for the ANC.

### 2.5.1 eNCA

eNCA followed protests in three different areas of the country: Bekkersdal in Gauteng, Sterkspruit in the Eastern Cape, and Malamulele in Limpopo. In every broadcast where the protests occur, we see the police and military “out in force, keeping the peace” (Hlubi, *SA turned out in their droves*). Journalist Sibongile Mkani-Mpolweni reports the military and police maintain “peace and order in a town marred by violence” (*Heavy security in Sterkspruit*) while Thabang Masanabo suggests no trouble was reported on voting day because of “heavy security” (*News Day 6am*). eNCA even offered police officer Miranda Mills an opportunity to explain: “In Sterkspruit in particular, we’ve got reaction forces in place, we have deployed additional SAPS members, and we have the support of the South African National Defence Force” (*Heavy security in Sterkspruit*). Meanwhile, brown army tanks stand stationary, relaxed soldiers lean against vehicles, and police cars drive up the roads in all eNCA’s protest broadcasts (see Images 7.29 – 7.31). It seems the military and police were in “maintenance mode” rather than actively defending the 2014 election against a threat of violence.



Image 7.29: *News night 3*, eNCA, 2014. “Relaxed military”




Image 7.30: *Heavy security in Sterkspruit*, eNCA, 2014. “Cops playing around”



Image 7.31: *News night 3*, eNCA, 2014. “Relaxed mounted police”

Foregrounding the police and military illustrates Fair and Astroff’s (1991: 58) argument that the authorities in South Africa are often viewed as unequivocal “bringers of law and order”; it also resonates with Wasserman’s (2014) interrogation of voices of the poor in mainstream media. We only know about the protests through the elite, Known voices of police officers, government officials, or journalists, or the pro-vote Unknown vox pops. eNCA does not allow protesters to speak during this sample.

### 2.5.2 AJE

By attempting to interview people affected by the protests, AJE goes further than the South African channels but, as with eNCA, the military were present to “instil a sense of calm” (Page, *OB 2*). Police act against violence only once on the channel – ANC

members hijack a DA march in Johannesburg and the clash turns violent. Police cars, lights flashing and sirens blaring, chase down ANC supporters in narrow streets, the action occurring in the distance. “Then the chase began,” Haru Mutasa narrates. “Police managed to out-manoeuvre the ANC members who were chasing the DA march” (*SA rally ends in violence*).

Similar to the eNCA signification, the military, in “maintenance mode”, were always present when protests were mentioned: mounted police officers walk horses down the road, soldiers lean against tanks in the sun, and police stroll down dust roads (see Image 7.32). AJE emphasises not only their presence but also their relaxed control of the areas. In Bekkersdal, Mutasa paraphrases the military message: “keep calm, vote, and go home. Be careful” (*OB 3*). As with eNCA’s depiction of these authorities, the presence of the military is never questioned on AJE and is ultimately judged as an appropriate response to seemingly destructive, violent protests. Fair and Astroff’s (1991) argument rings true: AJE and eNCA maintain the neoliberal hegemony and protect the status quo through narratives that endorse the authorities as unquestioned “bringers of law and order”.



Image 7.32: *South Africans vote in general election*, AJE, 2014. “Relaxed army”

### 2.5.3 BBC

In contrast to eNCA and AJE's "bringers of law and order" narrative, the BBC held a different view of the authorities. In three broadcasts, BBC journalists imply the military and police were overly brutal in their control, and were present in township "hotspots" to intimidate residents to vote for the ANC.

The BBC was one of the only channels to show footage of the tragic Marikana massacre,<sup>90</sup> and the juxtaposition of this footage with the previous audio creates a damning narrative of the police and the government. In *What issues face the ANC after SA elections* journalist Andrew Harding investigates South Africa's struggling economy, focusing on the mining sector. At the NROC, Home Affairs Minister Naledi Pandor touts the ANC's neoliberal economic plans: "There's gonna be I think quite an exciting and robust development of the economy of South Africa as long as we stick to the plans that we have, that are very good plans." After a brief pause, booming guns signal a brutal scene: police officers fire live ammunition into Marikana miners, a dust cloud masks the protesters (Image 7.33). A large contingent of police officers shoot into the advancing group until finally the commanders give the signal to cease. Because of the juxtaposition between scenes, Pandor's "plans" seem to mean the police brutally controlling strikers. This footage was eerily reminiscent of apartheid imagery: a large show of police force using live ammunition to control a group of black protesters. The juxtaposition between discourse and visuals here appears to be another attempt to create the illusion of depth through editing, and the broadcast is one of the few from 2014 that attempt to understand the context of the fifth election.

---

<sup>90</sup> VOA showed the barrage of Marikana miners pushing against a line of struggling police officers while eNCA depicted a low angle of police running from strikers.



Image 7.33: *What issue face the ANC after SA elections*, BBC, 2014. “Guns of Marikana”

In another broadcast, the BBC presents the military and police as a signifier for apartheid-era violence and control. In *Security tight ahead of SA poll*, five large brown army trucks roll down a dusty street as soldiers gaze impassively at bemused black schoolboys walking alongside. Nomsa Masego observes, “a sign of force not seen since apartheid days, with the government sending a strong message to the youth: Behave, or face the consequences” (*Security tight ahead of SA poll*, BBC) (Image 7.34). Masego then interviews two vox pops: “Stop intimidating us with these police cars, telling us to vote for the ANC”, one says, while another claims, “Today [the ANC] want the very same dirty votes with a barrel of a gun with a number of police to intimidate us to vote for them. We won’t!” In a third broadcast, as the camera pulls up from a close up of army truck tyres to the driver’s impassive face, Andrew Harding (*World News Today with Zeinab Bedawi*) narrates, “the ANC is starting to lose ground. The army was brought into this impoverished township after riots yesterday”.



Image 7.34: *Security tight ahead of SA poll*, BBC, 2014. “Behave, or face the consequences”

Each time the BBC mentioned the protests or riots, journalists linked the military to the ANC’s desire to “control” and “intimidate”. Thus, for the BBC, the military was antithetical to Fair and Astroff’s (1991) idea of “law or order”, instead representing brutality, government control, and oppression of the masses by the ruling ANC. Achille Mbembe (2015: 111) that

one should not underestimate the violence that can be set in motion to protect the vocabulary used to denote or speak of the *commandement*, and to safeguard the official fictions that underwrite the apparatus of domination, since these are essential to keeping people under the *commandement*’s spell, within an enchanted forest of adulation.

It might not be possible to see this “enchanted forest” through the vistas of brown army tanks, but the BBC may have had a point. Although these broadcasts seem conspiratorial, David Bruce argues in some areas of South Africa the police are perceived to operate directly as instruments of the ANC, while the ANC are widely acknowledged as the main perpetrator of this intimidation (2014: 61, 82). Strangely, and despite Bruce’s corroboration of the BBC’s suggestion, no other broadcasts report on this topic. Where the military intervened in controlling the population, this action was always deemed right, just, and appropriate, except on the BBC.



Overall, then, the difference between the local and global media coverage of the 2014 election was mostly between the narrowness and shallowness of narratives. Global news frames tended to flatten experiences of democracy and depictions of the electorate into contradicting and confusing stereotypes, and neglected citizen voices that would have enabled a proper view from the ground. Local news, conversely, avoided controversy and offered particularly narrow news frames that supported the status quo narrative of a consolidated, efficient democracy. This mainstream local media perspective seemed biased towards a “view from the suburbs” (Friedman, 2011: 109). A crucial exception was the non-mainstream local broadcasts that attempted to voice citizens and explore controversial topics. Both local and global news offered a “top down” view of the election and surrounding topics, foregrounding voices of authorities, pundits, and government over citizens.

### 3 DISCUSSION OF 2014

Three main narratives characterised the media coverage of the 2014 election. Firstly, mediated coverage left little room for exploring context, particularly about how the ANC won the election despite routinely disappointing the electorate. Secondly, the omission of important topics supported the status quo, especially on South African broadcasts. Finally, the top-down organisation of the news coverage tended to ignore grassroots voices, which could have added meaningful context and remedied the confusing and contradictory frames.

### 3.1 Desperately seeking depth in the ANC's win

In 2009, Jane Duncan suggested topics that required investigation received inadequate attention on local media, a trend that had continued from 1999 (2009: 219). The high degree of personalisation resulted in coverage that focused only on superficial issues, without seeking depth required for the media to play an adequate role in democratisation. Duncan blames the ANC's long-running battle with the media and political pressure on the SABC in particular for this hesitant approach to covering controversial topics (2009: 229). Duncan labels the 2009 media coverage "desperately seeking depth" because of the focus on "'who', 'what' and 'where', at the expense of 'why'" (ibid.: 231). In my analysis of the 2014 elections, on global channels at least, there seemed to be a push for understanding why ANC supporters continually voted in the party that frequently failed them. For the first time in five election years, the liberation narrative featured in most global channels and went some way to explain the seemingly hypnotic ANC embrace.

#### 3.1.1 Liberation narrative<sup>91</sup>

Butler (2013: 67) controversially argues that, although the ANC was a genuine and significant force in opposing apartheid, the party tended to swallow up and delegitimise many opposing movements (such as the PAC, the United Democratic Force, and the SACP) during the late 1980s. Holmes and Shoup (2013: 57) and Graham (2014: 177) also observe that the ANC continues to present itself as the only legitimate "liberation movement" in South Africa post-apartheid. Graham suggests that discrediting other anti-apartheid activist groups and movements resulted in "a self-centred heroic narrative" that "distorted the historical picture and created a distinct sense of 'us' and 'them', which has since been ingrained into the modern political process" (ibid.). Melber notes that the ANC promotes the "equation that the party is the government and the government is

---

<sup>91</sup> I am indebted to Dr. Chris Paterson from Leeds University for the several conversations that helped focus this section.

the state. Any political alternative that does not emerge from within will not be acceptable” (2016). Graham suggests this “myth” is “not necessarily a falsehood, but based instead on an ‘acceptable’ version of past events” (2014: 180). He further argues that the slow pace of change, poor levels of service delivery, and a continued socio-economic inequality in the country, means “the ANC is forced to turn to history as a justification for its retention of power, rather than its record in office” (2014: 180).

Global journalists attempted to explain the seemingly unshakeable loyalty through this so-called liberation narrative. Supporters seemed to follow the ANC not just because of policies (as in 1999), or Zuma’s personality (as in 2009), but because the party is imagined as liberator, saviour, and provider of a “better life for all”. The narrative is apparently so strong that voters could seemingly ignore the numerous scandals and shortcomings because, as one vox pop said, the vote would be for “the old man” (*World News Today with Zeinab Bedawi*, BBC), meaning Mandela. For the majority of broadcasts, the ANC is synonymous with the emancipation of South Africa and its sole liberator. Journalists often unwittingly ratified the ANC’s liberation narrative by repeating slogans and imagery that depict the ANC as liberator, saviour, and bringer of a better life for all, as well as discourse stating. The neutralisation of controversial frames on South African broadcasts created the same effect: by ignoring controversy (such as Marikana and exploring protester voices), the status quo of the ANC as sole liberator is thus supported.

### 3.1.2 Dissidence

Both local and global broadcasters did not adequately explore the citizens’ experience of the protest action in 2014, despite a few notable examples across the regions. Instead, protest was often seen from a distance, through the remnants of burnt property, and through the frame of “security” in control of dissidence. Achille Mbembe describes

postcolonial conflict in Togo, wherein the president and the country's sole party symbolised liberty, democracy, and statehood rolled into one. The party thus proclaimed "the unity of the people, among whom no divisions could be allowed to exist" (2015: 105). Mbembe argues that in this context, all resistance was denied through verbal control or violence from the *commandement*. Other scholars (Butler, 2013: 62; De Vos, 2012; Du Preez, 2013: 214 – 215), writers (Essop, 2016; Grootes, 2013: 29; Munusamy, 2013), and even the ANC itself (Mantashe, 2015), suggest the government insists on a type of unification of South Africans, a "Rainbow Nation", of which the ANC is the sole liberator and saviour. The protests among the South African poor directly contradict this "liberation narrative": the ANC is no longer saviour from suffering, deliverer of dignity, or representatives of the poor. While journalists rarely connect this argument outright, the attempt is there to obtain some kind of understanding in the seemingly contradictory and perplexing South African democracy. Of course, Marais argues that this type of "rolling rebellion" (2011: 459) narrative is inaccurate because of the myriad reasons constituting the protests, but broadcasters tended to lump "protest action" together in much the same way as they amalgamated "Born Frees" and "ANC support".

Despite some notable broadcasts in this sample and an attempt to dig a little deeper, the majority offered a simplistic re-telling of this "liberation narrative" wherein the ANC is in danger of becoming a synecdoche for the entire anti-apartheid and anti-colonisation struggle, essentially squashing the many facets of opposition during the three hundred years of white rule. Jacobs and Calland (2002: 15) argue South Africa's identity is often seen as an amalgamation of difference, yet the ANC's appropriation of their own struggle history narrative is not an amalgamation but rather a *devouring* of opposing identities.

### 3.2 Omission of important frames supports the status quo

If the global channels in 2014 sought the “why” in the ANC’s win despite all failures and disappointments, then local channels did not even consider the “why”. Duncan (2014b: 151) notes that South African framing of the 2014 election was banal and boring, leaving little space for a creative retelling of the election. However, this study shows that the South African narratives are more nuanced than simply banal – the local broadcasts seem hesitant to explore any narratives other than the experience of poverty, the process of democracy, and the military in control of the protest action. The SABC actively avoids any mention of the Nkandla scandal, even when the journalist stood in the Nkandla voting station and zoomed out of the controversial homestead. Waldahl (2005a) suggests that pro-government local media in Zimbabwe were generally uncritical of the 2000 election, and this study reflects some of her conclusions, in that the SABC avoided any controversial frames or narratives during the election. However, Waldahl suggests pro-opposition or independent media offered both technical and substantive information, yet I found that other South African channels (eNCA and EWN are presumably independent) followed the same banal, uncritical coverage as the SABC.

Analysing both imagery and audio, and the resulting juxtaposition between both, showed a cautious approach to representing the 2014 election on local broadcasts. This finding is not represented in many of the most prevalent pieces of research about the 2014 media coverage (such as Duncan 2014b), but I assume this is because of the difference in method employed. Previous research employed basic content analysis that looked at discourse and tone of broadcasts, a method that Bucy and Grabe (2009: 70, 77) suggest ignores the single most distinguishing feature of television, the stream of images, and is therefore insufficient. The method employed here puts specific emphasis on the image

rhetoric and notes key juxtapositions between audio and visual, and so the study has found additional layers to Duncan's statement that local media coverage was "banal".

### 3.3 Top down organization of the media excludes grassroots voices

The protest action that surrounded the 2014 election was framed as a "horse race" between narratives: who would win, the chaotic protesters, or the military employed to restore law and order? In a similar but less urgent way as 1994, journalists framed peace and war in a "neck and neck" race to the election. Wasserman, Bosch, and Chuma (2016) explain that the voices of the poor are missing from mainstream media: protestors were either not heard, or not taken seriously, and "are reported only inasmuch as they inconvenience a middle-class audience, for instance to inform them where traffic may be disrupted" (2016). Indeed, very few citizen voices were heard in this sample, with 66% Known voices compared to 34% Unknown. Of that 34%, the majority were excited Born Free voters, themselves a homogeneous group, rather than protesters or township residents. The grinding poverty that most black South Africans face almost always happens away from us, in the background, at a safe distance. We hear very little from the grassroots communities who are actively involved in the protests, although a few broadcasts do attempt some kind of complex and investigative journalism.

Even though journalists in this sample seem to grasp at elements of depth – acknowledging this liberation narrative, for example, and distinguishing disillusionment in divergent groups of the voting populace – the lack of space and time allowed to develop these ideas leaves entangled narratives and perplexing stories, as well as a flattened and insubstantial depiction of democracy in South Africa. By using Iyengar's (1991: 18) episodic or event-driven reporting, journalists focus too heavily on binaries

(such as the myth of the Born Frees) and drama (as in the visualisation of the protests), rather than exploring context that might enlighten and explain the complexities of South African democracy and society. These findings coincide with Duncan's (2014b: 152) conclusions and the MMA (2014: 3) research: the shallow portrayal of the election with a few repeated narratives meant that style was allowed to triumph over substance. Ultimately, the local and global perspective of the 2014 election, despite a few profound broadcasts that explored depth, was a "view from the suburbs" (Friedman, 2011: 109) that informed audiences of only some realities.

#### 4 SUMMARY

The difference between the local and global news coverage appeared in the visualisation of the election. Local broadcasters opted for a seemingly "safe" option of giving a narrow overview of the election, showing the normality of democracy through leaders and citizens voting. This pedestrian news coverage shied away from important or controversial news issues and frames such as the Nkandla scandal, Zuma's corruption, the liberation narrative, or the concerns of youth participation. Global broadcasters went too far the other way, offering mediatised coverage that was often organised top down with a focus on authorities, elite voices, and power. In favouring visually rich events over grassroots issues, global journalists presented entangled framing due to lack of context afforded to South Africa's complex democracy.

International journalists in 2014 attempted to engage with the liberation narrative as well as dissidence. However, their ultimate failure to contextualise the frustrated rebellion and adequately interrogate voting patterns resulted in a mediatised, event-based coverage and

reduces the protests to “disengagement” with democracy. Mbembe warns against this: “The practices of ordinary citizens cannot always be read in terms of “opposition to the state”, “deconstructing power”, and “disengagement”. In the postcolony, an intimate tyranny links the rulers with the ruled” (2015: 128), and the journalists, even those from AJE, the only channel that attempted any kind of complexity of coverage, failed to acknowledge this intimate relationship between the ANC and the electorate.



# Chapter 8: Discussion

## 1 SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS

This thesis investigated the narratives about South African democratic elections on both local and global television news, using a dedicated multimodal analysis method. Three overarching themes in the representation of the elections appeared. The first principal outcome suggests news coverage was predominantly driven by increased mediatisation. The second main discovery centres on the differences between South African and global news coverage: local narratives were frequently hesitant, presumably in an attempt to normalise democracy in South Africa, and often highlighted stability at the expense of controversial frames. Conversely, dramatic global narratives emphasised visually rich events, but at times ended up becoming entangled and contradictory because of the lack of context afforded to the stories. Finally, journalists disengage with political leaders and citizen voices over time and increasingly rely on pundits, which increases the distance between the audience and politics.

This chapter outlines the overarching narratives on both local and global channels over the years, and moves to a discussion of journalism practice and the factors driving the shift in narratives. It ends with contributions to political communication theory, including important discussions around the drop-off in voicing political leaders, the

different set of binaries through which the South African elections were framed, and finally the effect mediated news coverage has on understanding elections.

## 2 UNDERSTANDING SOUTH AFRICAN ELECTIONS

### 2.1 Local narratives

Most South African channels attempted to normalise the experience of democracy during the sample years; the SABC in particular focused on the stability of the elections and effectiveness of the IEC. Local broadcasters showed an enthusiastic electorate that queued for hours to make their mark and, while some polling stations opened late, the mood never dampened.

As the only South African broadcaster in 1994, the SABC presented a careful and optimistic overview of the first all-race voting day and avoided any mention whatsoever of the pre-election violence. At the time, the broadcaster was under a harsh international spotlight from media watchdogs, which may have contributed to the scant and optimistic narratives. In 1999, the narratives were surprisingly critical of the ruling party, with vox pops openly stating the ANC had not delivered on promises. This was one of the only times that overtly critical voices were heard, although the ANC received overall favourable coverage from local broadcasters. In 2004, both the SABC and eTV shifted to narratives that glamorised authorities and the government, presenting President Mbeki as a man of the people, popular with the youth, and personally delivering on promises. This frame contradicted accounts about South Africa's second president, who was frequently accused of being aloof (Gevisser, 2007; Russell, 2009) and out of touch with the electorate (Jacobs & Calland, 2002: 5). Most conspicuous in 2004 was the lack of representation of the stark inequalities in South Africa and the HIV/AIDS pandemic. In

2009, South African broadcasters ignored controversial issues such as the corruption trial and the Mbeki ousting. Non-mainstream news channels AfricaNews and AmandlaTV attempted in-depth coverage, however. The final election year exhibited even more hesitancy from South African news broadcasts as eNCA and the SABC ignored the Nkandla scandal, the protest action (save for repetitions of how the military enforced order), and increasing citizen disillusionment with the democratic process.

Prominent narratives across all election years presented the view of a stable, consolidated, efficient democracy, where authorities controlled small incidents of violence and unrest, and where the enthusiastic electorate mostly supported the ruling party. Normalising this democracy came at the expense of representing more controversial frames and issues. The South African broadcasts were notable in the absence of seminal issues that affected the country at the time. Local journalists rarely depicted the overt gap between the rich and the poor in the country, and even fewer explored the ANC's failure to deliver services. Having said that, the process of normalising democracy contrasted with the focus on the military's control protests in 2014, which makes the maintenance of democracy anything but normal.

### 2.1.1 A note on the methodology

Despite the overwhelming neglect of prominent and controversial frames over the years, the SABC was more critical of the government than expected than suggested by the literature of the time (Jacobs, 1999; Jones & Lodge, 1999; Davis, 2005; Duncan, 2009). Part of the reason for the discrepancy between my findings and those of the literature has to do with the analysis method employed in this study. The nuances of television news narratives were only made manifest with the dedicated multimodal methodology

described in Chapter 2 and in Jones (2016), rather than the usual content analysis for discourse and tone.

While the literature (Jones & Lodge, 1999; MMA, 1999; Berger, 2002) about the 1999 election accused the SABC of biased and uncritical coverage, my own findings present a slightly different view. The SABC was hesitant to overtly criticise the ANC but unexpectedly, perhaps inadvertently, represented some overtly critical voices. Moreover, literature about the 2014 election suggests that South African broadcasters were often banal, boring, and lacked substantive information, with “shallow and narrow” (MMA, 2014: 3) narratives, but I push this further: local coverage was more than simply boring. The conservative approach to the 2014 elections extended to a hesitancy to investigate controversial frames and narratives, and the SABC in particular employed conspicuous journalistic acrobatics to avoid speaking about Nkandla, protests, and corruption. The factors driving this hesitancy are explored later in this chapter.

## 2.2 Global narratives

International broadcasts, particularly those from Western news channels, highlighted events that were dramatic, visually rich, and pitted one side against another in a form of a “horse race”: violence and protest action dominated the coverage in 1994 and in 2014, Jacob Zuma’s cult-like status and the diverse opposition consumed journalists in 2009, while the shocking inequality between the poor and the rich black populace was the leading focus in 2004. Creative camera techniques and juxtaposition between visuals and audio explored these events.

In 1994, the push towards post-Cold War frames meant that neoliberal concerns were foregrounded at the expense of an adequate explanation of the South African reality. White fears of loss of civil liberties were highlighted and black hopes of egalitarianism were pushed to the background and kept ambiguous. Between 1999 and 2004, global broadcasters avoided covering the election comprehensively, preferring instead to focus on long, exasperated queues (ITN, 1999) and the stark contrast between the “black diamond” Haves and the poor urban Have Nots (AP, 2004). Moving to 2009, Jacob Zuma’s controversies and the symbolism of his followers ensured that the context of Zuma’s campaign, exploring the vehement loyalty that the ANC commanded, and voting patterns were skimmed over. Any kind of substantive analysis was lost in the sea of swaying black bodies and piercing singing that drowned out the journalists. In 2014, the fixation on visually rich events continued as journalists portrayed the protest action through neoliberal frames of property destruction, keeping poverty and protest at a safe distance and overlooking adequate grassroots voices to explore these issues. Journalists also relied on binaries to represent the Born Free group and ANC supporters, but eventually present entangled and simplistic framing. Journalists repeatedly contradicted themselves when confronted with a complex, inconsistent electorate.

In 1994, 2009, and 2014, Western news channels tended to report on the captivating crises of the elections with little exploration of context or consequences. As was the case in the coverage of Burundi’s post-election violence in 2015, international journalists became, as Hall (2015) terms, a “mayfly”, reporting on big stories with “they type of breathless excitement of a boxing match shorn of context and personality” (ibid.). Depicting the complicated South African democracy as an either-or concept (Nyamnjoh, 2005; Nay, 2013: 7-8; Grinker, et al., 2010: 587; Spurr, 1994: 19) trivialises issues and flattens experiences into a single story.

### 2.2.1 Western and non-Western channels

There is a difference between Western and non-Western international broadcasters, however. The most simplistic, binarised narratives came from Anglo-American channels like the BBC, Sky, and CNN. Non-Western global channels like AJE, at least in 2014, attempted more in-depth reporting of issues on the ground with dedicated live OBs from “hotspots” and citizen interviews. Anglo-American channels appeared to have a more mediated type of journalism than non-Western channels, although this was not always the case. VOA, especially in 2014, explored the inherent contradictions of South African society and avoided using the binary, “horse race” frame of other North American channels. This reliance on already-known frames illustrates the point that Norris (1997), Turkington (1997), Reta (2000), Hawk (2002) and Ndlela (2005) argue: Anglo-American channels are more frequently binarised in their reporting about African elections in their attempt to create the illusion of depth, but do not tackle the underlying causes.

### 2.2.2 Wiping out Mbeki

An intriguing example of the shallowness of global frames was the transition between Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma, virtually wiped out from the 2009 coverage. Journalists implied that Zuma was the successor to Mandela, rather than to Mbeki, and this remains a mystifying conclusion: did global journalists ignore Mbeki’s leadership because he was difficult to approach, as Gevisser (2007) suggests, or that he loathed the mediated political journalism style and refused to submit to “sound bites” (Louw, 2005: 181)? Zuma’s populist leadership style drew more of the spotlight and naturally overshadowed Mbeki’s more austere and reserved personality. The avoidance of narratives about Mbeki and the scandalous transition between the two presidents is again symptomatic of mediation. South Africa’s biggest political scandal in the first two decades of democracy was effectively erased on the news because, presumably, Zuma’s cult-like

personality was a far greater draw card. The tussle between Zuma and Mbeki was hardly mentioned in literature about the 2009 election media coverage, and this sample shows why – broadcasters themselves did not mention it.

### 2.2.3 Offer and demand

The global spotlight shifted away from the country in the 1999 and 2004 polls, but returned with an added luminosity in 2009 with the visualisation of Jacob Zuma's cult-like status. The lack of context of Zuma's personality was surprising as literature of the time noted the media's focus on his polygamous lifestyle and populist, charismatic campaign (Hamill, 2005; Geersema-Sligh, 2015), yet none of these elements were observed in the sample, perhaps because of this study's sample dates. Instead, the global broadcasts presented a "Jacob Zuma Show" that was loud and intimidating, yet without any direct discourse between the presidential candidate and the journalists.

When analysing images and participants therein, Kress and Van Leeuwen (2005: 126) remark that two forms of contact with the audience, offer and demand, are commonplace. Framing an individual in this manner assists somewhat in the narrative reading of the image. The authors suggest that the person presented in an "offer" stance appears as if they do not know they are being looked at (by the camera and the viewers). Conversely, then, "demand" images show the subject as directly addressing the viewer, aware of the camera and of being in the shot. In Zuma's representation, the viewer's gaze was on an abstract, passive participant in "offer" stance rather than an active leader engaged with the television audience. This passive participation continued to the 2014 election where political leaders were hardly heard speaking and hardly seen, sharply different to the representation of 1994 where Constand Viljoen, Mandela, and Buthelezi had dedicated broadcasts and in-depth interviews with journalists. The "offer"

positioning here may be due to either the journalist's framing or the politician's reluctance to engage with the media, or both.

As viewers, we were also kept apart from the populace both in their experience of poverty and in their protest action. Long shots of the protests and townships, close-ups of burning rubble, and a lack of citizen voices kept the experience of ordinary South Africans at arm's length in the global broadcasts. Overall, the later election years positioned participants far more often in passive, "offer" stances than in "demand" stances. The notable exception was AJE in 2014, where embedded journalists attempted to garner citizen voices and contextualise poverty, protests, and the liberation narrative that strengthened the ANC's support.

#### 2.2.4 Liberation narrative

Even though this sample was awash with contradictory and confusing narratives, at least global journalists attempted to explore controversial topics about the elections. In 2009, and especially in 2014, international broadcasters touched on the ANC's liberation narrative and voting patterns of South Africans as an attempt to address the "why" (Duncan, 2014b) in the elections.

The ANC has a tendency to control the type of narratives and histories spoken of, about, and through the party lines. Alec Russell suggests that the history of the ANC's exile from South Africa has had a significant impact on the way the party organises this hierarchy: once in power, the movement was determined to maintain this control through militancy, an obsession that was rooted in its long years underground. Often convinced that its enemies were constantly trying to undermine it by peeling off potential defectors (Russell 2009: 62) while in exile, loyalty to the party line was therefore



paramount. Post-apartheid, criticism of the government (by the media, by opposition parties, and by citizens) is often called “counter-revolutionary thinking” (Butler, 2012: 62, Munusamy, 2013; Sapa, 2014a; Mantashe, 2015; Essop, 2016), while opposition parties are “anti-majoritarian” (Nzimande, 2012) or “racist and fascist” (Isaacs, Whittles, & Grootes, 2014). De Vos (2012b), Du Preez (2013: 214 – 215), and Grootes (2013: 29) argue that the ANC’s communication department often quashes contradicting views by using these particular terms. As Russell remarks (2009: 65), and previous chapters have explored, loyalty under Mbeki’s rule was prized above all else, while Zuma employed authority force (through military and police) to “behave, or face the consequences” (Masego, *Security tight ahead of SA poll*, BBC, 2014). Mbembe’s (2015: 128) notion of the *commandement* controlling societal structures through force or enchantment appears to be at play here.

The re-telling of this “liberation narrative” tends to obliterate smaller opposition movements in the ANC’s history (Holmes & Shoup, 2013: 57), and both local and global broadcasts across the years seem to be guilty of doing just that. Reducing the complexity of the Struggle to a single-facet liberation narrative squashes interpretation into a few easily grasped stereotypes. In this study, even though journalists grasp at elements of depth in later years, the lack of space and time to develop these ideas and explain context generates entangled narratives and perplexed journalists, as well as a flattened and superficial depiction of democracy in South Africa.

### 3 JOURNALISM PRACTICE

#### 3.1 South African journalism

As noted, one discovery of the election analysis was that South African broadcasters were ultimately cautious to explore controversial frames and narratives – despite the SABC’s subtle criticism in 1999. This peculiar avoidance was a surprise – a hypothesis of this research was that local narratives would closely follow those on international channels, albeit less pessimistic, and this discovery also contradicts much of the assumptions about South African broadcasters in the literature of the time (Jacobs, 1999; Davis, 2005; Duncan, 2009, 2014b).

This hesitancy was rooted in the local broadcasters’ desire to present democracy in South Africa as normal, stable, and uncontested, following with Wasserman’s (2010, 2013, 2014; Wasserman & Rao, 2008) African media ethics and Ogdan’s (1980) developmental journalism principle. Another reason for this avoidance was born out of a presumed chilling effect amongst local media. Davis (2005: 234) noticed that journalists in the 2004 election shied away from criticising any political party, but particularly the government, which is also revealed in this study. The ANC’s need for total control (Makhanya, 2008: 18) over the press means that the government often accuses journalists of racism and right-wing politics. In 2003, SABC board member Thami Mazwai commented that “old clichés such as objectivity or right of the editor” (Davis, 2005: 233) had little place in the Africanist aspirations of the national broadcaster. Wasserman (2003: 219) agrees that rethinking normative journalistic ethics, media ownership, freedom of speech, and transformation of the media is important, especially in post-apartheid South Africa, but argues that Mazwai “seems to be confusing issues” (ibid.: 222) in that objectivity is a cornerstone of democracy, rather than an attack on media freedom.

Although the ANC's control of the SABC has never been overt, the broadcaster's hesitancy to investigate critical narratives or present controversial stories during elections suggests the ANC's sensitivity to negative frames has influenced the news agenda. Yet the SABC is not the only South African broadcaster to show such hesitancy – eTV/eNCA was equally as cautious, which was unexpected given the channel's slogan proclaiming “independence” and “investigative journalism”. The sample size for eTV/eNCA broadcasts pre-2014 was very small due to costs, so perhaps given more time and money, a wider range of narratives might be discovered.

### 3.1.1 Mainstream and grassroots

While most South African channels were mainstream news (SABC, eNCA, and EWN), some independent news channels were included in later years (AfricaNews and AmandlaTV). These non-mainstream broadcasts were far more investigative with a greater focus on citizen issues and voices, indicating an increase in pluralism and enhanced democracy. With increased independent news broadcasters exploring grassroots issues and acknowledging a diverse range of voices, democracy is strengthened because there is more choice for substantive and deliberative information (Berger in 2002 accorded much importance on media pluralism and diversity in a well-functioning democracy). One chief caveat to this encouraging statistic is viewing access – both AmandlaTV and AfricaNews are online-only channels, where subscribers require a computer or smart phone and a data package. South African data costs are one of the highest in the world, second only to Brazil (Van Zyl, 2016), and the Internet remains unaffordable for most.

### 3.2 Global journalism

Bennett suggests that newsworthiness and immediacy often trumps fact-checking in the digitised era, and economic pressures drive this deficiency in “accountability journalism” (2012: 3). A brutal reliance on advertising revenue, newsroom cutbacks, closure of investigative bureaux, and staffing cuts (ibid.) combined with news frames that mostly confirm and conform to discourses of liberal capitalism (Louw, 2005: 82) result in both narrow and shallow frames of elections. “When news is consumed with public relations, the messages become a mix of absurd sensationalism... and formula slogans” (Bennett, 2012: 9). As Nyamnjoh notes, these thrusts towards a PR-ised form of journalism result in too many cases of “talking without listening” (2005: 57), and prevents the media on performing their role adequately in the democratisation process.

Louw (2005: 66) suggests that the “racy” style of modern political journalism comfortably confirms liberal hegemonies: narratives lack substance and deal in the spectacular only; news avoids the discussion of solutions and prefers to confront the viewer with shocking or outraging scenarios, leaving them entertained but no wiser; and entertainment is favoured over substance. Louw (2005: 66), Hawk (2002: 158), and Norris (1995: 359, 1997: 14) agree that post-Cold War news frames during the Clinton presidency led to an increased commercialisation of journalism, resulting in “empty stories” (Louw, 2005: 67). While Louw’s cynicism is rooted in Westernised celebrity politics, this kind of “racy” journalism is seen throughout this study too. Producing these types of stories does not require great expense or embedded journalists. With the increased digitisation and convergence of journalism and the reliance on social and swift media over long-form and investigative stories, journalists are no longer encouraged to get ‘down on the ground’.

In 2014, the visualisation of protest action centred on the destruction of property and disruption of the election. Even though AJE's embedded journalists Tania Page and Haru Mutasa attempted a view-from-the-ground analysis of the protests and election, these few broadcasts were again lost in the sea of visually rich protests, burning tyres, intimidating marches, and ruined buildings on other channels. AJE was one of the only channels that interviewed citizens and protesters directly and thus avoided "racy" journalism that turns politics into spectacle, but only through the use of embedded journalists that occasionally listened to grassroots voices.

### 3.2.1 The lack of listening

An important finding of this thesis is this lack of listening to citizens, and was evident on both South African and global broadcasts. The decrease in citizen (Unknown) voices post-1994 indicates a focus on authorities and, later, pundits at the expense of grassroots voices. Despite some profound coverage on AJE, VOA, CBS, and the SABC, these were lost over the years in mediatised, top-down, and polarised coverage. This study reiterates Duncan's warnings in 2014: the top down organisation of a media that promotes authority sources yet neglects citizens "has serious implications, as it fosters a society that is unable to see itself, and respond to its most pressing problems" (2014a: 92). The media should provide substantive information necessary to enable democracy but, "in order for them to play this role, they need to constitute an inclusive public sphere that provides equality of opportunity to receive information, to listen and to speak" (ibid.: 76).


Thus, the importance of "listening" to the view from the ground cannot be overstated, especially during volatile situations, when presenting controversial issues, and during rising unrest. When the populace no longer feel they are taken seriously or, worse, no longer trust the representation they are given by an unsympathetic and uncaring media, citizens tend to distrust journalists. Duncan (2014b), Cross (2010), Bennett (2012: 2), and

Louw (2005: 81) suggest that recent political journalism prefers drama to depth, pundits over people, and personalities over policies. This “hype-ocracy” (Louw, 2005: 50) tends to value the “priestly caste” (Nimmo & Combs, 1992: 24) of experts, celebrities, and smooth talkers over politicians and citizens, and devolves thoughtful viewpoints into an echo chamber of sound bites.

## 4 CONTRIBUTIONS TO POLITICAL COMMUNICATION THEORY


### 4.1 Political engagement drop-off

The reliance on political leaders as sources dropped off significantly in the 2014 election. As Graph 8.1 shows, speakers across the years favoured the Unknowns or vox pops until 2004, where Knowns suddenly became preferred sources. The 2004 sample size was very small, and so conclusions should not be based solely on this year, but as seen in Graph 8.1 the 2009 and 2014 election years showed an increase in Known over Unknown speakers.



Graph 8.1

Further, the difference between political leaders speaking and other Knowns speaking was significant in the 2014 election. Graph 8.2 shows the abrupt decrease in political leaders and spokespeople speaking in relation to other Knowns (such as political analysts or celebrities).



Graph 8.2

Only 31% of Known speakers were political leaders in 2014, compared to 75% in 1999, 71% in 1994, 67% in 2009, and 64% in 2004. The lack of broadcasts available in 1999 and 2004 make it difficult to draw conclusions from these two years, but broadcasts were more accessible in 1994, 2009, and 2014.

Journalists disengaged with political leaders in later years, selecting political analysts, celebrities, and thought leaders rather than political party sources. Cross (2010) found that the type of source focus has shifted from political leader voices to punditry instead, echoing Louw's earlier discussion on "punditocracy" (2005: 80), and this thesis agrees, at least towards the latter years of analysis. The preference for punditry creates yet more distance between the viewer and the politicians, with more layers of interpretation between participant and audience. Political leaders are interpreted, rather than voiced, and this increases the "offer" stance that Kress and Van Leeuwen describe as an "invisible barrier ... erected between the represented participants and the viewers, a sense of disengagement" (2005: 126). While the authors describe offer and demand poses strictly through static images, I posit that the political leaders in this study have been

frequently positioned, through indirect means such as visual framing and the drop-off in voicing, as passive participants, which weakens the information and instead increases distance between viewer and policy discussion.

#### 4.2 Binaries

Spurr (1994: 19), Hawk (2002: 170), West (2008), and Grinker et al. (2010: 587) suggest that global journalists often position African stories through a frame of “development” towards a Western ideal state, or the “failure” of that development. These binaries were not as prevalent in this study as the literature suggested. Global and local journalists occasionally positioned the South African elections as synonymous with dignity and development (CBS in 1994 and the SABC in 1999), but the references were far more nuanced and sporadic than assumed. Another surprise was that global narratives did not equate South African democracy to that in other African countries. In my study on the FIFA 2010 World Cup (Jones, 2012), I found that global journalists tended to conflate South Africa with the rest of the continent, but I found very few instances of this practise across the election samples.

Instead of these binaries, an adjusted horse race frame was employed throughout the coverage, but because of South Africa’s single party-dominated democracy the “game frame” was not between two parties (as in Broh, 1980; Patterson, 1980; Hallin, 1992; Aalberg, et al., 2011), but between two narratives. Journalists binarised coverage by presenting two competing sides, reminiscent of Nyamnjoh’s (2005: 235) observation of the polarised media and Rassool and Witz’s (1996: 339) morality play: peace ran neck and neck with war in 1994; the rural competed with urban in 1999 and 2004; traditional rituals and modern policies collided in 1994 and 2009 while the chaos of protesters and



control of the police clashed in 2014. The “race” that involved the ANC was not whether the party would win, but whether the much-feared two-thirds majority would be reached.

The reimagining of this horse race frame indicates the strength of post-Cold War news values, including mediatisation, in the narratives about elections, particularly on global news. These framing devices flatten the experience of democracy and the elections to a few already-known narratives and stereotypes of the threat of a failed state, a prized negotiated settlement, the intimidating tribalist movement, a moral military controlling chaotic protests, and the unknowable rural and poor existence. Global journalists played prophet in judging which side would win, particularly in the 1994, 2009, and 2014 elections where violence, protest, and populism vied for the spotlight against peace, control, and policies.

#### 4.3 Mediatized coverage on global channels

Global research about the media’s role in covering elections shows that mediatisation drives global journalism practice (Louw, 2005: 66, 271; Strömbäck, 2008: 230), and this study is broadly consistent with established research. Context and comprehension was often obliterated when journalists emphasised strong visuals of scandalous events, and little substantive information about the elections was therefore forthcoming.

Mediatized political communication relies on dramatic visuals (Louw, 2005: 179, Bennett, 2012: 44), personality-driven coverage (Strömbäck, 2008: 230), media-centric sources, and the emphasis on the role of these authorities at the expense of citizen voices (Cross, 2010). Two consequences tend to arise because of mediatized election coverage: firstly,

democracy is weakened as the media offer fewer opportunities for deliberative information, while feeding the electorate on a poor diet of bright colours and flashing lights. Secondly, these mediatised narratives flatten the complexities of elections; remove explanations; and suppress substantive information. Journalists thus urgently grasp for some kind of explanation when faced with a complicated democracy but ultimately resort to already-known stereotypes and juxtapositions to create the illusion of depth.

This study has determined that most global journalists present entangled narratives because mediatisation and episodic reporting seemed to steer their coverage of the elections, from the violent-turned-miracle 1994 election to the perplexing 2014 ANC win. With fewer political leaders voiced as sources and less citizen vox pops in the broadcasts, these journalists could not hope to get the full picture of the election.

#### 4.4 The liberation narrative and media freedom

As reflected in the literature about South African journalism, local journalists in this study tended to avoid important yet controversial narratives throughout the years, suggesting a chilling effect (echoing Davis, 2005; Wasserman & De Beer, 2009; and Malila, 2014), increased government involvement in news agendas (as per Gouws & De Beer, 2008; Sparks, 2009; and Malila, 2014), or the lack of training and access to resources (suggested by Jones & Lodge, 1999 and Duncan, 2009). South African channels were progressively more hesitant to cover controversial topics or criticise the ruling party as an increasingly paranoid government policed South Africa's primary broadcaster, demanding loyalty to the party narrative at all costs.

The SABC's avoidance of controversy in the later years of the sample showed a swing towards Kuper and Kuper's definition of "Sunshine Journalism" that "amplifies the extent of social cohesion and development" (2001: 357). While some (Versfeld, Kruger & Smith, 1996; Saidykhan, 2011) suggest that favouring positive aspects in reporting South Africa may balance the previously negative representations of Africa in Western public opinion, Sunshine Journalism is essentially a 'false positive' and not without faults. Kuper and Kuper argue that if journalists focus on positive news at the expense of the negative, "people are presented with a perspective that falsifies their daily realities and wider experiences" (2001: 358). Just as Afropessimism damages narratives about the continent (Nothias, 2012; Jones, 2014), so Sunshine Journalism flattens experiences and reduces complex issues to easily grasped stereotypes. In South Africa, if news is censored or manipulated at election time to present a "Sunshine" view of the incumbent government, the voting populace is less likely to get a full and critical perspective of the political landscape. Throughout the five election periods, the SABC tended to focus on the "Good News" narrative – ignoring the violence in 1994, neatly skipping over Mbeki's AIDS denialism in 1999 and 2004, avoiding any mention of the controversy surrounding Jacob Zuma, and highlighting the process of democracy rather than any negative aspects (of which there were many) in 2014. Whatever light was shed on representing the elections on the SABC was discernibly of the "sunshine" variety.

# Conclusion

## 1 SUMMARY OF THE THESIS

This thesis chronicled how South African elections were represented on global and local television news. To do so, it developed a dedicated multimodal methodology that joined semiotics and discourse analysis. This thesis found that a nuanced form of mediatisation framed the elections on global channels, even though journalists sought narrative depth to explain the complex South African voting patterns and democracy. Locally, the liberation narrative restricted news narratives about the elections, resulting in avoidance of important and controversial stories information that could have developed a broader picture of the elections. This framing style was in direct contrast to the personality-driven coverage of global journalists. Citizen voices and political leaders as sources were missing from the later election years on all channels in favour of pundits, a symptom of the swing towards media logic. Overall, the representation of the elections kept the electorate and the viewers apart, inserting levels of detachment via camera proxemics, evaluative voices, and mediatised news frames.

## 2 LIMITATIONS

The above generalisations are possible, with caveats. First among them is the sample size of the interim years. 1999 and 2004 were very small samples and so generalisation is not

recommended from these years. However, narratives gathered from these years were still interesting and important. A second caveat entails sample dates. Generalisation of these findings should not extend to campaign coverage or political party representation overall, as the sample focused only on the voting week with some outlier broadcasts for context. Finally, elections are but one example of how a nation experiences democracy – elections are highly organised, employing specialised party rhetoric. Ergo, this study does not make any presumptions about news narratives about parties outside of the elections, nor how the society experiences democracy as a whole.<sup>92</sup>

### 3 IMPLICATIONS AND APPLICATIONS

This study has three major implications and applications. Firstly, the innovative method in this thesis can provide a basis for future studies of elections in particular and television broadcasts in general. Secondly, this study adds empirical data to the overall study of media coverage of South African elections. It combines an analysis of previous studies of each election with new data about the broadcast media coverage of the elections, so often neglected in favour of print media. Finally, this study provides a theoretical indication for the symptoms of mediatised coverage during elections in South Africa – the lack of listening and context gives rise to entangled, contradictory narratives that in turn flatten the experience of democracy.

---

<sup>92</sup> Where this thesis conflated elections with democracy, this occurred because the broadcasters themselves did so.

## 4 RECOMMENDATIONS

### 4.1 Analysis methodology

This study primarily recommends that future political communication analysts employ this or a similar method to analyse broadcast news. Television news is so often overlooked in favour of print media or, worse, lumped together with radio and print media under the heading “media coverage”. Such a complex and shifting medium deserves a better method of analysis, especially in the age of Post-Truth (Beckett, 2016; Glasser, 2016) and convergence, digital media. With mediatised coverage of political events and elections, a dedicated methodology designed specifically for the visual nature of television and convergence media should be employed as far as possible. This study therefore recommends a more nuanced investigation of broadcast news coverage during elections in order to discover the role of the media in a democracy. The methodology employed here has scope to be developed, modified, and repurposed for different fields of study. The combined elements of discourse, visual analysis, and production context is an appropriate and recommended method of exploration for media scholars interested in political journalism analysis. Additional studies that employ this type of method include Teer-Tomaselli (1993), Dueck (1995), and Orgeret (2006).

### 4.2 Archival techniques

A second recommendation of this study is an urgent request to the SABC and eNCA archivists. Access to these archives is extremely difficult, despite on-going digitisation processes. The SABC has competent and helpful employees doing their best with a chaotically organised archive, and for future researchers to analyse broadcast data this archive should be properly classified. Suggestions include correct usage of keywords, accurate and detailed transcriptions of the broadcasts, and a properly categorised

broadcast system. These implementations will probably be time consuming, but the importance of accurate archives for the national broadcaster cannot be overstated. The eNCA archive is much more systematic but is prohibitively expensive for scholarly analysis – perhaps a pro-rata system of costs could be negotiated for scholars, without having to download and keep the broadcasts but as a watch-and-return system, similar to the system employed at Getty Images. Low resolution and watermarked copies of the broadcasts are kept online and can be watched for free, provided the scholar logs into the webpage. Adequate but incomplete transcripts of the broadcasts exist below the video. A digital ordering system is then implemented if the scholar requires the full broadcast. Again, setting up a system like this would be time consuming and costly, but would save time and increase access to broadcast data in the long run.

Additionally, when SABC and eTV provided transcripts of the broadcasts so I could gain an overview of what was available, these documents varied so greatly in style and substance that in some cases I had no idea as to what the broadcast entailed. For example, an SABC transcript of a 1999 election broadcast continued thus:

- ws press with cameras , outside and bodyguards

- ws arrival of Nelson Mandela ; greeting staff inside hall , with Graca inside hall

- 16:41:20 mcu ivd Nelson Mandela about how he feels

- ws moving to next counter ; given a ballot papers ; going to the voting booth ;

16:41:31 c/a casting his vote , being shown how to cast ; , casting both ballots ;

16:41:38 mcu ivd Mandela saying its a wonderful occasion , doing this for the second time , the feeling is not as intense as it was in 1994 , because then I was exercising for the first time , I am very happy ; laughed when asked whom did he vote for , saying no that is the secret he might be charged ;

KEYWORDS := XYZ saelect99 vote voting cast line democracy citizen population  
polls ballot voting party politics ELECTIONS ELECTION LEADER  
PRESIDENT ANC democratic party

This transcript is woefully inadequate and slightly incorrect. There is no differentiation between the quoted words from the broadcast and those used to describe the action, and the description swings from visual to discourse, giving little idea as to the nature of the content. It was impossible to gauge whether or not this broadcast would be useful to analyse, and so I had to order a large amount of data that ended up being useless to this research project.

A second recommendation is therefore to standardise the transcription process broadcasts to systematically organise these archives. A systematic transcription method such as the one used in this study and in Jones (2016) should be employed for detailed and accurate keyword searching. While time consuming, the accuracy of transcripts will



pay dividends to the broadcasters in the long run. It will mean easier, more accurate search and retrieval.

#### 4.3 Voicing citizens, and engaging with journalists

The final recommendation concerns the worrying trend of significant drop-off of quotes from sources, particularly from political leaders. In order to create and maintain a functioning democracy, substantive information between communities and governments should be adequately mediated through the news media. The final recommendation is thus to include, where possible, more voices direct from sources – citizens, protesters, political leaders, and community leaders. As seen in the 2009 and 2014 election years, ANC voices were substantially missing from the broadcasts, leading most journalists to rely on simplistic juxtaposition and lip flaps to present a shallow overview of a complex society. The ANC's representation on these broadcasts was mostly negative, too. The deteriorating relationship between the ANC and journalists is a further concern, and this study recommends that government spokespeople engage with the media more frequently with more transparency to repair this relationship.

Understandably, voicing political leaders and citizens comes with limitations: time, resources, training, and funding are all barriers to including more grassroots voices, while adding political sources depends on the relationship between politicians and the media. In order to effect change, journalists should take the lead in investigating citizen and political voices, as evidenced in Al Jazeera's embedded journalists during the 2014 election, or CNN's Mike Hanna in 1994 or Robyn Curnow in 2009. Embedding journalism is a costly exercise, and in an era where newsrooms are routinely underfunded, bureaux across Africa closed, and long form journalism pushed to the side in favour of quick acting social media, this may seem like a tall order. As Beckett (2016)

asserts, news media should not merely listen and represent voices, but rather create the space for the relationship that allows us to hear each other better. Listening to the community and presenting these voices on broadcast media is a key tenet of journalism, and the art of listening is slowly being subjugated in the blizzard of fast news and mediatised razzmatazz. It is thus up to the journalists and editors themselves to regard community, citizen, and grassroots voices as powerful sources, rather than rely on the easily accessible elite voices of punditry and journalists-as-experts. Getting more journalists on the ground, up close and personal with the everyday sources will help halt the stampede in political journalism to mediatised Post-Truth information. This study thus recommends that the broadcasters named in this analysis, as well as other mainstream news networks, make a concerted effort to widen their group of political sources to include citizen vox pops, political party members, and grassroots sources.

WORD COUNT: 79 656

# References

## WORKS

Aalberg, T; Strömbäck, J; De Vreese, CH. 2011. The framing of politics as strategy and game: a review of concepts, operationalizations, and key findings, in *Journalism* 13(2): pp162-178

Abate, A. 2013. The framing of the 2005 Ethiopian National Election by privately owned print media outlets in Ethiopia. Masters thesis, Mid Sweden University. [O]. Available: <http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:664586/fulltext01.pdf>  
Accessed 20 April 2016

Akoh, B & Ahiabenu, K. 2013. A journey through 10 countries. Online election coverage in Africa, in *Journalism Practice* 6(3): pp349-365

Altbeker, A. (2007). A country at war with itself: South Africa's crisis of crime, South Africa: Jonathan Ball Publishers.

Altheide, DL, & Snow, RL. 1979. *Media Logic*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Altheide, DL, & Snow, RL. 1988. Toward a Theory of Mediation, in *Communication Yearbook*. Ed. JA Anderson. 11th Ed. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Altheide, DL, & Snow, RL. 1991. *Media Worlds in the Postjournalism Era*. New York: Aldine de Gruyter

Anglin, DG. 1995. International monitoring of the transition to democracy in South Africa, 1992-1994, in *African Affairs* 94: pp519-543

Appiah, KA. 1992. *In my father's house: Africa in the philosophy of culture*. Oxford University Press

Bailard, CS. 2012: A Field Experiment on the Internet's Effect in an African Election: Savvier Citizens, Disaffected Voters, or Both? In *Journal of Communication* 62(2): pp330-344

Ballington, J & Fick, G. 1999. Case study: South Africa. Educating all voters in support of a multiracial democracy, in *Youth voter participation: involving today's young in tomorrow's democracy*. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance: Stockholm, Sweden. [O]. Available: <http://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/youth-voter-participation.PDF>  
Accessed 20 February 2017

- Barnhurst, KG & Nerone, J. 2009. Journalism history, in *The Handbook of Journalism Studies*. Edited by K Wahl-Jorgensen & T Hanitzsch. London: Routledge. pp17-28
- Barthes, R. 1968. *Elements of semiology*. New York: Hill and Wang.
- Battersby, JD. 1988. *Rightists rally in Pretoria, urging a white state*, New York Times. [O]. Available:  
<http://www.nytimes.com/1988/02/28/world/rightists-rally-in-pretoria-urging-a-white-state.html>  
 Accessed 20 June 2017
- BBC South Africa profile – Timeline, 2015. [O]. Available:  
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14094918>  
 Accessed 10 June 2016
- BBC, 2014. Famous people, Nelson Mandela. [O]. Available;  
[http://www.bbc.co.uk/schools/primaryhistory/famouspeople/nelson\\_mandela/](http://www.bbc.co.uk/schools/primaryhistory/famouspeople/nelson_mandela/)  
 Accessed 10 December 2016
- BBC, 2016. The last great liberator. [O]. Available:  
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/timelines/ztd26sg#zswsvcw>  
 Accessed 10 December 2016
- B’Ber, BE & Louw EP. 2011. Afropessimism: a genealogy of discourse. *Critical Arts: South-North cultural and media studies* 25(3): 335-346
- Beckett, C. 2016. What does the Trump triumph mean for journalism, politics, and social media? [O]. Available:  
[blogs.lse.ac.uk/polis/2016/11/13/what-does-the-trump-triumph-mean-for-journalism-politics-and-social-media/](http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/polis/2016/11/13/what-does-the-trump-triumph-mean-for-journalism-politics-and-social-media/)  
 Accessed 10 May 2017
- Bennett, WL. 2012. *News: the politics of illusion*. 9<sup>th</sup> Edition. Boston: Longman.
- Benoit, WL. 2004. *Bush versus Kerry: a functional analysis of campaign 2004*. New York: Peter Lang
- Benoit, WL. 2007. *Communication in political campaigns*. New York: Peter Lang
- Benoit, WL & Currie, H. 2001. Inaccuracies in media coverage of presidential debates, in *Argumentation and Advocacy* 38: pp28-39
- Benoit, WL; Stein, KA; & Hansen, GL. 2004. How newspapers cover presidential nomination acceptance addresses, in *Newspaper research journal* 25(3): pp83-89
- Berelson, BD. 1952. *Content analysis in communication research*. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press.
- Berger, AA. 2004. *Media analysis methods*. London: Sage.

- Berger, G. 2002. *What are the media preconditions for an election to qualify as being free and fair?* SANEF document. 22 Feb 2002. [O]. Available: <http://guyberger.ru.ac.za/Research/Democracy/election.htm>
- Berger, G. 2007. *Media legislation in Africa: a comparative legal survey*. Grahamstown, South Africa: School of Journalism and Media Studies / Unesco
- Berliner, D. Sunlight or Window Dressing? Local government compliance with South Africa's promotion of Access to Information Act. [O]. Available: [http://www.danielberliner.com/uploads/2/1/9/0/21908308/berliner\\_2016\\_governance\\_sunlight\\_or\\_window\\_dressing.pdf](http://www.danielberliner.com/uploads/2/1/9/0/21908308/berliner_2016_governance_sunlight_or_window_dressing.pdf)  
Accessed 20 February 2017
- Bertelsen, E. 1996. Selling change: advertisements for the 1994 South African election, in *African Affairs* 95(379): 225-252
- Biography, 2016. Nelson Mandela. [O]. Available: <http://www.biography.com/people/nelson-mandela-9397017>  
Accessed 10 December 2016
- Bignell, J. 2002. *Media semiotics: introduction*. 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed. Manchester University Press.
- Bird, W. 2008. Follow the leader: an overview of key media trends in election coverage from 1994 onwards, in *The role of the media in promoting electoral democracy in South Africa*. Proceedings compiled by NB Malada. IEC 2008.
- Bird, W. 2010. *State of South Africa's media. A media monitor's perspective*. Media Monitoring Africa. August 2010. [O]. Available: [http://www.sanef.org.za/images/uploads/MMA\\_Presentation\\_-\\_State\\_of\\_Media.pdf](http://www.sanef.org.za/images/uploads/MMA_Presentation_-_State_of_Media.pdf)  
Accessed 10 December 2015
- Bird, SE & Dardene, RW. 2012. Rethinking news and myth as storytelling, in *The Handbook of Journalism Studies*. Edited by K Wahl-Jorgensen & T Hanitzsch. London: Routledge.
- Blumler, J & Kavanagh, D. 1999. The third age of political communication: influences and features, in *Political Communication* 16: 209-230
- Booyesen, S. 2009, Congress of the people: between foothold of hope and slippery slope, in *Zunami*. Edited by R Southall. Auckland Park: Jacana. Pp85-113
- Boraine, A. 2014. *What's gone wrong? South Africa on the brink of a failed statehood*. Jeppestown: Jonathan Ball Publishers
- Borger, J. 2013. *The Conservative party's uncomfortable relationship with Nelson Mandela*. Guardian. 6 December 2013. [O]. Available: <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/dec/06/conservative-party-uncomfortable-nelson-mandela>  
Accessed 20 January 2017

Bourgault, LM. 1995. *Mass Media in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press

Broh, CA. 1980. Horse race journalism: reporting the polls in the 1976 presidential election, in *Public Opinion Quarterly* 44:pp514-529

Bruce, D. 2014. *Just singing and dancing? Intimidation and the manipulation of voters and the electoral process in the build-up to the 2014 elections*, for Community Agency for Social Enquiry. [O]. Available: <https://www.nelsonmandela.org/uploads/files/intimidation-in-elections.pdf>  
Accessed 23 June 2017

Bucy, EP & Grabe, ME. 2007. Taking television seriously: a sound and image bite analysis of presidential campaign coverage, 1992-2004, in *Journal of Communication* 57 (2007): pp652-675

Bucy, EP & Grabe, ME. 2009. *Image bite politics. News and the visual framing of elections*. Oxford University Press

Burger, J. 2009. Worrying trends: the official 2008/9 South African crime statistics, in *SA Crime Quarterly*, December 2009.

Butler, A. 2009. The ANC's national election campaign in 2009: Siyanqoba!, in *Zunami! The 2009 South African elections*. Edited by R Southall & J Daniel. Auckland Park: Jacana. Pp 65-84

Butler, A. 2012. *The idea of the ANC*. Ohio University Press

Butler, A. 2014. The ANC's campaign in 2014, in *Election 2014: the campaigns, results, & future prospects*. Edited by C Schulz-Herzenberg & R Southall. Auckland Park: Jacana. Pp 42-56

Calland, R. 1999. Democratic government South African style 1994-1999, in *Election 1999. From Mandela to Mbeki*. Edited by A Reynolds.

Calland, R. 2013. *The Zuma Years: South Africa's changing face of power*. Cape Town: Zebra Press

Cappella, JN & Jamieson, KH. 1996. News frames, political cynicism, and media cynicism, in *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 546(1): pp71-84

Carlin, J. 1994. The township where the war has no end. [O]: Available: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/township-where-the-war-has-no-end-after-dusk-in-katlehong-only-madmen-murderers-and-self-appointed-1401855.html>  
Accessed 6 June 2017

Carlin, J. 2013. Nelson Mandela: the freedom fighter who embraced his enemies. [O]. Available: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/07/nelson-mandela-freedom-fighter-john-carlin>  
Accessed 20 January 2017

- Cenite, M; Shing Yee, C; Teck Juan, H; Li Qin, L & Xian Lin, T. 2008. Perpetual development journalism? Balance and framing in the 2006 Singapore election coverage, in *Asian Journal of Communication* 18(3): pp280-295
- Chalaby, JK. 1998. *The invention of journalism*. New York: Palgrave-MacMillan
- Chandler, D. 1994a. *Semiotics for beginners*. [O]. Available: <http://www.aber.ac.uk/media/Documents/S4B/sem05.html>  
Accessed on 19 April 2014.
- Chandler, D. 1994b. Grammar for film and TV. [O]. Available: <http://www.aber.ac.uk/media/Documents/short/gramtv.html>  
Accessed on 1 December 2010.
- Chandler, D. 1994c. *Notes on the construction of reality in TV news programmes*. [O]. Available: <http://visual-memory.co.uk/daniel/Documents/short/news.html>  
Accessed 5 September 2015
- Chandler, D. 1994d. *Criticisms of semiotic analysis*. [O]. Available: <http://visual-memory.co.uk/daniel/Documents/S4B/sem11.html>  
Accessed 5 September 2015
- Chikane, F. 2012. *Eight days in September. The removal of Thabo Mbeki*. Picador Africa
- Christians, CH; Glasser, TL; McQuail, D; Nordenstren, K; & White, RA. 2009. *Normative theories of the press: journalism in democratic societies*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press
- Christiansen, B & Koeman, J. 2015. *Nationalism, Cultural Indoctrination, and Economic Prosperity in the Digital Age*. Pennsylvania: ICI Global
- Chuma, W. 2005. Zimbabwe: the media, market failure, and political turbulence, in *Ecquid Novi: African Journalism Studies* 26(1): 46-62
- Chuma, W. 2008. Mediating the 2000 elections in Zimbabwe: Competing journalisms in a society at the crossroads, in *Ecquid Novi: African Journalism Studies* 29(1): 21-41
- Cooper, S. 1994. The PAC and AZAPO, in *Election 1994: the campaigns, results, and future*. Edited by A Reynolds. Claremont: David Phillips
- Coronel, S. 2001. The role of the media in deepening democracy. [O]. Available: <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan010194.pdf>  
Accessed 21 April 2016
- Cross, KA. 2010. Experts in the news: the differential use of sources in election television news, in *Canadian Journal of Communication* 25: pp413-429
- Crowe, S. 1994. *Sky News Sunrise*. 25 April 1994. Sky News. [News broadcast]. Available: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5w8GsXKm5No>  
Accessed 10 July 2015

Cushion, S & Sambrook, R. 2015. How television news let the Tories fight the election on their own terms. *The Guardian* 15 May 2015. [O]. Available: [http://www.theguardian.com/media/2015/may/15/tv-news-let-the-tories-fight-the-election-coalition-economy-taxation?CMP=share\\_btn\\_tw](http://www.theguardian.com/media/2015/may/15/tv-news-let-the-tories-fight-the-election-coalition-economy-taxation?CMP=share_btn_tw)  
Accessed on 10 September 2015

Cushion, S; Thomas, R; & Ellis, O. 2015. The mediatisation of the 2<sup>nd</sup> order elections and party launches: UK television news reporting of the 2014 EU campaign, in *International Journal of Communication* 9(2015): pp1523-1543

D'Alessio, D & Allen, M. 2006. Media bias in presidential elections: a meta-analysis, in *Journal of Communication* 50(4): pp133-156

Danker-Dake, JA. 2008. US media coverage of Africa: a content analysis of the New York Times from 2003-2007. Unpublished Masters thesis, Oklahoma State University, May 2008

Davis, G. 2005. Media coverage in Election 2004: were some parties more equal than others? In *Electoral politics in South Africa: assessing the first democratic decade*. Edited by J Piombo and L Nijzink. London: Palgrave Macmillan

De Beer, A. 2004. South Africa, in *Media and elections. A Handbook and comparative study*. Edited by BP Lange & D Ward. London: LEA: pp73-99

De Beer, AS. 2010. News from and in the 'Dark Continent', in *Journalism Studies* 11(4): pp596-609

De Beer, A; Wasserman, H; Malila, V; & Beckett, S. 2014. Being both a watchdog and a developmental journalist? First impressions from the South African Worlds of Journalism Study. Working paper for the Worlds of Journalism Study convention, Greece, 27 March 2014.

De Beer, A; Malila, V; Beckett, S; & Wasserman, H. 2016. Binary opposites – can South African journalists be both watchdogs and developmental journalists? In *Journal of African Media Studies* 8(1): pp35-53

De Nelson, SA. 2007. Press freedom under siege: effects of market forces, government controls, and journalism practices, in *Brazilian Journalism Research* 3(1): pp173-193

De Vos, P. 2012. *What is to be done about the SABC?* [O]. Available: <http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/what-is-to-be-done-about-the-sabc/>  
Accessed 12 May 2014

Dearing, JW & Rogers, EM. 1996. *Agenda-Setting*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage

Demian, 2015. Have protests in South Africa nearly doubled since 2010? [O]. Available: <https://africacheck.org/reports/have-protests-in-south-africa-nearly-doubled-since-2010/>  
Accessed 2 May 2016



- Domke, D., Fan, D. P., Fibison, M., Shah, D. V., Smith, S. S., & Watts, M. D. (1997). News media, candidates and issues, and public opinion in the 1996 presidential campaign. *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly*, 74(4), 718–737.
- Donnington, R; Bradshaw, D; Johnson, L & Budlender, D. 2004. *The demographic impact of HIV/AIDS in South Africa: National indicators for 2004*. Cape Town: Centre for Actuarial Research, South African Medical Research Council and Actuarial Society of South Africa. [O]. Available: <http://www.mrc.ac.za/bod/demographic.pdf>  
Accessed 15 May 2017
- Dowden, R. 2013. Nelson Mandela: the man who shaped the new South Africa. [O]. Available: <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/nelson-mandela-the-man-who-shaped-the-new-south-africa-8990869.html>  
Accessed 20 January 2017
- Druckman, JN. 2005. Media matter: how newspapers and television news cover campaigns and influence voters, in *Political Communication* 22: pp463-481
- Druckman, JN, Kifer, MJ; & Parkin. 2009. The technological development of candidate websites: how and why candidates use web innovations, in *Politicking Online: The transformation of election campaign communications*. Edited by C Panagopoulos. Rutgers University Press
- Dueck, S. 1995. The genre of television news: grammar, rhetoric, and the politics of representation. Simon Fraser University: MA Thesis.
- Du Plooy, G. 2009. Visual text analysis, in *Media studies 3. Media content and media audiences*. Edited by PJ Fourie. Unisa Press. Pp148-203
- Du Preez, M. 2004. *Pale Native*. Cape Town: Zebra
- Du Preez, M. 2013. *A rumour of spring: South Africa after 20 years of democracy*. Cape Town: Zebra
- Du Toit, BM. 1991. The far right in current South African politics, in *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 29 (4): 627-667
- Dubin, SC. 2012. *Spearheading debate: culture wars and uneasy truces*. Auckland Park: Jacana
- Duncan, J. 2009. Desperately seeking depth: the media and the 2009 elections, in *Zunami! The South African elections of 2009*. Edited by R Southall and J Daniel. Auckland Park: Jacana. Pp215-231
- Duncan, J. 2014a: 'It's not just the unions that are cut off from people, but the media too': reconstituting South Africa's mediated public sphere, in *Acta Academica* 2014 46(1): pp73-97
- Duncan, J. 2014b: The media and the elections: competition without diversity. in *Election 2014: the campaigns, results, & future prospects*. Edited by C Schulz-Herzenberg & R Southall. Auckland Park: Jacana. Pp133-154

- Duncan, J. 2014c. Are South Africa's protests really driven by rising expectations? *South African Civil Society Information Service* [O]. Available: <http://www.sacsis.org.za/site/article/2156>  
Accessed 10 June 2016
- Eargle, A; Esmail, AM; & Sullivan, JM. 2008. Voting the issues or voting the demographics? The media's construction of political candidates' credibility, in *Race, Gender, and Class* 15(3-4): pp8-31
- Eaton, RJR. 1990. Liberal democracy in Africa, in *Political Science Quarterly* 105(3): pp455-473
- Eifert, B; Miguel, E; & Posner, DN. 2010. Political competition and ethnic identification in Africa, in *American journal of political science* 54(2): pp494-510
- Emenyeonu, BN. 1995. Africa's Image in the Local Press: An Analysis of African News in Some Nigerian Newspapers, in *African Media Review* 9(2): pp82-104
- Entman, R. 1991. Framing US coverage of international news: contrasts in narratives of the KAL and Iran air incidents, in *Journal of Communication* 41(4): 6-27.
- Entman, R. 1993. Framing: toward clarification of a fractured paradigm, in *Journal of Communication* 43(4): pp51-58
- Esser, F & Angelo, PD. 2006. Framing the press and publicity process in US, British, and German general election campaigns. A comparative study of metacoverage, in *The International Journal of Press/Politics* 11(3): pp44-66
- Essop, R. 2016. *Zuma describes attempt to disrupt partly as counter-revolutionary*. [O]. Available: <http://ewn.co.za/2016/01/09/Zuma-describes-attempts-to-disrupt-Parly-as-counterrevolutionary>  
Accessed 1 May 2017
- Evans, M. 2013. Controlling the Mandela image, in *RJR Alive* 2: November 2013. Pp 27-29.
- Evans, M. 2014. *Broadcasting the end of apartheid: live television and the birth of the new South Africa*. London: I.B. Tauris
- Evans, M. 2014. *Do it for Mandela plea masks divisive South African election*. [O]. Available: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/do-it-for-mandela-plea-masks-divisive-south-african-election-1.2632873>  
Accessed 10 April 2017
- Evans, G & Bruce, A. 1999. Redeeming the democratic deficit: South Africa's second post-apartheid, in *Representation* 36(4): pp294-306
- Evans, M & Glenn, I. 2010. "TIA – This is Africa": Afropessimism in Twenty-First Century narrative film, in *Black Camera* 2(1): 14-35.

Fair, JE & Astroff, RJ. 1991. Constructing race and violence: U.S news coverage and the signifying practices of apartheid, in *Journal of Communication* 41(4): 58-74

Farnsworth, SJ & Lichter, SR. 2003. *The nightly news nightmare: Network television's coverage of the US presidential elections, 1988-2000*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield

Fihlani, P. 2016. *How South African women are reclaiming the headscarf*. [O]. Online: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-36461213>  
Accessed 1 May 2017

Fields, S. 2005. *Continental Divide: Why Africa's Climate Change Burden Is Greater*. [O]. Available: <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1280367/>  
Accessed on 28 June 2012

Fiske, J. 1987. *Television Culture*. London: Routledge

Fiske, J & Hartley, J. 1978. *Reading Television*. London: Methuen

Forde, F. 2012. *An inconvenient youth. Julius Malema and the 'new' ANC*. Portabello Africa

Friedman, S. 2004. South Africa's ten years of democracy, in *Electoral politics in South Africa: assessing the first democratic decade*. Edited by J Piombo and L Nijzink. Cape Town: HSRC Press. Pp3-22

Foucault, M. 1970. "Las Meninas." In *The Order of Things*. New York: Pantheon Books.

Fourie, PJ. 2007. *Media Studies: media history, media and society*. 2<sup>nd</sup> edition. Cape Town: Juta

Franks, S. 2010. The neglect of Africa and the power of aid, in *International communication gazette* 72(1): pp71-84

Freedom House. 2016. *Freedom of the Press, South Africa 2016*. [O]. Available: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2016/south-africa>  
Accessed 20 May 2016

Frere, MS. 2011. *Elections and the media in post-conflict Africa: votes and voices for peace?* New York: Zed Books.

Friedman, S. 2011. Whose freedom? South Africa's press, middle-class bias and the threat of control, in *Ecquid Novi: African Journalism Studies* 32(2): pp106-121

Friedman, S. 2013. Theory of born frees rests on many falsehoods. [O]. Available: <http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/columnists/2013/11/20/theory-of-born-frees-rests-on-many-falsehoods>  
Accessed 2 May 2014

Friedman, S. 2015. *Nothing ground-breaking in Mandela debate*. [O]. Available: <http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/columnists/2015/12/09/nothing-groundbreaking-in-mandela-debate>  
Accessed on 9 December 2015

- Galeano, E. 2001. *Upside Down*. New York: Metropolitan Books.
- Gans, HJ. 1979. *Deciding what's news: A study of CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, Newsweek and Time*. New York, NY: Vintage Books
- Geersema-Sligh, M. 2015. Framing of Jacob Zuma and polygamy in *Die Burger* 2008-2013, in *Comminucatio* 41(2): pp175-191
- Gevisser, M. 2007. *Thabo Mbeki. A dream deferred*. Jeppestown: Jonathan Ball
- Gianetti, L. 1990. *Understanding Movies*, 5th edition. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall
- Giliomee, H. 1994. The National Party's campaign for a liberation election, in *Election 94: the campaigns, results, and future prospects*. Edited by A Reynolds. Claremont: David Phillips
- Gitlin, T. 1980. *The whole world is watching. Mass media in the making and unmaking of the new left*. University of California Press.
- Glantz, M. 2016. Internet and elections, in *Praeger Handbook of Political Campaigning in the United States*. Edited by WL Benoit. Praeger Press.
- Glasser, SB. 2016. *Covering politics in a "post-truth" America*. Washington: The Brookings Institution Press
- Glasgow Media Group, 1976. *Bad News*. London: Routledge.
- Glasgow Media Group, 1980. *More bad news*. London: Routledge.
- Glasgow Media Group, 1982. *Really bad news*. London: Routledge.
- Golan, GJ. 2008. Where in the world is Africa? Predicting coverage of Africa by US television networks, in *The International Communication Gazette* 70(1): pp41-57
- Golding, P. 1977. Media professionalism in the Third World: the transfer of an ideology, in *Mass Communication and Society*. Edited by J Curran, M Gurevitch, & J Woollacott. London: Arnold
- Goldstein, J & Rotich, J. 2008. Digitally networked technology in Kenya's 2007-2008 post-election crisis, in *Internet and Democracy Case Study Series*. Berkman: Harvard
- Göttsche, D. 2013. *Remembering Africa: the rediscovery of colonialism in contemporary German literature*. Rochester, NY: Camden House.
- Gouws, A & De Beer, AS. 2008. Media and elections in South Africa: finding a foothold on the democratic path, in *The handbook of election news coverage around the world*. Edited by A Gouws and AS De Beer. New York: Routledge pp273-286
- Goval, R. 2016. *Foresight Africa 2016: divergence between international and local African media coverage*. [O]. Available: <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/africa-in-focus/posts/2016/01/14-divergence-international-local-african-media-goyal>  
Accessed 11 May 2016

- Grabe, ME. 1996. The South African Broadcasting Corporation's coverage of the 1987 and 1989 elections: the matter of visual bias, in *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media* 40 (2)
- Grabe, ME & Bucy, EP. *Image bite politics: news and the visual framing of elections*. Oxford University Press
- Graber, DA. 1971. Press coverage patterns of campaign news: the 1968 presidential race, in *Journalism Quarterly* 48:pp502-512
- Graber, DA. 1976. *Verbal behaviour and politics*. University of Illinois Press.
- Graber, DA. 1988. *Processing the news: how people tame the information tide*. 2<sup>nd</sup> edition. New York: Longman
- Graber, DA & Dunaway, J. 2015. *Mass media and American Politics*. 9<sup>th</sup> Ed. New York: Sage
- Graham, M. 2014. The ANC and the 'myth' of liberation solidarity: 'Othering' in post-apartheid South(ern) Africa, in *African Insight* 44(1): pp176-190
- Grinker, RR; Lubkemann, SC; & Steiner, CB. 2010. *Perspectives on Africa: a reader in culture history and representation*. 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell
- Grootes, S. 2013. *S.A. politics unspun*. Kenilworth: Two Dogs Mercury
- Grootes, S. 2014. *Say goodbye: the last of the post-1994 era elections*. [O]. Available: <http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2014-05-05-say-goodbye-the-last-of-the-post-1994-era-elections/>  
Accessed 7 May 2014
- Grootes, S & Essop, R. 2016. *MMA heads to ICASA over SABC's protest policy*. [O]. Available: <http://ewn.co.za/2016/06/01/Media-Monitoring-Africa-lodges-a-complaint-against-SABCs-protests-quota>  
Accessed 6 June 2016
- Guelke, A. 1996. Dissecting the South African miracle: African parallels, in *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 2(1): pp141-154
- Guest, R. 2005. *The Shackled Continent: Africa's past, present, and future*. London: Pan Macmillan
- Habib, A & Herzenberg, CS. 2011. Democratization & parliamentary opposition in contemporary SA: the 2009 national & provincial elections in perspective, in *Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies* 38(2): 191-210
- Hadland, A & Thorne, K. 2004. *The people's voice: the development and current state of the South African small media sector*. Cape Town: Human Sciences Research Council

- Hahn, K & Iyengar, S. Consumer demand for election news: the horserace sells. Presentation for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, August 30 2002. [O]. Available: <https://pcl.stanford.edu/common/docs/research/iyengar/2002/APSA2002.pdf> Accessed April 26<sup>th</sup> 2016
- Hall, ET. 1982. *The Hidden Dimension*. Toronto: Random House
- Hall, S. 1973 (1980). Encoding/Decoding. In: *Culture, Media, Language*. London: Hutchinson. 51-61.
- Hall, J. 2015. *What the global media missed with Burundi: Superficial coverage celebrates crisis and overlooks the bigger picture*. [O]. Available: <http://www.inonafrica.com/2015/10/21/what-the-global-media-missed-with-burundi-superficial-coverage-celebrates-crisis-and-overlooks-the-bigger-picture/> Accessed May 2nd 2016
- Hallin, DC. 1992. Sound bite news: television coverage of elections, 1968-1988, in *Journal of communication* Spring 1992 (42): pp5-24
- Hallin, DC. 2006. Sound bite news: television coverage of elections, 1968-1988, in *Journal of Communication* 42 (2): pp5-24
- Hallin, DC & Mancini, P. 2004. *Comparing media systems: three kinds of media and politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press
- Hamill, J. 2009. A (qualified) reaffirmation of ANC hegemony: Assessing South Africa's 2009 election, in *Politikon* 37(1): pp3-23
- Hamilton, G & Marè, G. 1994. The Inkatha Freedom Party, in *Election 94: the campaigns, results, and future prospects*. Edited by A Reynolds. Claremont: David Phillips
- Hanitzsch, T. 2009. Comparative journalism studies, in *The Handbook of Journalism Studies*. Edited by K Wahl-Jorgensen & T Hanitzsch. London: Routledge. pp413-427
- Harris, P. 2010. *Birth. The conspiracy to stop the '94 election*. Cape Town: Umuzi
- Harrison, D. 1987. *The White Tribe of Africa*. California Press
- Hartley, J. 1982. *Understanding News*. London: Methuen
- Hartley, J. 1992. *Tele-ology. Studies in television*. London: Routledge
- Hawk, BG. 2002. African politics and American reporting, in *Media and democracy in Africa*. Edited by G Hyden, M Leslie, & FF Ogundimu. NJ: Transaction: pp157-176
- Herman, E & Chomsky, N. 2008. *Manufacturing consent: the political economy of the mass media*. London: Random House.
- Herwitz, D. 2012. *Heritage, culture & politics*. New York: Columbia University

Heyn, HM. 2009. South Africa's smaller parties [UDM, ACDP, ID, FF+]: searching for a role and fighting for survival, in *Zunami*. Edited by R Southall. Auckland Park: Jacana. Pp162-179

*HIV and AIDS in South Africa*, 2017. [O]. Available:  
<https://www.avert.org/professionals/hiv-around-world/sub-saharan-africa/south-africa>  
Accessed 21 June 2017

Holmes, CE & Shoup, BD. 2013. Framing the democratic narrative: local and national voting patterns in South Africa, in *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 51(1): pp56-75

Holtz-Bacha, C. 2016. The Role of the Media in German Election Campaigns. Seminar presented for the CSSR, University of Cape Town. 8 March 2016.

Housholder, EE & LaMarre, HL. 2014. Facebook politics: toward a process model for archiving political source credibility for ethnic groups, in *Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media* 56(1): pp150-167

Hountondji, P. 1983. *African philosophy, myth, and reality*. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press

Hubbard, H. 2010. Stance and style: a corpus-driven perspective on television coverage of the 2009 South African general election, in *Language Matters* 41(1): pp3-24

Hungbo, J. 2011. Talking to the polls: Power, time, and the politics of representation in two South African radio talk shows, in *African Studies* 70(2): 437-454

Hunter-Gault, C. 2006. *New news out of Africa: uncovering Africa's renaissance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Husbands, A. 2004. *Timeline of apartheid*. [O]. Available:  
[http://web.stanford.edu/~jbaugh/saw/Ajani\\_Apartheid.html](http://web.stanford.edu/~jbaugh/saw/Ajani_Apartheid.html)  
Accessed 10 June 2016

Huntington, SP. 1996. *The Clash of Civilizations*. Simon & Schuster: New York, New York.

Hyden, G; Leslie, M; & Ogundimu, FF. 2003. *Media and democracy in Africa*. Transaction Publishers

*Inside the SABC blacklist report*, 2006. Mail and Guardian, 13 October 2006. [O]. Available:  
<https://mg.co.za/article/2006-10-13-inside-the-sabc-blacklist-report>  
Accessed 20 July 2017

Isaacs, L; Whittles, G; & Grootes, S. 2014. *Parliament drama: ANC calls opposition 'racist' and 'fascist'*. [O]. Available:  
<http://ewn.co.za/2014/11/14/Parliament-fiasco-ANC-labels-opposition-racists-and-fascists>  
Accessed 12 June 2016

Iyengar, S. 1991. *Is anyone responsible? How television frames political issues*. Chicago University Press



- Iyengar, S & McGrady, JA. 2007. *Media politics: a citizen's guide*. New York: WW Norton
- Jacobs, S & Calland, R [Eds]. 2002. *Thabo Mbeki's world*. Scottsville: University of Natal Press.
- Jacobs, S. 1999. The media and the elections, in *Election 99 South Africa. From Mandela to Mbeki*. Edited by A Reynolds. Cape Town: David Phillips: pp147-158
- Jacobs, S. 2003. How good is South African media for democracy? Mapping the South African public sphere after apartheid, in *Media, identity, and the public sphere in post-apartheid South Africa*. Edited by A Zegeye & RL Harris. Boston: Brill: pp41-64
- Jamieson, KH; Waldman, P; & Devitt, J. 1998. Mapping the discourse of the 1996 US presidential general election, in *Media, Culture and Society* 20(2): pp347-354
- Jeffery, A. 2009. *People's War: new light on the struggle for South Africa*. Jonathan Ball
- Jerven, M. 2014. *What do Nigeria's new GDP numbers really mean?* [O]. Available: <https://africacheck.org/2014/04/09/what-do-nigerias-new-gdp-numbers-reallymean/> Accessed 5 December 2015
- Jolobe, Z. 2009. The DA: Consolidating the official opposition, in *Zunami*. Edited by R Southall. Auckland Park: Jacana. Pp131-146
- Jolobe, Z. 2014. The Democratic Alliance's election campaign: 'Ayisafani'? in *Election 2014: the campaigns, results, & future prospects*. Edited by C Schulz-Herzenberg & R Southall. Auckland Park: Jacana. Pp57-71
- Jones, B. 2012. Of Sunsets, Savages and Soccer: Framing Africa during the final few days of the FIFA 2010 World Cup. MA Thesis. University of Cape Town. [O]. Available: <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/29057848.pdf> Accessed 29 May 2017
- Jones, B. 2014. Of sunsets, savages, and soccer: Framing Africa during the last days of the FIFA 2010 World Cup, in *African football, identity politics, and global media narratives*. Edited by T Chari & N Mphiripiri. Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Jones, B. 2016. Television news and the digital environment: a triadic multimodal approach for analysing moving image media, in *African Journalism Studies* 37(2): 116-137
- Joseph, B. 2009. Journalism education, in *The Handbook of Journalism Studies*. Edited by K Wahl-Jorgensen & T Hanitzsch. London: Routledge. pp42-58
- Just, M; Crigler, A; & Buhr, T. 1999. Voice, substance, and cynicism in presidential campaign media, in *Political Communication* 16: pp25-44
- Kale, E, Kannenberg, J & Ponder, E. 2014. *South Africa historical timeline*. [O]. Available: <http://sites.library.northwestern.edu/southafrica/timeline/> Accessed 10 June 2016
- Kaid, LL; McKinney, M; & Tedesco, JC. 2000. *Civic dialogue in the 1996 presidential campaign: candidate, media, and public voices*. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press



- Kalyango, Y. 2011. Critical discourse analysis of CNN International's coverage of Africa, in *Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media* 55(2): pp160-179
- Kasoma FP. 1995. The role of the independent media in Africa's change to democracy, in *Media, Culture & Society* 17(4): pp537–555.
- Keith, S. 2011. Shifting Circles: Reconceptualising Shoemaker & Reese Theory of a Hierarchy of Influences on media content for a newer media era. [O]. Available: <http://www.scripps.ohiou.edu/wjmcr/vol29/29.html>  
Accessed 22 October 2014.
- Kellner, D. 2016. *Media spectacle and the crisis of democracy: terrorism, war, and election battles*. New York: Routledge
- Kellow CL & Steeves HL. 1998. The role of radio in the Rwandan genocide, in *Journal of Communication* 48(3): pp107–128
- Kern, M. 1989. *30 second politics: political advertising in the eighties*. New York: Praeger
- Kharsany, AB., Frohlich, JA., Yende-Zuma, N., Mahlase, G., Samsunder, N., Dellar, R. C., & Karim, QA. 2015. Trends in HIV prevalence in pregnant women in rural South Africa. *Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndromes (1999)*, 70(3), 289–295
- Khor, L. 2010. Whose image of whose Africa? Problems of representation in Ryszard Kaucuski's 'The shadow of the sun', in *Facts, fiction, and African creative imaginations*. Edited by T Falola & F Ngom. New York: Routledge
- Khosa, M. 1999. Voting in action: focus group and workshop findings, in *Democracy South Africa. Evaluating the 1999 election*. Edited by Y Muthien. Cape Town: HSRC press
- Kiousis, S. 2006. Explicating media salience: a factor analysis of *New York Times* issue coverage during the 2000 US presidential election, in *Journal of Communication* 54(1): 71-87
- Klein, N. 2007. *Shock doctrine: the rise of disaster capitalism*. New York: Picador
- Klein, MW & Maccoby, N. 1954. Newspaper objectivity in the 1952 campaign, in *Journalism Quarterly* 31: pp285-296
- Kpaduwa, F. 2013. African politics and the mass media: evidence of the role of the media in elections, in *Media role in African changing electoral process: a political communication perspective*. Edited by CU Nwokefor & K Langmia. Plymouth: UPA. Pp 16-29
- Kress, G. & Van Leeuwen, T. 1998. Front pages: the critical analysis of newspaper layout, in *Approaches to media discourse*. Edited by A Bell and P Garrett. Blackwell: Oxford. Pp186-219
- Kress, G & Van Leeuwen, T. 2001. *Multimodal discourse: the modes and media of contemporary communication*. Oxford University Press

- Kress, G & Van Leeuwen, TL. 2005. *Reading images: the grammar of visual design*. London: Routledge.
- Krüger, F. 2014. *Good-news SABC is bad news*. [O]. Available: <http://www.journalism.co.za/blog/good-news-sabc-bad-news/>  
Accessed 1 May 2016
- Kunene, K. 2012. *An open letter to Zuma*. [O]. Available: <http://www.iol.co.za/the-star/kenny-kunenes-letter-to-zuma-1535280>  
Accessed 10 March 2017
- Kuper, A & Kuper, J. 2001. Serving the new democracy: must the media 'speak softly'? Learning from South Africa. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 13(4): 355-376
- Kushin, MJ & Yamamoto, M. 2010. Did social media really matter? College students' use of online media and political decision making in the 2008 election, in *Mass Communication and Society* 13(5): pp608-630
- Lamb, D. 1983. *The Africans*. Random House
- Lancaster, L. 2014. Getting to the bottom of what really drives public violence in South Africa. *Institute for Security Studies*. [O]. Available: <https://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/getting-to-the-bottom-of-what-really-drives-public-violence-in-south-africa>  
Accessed 10 June 2016
- Land, JE & Faure, M. Eds. 1996. *South Africa: designing political institutions*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
- Landsberg, C. 1994. Directing from the stalls? The international community and the South African negotiation forum, in *The small miracle: South Africa's negotiated settlement*. Edited by S Friedman and D Atkinson. Braamfontein: Ravan Press. Pp 290-291
- Lang, S. 2013. *Mandela's difficult political legacy: the challenges facing the new South Africa*. [O]. Available: <https://historyshadow.wordpress.com/2013/12/09/mandelas-difficult-political-legacy-the-challenges-facing-the-new-south-africa/>  
Accessed 20 November 2016
- Lauerbach, G. 2007. Presenting television election nights in Britain, the United States, and German, in *Political Discourse in the media: cross-cultural perspectives*. Edited by A Fetzer & GE Lauerbach. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Pp314-387
- Lawrence, R. G. (2000). Game-framing the issues: Tracking the strategy frame in public policy news. *Political Communication*, 17(2), 93-114.
- Leman-Langlois, S & Shearing, CD. 2013. Repairing the future: the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission at work, in *Crime, Truth, and Justice*. Edited by G Gilligan & J Pratt. Oxon: Routledge. Pp222-242
- Levitsky, S & Way, L. 2002. The rise of competitive authoritarianism, in *Journal of Democracy* 13(2): pp51-65

- Levitsky, S & Way, L. 2005. The dynamics of autocratic coercive capacity after the Cold War, in *Communist and post-communist studies* 39(3): pp387-410
- Lewis, J. & Cushion, S. 2009. The thirst to be first: an analysis of breaking news stories and their impact on the quality of 24-hour news coverage in the UK, in *Journalism Practice* 3(3): 304-318
- Lichter, SR; Noyes, RE; & Kaid, LL. 1999. No news or negative news: how the networks nixed the 96 campaign, in *The electronic election: perspectives on the 1996 campaign communication*. Edited by LL Kaid & DG Bystrom. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum
- Lodge, T. 1994. The ANC and its allies, in *Election 94: the campaigns, results, and future prospects*. Edited by A Reynolds. Claremont: David Phillips
- Lodge, T. 1999. The ANC, in *Election 99 South Africa. From Mandela to Mbeki*. Edited by A Reynolds. Cape Town: David Phillips: pg65-88
- Lodge, T. 2006. *Mandela: A Critical Life*. Oxford: Oxford University Press
- London, S. 1993. *How the media frames political issues*. [O]. Available: <http://www.scottlondon.com/reports/frames.html>  
Accessed 5 May 2016
- Louw, E. 2005. *The media and political process*. London: Sage
- Louw, PE. 2009. *Reporting foreign places, in Global journalism: topical issues and media systems*. Edited by AS De Beer & JC Merrill. London: Pearson Education: 153-164
- Louw, R. 2014. *The evolution of South African media over 20 years*. [O]. Available: <http://themediainline.co.za/2014/04/the-evolution-of-african-media-over-20-years-south-africa/>  
Accessed 20 May 2016
- Louw, E & Chitty, N. 2000. South Africa's miracle cure: a stage-managed TV spectacular? In *The global dynamics of news: studies in international news coverage and news agenda*. Edited by A Malek & AP Kavoori. Connecticut: Ablex. P285
- Machin, D & Mayr, A. 2012. *How to do critical discourse analysis*. London: Sage.
- Magubane, B. 2006. Resistance and Repression in the Bantustans, in *The road to democracy in South Africa volume 2 [1970-1980]*. Unisa Press. Pp749-805
- Mäkinen, M & Kuira, MW. 2008. Social media and postelection crisis in Kenya, in *International journal of press/politics* 13(3): pp328-335
- Malala, J. 2015. *We have now begun our descent. How to stop South Africa losing its way*. Cape Town: Jonathan Ball
- Malila, V. 2014. Tracing the ANC's criticism of South African media, in *RJR* 34 (August): pp13-15

- Makhanya, MA. 2008. Leaders must seek a new language that speaks of greatness. *Sunday Times*, 19 October: 18.
- Mandela, N. 1994. *Long Walk to Freedom Volume I: 1918–1962*. Little, Brown & Company
- Manzella, J. 2008. The Star's first draft: a news organisation revises the next narrative of race in post-apartheid South Africa, in *Culture and Organisation* 14(2): pp261-277
- Mantashe, G. 2015. *Early signs of counter-revolution identified – ANC NEC*. [O]. Available: <http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politics/early-signs-of-counterrevolution-identified--anc-n> Accessed 1 May 2017
- Mantler, G & Whiteman, D. 1995. Attention to candidates and issues in newspaper coverage of 1992 presidential campaign. *Newspaper Research Journal*, 16(3), 14–28
- Marais, H. 2011. *South Africa: Pushed to the limit. The political economy of change*. UCT Press
- Marè, G. 1999. The IFP, in *Election 99 South Africa. From Mandela to Mbeki*. Edited by A Reynolds. Cape Town: David Phillips: pg101-112
- Marinovich, G. 2012. Marikana's small koppie: 14 dead, 300 meters away from Wonderkop. Why? *Daily Maverick*, 8 September
- Marinovich, G. 2016. *Murder at small koppie. The real story of the Marikana massacre*. Penguin, South Africa
- Marschall, S. 2004. Commodifying heritage: post-apartheid monuments and cultural tourism in South Africa, in *Tourism and postcolonialism: contested discourses, identities, and representations*. Edited by C. M. Hall and H. Tucker. New York: Routledge: pp95-112
- Maserumule, MH. 2016. *What rising protests say about our attitudes towards local government*. [O]. Available: <http://www.timeslive.co.za/sundaytimes/opinion/2016/06/21/What-rising-protests-say-about-our-attitudes-towards-local-government?platform=hootsuite> Accessed 10 October 2016
- Mattes, R; Taylor, H & Africa, C. 1999. Public opinion and voter preferences 1994-9, in *Election 99 South Africa. From Mandela to Mbeki*. Edited by A Reynolds. Cape Town: David Phillips
- Mattes, R. 2005. Public opinion since 1994, in *Electoral politics in South Africa: assessing the first democratic decade*. Edited by J Piombo & L Nijzink. Cape Town: HSRC Press. Pp40-63
- Mattes, R. 2014. The 2014 election and South African democracy, in *Election 2014: the campaigns, results, & future prospects*. Edited by C Schulz-Herzenberg & R Southall. Auckland Park: Jacana. Pp169-187
- Maurer, M. 2010. *Agenda Setting*. Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos
- Mazzoleni, G., & Schulz, W. (1999). “Mediatization” of Politics: A Challenge for Democracy? In *Political Communication*, 16(3), 247–261.

- Mbembe, A. 2015. *On the postcolony*. Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California.
- McChesney, R. 2005. *The future of media: resistance and reform in the 21<sup>st</sup> century*. New York: Seven Stories Press
- McChesney, R. 2009. *The political economy of the media: enduring issues, emerging dilemmas*. New York: Monthly Review Press
- McCombs, ME. 2004. *Setting the agenda: the mass media and public opinion*. Cambridge, UK: Polity.
- McGreal, C. 1999. *The great persuader*. [O]. Available: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/may/29/southafrica>  
Accessed 10 May 2016
- McKeiser, E. 2014. *Could I vote DA? A voter's dilemma*. Bookstorm.
- McLuhan, M. 1964. *Understanding media*. New York: Signet Books.
- McNair, B. 2009. Journalism and democracy. In *Handbook of Journalism Studies*. K Wahl-Jorgensen & T Hanitzsch. London: Routledge pp237-249
- McNeil, J. 2012. *A history of official government HIV/AIDS policy in South Africa*. [O]. Available: <http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/history-official-government-hiv-aids-policy-south-africa>  
Accessed 10 December 2016
- McQuail, D. 1987. *Mass Communication Theory: An Introduction* (2nd ed.). London: Sage
- Melber, H. 2016. *How liberators turn into oppressors: a study of Southern African states*. [O]. Available: <https://theconversation.com/how-liberators-turn-into-oppressors-a-study-of-southern-african-states-57213>  
Accessed 12 June 2016
- Meredith, M. 2010. *Mandela: A Biography*. New York: Public Affairs
- Minnaar, A. 1994. Political violence in South Africa, in *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 6 (3) pp389-399
- Mkhatshwa, S. 2014. Post 2014 general elections: “Quo Vadis South Africa?”. [O]. Available: <http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/7f16a680440ae2ba898bbd866b9bf97e/Post-2014-General-Elections:-%E2%80%9CQuo-vadis,-South-Africa%E2%80%9D-20141805>  
Accessed 20 April 2015
- Mkhize, MC. 2015. Is South Africa's 20 years of democracy in crisis? Examining the impact of unrest incidents in local protests in the post-apartheid South Africa, in *African Security Review* 24(2): 190-206
- Mkhondo, R. 1993. *Reporting South Africa*. Claremont: Heinemann

- MMA. 1999. *So what's news in the elections? An analysis of media coverage of the 1999 elections*. [O]. Available: [http://www.mediamonitoringafrica.org/images/uploads/MMP\\_99\\_elections\\_Media\\_Report.pdf](http://www.mediamonitoringafrica.org/images/uploads/MMP_99_elections_Media_Report.pdf)  
Accessed 1 December 2015
- MMA. 2004. *Making their mark: coverage of the 2004 elections*. [O]. Available: [http://www.mediamonitoringafrica.org/images/uploads/E2004\\_Full\\_Report](http://www.mediamonitoringafrica.org/images/uploads/E2004_Full_Report)  
Accessed 1 December 2015
- MMA. 2009. *A win or a place, citizens come last*. [O]. Available: [http://www.mediamonitoringafrica.org/images/uploads/elections\\_report09.pdf](http://www.mediamonitoringafrica.org/images/uploads/elections_report09.pdf)  
Accessed 1 May 2016
- MMA. 2014. *Reporting elections: A good story to tell?* [O]. Available: [http://www.mediamonitoringafrica.org/images/uploads/Reporting\\_Elections\\_A\\_Good\\_Story\\_to\\_Tell.pdf](http://www.mediamonitoringafrica.org/images/uploads/Reporting_Elections_A_Good_Story_to_Tell.pdf)  
Accessed 1 May 2016
- Montgomery, M. 2007. *The discourse of broadcast news: a linguistic approach*. London: Routledge
- Moyo, B. 2010. Governing the public sphere: civil society regulation in Africa, in *(Dis)enabling the public sphere: civil society regulation in Africa Vol 1*. Edited by B Moyo. Midrand: Southern Africa Trust and TrustAfrica. Pp1-24
- Mullen, A. 2009. The propaganda model after 20 years: interview with Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, in *Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture* [O] available: <http://www.chomsky.info/interviews/200911--.html>  
Accessed 5 September 2015
- Munusamy, R. 2013a. *In the name of the Father: Jacob's law on politics and religion*. [O]. Available: <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2013-10-08-in-the-name-of-the-father-jacobs-law-on-politics-and-religion/#.WNqW9xIrJFQ>  
Accessed 10 March 2017
- Munusamy, R. 2013b. *The ANC's imagined and real enemies: 'creeping counter-revolution' vs. creeping scandals*. [O]. Available: <http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2013-01-21-the-ancs-imagined-and-real-enemies-creeping-counter-revolution-vs-creeping-scandals/#.V21d3SN95FQ>  
Accessed 12 June 2016
- Mutua, M. 2002. *Human Rights, a political and cultural critique*. University of Pennsylvania Press
- Myburgh, J. 2006. *How the ANC captured the SABC*. [O]. Available: <http://politicsweb.co.za/documents/how-the-anc-captured-the-sabc>  
Accessed 14 June 2017

- Myer, G; Klak, T; Koehl, T. 1996. The inscription of difference: news coverage of the conflicts in Rwanda and Bosnia, in *Political Geography* 15(1): 21-46
- Naidoo, P. 2015. Political reconfigurations in the wake of Marikana, in *New South African Review 5: Beyond Marikana*. Edited by GM Khadiagala, P Naidoo, D Pillay & R Southall. Wits University Press
- National vote turn out*. 2014. [O]. Available:  
<http://www.news24.com/Elections/Results#map=voter>  
 Accessed 1 June 2016
- Nay, O. 2013. Fragile and failed states: critical perspectives on conceptual hybrids, in *International Political Science Review* 0(0): pp1-16
- Neocosmos, M. 2010. From 'foreign natives' to 'native foreigners'. Explaining xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa, citizenship and nationalism, identity and politics. Dakar, CODESRIA, 2010. [O]. Available:  
<http://www.codesria.org/spip.php?article1415>  
 Accessed 18 June 2017
- Nevitt, L. 2010. *What's the deal with Toyi-Toyi?* [O]. Available:  
[http://www.capetownmagazine.com/whats-the-deal-with/Whats-the-Deal-With-Toyitoyi/125\\_22\\_17384](http://www.capetownmagazine.com/whats-the-deal-with/Whats-the-Deal-With-Toyitoyi/125_22_17384)  
 Accessed 20 July 2017
- Ndlela, N. 2005. The African Paradigm: The coverage of the Zimbabwean crisis in the Norwegian Media, in Westminster Papers in *Communication and Culture*. Special issue 2005: 71-90
- Nicholson, G. *South Africa: where 12 million live in extreme poverty*. [O]. Available:  
<https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2015-02-03-south-africa-where-12-million-live-in-extreme-poverty/#.WXaJgNMrfJQ>  
 Accessed 20 July 2017
- Nimmo, D & Combs, JE. 1992. *The political pundits*. New York: Praeger
- Norris, P. 1995. The restless searchlight: network news framing of the post-cold war world, in *Political Communication* 12(4): 357-370
- Norris, P [Ed]. 1997. Introduction, the rise of postmodern political communication, in *Politics and the press: the news media and their influences*. London: LPR: pp1-17
- Norris, P. 2002. The Bridging or Bonding Role of Online Communities, in *Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics* 7
- Norris, P & Mattes, R. 2003. Does Ethnicity Determine Support for the Governing Party? The Structural and Attitudinal Basis of Partisan Identification in 12 African Nations. KSG Working Paper Series No. RWP03-009. Available at SSRN:  
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=385209>



Nothias, T. 2012. Definition and scope of Afro-pessimism: mapping the concept and its usefulness for analysing news media coverage of Africa, in *African Studies Bulletin* 74 (December 2012): 54-62

Nyamnjoh, FM. 2005. *Africa's media, democracy, and politics of belonging*. Pretoria: UNISA

Nzimande, B. 2012. *Viewpoint: Blade Nzimande. Debate is no attack, and attack is no debate*. [O]. Available:

<http://www.anc.org.za/docs/anctoday/2015/at24.htm>

Accessed 10 May 2015

Ogden, CL. 1980. Development journalism/communication: the status of the concept. Working paper presented at the *Journalism Annual Convention*, Massachusetts. August 1980.

Onyebadi, U. 2008. Towards an examination and expansion of the agenda setting theory: did the media matter in Kenya's presidential election 2007? Unpublished PhD Thesis: University of Missouri. Available:

<https://mospace.umsystem.edu/xmlui/handle/10355/5559>

Accessed 10 May 2016

Onyebadi, U & Oyediji, T. 2011. Newspaper coverage of post political election violence in Africa: an assessment of the Kenyan example, in *Media, War, and Conflict* 4(3): pp215-230

Orgaret, KS. 2006. *Moments of nationhood: the SABC news in English – the first decade of democracy*. Oslo: Unipub

Padayachee, A & Desai, A. 2008. *Post-Apartheid South Africa and the crisis of expectation – DPRN Four*. [O]. Available: <http://rozenbergquarterly.com/post-apartheid-south-africa-and-the-crisis-of-expectation-dprn-four/> Accessed 20 January 2017

Paine, AA. 2014. Election 2014. SABC Digital News. 9 May 2014 [News broadcast]. Available:

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wf2yI75cd0s>

Accessed 9<sup>th</sup> August 2014

Patterson, TE. 1994. *Out of Order: an incisive and boldly original critique of the news media's domination of America's political process*. New York: First Vintage

Patterson, TE. 2000. (1993). *The United States: news in a free-market society. In democracy and the media. A comparative perspective*. (Richard Guthrie and Anthony Mughan, Ed.). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Peterson, DL. 1994. Debunking ten myths about democracy in Africa, in *The Washington Quarterly* 17(3): pp129-141

Piombo, J & Nijzink, L. 2005. *Electoral politics in South Africa: assessing the first democratic decade*. Cape Town: HSRC Press



Prinsloo, F. 2014. *Why Born Frees reject democracy*. [O]. Available: <http://www.news24.com/elections/mynews24/bornfrees-why-a-generation-is-rejecting-democracy-20140509>  
Accessed 6 June 2014

Prinsloo, M & Robins, S. 1996. Literacy, voter education and constructions of citizenship in the Western Cape during the first democratic national elections in South Africa, in *Social uses of literacy: theory and practice in contemporary South Africa*. Edited by M Prinsloo & M Breier. University of Cape Town: Sached Books

Prior, M. 2007. *Post-Broadcast democracy: how media choice increases inequality in political involvement and polarizes elections*. Cambridge University Press.

Pope, R. 1998. *The English Studies book. An introduction to language, literature, and culture*. London: Routledge

Posel, D. 2013. "Madiba magic": Politics as enchantment. *The Cambridge Companion to Nelson Mandela*. Edited by R Barnard. Cambridge University Press: pp70-91

*Rainbow stagnation: how corruption and bad policies are strangling South Africa*. Economist, 26 November 2016. [O]. Available: <http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21710824-business-and-government-are-pulling-opposite-directions-growth-how?zid=309&ah=80dcf288b8561b012f603b9fd9577f0e>  
Accessed 21 June 2017

Rassool, C & Witz, L. 1996. South Africa: a world in one country: moments in international tourist encounters with wildlife, the primitive and the modern, in *Cahiers d'Études Africaines* 36(143): pp335-371

Reed, J. 1990. *Grayed but unbowed, Mandela is freed*. UPI. 11 February 1990. [O]. Available: <http://www.upi.com/Archives/1990/02/11/Grayed-but-unbowed-Mandela-is-freed/1168634712400/> Accessed 20 January 2017

Reynolds, A (Ed). 1994. *Election 94: the campaigns, results, and future prospects*. Claremont: David Phillips

Reynolds, A (Ed). 1999. *Election 99 South Africa. From Mandela to Mbeki*. Cape Town: David Phillips

Richards, R & Zakwe, L. 2009. Youth uninspired by politics? In *Synopsis: Policy Studies bulletin of CPS*, Centre for Policy Studies 10(2): pp14-18. Available: [http://ggln.org.za/publications/reports-on-learning-exchanges/synopsis-june-2009.pdf/at\\_download/file](http://ggln.org.za/publications/reports-on-learning-exchanges/synopsis-june-2009.pdf/at_download/file).  
Accessed 20 March 2017

Reid, J. 2014. *Analysis: South African media on World Press Freedom Day 2014*. [O]. Available: <http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2014-04-24-analysis-south-african-media-on-world-press-freedom-day-2014/#.V0rvjyN95FQ>  
Accessed 20 May 2016

- Reta, MC. 2000. US media coverage of the 1994 elections in South Africa, in *International Communication Gazette* 62(6): pp523-536
- Roberts, B. 2009. *Age of hope or anxiety? Dynamics of the fear of crime in South Africa*, HSRC policy brief (March), Pretoria.
- Robins, S. 2008. Sexual politics and the Zuma Rape Trial, in *Journal of Southern African Studies* 34(2): 411-427
- Robinson, J. 2014. *The economic freedom fighters: birth of a giant?* in *Election 2014: the campaigns, results, & future prospects*. Edited by C Schulz-Herzenberg & R Southall. Auckland Park: Jacana.
- Robinson, MJ & Sheehan, MA. 1983. *Over the wire and on TV*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation
- Rose, JSP. 2014. The new racism in the media: a discourse analysis of newspaper commentary on race, presidential politics, and welfare reform. Thesis, Georgia State University. [O]. Available: [http://scholarworks.gsu.edu/sociology\\_theses/51](http://scholarworks.gsu.edu/sociology_theses/51)  
Accessed 5 May 2016
- Roper, C. 2013. *The day we broke Nkandla*. [O]. Available: <https://mg.co.za/article/2013-12-04-the-day-we-broke-nkandla>  
Accessed 1 August 2017
- Roussouw, M. 2009. *Zuma's R65m Nkandla splurge*. [O]. Available: <https://mg.co.za/article/2009-12-04-zumas-r65m-nkandla-splurge>  
Accessed 1 August 2017
- Rudestam, KE & Newton, RR. 2007. *Surviving your dissertation: a comprehensive guide to content and process* Third Edition. London: Sage
- Russell, A. 2009. *After Mandela: the battle for the soul of South Africa*. London: Hutchinson
- Russonello, JM & Wolf, F. 1979. Newspaper coverage of the 1976 and 1968 presidential campaign, in *Journalism Quarterly* 56: pp360-364
- Rykief, S. 2002. Does the Emperor really have no clothes? Thabo Mbeki and ideology, in *Thabo Mbeki's World*. Edited by S Jacobs and R Calland. Scottsville: University of Natal Press.
- Said, EW. 1978 (2001). *Orientalism*. Johannesburg: Penguin
- SA History Online. 2011. South Africa and the United Nations, 1946-1990. [O]. Available: <http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/united-nations-and-apartheid-timeline-1946-1994> Accessed on 21 September 2016
- SA History, 2011. *Jacob Gedleyihlekisa Zuma*. [O]. Available: <http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/jacob-gedleyihlekisa-zuma> Accessed 20 March 2017

- Saidykhan, M. 2011. "Avoid negative typecasting of Africa". [O]. Available: <http://www.afrol.com/articles/25622>  
Accessed 16 June 2015
- Sapa, 2014a. *Kasrils reckless and counter-revolutionary: ANC*. [O]. Available: <http://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2014/04/15/kasrils-reckless-and-counter-revolutionary-anc>  
Accessed 10 May 2016
- Sampson, A. 2011. *Mandela. The authorised biography*. London: Harper Press
- Sampson, A. 2013. *Mandela at 85*. [O]. Available: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/jul/06/nelsonmandela.southafrica>  
Accessed 10 December 2016
- Saul, J. 2002. Cry for the beloved country: the post-apartheid denouement, in *Thabo Mbeki's world*. Edited by S Jacobs and R Calland. University of Natal Press. Pp27-49
- Scheithauer, R. 2007. Metaphors in election night television coverage in Britain, the United States, and Germany, in *Political Discourse in the media: cross-cultural perspectives*. Edited by A Fetzer & GE Lauerbach. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Pp75-107
- Scheufele, DA. 1999. Framing as a theory of media effects, in *Journal of Communication* Winter 1999: 103-122
- Schieß, R. 2007. A visual analysis of election night TV programs across cultures, in *Political Discourse in the media: cross-cultural perspectives*. Edited by A Fetzer & GE Lauerbach. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Pp276-313
- Schneider, R. 2014. *Jesus, religion, and revolution in the South African elections*. [O]. Available: <http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2014/06/02/jesus-religion-and-revolution-in-the-south-african-elections/>  
Accessed 20 February 2017
- Schönteich, M & Boschoff, H. 2003 *'Volk', faith, and fatherland. The security threat posed by the white right*. South Africa: Institute for Security Studies
- Schraeder, PJ & Endless, B. 1998. The media and Africa: the portrayal of Africa in the New York Times (1955-1995), in *African Issues* 26(2):
- Schulz-Herzenberg C & R Southall. 2014. *Election 2014 South Africa: the campaigns, results, and future prospects*. Auckland Park: Jacana.
- Schulz-Herzenberg, C. 2005. The New National Party, in in *Electoral politics in South Africa: assessing the first democratic decade*. Edited by J Piombo and L Nijzink. Cape Town: HSRC Press. P166-186
- Schulz-Herzenberg, C. 2014a. Voter participation in the South African elections of 2014. ISS Policy Brief 61: August 2014. [O]. Available: [https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/PolBrief61\\_Aug14.pdf](https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/PolBrief61_Aug14.pdf)  
Accessed 20 February 2017

- Schulz-Herzenberg, C. 2014b. The 2014 national and provincial results, in *Election 2014. The campaigns, results, and future prospects*. Edited by C Schulz-Herzenberg & R Southall. Cape Town: Jacana. Pp 188-227
- Scollon, R. 2005. *Discourse and technology. Multimodal discourse analysis*. Georgetown University Press.
- Scott, D, Vawda, M, Swartz, S & Bhana, A. 2012. *Punching below their weight: young South Africans' recent voting patterns*. HSRC Review 10: 3. Pp 19-21. [O]. Available: <http://www.hsrc.ac.za/uploads/pageContent/2842/HSRC%20review%20Sept%20receipt%20voting%20patterns.pdf>  
Accessed 20 March 2017
- Search engines*. 2015. University of Bristol: Website. [O]. Available: Bristol: <http://www.bristol.ac.uk/library/support/findinginfo/search-engines/>  
Accessed on 11 October 2015
- Seedat, M. 2009. Violence and injuries in South Africa: prioritising an agenda for prevention, in *Lancet* 374 (9694): 1011 – 1022
- Seekings, J. 2001. Review: South Africa's 1999 elections, in *Journal of South African Studies* 27(1): pp163-166
- Semetko, HA; Blumler, JA; Gurevitch, M; & Weaver, DH. 2011. *The formation of campaign agendas: a comparative analysis of party and media roles in recent American and British Elections*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum
- Shaw, IS. 2009. Towards an African journalism model: a critical historical perspective, in *International Communication Gazette*, 71 (6): pp491-510
- Shezi, L. 2016. *Media watchdog files complaint against SABC violent protest ban*. [O]. Available: <https://www.htxt.co.za/2016/06/01/media-watchdog-lays-complaint-with-icasa-against-unlawful-sabc-ban-on-violent-protests/>  
Accessed 1 June 2016
- Shoemaker, PJ & Reese SD. 1996. *Mediating the message: theories of influence on mass media content*. 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition. NY: Longman.
- Shoemaker, PJ & Reese SD. 2014. *Mediating the message in the 21<sup>st</sup> century*. 3<sup>rd</sup> Ed. NY: Longman.
- Silke, D & Shirire, R. 1994. The mass media and the South African election, in *Election 94. The campaigns, results, and future prospects*. Edited by A Reynolds. Claremont: David Phillips: pp121-143
- Sisk, T. 1994. A US perspective of South Africa's 1994 election, in *Election 94. The campaigns, results, and future prospects*. Edited by A Reynolds. Claremont: David Phillips: pp144-158

Smith, D. 2012. Jacob Zuma risks removal over handling of Marikana mine killings. [O]. Available: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/aug/26/jacob-zuma-marikana-mine-killings>

Accessed 1 May 2017

Somerville, K. 2009. British media coverage of the post-election violence in Kenya, 2007-08, in *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 3(3): pp526-542

*South Africa – CIA Factbook*. [O]. Available:

<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sf.html>

Accessed 18 June 2017

*South African History Archive*, 2016. [O]. Available:

<http://www.saha.org.za/ecc25/index.htm>

Accessed on 21 September 2016

Southall, R & Daniel, J (eds). 2009. *Zunami! The 2009 South African elections*. Auckland Park: Jacana Media

Southall, R. 2014. The context of the South African election of 2014: Prologue to change? In *Election 2014: the campaigns, results, & future prospects*. Edited by C Schulz-Herzenberg & R Southall. Auckland Park: Jacana. Pp1-19

Sparks, C. 2009. South African media in transition, in *Journal of African Media Studies* 1(2): pp195-220

Spaull, N. 2013. *South Africa's education crisis: the quality of education in South Africa 1994-*

*2011*. Centre for Development and Enterprise. [O]. Available:

<http://www.section27.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Spaull-2013-CDE-report-South-Africas-Education-Crisis.pdf>

Accessed 2 May 2015

Spurr, D. 1994. *The rhetoric of empire*. Durham: Duke University Press.

StatsSA, 2002. *Earning and spending in South Africa: selected findings and comparisons from the income and expenditure surveys of October 1995 and October 2000*, Pretoria

StatsSA, 2008. *Income & Expenditures of households, 2005/2006*. Statistical release P0100, Pretoria

Stempel, GH & Windhauser, JW (1991). *The media in the 1984 and 1988 presidential campaigns*. New York: Greenwood Press

Strom, ML. 2007. Media and elections, in *Youth Vote South Africa* 12

Strömbäck 2008. Four phases of mediatisation, in *Press/Politics* 13(3) July 2008: pp228-246

Suttner, R. 2015. *Recovering democracy in South Africa*. Auckland Park: Jacana

- Suttner, R & Silke, D. 2014. *Reviewing South Africa's 20 years of democracy*. 7<sup>th</sup> May 2014. CNBC Africa. [News broadcast]. Available: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZgflnUm13E8> Accessed on 10<sup>th</sup> July 2014
- Teer-Tomaselli, R. 1993. The politics of discourse, and the discourse of politics: Images of violence and reform on the SABC's television news bulletins, July 1985-November 1986. PhD thesis, University of Natal, Durban.
- Temin, J & Smith, DA. 2002. Media matters: evaluating the role of the media in Ghana's 2000 elections, in *African Affairs* 101: pp585-605
- Terre'blanche, S. 2014. *Where will Zuma go with economic policy and the NDP?* [O]. Available: <http://www.theintelligencebulletin.co.za/articles/political-watch-1629.html> Accessed on 15 May 2014
- Tlakula, P. 2004. *Election Report: 2004 National and Provisional elections*. [O]. Available: <http://www.elections.org.za/content/Dynamic.aspx?id=1345&name=Elections&LeftMenuId=100&BreadCrumbId=220> Accessed 20 February 2017
- Tracey, L. 2016. Do you want my vote? Understanding the factors that influence voting among young South Africans. ISS Monograph 193. [O]. Available: <https://issafrica.org/research/monographs/do-you-want-my-vote-understanding-the-factors-that-influence-voting-among-young-south-africans> Accessed 20 February 2017
- Tomaselli, R; Tomaselli, K; & Muller, J. 1987. Narrating the crisis: hegemony and the South African press. Johannesburg: Richard Lyon
- Turkington, T. 1997. "Reporting a "miracle": How The New York Times The Times of London and The Star of Johannesburg covered South Africa's founding democratic election." *Theses, Dissertations, Professional Papers. Paper 5052*
- Vale, P & Maseko, S. 2002. Thabo Mbeki, South Africa and the idea of an African renaissance, in *Thabo Mbeki's World*. Edited by S Jacobs and R Calland. Scottsville: University of Natal Press. Pp.121-142.
- Van den Bosch, S. 2012. South Africa no longer the gateway to the continent. [O]. Available: <http://www.ipsnews.net/2012/03/south-africa-no-longer-the-gateway-to-the-continent/> Accessed 12 May 2016
- Van Dijk, T. 2009. News and ideology. In *Handbook of Journalism Studies*. Edited by K Wahl-Jorgensen & T Hanitzsch. London: Routledge
- Van Heeden, M. 2008. Internal media regulation in South Africa, in *Media studies 2: media content and media audiences*. Edited by PJ Fourie. Lansdowne: Juta: 72-114.



- Van Zyl, G. 2016. *Data prices: how SA compares to the rest of the world*. [O]. Available: <http://www.fin24.com/Tech/Multimedia/data-prices-how-sa-compares-to-the-rest-of-the-world-20160930>  
Accessed 25 May 2017
- Van Zyl Slabbert, F. 1999. South Africa under Thabo Mbeki – the challenge of democratic stability, in *Thabo Mbeki's World*. Edited by S Jacobs and R Calland. University of Natal Press. Pp210-213
- Versfeld, J., Kruger, T. & Smith, G. 1996. *Walking on sunshine*. Stellenbosch Journalism Insight. [O] Available: <http://academic.sun.ac.za/journalism/sji/1996/sunshine.htm>  
Accessed 10 May 2014
- Vicente, PN. 2013. Foreign correspondence from Sub-Saharan Africa: an evolving communicational paradigm shift, in *index.comunicacion* 3(2): 13-35
- Voltmer, K. 2010. The media, government accountability, and citizen engagement, in *Public Sentinel: news media and governance reform*. Edited by P Norris. Washington DC: The World Bank Press pp137-159
- Waisbord, S. 2009. Advocacy journalism in a global context, in *The Handbook of Journalism Studies*. Edited by K Wahl-Jorgensen & T Hanitzsch. London: Routledge. pp371-385
- Waldahl, R. 2005a. Mediated political cleavages: Zimbabwe's 2000 election seen through the media, in *Critical arts: South-North cultural and media studies* 19(1-2): pp61-73
- Waldahl, R. 2005b. Political Journalism the Zimbabwean Way: Experiences from the 2000 Election Campaign, in *Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture* 2: pp18–32
- Wasserman, H & Rao, S. 2008. The glocalization of journalism ethics, in *Journalism: Theory, practice, criticism* 9(2): pp163-181
- Walton, M. 2013. Pavement Internet: Mobile media economies and ecologies for young people in South Africa, in *The Routledge Companion to Mobile Media*. Edited by G. Goggin and L. Hjorth. London: Routledge
- Wanta, W & Ghanem, S. 2007. Effects of agenda-setting, in *Mass Media Effects Research: Advances through meta-analysis*. Edited by RW Preiss, BM Gayle, N Burrell, M Allen, & J Byran. Pp 37-51. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum
- Ward, SJA. 2009. Journalism ethics, in *The Handbook of Journalism Studies*. Edited by K Wahl-Jorgensen & T Hanitzsch. London: Routledge. pp295-309
- Wasserman, H. 2003. Post-apartheid media debates and the discourse of identity, in *Ecquid Novi* 24(2): pp218-224
- Wasserman, H. 2010. Freedom's just another word? Perspectives on media freedom and responsibility in South Africa and Namibia, in *International Communication Gazette* 72(7): pp567-588

- Wasserman, H. 2013. Media ethics in a new democracy: SA perspectives on freedom, dignity, and citizenship, in *Global Media Ethics: Problems and Perspectives*. Edited by SJA Ward. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Wasserman, H. 2014. *Youth, conflict, governance, and the media: a South African perspective*. [O]. Available: <http://hermanwasserman.wordpress.com/2014/03/14/youth-conflict-governance-and-the-media-south-african-perspectives/> Accessed 16 May 2014
- Wasserman, H; Bosch, T; Chuma, W. 2016. *The voices from the poor are missing from South Africa's media*. [O]. Available: <https://theconversation.com/voices-of-the-poor-are-missing-from-south-africas-media-53068> Accessed 16 October 2016
- Wasserman, H & De Beer, A. 2009. Afro-optimism/Afro-pessimism and the South African media, in *Critical Arts* 23(3): pp377-395
- Wasserman, H & Rao, S. 2008. The glocalization of journalism ethics, in *Journalism: Theory, practice, criticism* 9(2): pp163-181
- Weaver, DH. 1998. *The global journalist: news people around the world*. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton
- Welsh, D. 1999. The DP, in *Election 99 South Africa. From Mandela to Mbeki*. Edited by A Reynolds. Cape Town: David Phillips
- West, HG. 2008, "Govern Yourself!" Democracy and Carnage in Northern Mozambique, in *Democracy: Anthropological Approaches*. Edited by J Paley. Santa Fe: School of Advanced Research Press: pp97-121
- Wiarda, H. 2014. *Dispatches from the frontlines: studies in foreign policy, comparative politics, and international affairs*. University Press of America
- Willems, W. 2005. Remnants of Empire? British media reporting on Zimbabwe, in *Westminster papers in communication and culture* Special Issue November 2005: pp91-108
- Windrich, E. 1994. Media coverage of the Angolan elections, in *A Journal of Opinion* 1(22): pp19-23
- Wodak, R. 2011. Critical Discourse Analysis, in *The continuum companion to discourse analysis*. Edited by K Hyland and B Paltridge. London: Continuum Books.
- Woo, J. 1996. Television news discourse in political transition: framing the 1987 and 1992 Korean presidential elections, in *Political Communication* 13: pp68-80
- WSJ, 2017. *About*. [O]. Available: <http://www.wsj.com/public/page/designtech-wsjLiveModule.html> Accessed 26 April 2017
- Zegeye, A & Harris, RL. 2003. *Media, identity, and the public sphere in post-apartheid South Africa*. Boston: Brill



Zeldes, GA; Fico, F; Carpenter, S; & Diddi, A. 2008. Partisan balance and bias in network coverage of the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections, in *Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media* 52(4): 563-580

Zellizer, B. 1990. Where is the author in American TV news? On the construction and presentation of proximity, authorship, and journalistic authority, in *Semiotica*. 80 [1-2] pp: 37-48

Zille, H. 2016. *Not without a fight: the autobiography*. Penguin South Africa

## BROADCASTS<sup>93</sup>

### Broadcasts 1994

1. *Bernard Shaw and Mike Hanna discuss election*, 1994. [News broadcast]. CNN: Bernard Shaw, Mike Hanna
2. *Bloody Sunday at High Noon*, 1994. [News broadcast]. CNN: Peter Arnett, Mark Watts
3. *Earth Matters*, 1994. [News broadcast]. CNN: David Mattingly, Sharon Collins, Joe Oliver
4. *Electing the Future spot*, 1994. [News broadcast]. CNN: Unknown reporter
5. *Election 94*, 1994. [News broadcast]. SABC TV 1: Tim Modise, Penny Smythe
6. *Evening news*, 1994. [News broadcast]. CBS: Bill Whitaker
7. *Flag lowering ceremonies*, 1994. [News broadcast]. SABC TV 1: Tim Modise, Penny Smythe, unknown reporter
8. *Flag making*, 1994. [News broadcast]. SABC TV 1: Unknown reporter
9. *Freedom Front and IFP have common ideals*, 1994. [News broadcast]. CBS: Dan Rather, Connie Chung
10. *Mandela alleges election sabotage*, 1994. [News broadcast]. ITN: Mark Austin
11. *Mugabe reassures white South Africans*, 1994. [News broadcast]. CBS: Dan Rather, Connie Chung
12. *Profile of a Zulu nation*, 1994. [News broadcast]. CNN: Brett Sadler
13. *Sky News report on South Africa*, 1994. [News broadcast]. Sky: Sarah Crowe
14. *Sky News Sunrise*, 1994. [News broadcast]. Sky: Sarah Crowe
15. *South Africa – election voting*, 1994. [News broadcast]. ITN: Mark Austin
16. *South Africa election bomb*, 1994. [News broadcast]. ITN: Mark Austin
17. *South Africa elections*, 1994. [News broadcast]. ITN: Michael Nicholson
18. *South Africa voter education*, 1994. [News broadcast]. ITN: Judy Aslett
19. *South Africa's first free elections*, 1994. [News broadcast]. ABC: Jim Laurie
20. *South Africa's youngest voters* 1994. [News broadcast]. CNN: James Maites
21. *The Big Story*, 1994. [News broadcast]. CNN: Brett Sadler, Peter Arnett, Mike Hanna
22. *UK South African voters*, 1994. [News broadcast]. AP: Unknown reporter
23. *Vote, the beloved country*, 1994. [News broadcast] AP: Unknown reporter
24. *World Service South Africa report*, 1994. [News broadcast]. BBC: Fiona Werge

### Broadcasts 1999

25. *Elites voting*, 1999. [News broadcast]. SABC: Kgomotso Sebetso, Ed Herbst, Shannon Neill, Jinty Jackson

---

<sup>93</sup> All broadcasts are available digitally upon request, and were donated to the Centre for Film and Media Studies at the University of Cape Town in April 2018.

26. *Journalist recap*, 1999. [News broadcast]. SABC: Various
27. *Mbekis in the Eastern Cape*, 1999. [News broadcast]. eTV: Denis Motsane
28. *Nelson Mandela voting*, 1999. [News broadcast]. SABC: Unknown reporter
29. *Polling day 1*, 1999. [News broadcast]. ITN: Tim Ewart
30. *Polling day 2*, 1999. [News broadcast]. ITN: Tim Ewart
31. *Sowetan youth*, 1999. [News broadcast]. SABC: Linda van Tilburg
32. *WC coloured community*, 1999. [News broadcast]. SABC: Faizel Cook
33. *Western Cape voters*, 1999. [News broadcast]. eTV: Isha Ismail

#### Broadcasts 2004

34. *Campaign trail*, 2004. [News broadcast]. 10 April 2004. SABC: Denzyl Janneker
35. *DA/IFP campaigning*, 2004. [News broadcast]. 12 April 2004. SABC: Unknown reporter
36. *Election 2004*, 2004. [News broadcast]. 14 April 2004. eTV: Debora Patta, Hope Mokgatle, Natasha Landman, Akash Bramdeo
37. *Election 2004 2*, 2004. [News broadcast]. 14 April 2004. eTV: Debora Patta, Romy Titus
38. *ID Books*, 2004. [News broadcast]. 10 April 2004. SABC: Mahendra Raghnuath
39. *IEC preparation and election briefs*, 2004. [News broadcast]. 12 April 2004. SABC: Altaaf Khazi
40. *IEC special votes*, 2004. [News broadcast]. 12 April 2004 SABC: Clayson Monyela
41. *Mbeki visits the Rand Show*, 2004. [News broadcast]. 12 April 2004. SABC: Unknown reporter
42. *Police*, 2004. [News broadcast]. 10 April 2004. SABC: Preshane Pillay
43. *Small party campaigns*, 2004. [News broadcast]. 12 April 2004. SABC: Joanne Joseph, unknown
44. *South Africa preview*, 2004. [News broadcast]. 10 April 2004. AP: Unknown reporter

#### Broadcasts 2009

45. *AmandlaTV South African election: housing*, 2009. [News broadcast]. AmandlaTV: boeijong, Nadine Cloete
46. *AmandlaTV South African election: unemployment*, 2009. [News broadcast]. AmandlaTV: boeijong, Nadine Cloete
47. *ANC awaits South African election result*, 2009. [News broadcast]. Sky News: Emma Hurd
48. *ANC leader cleared on corruption charges*, 2009. [News broadcast]. NTDTV: Unknown reporter
49. *ANC's Jacob Zuma divides South Africa*, 2009. [News broadcast]. Sky News: Emma Hurd
50. *Challenges await South Africa's future leader*, 2009. [News broadcast]. AFP: Unknown reporter
51. *DA and ANC in the Western Cape*, 2009. [News broadcast]. SABC: Unknown reporter
52. *Effects of apartheid linger in South Africa*, 2009. [News broadcast]. AJE: Mike Hanna
53. *Election day in South Africa*, 2009. [News broadcast]. AfricaNews: Lirandzu Themba
54. *Election oddballs*, 2009. [News broadcast]. CNN: Robyn Curnow
55. *Election promises for South Africa*, 2009. [News broadcast]. BBC: Mpho Lakaje
56. *Final election rallies*, 2009. [News broadcast]. BBC: Peter Biles
57. *First time voters give their views*, 2009. [News broadcast]. BBC: Mpho Lakaje
58. *Grassy Park*, 2009. [News broadcast]. BBC: Andrew Harding

59. *Growing anger as South Africa goes to the polls*, 2009. [News broadcast]. Sky News: Emma Hurd
60. *Huge turnout in South Africa election*, 2009. [News broadcast]. BBC: John Simpson
61. *Inside Africa: South African election*, 2009. [News broadcast]. CNN: Isha Sesay, Nkepile Mabuse
62. *Inside South Africa: South African youth vote*, 2009. [News broadcast]. CNN: Nkepile Mabuse
63. *Insight South Africa*, 2009. [News broadcast]. CCTV: Unknown
64. *Is COPE an alternative to the ANC?* 2009. [News broadcast]. AfricaNews: Lirandzu Themba
65. *Leaders Voting*, 2009. [News broadcast]. eTV: Deborah Patta
66. *Long lines of voters*, 2009. [News broadcast]. AFP: Unknown reporter
67. *Mandela voting short*, 2009. [News broadcast]. SABC: Unknown reporter
68. *OB Khutsong, Mitchell's Plain*, 2009. [News broadcast]. SABC: Unknown reporter
69. *OB Middleberg, Limpopo, Bloemfontein*, 2009. [News broadcast]. SABC: Unknown reporter
70. *Over 23mil people eligible to vote*, 2009. [News broadcast]. F24: Hayde Fitzpatrick
71. *Results from Wednesday's poll*, 2009. [News broadcast]. AFP: Unknown reporter
72. *Small parties*, 2009. [News broadcast]. SABC: Unknown reporter
73. *South Africa gets ready to vote*, 2009. [News broadcast]. BBC: Andrew Harding
74. *South Africa prepares to vote*, 2009. [News broadcast]. NTV: Unknown reporter
75. *South Africa today*, 2009. [News broadcast]. CNN: Isha Sesay, Nkepile Mabuse, Robyn Curnow
76. *South Africa's cyber election*, 2009. [News broadcast]. CNN: Isha Sesay
77. *South Africa's future*, 2009. [News broadcast]. CNN: Max Foster
78. *South Africa's parliament selects new president*, 2009. [News broadcast]. VOA: Unknown reporter
79. *South African coloureds*, 2009. [News broadcast]. NZ3: Mike McRoberts
80. *South African election: ANC under fire*, 2009. [News broadcast]. CNN: Nkepile Mabuse
81. *South African election day*, 2009. [News broadcast]. CBC: David McGuffin
82. *South African election reporter diary*, 2009. [News broadcast]. AJE: Jane Dutton
83. *South African elections*, 2009. [News broadcast]. AJE: Jane Dutton
84. *Student news*, 2009. [News broadcast]. CNN: Robyn Curnow
85. *The main candidates*, 2009. [News broadcast]. F24: Unknown reporter
86. *Voting day*, 2009. [News broadcast]. eTV: Deborah Patta
87. *Voting starts*, 2009. [News broadcast]. SABC: Unknown reporter
88. *Young people in South Africa have no memory of apartheid*, 2009. [News broadcast]. AFP: Unknown reporter
89. *Youth Vote*, 2009. [News broadcast]. SABC: Ismarie Prinsloo
90. *Zuma's ANC closing in on election victory*, 2009. [News broadcast]. Sky News: Emma Hurd

#### Broadcasts 2014

91. *AbaThembu King*, 2014. [News broadcast]. eNCA: Sandy McCowen
92. *Bekkersdal*, 2014. [News broadcast]. SABC 2: Mahendra Raghnuath
93. *Boulton and Co Khadija interview spot*, 2014. [News broadcast]. Sky News: Khadija Patel
94. *Cookhouse*, 2014. [News broadcast]. SABC 3: Lerato Thipa
95. *Counting underway in South Africa's general election*, 2014. [News broadcast]. EuroNews: Unknown reporter
96. *Elections 2014 ballot papers*, 2014. [News broadcast]. eNCA: Unknown reporter
97. *Elections 2014*, 2014. [News broadcast]. SABC 3: Bulelani Philip

98. *eNCA 6am*, 2014. [News broadcast]. eNCA: Thabang Masanabo
99. *Fewer instances of community violence at voting stations*, 2014. [News broadcast]. eNCA: Unknown reporter
100. *First South African vote since Mandela died*, 2014. [News broadcast]. CNN: Robyn Curnow
101. *Focus on Africa* NROC, 2014. [News broadcast]. BBC: Nomsa Masego
102. *GMT with George Alagiah*, 2014. [News broadcast]. BBC: Zeinab Badawi
103. *Heavy security presence in Sterkspruit*, 2014. [News broadcast]. eNCA: Sibongile Mkani-Mpolweni
104. *History and de Doorns*, 2014. [News broadcast]. AJE: Haru Mutasa, Tania Page
105. *Khayelitsba*, 2014. [News broadcast]. SABC 2: Bulelani Philip
106. *Limpopo loyal ground of ruling ANC*, 2014. [News broadcast]. eNCA: Zikhona Tshona
107. *Millions head to polls in South Africa*, 2014. [News broadcast]. CNN: Robyn Curnow
108. *Moeletsi Mbeki interview spot*, 2014. [News broadcast]. Sky News: Moeletsi Mbeki
109. *Morning news highlights*, 2014. [News broadcast]. eNCA: Arabile Gumede, Malungelo Booii
110. *News night 3*, 2014. [News broadcast]. eNCA: Thabang Masanabo
111. *NewsCentre South Africa spot*, 2014. [News broadcast]. CNN: Robyn Curnow
112. *OB 1*, 2014. [News broadcast]. AJE: Tania Page
113. *OB2*, 2014. [News broadcast]. AJE: Haru Mutasa
114. *OB3*, 2014. [News broadcast]. AJE: Haru Mutasa, Tania Page
115. *Opposition parties eye out troubled North West*, 2014. [News broadcast]. eNCA: Phakamile Hlubi
116. *Polls indicate ANC leads*, 2014. [News broadcast]. VOA: Paul Cisco
117. *Ruling SA party wins its fifth successive election*, 2014. [News broadcast]. CCTV: Guy Hendersen
118. *SA celebrates Freedom Day*, 2014. [News broadcast]. CCTV: Guy Hendersen
119. *SA Elections*, 2014. [News broadcast]. VOA: Emily Jaab
120. *SA elections protest vote*, 2014. [News broadcast]. VOA: Emily Jaab
121. *SA heads to the polls in first born free election*, 2014. [News broadcast]. F24: Ayesha Ismail, Caroline Dumay, Stefan Carstens
122. *SA parties step up hunts for votes*, 2014. [News broadcast]. CCTV: Guy Hendersen
123. *SA police arrest 59*, 2014. [News broadcast]. Reuters: Unknown reporter
124. *SA poverty 20 years later*, 2014. [News broadcast]. CCTV: Rachelle Akuffo
125. *SA rally ends in violence*, 2014. [News broadcast]. AJE: Tania Page
126. *SA ruling party ANC takes commanding lead early on*, 2014. [News broadcast]. CCTV: Guy Hendersen
127. *SA ruling party wins elections*, 2014. [News broadcast]. PressTV: Haseen Seria
128. *SA votes in Born Free election*, 2014. [News broadcast]. Reuters: Unknown reporter
129. *SA votes in national elections*, 2014. [News broadcast]. WSJ: Devon Maylie
130. *SABC 3 Prime Time 1*, 2014. [News broadcast]. SABC 3: Unknown reporter
131. *SABC 3 Prime Time 2*, 2014. [News broadcast]. SABC 3: Unknown reporter
132. *Security tight ahead of South African poll*, 2014. [News broadcast]. BBC: Nomsa Masego
133. *South Africa elections promo*, 2014. [News broadcast]. AJE: Unknown reporter
134. *South Africa heads to the polls*, 2014. [News broadcast]. AJE: Haru Mutasa
135. *South Africa in post-Nelson Mandela election*, 2014. [News broadcast]. BBC: Milton Nkosi
136. *South Africa votes – ANC favoured to win*, 2014. [News broadcast]. CBC: Margaret Evans

137. *South Africa votes*, 2014. [News broadcast]. EWN: Reinhart Turien
138. *South Africa's ANC braces for toughest election*, 2014. [News broadcast]. AJE: Haru Mutasa
139. *South Africa's economic challenges*, 2014. [News broadcast]. BBC: Adrienne Murray
140. *South Africa's first post-Nelson Mandela election*, 2014. [News broadcast]. EuroNews: Unknown reporter
141. *South Africa's Jacob Zuma wins landslide victory*, 2014. [News broadcast]. AJE: Haru Mutasa
142. *South Africa's opposition taps into discontent*, 2014. [News broadcast]. AJE: Haru Mutasa
143. *South African police arrest 60*, 2014. [News broadcast]. PressTV: Unknown reporter
144. *South Africans turned out in their droves to cast a vote*, 2014. [News broadcast]. eNCA: Phakamile Hlubi
145. *South Africans vote in general election*, 2014. [News broadcast]. AJE: Haru Mutasa
146. *South Africans wait in hour long queues*, 2014. [News broadcast]. ABC: Matt Gutman
147. *Sunrise Khadija interview spot*. 2014. [News broadcast]. Sky News: Khadija Patel
148. *Sunrise SA election*, 2014. [News broadcast]. Sky News: Unknown reporter
149. *Sunrise SA elections 2014*, 2014. [News broadcast]. Sky News: Julie Hyde Mew
150. *Western Cape residents reminisce about 1994 democracy*, 2014. [News broadcast]. CCTV: Rene Del Carme
151. *What issues face the ANC after South African elections*, 2014. [News broadcast]. BBC. Andrew Harding
152. *World News Today with Zeinab Badawi*, 2014. [News broadcast]. BBC: Zeinab Badawi, Andrew Harding
153. *World News Today*, 2014. [News broadcast]. BBC: Zeinab Badawi

# Appendix 1: channels

## NORTH AMERICA

**CNN:** An international 24-hour rolling news channel based in New York City, CNN has bureaux across the world including Atlanta, America; London, UK; Mumbai, India; and Hong Kong. Launched in 1985, it is owned by the Turner Broadcasting System, a division of Time Warner.

**CBS:** The initialism of the Columbia Broadcasting System, CBS is an American commercial television network broadcast from New York and Los Angeles. It was launched in 1941 and is owned by Viacom.

**ABC:** The initialism of the American Broadcasting Company, ABC was launched in 1943. It owned by Disney-ABC Television Group, a division of the Walt Disney Company, and broadcasts out of New York City and Los Angeles.

**AP:** The Associated Press is a respected American non-profit newswire headquartered in New York City. It is a co-operative and unincorporated group and staff journalists who are also union members write all material. It has 243 bureaux in 120 countries. It employs the inverted pyramid method of journalism in its stories to enable various news agencies to tailor the stories. AP is the US' primary news service and was formed in 1846.

**VOA:** The Voice of America is a government-funded American multimedia news source and international public broadcaster. It was launched in 1942 and is broadcast out of Washington, D.C.

**CBC:** The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation is a state-owned Canadian Federal Crown Corporation and public broadcaster. It is broadcast out of Ottawa and was launched in 1952. CBC operates autonomously from the Canadian government and is funded through advertising.

**WSJ:** The online version of the Wall Street Journal newspaper was launched in 2011 and completes its paper-based news with short broadcasts in a television news format. It is based in New York City and is owned by Dow Jones of NewsCorp.

## EUROPE

**BBC:** BBC World News is a 24-hour rolling news channel from London, UK, launched in 1995 and broadcast online in 2007. Global News Ltd, a commercial group of companies, owns it. BBC World News is funded through advertising and not the British Broadcasting Corporation or the government. It has 41 bureaux across the globe. BBC World News is not carried in the UK because of licencing laws, but the news broadcasts are identical on both the UK and international versions.

**SKY NEWS:** The 24-hour international rolling news channel Sky News was launched in 1989 and is owned by SkyPLC, a division of Fox Networks Group. It has 12 bureaux in 10 countries and has a British-based focus for news.

**ITN:** Independent Television News is a British-based newswire with bureaux in Brussels, Jerusalem, Johannesburg, New York, Paris, Sydney, and Washington, D.C. It was launched in 1955 and affected by the British change in ownership laws in the 1990s, which pushed broadcasters towards acquiring funding from advertising. ITN Source is the archive of all ITN broadcasts and also hosts Fox News, Reuters, and ITV.

**EURONEWS:** The pan-European and international news network is based in France and was launched in 1993. NBC-Universal and Media Globe Networks own it. It has bureaux in 9 cities.

**F24:** France24 is a 24-hour international news and current affairs channel based in Paris, France. It was launched in 2006 and is owned by France Médias Monde, a government-owned group. It is available via satellite and cable but increasingly online. It has 260 journalists in various bureaux but mostly centred in France.

**REUTERS:** The international newswire is based in London and has headquarters in New York City too. It is a division of Thompson Reuters and was launched in 1851. Almost every major news outlet subscribed to Reuters in 2014, and the newswire has 2500 journalists and 600 photojournalists in over 200 locations worldwide. Journalists for Reuters use the “Reuters Handbook” which ascribes consistency across the stories produced.

**AFP:** The Agence France-Presse is the third largest newswire after AP and Reuters. It was founded in 1944 and has 150 bureaux and offices worldwide. It is government-chartered but is a commercial business independent of the French government.

## AFRICA

**SABC:** The South African Broadcasting Corporation is a South African-based public service and commercial broadcasting company that provides television and radio news. It was launched in 1976 and is funded through government grants and advertising. The government of South Africa owns the SABC.

**eTV/eNCA:** eTV is free-to-air an entertainment and news channel broadcast out of Johannesburg and Cape Town, and launched in 1998. Since 2013 the channel has streamed content online. eNCA is South Africa’s flagship 24-hour rolling news channel, launched in 2008 as eNews and managed by black economic empowerment company HCI Holdings. Since 2013 eNCA has archived news reports online, especially on YouTube.

**NTV:** Nation Television is broadcast out of Kenya and is an entertainment and current affairs channel. It is owned by Nation Media Group and has broadcast on YouTube since 2007.

**EWN:** Eye Witness News is a South African-based multiplatform news publisher and owned by Primedia Broadcasting. It has streamed online since 2008.

**AFRICANEWS:** The first incarnation of the new-look AfricaNews channel launched in 2013. The pan-African channel is broadcast out of the Congo and is a subsidiary of EuroNews. Its tagline in 2009 was “The largest network of African reporters”.

**AMANDLATV:** Broadcast briefly in 2009 by the left wing South African media project Amandla, the AmandlaTV broadcasts are available on YouTube. Amandla was initiated in 2006/7 by leftist activists.

## ASIA AND MIDDLE EAST

**AJE:** Al Jazeera English is the Westernised version of the Arabic station and is Qatari state owned. The English channel is broadcast mainly from Doha, Qatar, but has over 60 bureaux in major cities all over the world, including London and Washington DC.

**CCTV:** The China Central Television, now known as China Global Television Network since 2016, is broadcast out of Beijing, China and is state-owned. It has 24 bureaux worldwide.

**NZ3:** New Zealand TV 3 is a regional television station from New Zealand.

**PRESS TV:** The rolling news channel is Tehran-based but also has offices in London, Beirut, Damascus, Kabul, and the Gaza Strip. It is affiliated to the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting but is independent. It was launched in 2007.